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Background: External oversight institutions were introduced to the English National Health 
Service (NHS) in an attempt to encourage quality improvements and avoid failures of care. 
Despite the breadth of literature exploring the theoretical relationship between improvement 
of quality of care and external oversight, robust empirical evidence does not yet exist to 
support this premise. In this thesis, the effect and costs of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
external inspections of acute hospitals on quality of care are explored. The aim is to determine 
to what extent inspections are associated with changes in care quality, and if inspections are 
cost-effective. 
Methods: Three pieces of empirical research are presented. First, existing literature on the 
effect of external oversight on hospital organisational performance and clinical outcomes was 
surveyed through an overview of reviews. Second, the effect of CQC inspections and their 
announcement on seven measures of care quality was estimated in three scenarios using an 
interrupted time-series design. Finally, the opportunity costs of CQC inspections were explored 
in a purposive sample of English acute NHS trusts. 
Results: The overview of reviews showed that external oversight has mixed effects on 
organisational performance and clinical outcomes. However, the quality of the evidence was 
low to moderate. The interrupted time-series studies suggest CQC inspections were not 
associated with changes in the measures of care quality. Although some statistically significant 
changes were present, the size of the effect is unlikely to be clinically relevant. The opportunity 
cost for acute trusts of a CQC inspection was estimated to lie between £169,691 and £418,136. 
Conclusions: CQC inspections are not associated with improvements in the quality of care 
provided in acute NHS hospitals.  
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1.1 Thesis rationale 
When the National Health Service (NHS) was created in 1948, it was believed that the codes of 
ethics of the professions would suffice to continuously improve healthcare processes, manage 
efficiently resources, and coordinate efforts between the different parts of the system. 
Although the service relied on professionalism for more than 30 years, several events led to 
the incremental introduction of systems for quality improvement going beyond the traditional 
professional self-regulation that was predominant in the early years. This began with the 
findings of the Griffiths Report (1983) leading to the introduction of managers and 
managerialism, as ideology, in the early 1980s. It continued in the 1990s with the 
implementation of a quasi-market as a solution for the continuous financial pressures the NHS 
was suffering. In the 2000s, the findings of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry into the deaths of 
29 babies undergoing cardiac surgery (Kennedy, 2001) led to the creation of regulatory 
institutions to ensure the public the service was safe and any irregularities would be 
investigated. 
The Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) was the first institution and focused on 
assessing the clinical governance arrangements of acute NHS trusts through “Clinical 
Governance Reviews” (CGRs), that were later added to the “star ratings” (Bevan and Cornwell, 
2006). The Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI or the Healthcare 
Commission) replaced CHI in 2004. The likely reason for its abolition was the second attempt 
to develop provider competition and, therefore, encourage new entrants from the 
independent sector (Bevan, 2011). CHAI was a light-touch regulator of the whole health sector 
that produced the “annual health checks”. These relied on self-assessments of performance 
and inspections were targeted to those at risk of breaching standards and a random 10% of 
not-at-risk trusts on an annual basis (Adil, 2008, Bevan, 2011). Both institutions were 
responsible for driving quality improvement, ensuring the delivery of minimum standards of 
care, and providing information on quality. CHI provided the “star ratings” used for “naming 
and shaming”, whilst CHAI “annual health checks” aimed to inform patient choice in a quasi-
market. 
The Care Quality Commission was created in 2008 to bring together the regulation of mental, 
social, and health care into one institution (Care Quality Commission, 2010b). At first, it 
inherited the model of regulation of CHAI, but it changed the regime of inspection to oversee a 
broader range of providers. A series of internal problems and external criticism led to a change 
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of regime in 2013 (Care Quality Commission, 2013a). In parallel to the problems the CQC had 
internally, the lighter touch regulatory approach of CHAI was believed to have allowed Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust to prioritise finances at the expense of clinical quality. The 
trust managed to reduce its deficit by cutting nursing staff while demanding waiting time 
targets were met, but care provided was poor and mortality rates higher than expected 
(Bevan, 2015). This is argued by Bevan (2011) to be the root cause of the Healthcare 
Commission failing to detect the problems underlying the developing scandal. This lead to the 
commissioning of an independent inquiry published in 2010 (i.e. the Francis Report) and a 
public inquiry published in 2013 (i.e. the Francis Inquiry). The first Francis Report found that 
care provided was below expected standards. Patients were not treated with dignity and 
respect, whilst there was a bullying culture that was not open to learning from previous 
mistakes (Francis, 2010). The second Francis Inquiry found that the regulatory system that was 
created to prevent failures of care had itself failed (Francis, 2013). 
The events of Mid-Staffordshire offered a chance to increase the intensity of inspection-based 
regimens based on a belief that inspections and regulation are effective in preventing failures 
and improving quality, and therefore, more intense oversight would generate more 
sustainable improvement, higher quality, stronger leadership, improved safety, and fewer 
failures. 
Two key uncertainties have not been addressed, empirically or theoretically, in any depth to 
support this increase in intensity, scale, and resources committed. First, it is not known 
whether a more resource-intensive regime of inspections provides advantages in terms of 
driving improvements over no inspection and the less resource-intensive regime of inspections 
that was previously used. Second, it is not known to what extent the characteristics and 
performance of trusts prior to inspection affect their performance post-inspection, which 
could guide the frequency and targeting of inspections. 
 
1.2 Thesis aim and approach 
This thesis aimed to evaluate, in terms of effects and costs, CQC inspections of NHS acute 
trusts in England. In the case of the effects, a carefully selected suite of measures of process of 
care and clinical outcomes was selected.1 Potential confounders have been accounted for in 
this selection, and in the research design and methods used. In the case of the costs, a 
                                                             
1 Falls with harm, Pressure ulcers, Summary Hospital Mortality Index, Accident and Emergency (A&E) 
waiting times, Referral to Treatment (RTT) waiting times, Patients’ perception of care, and rate of staff 
leaving each NHS trust. 
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purposive sample of NHS trusts was selected to provide a broad estimate of the opportunity 
costs borne by NHS trusts.  
Four research gaps were identified regarding the effect of external oversight regimes. Firstly, 
the mechanism explaining how they produce an effect. Secondly, why, how, and when 
hospitals respond to an upcoming inspection. Thirdly, which factors are associated with the 
size and direction of the effect of an inspection. Finally, what is the size of the effect and how 
previous performance influences the response to an inspection. The decision to estimate the 
effect of the change of regime using a quasi-experimental approach was based on the lack of 
robust assessments of the quantitative effect of these interventions in the English NHS and 
what was deemed achievable in the period available. Additionally, combining the effect and 
the information on cost would permit an estimate of cost-effectiveness, which is not available 
in the literature. 
The ten chapters that comprise this thesis provide a mix of theoretical perspectives (i.e. 
economic, organisational, psychological and social theories), historical and empirical insights 
into potential factors that could explain the effect (or lack of effect) of CQC inspections of 
acute hospitals in the context of the NHS between 2012 and 2017. 
 
1.2.1 Thesis structure 
With the aim of exploring the question “what is the effect of the Care Quality Commission 
inspections of acute NHS trusts on measures of quality of care”, Chapter 2 introduces the idea 
that a working approach to quality can be seen as rooted in (at least) four influential schools of 
thought. After outlining these, Chapter 3 examines their operationalisation into models of 
governance for quality and the emergence of the policy consensus that external regulation is a 
“good” and effective mechanism for promoting quality. 
Chapter 4 set out to test the assumption that external regulation improves organisational 
performance and clinical outcomes by systematically reviewing the global literature on 
inspection-based regulation. 
The UK context is in many ways unique, and the regulatory environment is certainly different 
to other healthcare systems. The policy levers available (i.e. incentives, commissioning 
arrangements, professional roles, regulation, public reporting of performance) are all different. 
The thesis examines the contribution of inspections in general, and in particular, the more-
resource intensive regime implemented after the Francis inquiry, to changes in care quality. 
Additionally, the contribution of previous quality performance to the effect of inspections was 
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explored. Accordingly, chapter five outlines an approach to primary research and modelling 
these effects over time that minimises biases and increases the trustworthiness of the findings 
presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
Constant financial pressures in the NHS has made it increasingly important to provide evidence 
of the value for money of new interventions. Therefore, Chapter 9 introduces an estimation of 
the opportunity cost of CQC inspections in a purposive sample of acute NHS trusts in England.  
Lastly, Chapter 10 synthesises the key findings of this thesis and places them within the 
broader historical, political and economic context of the NHS in England. Implications for 
policy, research and conclusions are also discussed. 
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2 Theoretical perspectives on quality 
and quality governance  
 
Quality does not have to be defined. You understand it without definition, ahead of 
definition. Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to intellectual 
abstractions (Pirsig, 1992). 
 
Although quality is intuitive (Harvey and Green, 1993) - suggesting that defining it should be 
easy - a consensus on its definition is elusive (Harvey and Green, 1993, Pfeffer and Coote, 
1991). One of the challenges in defining quality lies in how to construct a single definition that 
remains meaningful and applicable to each individual context and purpose (Steffen, 1988). 
Once quality is defined, its presence can be assessed (Harvey and Green, 1993). 
Definitions are useful because they allow for the mutual understanding of different cultures 
and knowledge-bound groups (Wierzbicka, 1996). However, the meaning attributed to these 
definitions is a social construction; therefore, their interpretation is not static, and any 
interaction with another agent or contextual changes can modify them (Blumer, 1986). 
In the English NHS, the concept of care quality is an example of how definitions can evolve. In 
the early days of the NHS, quality was understood as universal access, equity, hierarchical 
organisational structures, and professionalism in its workforce. In the 1970s, quality became 
linked to performance measurement and in the 1980s to general managers, which signalled a 
shift away from quality as a natural by-product of professionalism (Webster, 2002, Klein, 2013) 
to one that necessitated assurance and governance.2  
Governance of quality has changed in the same way definitions of quality have, with different 
perspectives devising various instruments for it. Governance has a broader meaning than 
regulation since it refers to the provision, distribution, and regulation of activities (Braithwaite 
et al., 2007). Therefore, governance of quality involves the instruments and mechanisms used 
by funders, usually governments, to steer behaviour and thus improve the quality of care 
delivered (Braithwaite et al., 2007, Bevan and Fasolo, 2013). 
                                                             
2 In the early stages of this thesis, a documentary analysis and a historical review were performed to 
inform how the concept of quality had evolved in the NHS. The results of this analysis are available in 
the Appendix to Chapter 2, Table 2.1. 
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The aim of this chapter is to explore the measurement of and efforts to improve “quality” in 
the healthcare sector and describe solutions that draw on different theoretical perspectives to 
govern quality in the NHS. This is achieved, firstly, by presenting an overview of different 
conceptualisations of quality - both general and healthcare specific - and their relation to the 
definitions used in the NHS. Secondly, the views on governing quality from four perspectives 
(healthcare professional, management, economics, and law) are described, together with the 
limitations of each perspective and the unintended consequences of monitoring quality. 
2.1 From generic to health-specific definitions of quality 
Quality or qualitas was first used by Plato to describe “of what sort” or “to what extent” (Todd, 
2006, Miller, 2014). Plato proposed that concepts of beauty, goodness, justice and quality are 
abstract: they do not exist in the physical world, and therefore, require no definition because 
they can be understood through experience (Dickie, 1997). Pfeffer and Coote (1991) term this 
approach the ‘traditional view’, with Garvin (1984) referring to this as the ‘transcendent 
approach’ to quality. Quality, from this perspective and in a modern context, is present in an 
excellent product or service that exceeds standards and has restricted accessibility (e.g. 
luxurious items) (Harvey and Green, 1993). 
The shift from an abstract, undefinable concept to the concrete, definable features of 
production came with the methods of Henry Ford. Ford’s approach to reducing waste and 
increasing productivity (Sheingold and Hahn, 2014, Cantiello et al., 2016, Zarbo and D’Angelo, 
2006), linked production (as a process) with quality as an outcome. In the 1980s, this growing 
interest in providing quality products extended to service industries. Ideas such as 
‘conformation to specifications’ (focusing on the manufacturing process), ‘fitness for use’ 
(focusing on fulfilling users’ expectations), and ‘total quality management’ (reducing defective 
items or redundant processes) (Garvin, 1984) became ubiquitous in industrial discourse. 
Alongside these shifts in manufacturing processes came a transformation in the role of 
consumers, casting them as active social agents with the power to shape the delivery of goods 
and services, rather than merely passive recipients of products. This shift led to a consumerism 
movement, with users being afforded the opportunity to express their views about and shape 
the delivery of quality (Pfeffer and Coote, 1991, Harvey and Green, 1993). 
Quality in manufacturing is associated with standardising production processes to make them 
efficient and reliable, satisfying consumers and maximising profits (Garvin, 1984). However, 
the service industry is different. Services have three features. First, they are intangible, 
meaning that setting precise standards of production is difficult. Second, they are 
heterogeneous due to inconsistencies in delivery. Third, services are inseparable because 
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production and consumption occur at the same time. Additionally, these consumers are highly 
involved and their input is key for the quality of the services (e.g. accuracy of a patient in 
describing his/her symptoms) (Parasuraman et al., 1985). This means that standardising 
processes is hardly achievable. Despite their limited application, there have been attempts to 
implement generic definitions in services such as healthcare (e.g. total quality management) 
(Walshe, 2009). The following section presents healthcare-specific definitions, which try to 
recognise that healthcare is both a service and a complex system. 
2.1.1 Health-specific conceptualisations of quality 
For the clinicians, managers and others who deliver healthcare, quality is both experienced 
existentially and also often defined formally within organisations; it is an outcome and also a 
process; it can be recognised and yet it is hard to influence through one’s own agency. Quality 
in healthcare is an abstract and multifaceted concept in a service industry that is also 
“complex” and “adaptive” (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001).  
Complex adaptive systems have multiple components that interact and connect with each 
other, continually adapting to the environment (The Health Foundation, 2010). The 
interrelatedness of systems means that individual components have to be studied in 
connection. Whilst the outcomes of system component interactions can be unpredictable, 
patterns of behaviour can emerge from repeated interactions (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001, 
Kannampallil et al., 2011). Complex adaptive systems are also capable of self-organising (The 
Health Foundation, 2010). Therefore, the quality of a healthcare provider depends on its 
interaction with the environment and is the result of the performance of several 
interconnected aspects of care and self-governing sub-systems. 
One of the most influential models of quality was proposed by Avedis Donabedian 
(Donabedian, 1966), with a model that consists of three main elements (Donabedian (1966, 
1978, 1980)):  
- Structure: the physical environment where the medical care occurs, including material 
resources, human resources and organisational structure. 
- Process: the medical visit itself, including the patient’s attitude and reasons for seeking care, 
and the practitioner’s decisions and actions in terms of diagnosing and deciding on the course 
of treatment. 
- Outcome: the effect of care on a patient’s health status, including measurable outcomes such 
as mortality, but also a patient’s satisfaction and behaviour relating to his/her health (i.e., 
adherence to treatment). 
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In later work, Donabedian proposed a utilitarian perspective: 
Quality of care is the kind of care which is expected to maximise an inclusive measure 
of patient welfare, after one has taken account of the balance of expected gains and 
losses that attend the process of care in all its parts (Donabedian (1980) extracted 
from Evans et al. (2001)). 
Following the traditional concept-definition-measurement approach, the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) generated a definition of quality that could guide the quality assurance efforts of 
Medicare (Institute of Medicine (US), 1990a, 1990b). Based on hundreds of, sometimes 
conflicting, definitions and components, the IOM chose those that were more relevant for 
improving service outcomes (Institute of Medicine (US), 1990a): 
Quality of care is the degree to which health services for individuals and populations 
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current 
professional knowledge (Lohr and Schroeder, 1990).  
Alongside the growth of managerial techniques for quality improvement, came an emphasis on 
measurement and monitoring (Brook et al., 2000, Campbell et al., 2000). Following these lines 
and as an extension of his previous work, Donabedian (2002) identified seven desirable 
features of high-quality care that could be measured: efficacy, effectiveness, efficiency (i.e. 
including clinical, production and distributional efficiency), optimality (i.e. optimum balance 
between cost and improvement to avoid waste), acceptability, legitimacy (i.e. fulfilment of 
social preferences), and equity. International organisations and countries have developed 
several frameworks as a way to clarify what aspects of care should be targeted and measured 
(Institute of Medicine (US), 2001a, Braithwaite et al., 2017b). Such frameworks tend towards 
specifying broad domains of quality relevant for the performance of a system in the long term, 
in a given context, and allowing for variation in how quality is measured over time (e.g. 
indicators within domains) (Institute of Medicine (US), 2001a, Stelfox and Straus, 2013).  
The domains of quality identified by Donabedian (2002), the Institute of Medicine (US) 
(2001b), two international organisations (i.e. WHO and OECD), and two countries (i.e. Canada 
and Australia) with health systems similar to the UK (Braithwaite et al., 2017b) are summarised 


















Efficacy       
Safety      
Competence       
Accessibility      
Timeliness       
Continuity      
Acceptability       
Patient-centred      
Responsiveness      
Effectiveness      
Efficiency      
Sustainability       
Equity    * * * 
Appropriateness      
Legitimacy       
IOM: Institute of Medicine. WHO: World Health Organisation. OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
*Equity does not appear as a domain for assessing the health system performance, but it is included as a 
crosscutting aim of the health system. 
 
This table illustrates the lack of clarity about what the components of quality of care are, and 
therefore, what to measure and improve. The most common domains identified are safety, 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, patient-centeredness, and accessibility. Although there are 
commonalities in their names, the meaning of each domain varies between countries. For 
example, in Australia, effectiveness refers to care being appropriate for patients’ needs and 
producing a desired outcome (National Health Performance Committee, 2009), whilst in 
Canada this is achieved separately in the domains of appropriateness and effectiveness 
(Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2012).  
The indicators within each domain also differ. Canada uses the hospitalised hip fracture event 
rate as a proxy for safety (Statistics Canada, 2017), whilst Australia uses rates of healthcare-
associated infections, unplanned hospital readmissions, and potentially preventable 
hospitalisations (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017). Whilst domains overlap, 
their operationalisation - and thus meaning and interpretation - differs. 
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Differing measures and indicators, and the interdependency of the underlying quality domains 
illustrate the difficulty of measuring (and governing based on those measurements) the 
abstract concept of quality; a concept that is subjectively interpreted by those in the frontline 
of this complex adaptive system called healthcare. 
 
2.1.2 Definitions of care quality in the English NHS 
Competing and sometimes conflicting definitions of quality from a wide range of perspectives 
have influenced the breadth of terms and instruments used to measure NHS quality. 
During its first three decades, NHS quality was something intuitive, implicit and assumed to be 
only understood and recognised by experts (i.e. health professionals) (Harrison and Pollitt, 
1994). After the publication of the Griffiths Report (1983), when the newly established public 
management grew alongside the arrival of business advisors to public and health services, 
quality was seen as something that should be governed, monitored, and measured (Jowett and 
Rothwell, 1988, Klein, 2013).  
Since then, performance indicators have determined the definition of quality, instead of 
following the classic measurement paradigm of concept-definition-measure. These indicators 
have served as the primary instrument used by governments to communicate what quality of 
care means to providers and consumers (Bevan, 2011), whilst external oversight institutions 
have assured3 its existence since 2000 (Bevan and Cornwell, 2006). After the introduction of 
external oversight, the approach used by these institutions came to dictate the definition of 
quality and where efforts for improvement should focus (Nuffield Trust, 2015). For instance, 
between 2000 and 2005 the definition of quality was associated with the seven pillars of 
clinical governance (assessed through “Clinical Governance Reviews”4), and the “star ratings”, 
which largely measured access to care (Bevan, 2011).These definitions, instead of one 
replacing the other, now coexist, influencing the regulatory environment where the CQC 
operates. 
                                                             
3 External oversight institutions have two functions: quality assurance and quality improvement. Quality 
assurance refers to the capacity of the regulatory instruments to detect cases of non-compliance before 
they produced undesired consequences. Quality improvement refers to the capacity of the regulator to 
encourage and generate improvement in the quality of care delivered (Bevan, 2011). 
4 The seven pillars were: Consultation and patient involvement; Clinical risk management; Clinical audit; 
Research and effectiveness; Staff focus; Staffing and staff management; Education, training and 
continuing personal and professional development; Use of information; and Use of information to 
support clinical governance and health care delivery. 
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Lord Darzi (2008) in his “next stage review” provided a definition of quality of care by using 
domains that were deemed relevant for the improvement of the service:  
High quality care should be as safe and effective as possible, with patients treated 
with compassion, dignity and respect. 
This definition made quality explicit, incorporating technical aspects and patient centeredness. 
Given that the previous decade focused on improving access, this new era was expected to 
improve safety, effectiveness, and patient-centeredness, which are some of the most common 
domains of care identified in the literature (Table 2.1), and were in tune with what NHS staff 
perceived as relevant (Darzi, 2008). The definition that the CQC introduced in 2013 superseded 
Lord Darzi’s, and it is the first one appearing in law (Care Quality Commission, 2013a): 
High care quality should be safe, effective, caring, responsive to people’s needs and 
well-led. 
This definition was produced after a consultation process and followed the recommendations 
of the Francis Inquiry (Francis, 2013) (See Chapter 3, section 3.2.5 for more details on the 
Francis Inquiry). Although it largely overlaps with the previous definition (i.e. safe, effective, 
and patient-centred care), in practice, the CQC assessed more than 1,000 indicators in the pre-
2013 era; and it currently focuses on around 150 indicators (Beaussier et al., 2015). 
Safety, effectiveness, accessibility, and patient-centeredness are among the most commonly 
used features of quality identified in the literature (see Table 2.1). However, the CQC also 
assesses institutional governance, which is rarely included in other frameworks (Braithwaite et 
al., 2017b). This might be explained because institutional governance refers to organisational 
features linked to maintaining quality (i.e. a structural component in Donabedian’s model), and 
can be seen by some, as not a measure of quality. Only Australia considers the capacity of the 
system to adapt to emerging need and support the workforce as an essential component of a 
quality health system. In the case of England, the focus on adequate internal governance arises 
from the findings of the Francis Inquiry and aims to remedy the failures detected in Mid-
Staffordshire (Care Quality Commission, 2013a). This illustrates that definitions are highly 
context-dependent and change over time. Even when the domains to assess quality might 
coincide, the application of these definitions varies in practice. 
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2.2 Governing quality in a complex adaptive system 
Defining, measuring and governing quality in healthcare is difficult because the concept is 
abstract and healthcare is a complex adaptive system. This means that components of the 
system such as hospitals, primary and social care interact with each other and are continually 
adapting to the environment. Each of these components has internal self-governing 
subsystems (e.g. wards), and the delivery of quality in one domain (regardless of how it is 
defined) depends on the interaction of these subsystems. In addition, attempts to improve 
quality can generate complex and unpredictable patterns of behaviour.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates this phenomenon using the domains of the CQC’s definition of quality, the 
seven measures chosen to evaluate the effect of inspections and some factors associated to 
improve these measures, as identified in the literature. For example, to improve Accident and 
Emergency (A&E) waiting times, which belongs in the domain of responsiveness, acute 
hospitals could target the management of flow and demand inside the institution (Oredsson et 
al., 2011, NHS Improvement, 2017). An essential component to managing the flow of patients 
is coordination with primary and social care (NHS Improvement, 2017), which could also help 
prevent hospitalisations for patients with chronic and complex needs (NHS England, 2015d). 
Other factors contributing to the reduction of A&E waiting times include the staff skills mix in 
A&E (Oredsson et al., 2011, Carter et al., 2014, CRD, 2015) and communication within and 
between teams inside and outside the hospital (NHS England, 2015d, NHS Improvement, 
2017). Therefore, targeting one or a combination of these aspects of care could lead to 
improvements in one or many other indicators or produce unintended consequences. 
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Figure 2.1 Domains of the CQC’s definition of quality and the interaction of factors associated with their 
improvement 
Key: The light-blue hexagons represent the domains of care quality according to the CQC definition. Green circles 
represent the outcome measures selected for assessing the effectiveness of CQC inspections (see Chapter 5). Beige 
rectangles contain factors associated with the improvement of outcome measures. 
 
The relevance of complexity for this thesis is twofold. Firstly, since quality is an abstract 
concept, there is no universal consensus on how to define and measure it; therefore, the set of 
indicators has to be carefully selected based on evidence and theory to ensure and facilitate 
judgements of the internal validity of the measurements. Secondly, the improvement of one 
measure depends on several factors; consequently, if CQC inspections are to produce 
improvements, these should target various aspects related to providing better care.  
In policy terms, quality is a contested arena in the delivery of healthcare. Professionals strive 
to deliver the best possible services, whilst managers seek to maximise the use of available 
resources at the frontline. Economists exert their influence during the policy-making process, 
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trying to maximise the return on investments made, whereas the legal profession provides a 
framework for and accountability for the quality of services. 
Professionals, managers, economists, and lawyers have different ideas of what should be done 
to deliver quality services. Their perspectives try to simplify the complexity of quality in 
healthcare by focusing on specific aspects for improvement. For instance, managerialism sees 
quality as manageable and measurable, whilst professionals see it as amenable to the 
professional-patient relationship and self-regulation. Given the influence of these four 
perspectives on governance of quality in the NHS, their theoretical views are highlighted in the 
following section. 
2.3 Theoretical perspectives on governance of healthcare quality 
The previous section explored generic and healthcare-specific definitions of quality to illustrate 
that the concept arises from an array of distinct domains, often combined to measure a 
complex phenomenon. Since the improvement of quality requires addressing various aspects 
of care - as Figure 2.1 suggests - different schools of thought have devised various instruments 
to steer the delivery of care quality. This combination of instruments can be seen as a model of 
governance.  
Bevan and Fasolo (2013) retrospectively analysed how quality assurance and improvement had 
been governed in the English NHS, identifying four models: trust and altruism, choice and 
competition, targets and terror, and naming and shaming (reputational) (Bevan and Fasolo, 
2013, Bevan, 2015). The underlying components of these models were analysed to pinpoint 
the schools of thought and mechanisms explaining their potential effectiveness. These four 
schools of thought were chosen since their views can be seen to have shaped the structures 
and processes (and thus outcomes) throughout the history of the NHS.  
2.3.1 The professional perspective 
As has been argued, the professional perspective that dominated the discourse on quality pre-
1980s, saw a combination of the altruistic intrinsic motivation of professionals (Saks, 1995) 
with peer feedback about performance as the primary mechanism for inducing behavioural 
changes without the threat of sanctions or promises of rewards (Berwick et al., 2003).  
Professionals are members of knowledge-bound groups that - through specialisation – have 
gained a privileged position in society, allowing them to establish codes of ethics and exert 
self-regulation (Larson, 1977, Saks, 2015). Akerlof and Kranton (2010) suggest that our identify 
as a professional is rooted in the norms attached to belonging to that social category, which 
are learned by observation or by following what the commonly understood rules dictate as an 
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ideal. In general, professions claim to have altruistic motives, subordinating their personal 
interest to those of society. This implies that professionals are expected to express moral 
behaviour (Frank, 1989) or act in a “knightly” manner (Le Grand, 2003), along with having 
intrinsic motivation for improvement. The inherent features of behaviour, communication, and 
appearance that together determine appropriate professional conduct is what it is called 
professionalism (Morrow et al., 2014). Lesser et al. (2010) provide a modern definition of 
professionalism in healthcare using its desired behaviours: compassionate, respectful and 
collaborative orientation in service of the patient; integrity and accountability; the pursuit of 
excellence; and the fair and ethical management of healthcare resources. The pursuit of 
excellence combined with data about performance would constitute the intermediate 
components that exist between business as usual and implementing improvements.  
This feedback about performance, usually coming from peers (Hibbard et al., 2003), should 
drive changes by offering information about the level of performance and clarifying what the 
criteria used to assess it are (Locke and Latham, 2002a). This model of self-regulation uses a 
close relational distance, that is, professionals from the same group who are aware of the 
internal functioning of the profession (Hood and Scott, 2000). This can have advantages in 
terms of providing an informed and friendly opinion for improvement; however, this alone is 
often viewed as insufficient since it does not state how to improve performance and is not 
bound to a goal-setting plan (Kluger and DeNisi, 1998). And even if it had all the components 
needed to incite improvement, internal peer-reviews are not a high-powered incentive (Bevan 
and Fasolo, 2013), because they remain private.  
Fournier (1999) suggests that professionalism serves to instil appropriate work conduct and 
practices within a network of accountability. This allows governing “professional conduct at 
distance”, whilst professionals retain their autonomy (Fournier, 1999). However, economic 
constraints and the introduction of new ideologies have led to a redefinition of professionalism 
to include budget awareness and performance management (Evetts, 2003). 
Professionalism is needed for improving the delivery of healthcare, but professionalism is 
perceived as insufficient on their own (Maynard and Bloor, 2003). The condition of self-
controlled and self-motivated healthcare professionals mean that the imposition of external 
methods of quality governance is often resisted (Evetts, 2003, Saks, 2015). However, when 
healthcare professionals, and in particular doctors, are convinced about the advantages of the 
change, the probabilities of success are higher (Best et al., 2012) (See Chapter 3 for an 
explanation on how professional perspectives interact with other perspectives to govern 
quality). 
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2.3.2 Managerialist perspective 
Managerialist ideas about the governance of the health service and managerialism as a social 
process gained traction after the publication of the Griffiths Report (Griffiths, 1983). Griffiths 
found a lack of leadership and clarity regarding who was accountable for failures in the 
provision of care. From this perspective, delivery of care quality is achieved by managing 
performance and implementing continuous quality improvement (McLaughlin and Kaluzny, 
2004). Quality is associated with the standardisation of processes and maximising efficiency, as 
suggested in the view of the manufacturing industry (Garvin, 1984). 
Managing performance through targets and performance monitoring can drive improvements 
because targets direct efforts by establishing the desired results and level of achievement. 
Then the continuous monitoring process allows individuals to know how well they are 
performing against set standards (Bevan and Hood, 2006b). Goal setting theory says that 
targets affect persistence of effort and lead to the use and discovery of strategies to tackle the 
goal, motivating individuals to improve continually (Locke and Latham, 2002a), which would 
explain how targets might lead to improvement. 
Performance monitoring systems can also be used for benchmarking performance. These 
systems can produce reputational incentives when they include four key elements: i) a ranking 
system that is ii) widely known and iii) understood by the public, and where iv) future 
reporting uses previous information to show how performance has changed (Hibbard et al., 
2003). Bevan and Fasolo (2013) provide two interpretations that explain how reputation or the 
threat of reputational damage can change organisational behaviour. One incentive is derived 
from accountability, where the published rankings of straightforward information on 
providers’ performance stick in the public's mind (Hibbard et al., 2005) and make 
accountability relationships salient. Accountability drives providers to exert an additional effort 
to improve certain aspects of care (Simonson and Nye, 1992), thus avoiding losing the public's 
trust. A second incentive relies on shame about being in the spotlight, which combines moral 
heuristics5 (Sunstein, 2005) with affect6 (Slovic and Västfjäll, 2010). “Do not betray” and 
“punish betrayals of trust” are moral heuristics ingrained in our minds (Sunstein, 2005, Bevan 
and Fasolo, 2013). They would be triggered by the public reporting of performance, generating 
a response arising from the fear of betraying the public’s trust; thus, stressing a very urgent 
need to respond before the public punishes any such betrayal (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013). 
                                                             
5 Cognitive shortcuts that can be useful on some occasions but tend to be sub-optimal in situations that 
are more general. 
6 Specific feelings of goodness or badness with or without awareness. 
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Continuous quality improvement, another managerial instrument for governing quality, refers 
to the initiatives used for the achievement of the organisational mission, vision and objectives 
(McLaughlin and Kaluzny, 2004). These initiatives involve collecting soft and hard data to 
measure performance and determine what is working and why (McLaughlin and Kaluzny, 
2004); analysing core health processes and redesigning them to make them more efficient and 
effective; aligning incentives with improvement goals; and having leadership that can model 
and inspire care improvement (Berwick et al., 2003). 
These techniques were created for improving processes in industry, where market incentives 
reduce costs and increase efficiency (McLaughlin and Kaluzny, 2004), with both producers and 
consumers agreeing on the desirability of the methods associated with these ideas. In 
healthcare, however, this consensus is far from established. Professionals, and in particular 
doctors, have resisted the introduction of “managerialism” as a route to quality (Clarke et al., 
2000). Quality as a management tool has the potential to weaken the autonomy and perceived 
power of professionals. This could be explained because techniques such as continuous quality 
improvement seek to promote organisational learning, horizontal responsibility for quality 
improvement, and the use of best practices (McLaughlin and Kaluzny, 2004), which can go 
against the status quo (Berwick et al., 2003). Additionally, managerialism is often seen as the 
central government imposing a new way to work that goes against professional freedom 
(Clarke et al., 2000). This may often be compounded by limited evidence on the effectiveness 
of these techniques (Buetow and Roland, 1999).  
2.3.3 Economic perspective 
From an economic perspective, quality is observed in a free market through profit 
maximisation (Garvin, 1984) and satisfied customers, as the consumerism movement suggests 
(Pfeffer and Coote, 1991). Quality is improved when the right incentives are in place. In a 
perfect market, productive and allocative efficiency is achieved by the price mechanism (Begg 
et al., 2014). A large number of providers and consumers exchange services and goods using 
full information, there are no barriers to entry, and products are homogenous (Goddard, 
2003). The questions of what, how and for whom to produce are addressed by market 
mechanisms (Begg et al., 2014). However, in healthcare these conditions are not met, 
producing market failure, which is used as the rationale for extensive governmental 
intervention. It is argued that for healthcare, government intervention is more likely to fulfil 
societal goals than are market forces with minimal regulation (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). 
The market in healthcare fails because full information about the quality of the services does 
not exist: information is asymmetric and the customer does not have enough knowledge to 
judge if care is appropriate. In addition, the specialised nature of healthcare means there are a 
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small number of competitors; therefore, sellers can generate demand, increase prices and 
reduce quality producing a welfare loss. Entry and exit have high associated costs. Finally, 
healthcare produces benefits that cannot be traded in a market (i.e. externalities), thus making 
a market inefficient. In the presence of market-failure, the alternatives are regulation and 
contracting (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
Publicly funded and provided healthcare was implemented in England in 1948 to maximise 
societal welfare. However, in the late 1980s, market-like reforms were introduced in the NHS 
as a means of creating incentives to drive improvements (Enthoven, 1985), since theoretically, 
public monopolies (like the NHS) do not provide adequate incentives to deliver quality services 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993), as a free market would. The rationale behind the introduction of a 
quasi-market in the NHS was that a purchaser could buy services from a different provider (i.e. 
increasing contestability of the market), which could drive competition among providers in the 
same region. This would improve the quality of the service, given that providers compete for 
quality in healthcare (Maynard, 1991). However, markets require accurate information about 
inputs, outputs and outcomes and their relationship to work (Maynard, 1991), which in 
healthcare it is still challenging to obtain. 
Given the cooperative relationship between parties with different goals and a division of 
labour, all market-like reforms have a principal-agent problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to 
agency theory, the problem arises because the principal (i.e. purchaser or commissioner) 
cannot know how the agent (i.e. provider) is behaving, which can lead to opportunistic 
behaviour (i.e. gaming). Depending on the quality of information systems and certainty about 
the achievement of outcomes, agency theory proposes to contract services based on 
behaviour or outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989). When there is not enough information about 
outcomes or their achievement is uncertain, the option is to contract based on behaviour 
(ibid), that is, payment for blocks of services.  
The implementation of a quasi-market was supposed to help to create a better information 
system for contracting services based on outcomes (Maynard, 1991), but this has still not been 
achieved. Instead, contracts are based on activities with fixed prices for services (i.e. payment-
by-results7), with the aim of driving efficiency and productivity since providers can redirect 
savings to other services (Mays and Dixon, 2011). Information is not only used to determine 
the best way to incentivise performance but also to choose providers (Berwick et al., 2003). 
The implementation of regulatory institutions conducting on-site inspections had the aim of 
                                                             
7 Payment-by-results is an incentive-based funding system where hospitals are paid for the volume of 
services adjusted for differences in the case-mix. Prices are fixed nationally (i.e. a national tariff) for each 
type of procedure, which creates an incentive to reduce length of stay and increase efficiency (Mannion 
et al., 2008). 
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providing information on quality, monitoring performance on a regular basis, and helping 
control potential deviant behaviour (Stevens, 2004, Le Grand and Hunter, 2006). Increasing 
transparency through the publication of performance information is also associated with 
greater productivity, competition and quality. When transparency is linked to rewards and 
sanctions, it can also improve accountability (Raleigh, 2012). 
Increasing contestability8 of the market with more potential providers is supposed to incite 
adaptation of services to what is demanded, instead of what has been historically produced 
(Maynard, 1991). Giving a choice to consumers (i.e. commissioners or patients) should 
increase competition among providers to attract patients and income. For patients, this means 
they can access services in other geographical areas providing a better quality of care, which 
was not possible before, potentially reducing inequalities regarding the quality of treatment 
(Mays and Dixon, 2011). For commissioners, the option of exercising choice means they can 
tender for innovative services, driving the development of new models of care and innovation 
(Mays and Dixon, 2011). 
In healthcare, however, there is insufficient information available for commissioners to 
exercise choice, contract, or monitor the quality of services. Additionally, entry and exit costs 
are high, the specialised nature of healthcare means that commissioners and patients often 
need an agent to make decisions (Maynard and Bloor, 2003), and healthcare professions tend 
to see market-related reforms as a threat to their autonomy (Saks, 1995). Therefore, the 
medical profession, in particular, has objected to every market-related reform of the NHS 
(Saks, 2015). 
Additionally, Bevan and Fasolo (2013) suggest that in healthcare there are four circumstances 
where individuals exercise choice if this is provided: 
- Individuals have a stable and well-defined preference before analysing the options 
available and making a decision. 
- The array of options available fulfils the needs and preferences of different individuals. 
- Individuals have the knowledge and expertise to make a choice, or they have the time 
and willingness to learn about the options before making a decision. 
- The options available do not involve unpleasant outcomes and do not require trade-
offs that could cause psychological pain. 
                                                             
8 A contestable market has zero costs associated with entry and exit (Begg et al., 2014). The two main 
determinants of contestability are the presence, or absence, of sunk costs (i.e. costs that cannot be 
recovered) and economies of scale (i.e. reduction of costs when a business grows). In the case of the 
NHS before the introduction of a quasi-market, the district management team would pay for the 
services of a local hospital regardless of the performance of that hospital. The quasi-market would allow 
district health authorities to purchase services from other hospitals. 
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In healthcare, these conditions are rarely met: patients learn about care quality or the features 
of care in a given hospital during the process of receiving care, and it is difficult for them to 
have a preference in advance. Regarding treatment, all patients have the same need, which is 
to be cured, meaning that options should not differ between hospitals. An average patient 
does not have the expertise or medical knowledge to make a choice, whilst devoting time and 
effort to inform themselves about their condition and available options can be difficult during 
ill health. In the scenario where a patient decides to move to another hospital, there is a risk of 
potential complications or separation from next of kin; therefore, it is not a hazard-free 
situation. Therefore, giving a choice to patients is not an effective way to govern quality, 
because there is a limited number of situations where patients can exercise choice in 
healthcare. 
2.3.4 Legal perspective 
From a legal point of view, governments have a duty to protect the right to health (i.e. 
provision of safety and quality standards and non-discrimination) by regulating activities 
through legislation, contracts, regulatory institutions, or any other legal means deemed 
necessary (Mariner, 2009). These legal instruments provide a framework for what is accepted 
and the enforcement actions attached to illegal activity. Two particular theories underpin why 
individuals or organisations will abide by the law. 
The first says that social influence (i.e. concerns about one’s own social reputation) motivates 
compliance with the law (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). This theory sees compliance as a moral 
act, which has four defining characteristics (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). First, it is intrinsically 
motivated by non-material reward. Second, it involves sacrifice and denial of pleasure; 
therefore, an institution could incur extra costs for carrying out the moral act. Third, the act 
concerns intentions and processes, not outcomes, and when outcomes are taken into account, 
the means to the end are relevant. Fourth, institutions or individuals in similar circumstances 
receive similar treatment. 
Social influence is stronger when there is a widespread understanding that compliance is a 
moral obligation, which is determined by the legitimacy of the overseeing institution (Sutinen 
and Kuperan, 1999). Evidence suggests that procedural justice (how just the process of 
regulation is) and distributive justice (the perception that benefits and sacrifices are shared 
fairly) influence the perception of legitimacy more than the effectiveness, efficiency and speed 
of the regulator to respond to problems within its authority and accomplish its mission 
(Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). 
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The second theory is the general and specific deterrence theory, which refers to the power of 
legal punishment to prevent illegal activity. The commitment of a crime or illegal activity by 
individuals and organisations is prevented or restricted by the fear of legal punishment 
(Stafford and Warr, 1993). This fear is achieved because individuals are aware of the potential 
punishment, have experienced the punishment themselves, or have observed the punishment 
of others (Stafford and Warr, 1993). The certainty and severity of the sanction are the two 
main variables associated with deterrence and the capacity of legal provisions to prevent 
deviant performance (Stafford and Warr, 1993). 
Since the costs related to constant on-site monitoring of compliance by a regulator are high, 
the relationship between the regulator and regulated institutions is based on trust that 
individuals and organisations are complying with the standards when the regulator is not there 
(O'Neill, 2002). Deceptions of trust often lead to an increase in central control: a new 
performance indicator, a more complex code of practice or a new standard (O'Neill, 2002). 
However, more regulations, stricter rules and more scrutiny does not guarantee compliance 
(Maynard, 2014) since it can lead to gaming or ritualistic compliance (Berwick 1989).  
Another problem of the application of a legal perspective to healthcare is that sanctions and 
enforcement actions need to balance the probability of unintended consequences with their 
ability to deter deviant behaviour. When sanctions are severe, the likelihood that a regulatory 
institution will use them is low since the repercussions go beyond the provider, for example, 
revoking the license to an NHS trust implies that the whole population in that area will have to 
seek care somewhere else. Conversely, when sanctions are lenient, the gain of engaging in 
illegal or out of boundaries activities is greater than the costs of the sanction; therefore, the 
punishment does not act as a deterrent. In turn, the rule of law provides the foundation for a 
legal view in governing quality, but to be effective, it requires other strategies in place, such as 
professionalism and performance management. 
2.4 Information, quality, and the unintended consequences of 
performance monitoring 
All the perspectives mentioned require monitoring or obtaining information to govern quality. 
In the case of healthcare professionals, particularly the medical profession, information is used 
within the profession at least to benchmark the current level of performance against an ideal, 
and consequently, to guide future actions (Berwick et al., 2003). For managers, data can also 
serve to determine what is working and why (McLaughlin and Kaluzny, 2004). According to 
economics, information is a commodity, and there are costs associated with obtaining reliable 
information to reduce uncertainties for decision-making (e.g. for exercising choice, 
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contracting, and monitoring performance) (Arrow, 1962). This means that in the presence of 
imperfect information and market failure, other options such as regulation should be used to 
assure and incentivise the delivery quality (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). From a legal viewpoint, 
data is needed to monitor compliance with contracts, legal restrictions, and regulations 
(Mariner, 2009). However, collecting information for quality governance is not free; it has a 
cost and potential unintended consequences, especially, when the achievement of a target is 
linked to high-powered incentives (Bevan, 2015). 
Collecting reliable, accurate and valid information on quality of care has a cost related to the 
effort and time spent obtaining that data and developing the information technology (IT) 
systems that will allow for collating the information in a centralised platform (Walker et al., 
2005). This means that the value of quality indicators depends on a trade-off between the 
benefits that the information provides and the costs borne from obtaining it (Schuster et al., 
2017). 
When performance indicators were first introduced, there was rarely enough evidence to 
support a link between such measurement and patient outcomes. Therefore, the decision of 
what to measure was related to what was available and was measurable rather than what 
measures were good proxies of care quality (Buetow and Roland, 1999). The complexity of 
healthcare means that not everything that matters can be measured, and performance 
indicators usually reflect restricted subdomains of quality (Bevan and Hood, 2006a, 2006b). 
Indicators can be classified as those that prompt further investigations but in isolation give an 
incomplete picture of performance (i.e. “tin-openers”), or those that are direct measures of a 
process (i.e. “dials”) (Carter, 1991). Consequently, for governing quality of care, it is assumed 
that the combination of information available provides a good reflection of actual 
performance and that the measurement itself will not induce gaming (Bevan and Hood, 
2006b). There can, however, be unintended consequences when performance is assessed 
based on the achievement of a target or the level of performance on a given indicator (Smith, 
1995), this is particularly so when targets are supplemented by financial incentives (Bevan, 
2015).  
Since targets and performance indicators are supposed to direct effort, the measurement of 
indicators to give a more comprehensive view of performance can make providers lose track of 
the priorities. Conversely, measuring just a few indicators can create “tunnel vision” where 
providers only focus their efforts on meeting what is measured (Smith, 1995, Bevan and Hood, 
2006). Gaming is the term used to refer to any creative “subversive reaction” from a provider 
to secure a strategic advantage (Bevan and Hood, 2006). Some examples of this are: 
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- Improving performance by focusing on the performance indicator instead of the goal 
that is reflecting,  
- Falsification or manipulation of data to meet a target or to improve performance, and  
- A lax interpretation of the definitions around a target. 
Within acute NHS trusts, there is evidence of manipulation of performance data when 
providers under-report adverse events (Sari, 2006). There can be a fixation on what is 
measured when the A&E waiting time target is met by modifying when the waiting time 
started or by taking action right before the target is missed (Locker and Mason, 2006). A 
similar phenomenon happened when waiting lists were shuffled to meet the referral to 
treatment waiting time (Besley et al., 2009).  
Gaming cannot be eliminated, but efforts can be made to minimise it. Some options are to 
audit the quality of reported data and introduce uncertainty in performance measurement, 
where organisations know what the target is but the specifics about the monitoring process 
remain unknown (Bevan and Hood, 2006). Improving reporting culture and adding some face-
to-face scrutiny (e.g. inspections) might limit the extent of gaming and detect outliers that 
would not appear through statistical monitoring, although adding inspections can be 
burdensome and has its pitfalls (Bevan and Hood, 2006). 
2.5 Conclusion 
Quality can be understood intuitively, as fitness for purpose, as conforming to specifications, 
or meeting the needs of consumers. These views have influenced the way quality is seen in 
healthcare. However, healthcare represents a complex adaptive system where the lack of a 
universal definition of quality of care and the different instruments used to drive improvement 
are problematic. The interconnectedness of the health system hinders efforts to improve 
quality, where the improvement in one area can improve several indicators or harm 
improvement in other areas and the improvement of one indicator might require targeting 
various areas of care. 
Four main perspectives have shaped the overall debate on how to govern quality in the NHS. 
Their influences come from the different roles they have for the functioning of the health 
service. Healthcare professions deliver care in the frontline, managers coordinate the work at 
the micro and meso levels of the system, economists participate in the policy-making process, 
and lawyers create the legal framework for each policy. They have consequently proposed 
different instruments to encourage social action and produce/assure quality. Whilst the 
healthcare professions’ view of quality is reliant on professionalism and internal motivation, 
managerialism uses methods that create an external motivator such as performance 
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monitoring and continuous quality improvement to incentivise the delivery of quality. 
Economics uses a wider variety of instruments to create external motivators for improvement, 
including competition, incentives, sanctions, contracting, regulation and transparency. Lastly, 
the legal perspective considers that the rule of law is enough to direct efforts, assuming 
enforcement actions will deter illegal and improper activity and individuals and organisations 
will act morally. These instruments are all present in the current CQC dominated regulatory 




3 The evolution of governance of 
quality in the English National Health 
Service 
 
Theory is so much clearer than history (Thompson, 1978). 
Given the complex interaction (in often unpredictable ways) of multiple factors affecting the 
effectiveness of quality improvement and assurance strategies (Greenhalgh et al., 2004), it is 
important to understand the obstacles and incentives for change when designing and 
evaluating interventions (Grol et al., 2007). This understanding comes from the theoretical 
assumptions and explanations behind the interventions implemented (Grol et al., 2007, Foy et 
al., 2011). Acknowledging the interactions between an intervention and the context in which it 
occurs allows accounting for confounding variables and finding explanations for the observed 
effects (Grol et al., 2007). 
In Chapter 2, the underlying theories for quality governance through the use of four 
perspectives were explored. A theory is an abstraction of a phenomenon expressed in an 
organised, heuristic, coherent and systematic array of statements that together provide 
generalizable understanding of a phenomenon (Foy et al., 2011). Conversely, a model is a 
simplification of a specific process outlining how the different components of it (e.g. an 
intervention) interact to produce intermediate outcomes (Rogers, 2005). Therefore, whilst 
theories are generalizable to different situations where a given phenomenon occurs (e.g. 
competition as a driver for improvement), models are specific to a situation and may use 
several theories to explain how hypothesised outcomes are achieved. 
In reality, the views of these four perspectives have combined, resulting in four distinguishable 
(with the benefit of hindsight) theoretical models of governance of quality: trust and altruism, 
targets and hierarchy, naming and shaming, and choice and competition (Bevan and Fasolo, 
2013). How these theoretical models unfolded in practice helps us understand the current 
context in which CQC inspections happen, and therefore, informing the design of evaluations 
and the understanding of those evaluations findings. 
In this chapter, the theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter 2 will be used to define 
theoretical models of “quality governance”. Following this, evidence is presented on how 
these models of governance unfolded in practice. Finally, with reference to implicit theories of 
change and relevant research, the current model of inspection-based NHS governance is 
outlined. 
46 
3.1  Theoretical models of quality governance 
Defining quality governance using the appropriate theory provides a lens through which to 
view the CQC and other initiatives designed to improve quality in the National Health Service. 
Governance of quality involves the instruments and mechanisms used by the government to 
steer behaviour for improving the quality of the care delivered (Braithwaite et al., 2007, Bevan 
and Fasolo, 2013).  
In the NHS, the healthcare professions, management, economic and legal views outlined in 
Chapter 2 have – over time – merged into four distinct models of governance (Bevan and 
Fasolo, 2013) that are intended to drive improvement. 
“Trust and altruism” posits healthcare providers as intrinsically motivated to perform well 
through professionalism. Consequently, there is no need for external monitoring or incentives. 
However, these “motivated” professionals require information or resources to implement 
change (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013). This method of governance was dominant in the pre-1990 
era: failure was rewarded by targeting extra resources and success largely ignored (Bevan, 
2010). 
“Choice and competition” relies on an economic view of providers and service users as rational 
(Simon, 1955) or “econs” (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013). In this model, service users make informed 
choices regarding providers and providers compete to attract or maintain users (Bevan and 
Fasolo, 2013). Choice and competition as a model of governance requires a quasi-market with 
comprehensive information about performance and several providers free to manage their 
"business". The obvious appeal for governments is that they are divorced from the 
responsibility of dealing with poor performance; instead, the invisible hand of the market 
provides the pressure (Le Grand, 2007). 
A ”targets and hierarchy” model (sometimes labelled “targets and terror”) (Bevan and Hood, 
2006b) relies on active management to govern quality. As with the choice and competition 
model, providers are seen as rational collectives of social actors. Success is incentivised and 
failure punished (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013). The targets and hierarchy model requires tight 
monitoring; something which is costly and unpopular with professionals (Le Grand, 2007, 
Bevan and Hood, 2006b). 
“Naming and shaming” assumes that in contrast to the view of users as “econs” (Le Grand, 
2007) healthcare consumers rarely exercise choice (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013). Consequently, 
performance information is not used to switch providers. Service providers – as collectives of 
non-econ, “humans” - are motivated by the reputational threats arising from performance 
rankings (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013) rather than performance info per se. Reputational models 
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come with a considerable downside: implementing them requires naming and shaming 
providers based on monitoring information. Thus, this model is unpopular with professionals 
(ibid) and could undermine the intrinsic motivation of health professions (as could targets and 
hierarchy).  
These four models explain, theoretically, NHS quality governance up to 2010. In 2010 there 
were elections and during the campaign, the conservatives claimed that “there will be no more 
of the tiresome, meddlesome, top-down re-structures that have dominated the last decade of 
the NHS” (The Economist, 2014). However , after coming to power, the coalition government 
spent two years trying to pass a bill to reform the commissioning system (Timmins, 2012). In 
parallel, the first Francis Report was published, which highlighted poor standards of care in 
Mid-Staffordshire, and the government commissioned a second inquiry to investigate the 
causes of the failure.  
The time between 2010 (when the new administration took power) and 2013 (with the 
publication of the Francis Inquiry report) can be seen as a transition period with governance 
features that none of these models can explain. Therefore, in this thesis, two extra models 
have been added to the Bevan and Fasolo (2013) models. The first one has been named the 
macro-level inquiries model referring to the period 2010-2013. 
The macro-level inquiries based model accepts the ‘human’ perspective of behaviour, where 
providers are perceived to respond to reputational threats and sermons (Vedung and Van der 
Doelen, 2017). The model requires high-profile failures of care to be investigated by a public or 
private inquiry since this will align providers’ priorities regarding the implementation of 
changes to remedy the causes of the high-profile failure (Best et al., 2012). 
The period after the Francis Inquiry also possesses special features that are not described by 
Bevan and Fasolo (2013) models of governance; this has been named the inspection state 
model. This model posits providers as responsive to reputational threats, but it is reputation 
among their peers that is a bigger incentive than reputation with the general public. The 
anticipatory pressure of an inspection would be the primary mechanism of change here, 
combined with the potential sanctions that a provider may receive if it is non-compliant. 
Additionally, for an inspection to drive improvement, each trust needs two types of leadership: 
designated leadership (i.e. someone formally in charge of the leading the process) and 
distributed leadership (i.e. professionals across teams sharing the responsibility for delivering 
changes and mobilising efforts) (Best et al., 2012). When both types of leadership are present, 
teams accommodate their inputs interactively to achieve the complex task (i.e. inspection), 
which requires credible leaders capable of mobilising influence (Best et al., 2012).  
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As a way of illustrating the principles of these models and identifying factors that could 
potentially explain the findings, the main mechanism of change, the systemic requirements 
and the claimed drivers for improvement in these six models are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Mechanism of change, systemic requirements and theoretical foundation for different models of quality 
governance. 
 1948-1989 1990-1997 2000-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 2014-2017 
 
Trust & Altruism Quasi-markets Targets & Terror 
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In this chapter thus far, the quality governance models of the NHS have been explained, 
building upon the theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter 2. In the following section, 
practical unfolding and evolution of these models are explored over time, providing context for 
the current environment where the CQC operates. 
3.2 Models for governance of quality in practice 
In practice, the implementation of the models of governance did not always bring about the 
expected result. The discretionary authority that frontline public services employees have to 
implement policies gives them the power to adapt reforms, influencing their hypothetical 
effect and hindering their potential benefit (Lipsky, 2010). As a means to illustrate this 
phenomenon, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the six previously mentioned models 
is presented. This informs what strategies worked and when in the NHS in the past, and 
therefore, permits the assessment of evidence on the effectiveness of CQC inspections. 
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Transitions between these models of quality governance have happened in the past when the 
previous model is deemed as a failure (e.g. after the Griffiths Report), after cases of 
demonstrably poor care (e.g. the case Mid-Staffordshire NHS FT), or when there has been a 
desire to incentivise further improvements (e.g. choice and competition, Stevens [2004]). The 
following analysis combines the Bevan and Fasolo (2013) models of governance with findings 
from a documentary analysis of policy documents (see Appendix Chapter 2, Table 2.1). It will 
argue that the current model of governance (i.e. the inspection state) is the product of a series 
of changes over time. It has “evolved” from perceived successes and failures of various 
initiatives, policies, and ideological shifts. The models of governance outlined in the following 
section provide a way of making sense of the chronology of “quality” and the evolution of the 
mechanisms used to assure society and govern care quality in one of the major functions of 
the UK state: the provision of public healthcare. 
3.2.1 Trust and altruism: necessary, but insufficient 
Healthcare professions are bound by a common knowledge that directly or indirectly creates 
social closure, with legal boundaries determining who is inside (Saks, 2015). Belonging to these 
groups infers a privileged social position in exchange for protecting the public through codes of 
ethics (Freidson, 2001). In medicine, codes of ethics reassure patients and funders of the 
health service that doctors will act in the patients’ and funders’ best interest (Maynard and 
Bloor, 2003). The specialised nature of healthcare means that neither patients nor payers have 
full information to make decisions, creating information asymmetry, where consumers seek 
the specialised advice of an agent in order to make decisions (ibid). Doctors act as agents for 
patients, advising them about best treatment options and at the same time acting as agents 
for funders, advising on what to purchase and where (Blomqvist, 1991). However, these 
agency relationships are imperfect since doctors are not impartial9 and the response to this 
incomplete agency relies on professionalism and self-regulation (Maynard and Bloor, 2003). 
For 40 years, it was thought that the administrative structure of the system was crucial for 
achieving efficiency and the integration of services (Webster, 2002); so for example, the 
restructuration of 1974 sought to streamline administration and money flow in the system 
whilst other components remained untouched. Governments relied on trust in the altruistic 
behaviour of healthcare professionals to work in a coordinated manner to run the service 
(Maynard and Bloor, 2003). Licensure and self-regulation were the main means to regulate 
                                                             
9 Doctors have personal interests such as improving their income, professional satisfaction and enjoying 
leisure time. These interests can in part agree and in part disagree with the interests of patients and 
payers. To be a perfect agency relationship, doctors should take decisions from the patient’s point of 
view, forgetting their personal aspirations (Maynard and Bloor, 2003). Supplier-induced demand is one 
example of this imperfect agency relationship (McGuire, 2000). 
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their activities, giving medics the freedom to practice (ibid). Efforts at improvement were 
based on information gathering exercises, and therefore, were a series of reports providing 
recommendations about the better use of material and human resources within the NHS. The 
Porritt Report (1962) looked at the organisation of the medical service with an emphasis on 
the tripartite structure,10 seeing administrative changes as a way to improve healthcare 
provision. The Cogwheel Report (1967) also focused on medical services, but in the hospitals. 
Again, it proposed organisational changes so that consultants could work in sub-speciality 
teams. The Merrison Report (1975) found a lack of control over the standards of practice in the 
medical profession; therefore, it recommended that the General Medical Council should be 
responsible for regulating education, the practice of doctors, and maintaining a register of 
physicians. Although these initiatives proposed improvements to the service, none of them 
defied the ability of healthcare professionals to run the service. 
Despite all these reports trying to drive change, the introduction of initiatives for quality 
improvement was sporadic. A sense of professional jealousy, and resistance to change 
(especially coming from outside the health professions), partially explains why this happened 
(Berwick, 2003). In general, the adoption of innovations in healthcare is slow. To be effective, 
quality improvement innovations should come from within the professions, requiring different 
leaders holding a diverse social capital to ignite positive change (Berwick, 2003, Greenhalgh et 
al., 2004). 
One example of the pace of change in healthcare is the introduction of evidence-based 
practice. Cochrane (1972) outlined the fundamental idea that decisions about treatments 
should be based on randomised trials, but it became “the new big innovation” 20 years later 
when Sackett and Guyatt proposed the term “evidence-based medicine” (Guyatt et al., 1992). 
NICE, an institution producing guidelines on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
treatments, was created five years later. It took the health professions several years to realise 
that best evidence was not being used consistently in practice (Bero et al., 1998), creating a 
new discipline of “knowledge translation” or “implementation science” (Graham et al., 2006). 
Although this new discipline uses several of the principles of continuous quality improvement, 
the fact that it came from the internal realisation that improvement was not being brought 
about as expected, triggered a change. 
The emergence of evidence questioning the effectiveness of interventions, highlighting 
unwarranted variations in practice, and the consequences of avoidable medical errors eroded 
                                                             
10 The tripartite structure refers to how the service was organised in 1962. Regional hospitals boards 
administrated hospital services, the executive council was in charge of primary care (including dental 
and ophthalmic services), and local health authorities managed community services (Webster, 2002). 
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the trust of funders, who looked for ways to increase accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, 
and quality (Maynard and Bloor, 2003). Professionalism has driven most changes in the 
practice of healthcare, and the NHS still relies on the altruistic motives of healthcare 
professionals to provide services on a daily basis, but the erosion of trust translated “trust and 
altruism” into an underlying condition instead of the primary driver of quality.  
The first change was the introduction of managers to the service in an environment with 
increasing financial pressure, rising consumer standards (Walshe, 2003), along with a wider 
societal shift toward neoliberal ideas of privatisation, de-regulation and containment of fiscal 
spending (Webster, 2002). This change was introduced after the publication of the Griffiths 
Report (1983), which looked into the management of the health services and suggested that: 
If Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS 
today, she would almost certainly be searching for the people in charge. 
There was discontent with medical self-regulation, and it was thought that managerial 
ideologies could increase efficiency (Ham, 2009a). However, filling those positions with medics 
instead of managers reduced the impact of the measure (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). The 
patients’ charter and the quasi-market reforms also had limited impact (see section 3.2.2 for 
more details about the quasi-market reform and its impact), partly due to the opposition of 
medics, except for GP fundholding, which gave power to GPs, strengthening their position and 
shifting the internal power within the medical profession (Saks, 2015). Since then (1991), any 
other reform perceived to strengthen the internal market has been opposed by the medical 
profession on the ground of increasing or leading to privatisation (Saks, 2015). 
The reign of trust and altruism ended after several scandals related to poor medical conduct, 
which eroded the public’s trust and provided evidence that this method alone was insufficient 
to govern quality (Maynard and Bloor, 2003). After holding inquiries to investigate the cause of 
these failures, it was found that in hospitals it was often viewed as not permitted to challenge 
specialist doctors or consultants because of their higher ranking (Ritchie, 2000), the culture 
was described as an “old-boys club”, the approach to clinical safety was lax, and patients were 
left-out of clinical decisions (Kennedy, 2001). The unethical conduct of a few eroded the trust 
in doctors and health professionals, whilst the lack of reliable information on quality in the 
NHS hindered confirming or refuting the suspicions of poor care in other areas (Maynard and 
Bloor, 2003). 
Professionalism still has the potential to be a more effective and efficient option for steering 
efforts to improve the NHS compared to using targets and external inspections (Maynard and 
Bloor, 2003). Firstly, it relies on and encourages internal motivation; secondly, it avoids the 
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unintended consequences of external methods of control, such as impaired self-determination 
(Frey, 1997); and thirdly, it can reduce the costs of external oversight institutions. However, 
returning to a reliance on trust would require better information systems and a cultural 
change to encourage improvement on a regular basis. The publication of surgical outcomes 
(Royal College of Surgeons, 2018) and the National Clinical Audit Programme (HQIP, 2018) are 
two examples of initiatives seeking to collect better information to increase transparency and 
drive improvements, which illustrates that a change of culture is already happening. 
3.2.2 Quasi-markets 
In 1987, the prime minister called for a review of the NHS since it was constantly under 
financial pressure. Several financing options were taken into consideration, trying to find an 
option that could increase efficiency, productivity, and quality regarding value for money 
(Klein, 2013). The final decision of the government was to follow Enthoven (1985) advice to 
implement an internal market. This would split providers and purchasers with the aim of 
increasing market contestability (i.e. reducing barriers to market entry and exit) by introducing 
contracts formalising the volume, quality and costs expected from providers (Maynard, 1991). 
Additionally, GP fundholding was implemented, where GPs could receive funds to purchase 
services for their patients (Maynard, 1986), although patients could not exercise choice 
themselves. Hospitals could choose to become NHS Trusts, which would confer on them more 
freedom to decide what services to provide (Maynard, 1991). 
In practice, evidence suggests that the effect of the various implemented policies was mixed, 
although the quality of the studies was inconsistent (Le Grand et al., 1998, Brereton and 
Vasoodaven, 2010, The Health Foundation, 2011). However, it must be considered that 
attributing the impact of the reforms was difficult because the implementation of many of 
them was voluntary (i.e. GP fundholding and NHS trust status), no monitoring system was in 
place to allow measuring their impact, and the injection of extra financial resources into the 
NHS was a confounding factor (Le Grand et al., 1998).  
Overall, GP fundholding seems to be the most successful policy since it led to improvements in 
secondary care quality and responsiveness; however, the quality of evidence is low (Le Grand 
et al., 1998, Brereton and Vasoodaven, 2010). Evidence on the impact of GP fundolding on 
referral rates and prescription costs appeared mixed (Surender et al., 1995, Stewart-Brown et 
al., 1995, Wilson et al., 1995, Redfern and Bowling, 2000, Dusheiko et al., 2006); costs 
decreased during the first two years, but increased later (Whynes and Reed, 1994, Stewart-
Brown et al., 1995, Whynes et al., 1997, Propper et al., 1998, Dixon et al., 1998); waiting times 
decreased and patient satisfaction with non-medical aspects of care improved (Mahon et al., 
1994, Dowling, 1997, Surender et al., 1998, Propper et al., 2002, Xavier, 2003, Dusheiko et al., 
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2004, Dusheiko et al., 2007). Patient choice does not seem to have been affected by this 
reform (Le Grand et al., 1998). However, the practices choosing to be GP fundholders tended 
to be better organised and located in middle-class areas, which could partially explain the 
improvements seen (Brereton and Vasoodaven, 2010). 
In terms of the effect of quasi-market reforms in hospital services, there is evidence suggesting 
improvements in productivity and reduced costs for those becoming NHS trusts (Söderlund et 
al., 1997, Hensher and Edwards, 1999). This suggests that hospitals found ways to respond to 
the incentives created. For example, the length of stay following surgery declined, but the 
proportion of patients being sent to nursing homes increased (Hamilton and Bramley‐Harker, 
1999). In terms of productivity, the number of elective admissions increased, whilst waiting 
times decreased (Propper et al., 2008). Conversely, the effect on quality of care might have 
been negative, since there is evidence that mortality rates got worse (Propper et al., 2004, 
Propper et al., 2008). Consequently, the overall effect of the quasi-market and the extra 
independence given to NHS trusts were mixed. 
What this period taught us about governing quality of care through a quasi-market was that its 
creation was feasible without catastrophic consequences, but provisions for the internal 
market were not enough to drive competition or significant improvements, and patients’ 
choice did not increase. However, the reforms did drive efficiency. It is contested that political 
interference and the lack of information on the quality of providers and the supply and 
demand available might have hindered the functioning of the market and the exploitation of 
its beneficial effects (Le Grand et al., 1998, Brereton and Vasoodaven, 2010). 
3.2.3 Managing through “targets and terror” and “naming and shaming” 
In the late 1990s, there was a series of cases of inadequate care in the NHS that led to a new 
regulatory cycle (Walshe, 2003). 
1. The outgoing Conservative government agreed to conduct an inquiry into the deaths of 29 
children receiving cardiac surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary in March 1997 (Kennedy, 
2001);  
2. In June 1997, the Secretary of State established a panel led by the Chief Medical Officer to 
investigate the cancer screening services at the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital. The panel 
found that at least 11 women had died due to medical misconduct (NHS Executive, 1997);  
3. In September 1998, the General Medical Council struck Rodney Ledward from the Medical 
Register after finding him guilty of medical misconduct during his practice as a 
gynaecologist (Ritchie, 2000) and  
4. In the same month, Harold Shipman was arrested for killing his patients whilst he worked as 
a GP (Smith, 2005), and later convicted of murder. 
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These cases led to inquiries (Ritchie, 2000, Kennedy, 2001, Smith, 2005) highlighting perceived 
problems in the culture of the NHS (i.e. being highly hierarchical and secretive about adverse 
incidents and malpractice) and a lack of adequate processes to reduce harm to patients. These 
failings were addressed discursively through the language of “modernisation”, the increasingly 
centralised control of resources (Klein, 2013) and with an emphasis on policy effectiveness as a 
goal (Blair 1997).  
The first five years of the 21st Century saw an emphasis on governing quality based on targets 
and reputation. Targets arose from the promise of increasing spending to the European 
average and an NHS plan with ambitious standards for waiting times (Klein, 2013). Targets 
were introduced as “Public Service Agreements” and aimed at increasing the efficiency and 
accountability of all public services, setting annual targets to measure performance (Klein, 
2013, Panchamia and Thomas, 2014). The targets for the NHS were integrated into star ratings, 
where NHS trusts received a star rating from zero to three based on meeting these standards 
(Bevan and Cornwell, 2006). Chief Executives of zero star hospitals were sacked (Besley et al., 
2009). In 2002, the Commission for Healthcare Improvement (CHI) took responsibility from the 
NHS Executive for the assessment and publication of star ratings. This led to the combination 
of three pieces of information in a balanced score card to produce star ratings: CHI’s 
assessment of progress implementing the seven pillars of clinical governance (i.e. Clinical 
Governance Reviews), and compliance with nine key targets and 40 additional indicators 
(Bevan and Cornwell, 2006). “Naming and shaming” came via the publication of hospital 
league tables – thus failures were more rapidly made more public than had been the case in 
the NHS’s past. 
Alongside “targets and terror”, the government implemented a package of quality 
improvement strategies. The white paper outlining these reforms (A First Class Service, NHS 
Executive, 1998) tipped the focus from making structural changes for delivering quality into 
focusing on external governance arrangements to improve the processes and outcomes of 
care. The first strategy proposed was the standards of practice produced by the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). The second was a review of relevant pathways of 
treatment through the National Service Framework. The third and fourth strategies were 
monitoring of performance through external oversight carried out by the Commission for 
Healthcare Improvement (CHI) and clinical governance as a way to change the organisational 
culture within the NHS, directing it towards one that would encourage continuing 
improvement and learning from mistakes (Klein, 2013). Box 1 highlights the functions of CHI 
and the seven pillars of its clinical governance reviews. 
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The regulatory functions of the CHI 
From April 2000, the CHI was responsible for: 
 Clinical governance reviews of NHS trusts and primary care trust providers 
 Developing and disseminating clinical governance principles and best practice  
 Examining the implementation of National Service Frameworks and NICE guidelines 
 Investigating serious or persistent problems of quality caused by systemic failures. 
From April 2003, the CHI was additionally responsible for: 
 Contracting for annual national surveys of staff and patients, and national clinical audits 
 Publishing star-ratings 
 Publishing an annual report to parliament on national progress on health care 
 
The seven pillars of clinical governance 
Processes for quality improvement 
 Consultation and patient involvement 
 Clinical risk management 
 Clinical audit 
 Research and effectiveness 
Staff focus 
 Staffing and staff management 
 Education, training and continuing personal and professional development 
Use of information 
 Use of information to support clinical governance and health care delivery. 
Box 1 CHI's functions and criteria for assessing clinical governance. Adapted from Bevan (2011) 
 
Besley et al. (2009) used a difference-in-difference design to compare the effect of “naming 
and shaming” and “targets and terror” on hospital waiting lists using the pre-2000 era in 
England, and performance in Wales, as controls. They found that the successive targets 
introduced reduced the number of patients waiting longer than the target (compared to the 
median size of the waiting list in June 1999) to zero. Additionally, the new nine-month wait 
target reduced by 67% the number of patients waiting between nine and 12 months. However, 
evidence of gaming by means of shifting patients across waiting categories was also found. For 
instance, when the 15-month and 18-month targets were introduced, there was an increase in 
the number of patients waiting between three and nine months (Besley et al., 2009). This 
regime also had an effect on in-hospital mortality, which was reduced in England, but 
remained stable in Wales; whilst the number of finished consultant episodes increased to a 
greater extent in England than in Wales (Besley et al., 2009). 
Despite the apparent success of this regime, official audits found issues with measurement of 
targets (National Audit Office, 2004), whilst patients reported worse performance than what 
was officially reported (CHI, 2004). One of the issues was the lack of a systematic auditing 
system that could reduce gaming in the absence of strong proxies for performance, or that 
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could measure the extent of gaming (Bevan and Hood, 2006b). This phenomenon can be seen 
to produce an "audit hole" where central government does not question the quality or 
reliability of performance information that appears as a remarkable success (ibid). 
This governance model was successful (National Audit Office, 2003, Benson et al., 2004, Day 
and Klein, 2004) because of the combination of successive and ambitious targets, real and 
meaningful sanctions to chief executives, and the straightforward publication of a ranking of 
performance with reputational effects. However, this was implemented at a time when the 
health service had extra money injected, and it was common understanding that improving 
waiting times was a long-standing issue. Therefore, institutions made a public commitment to 
achieving this goal. 
3.2.4 Choice and competition 
The reforms necessary for the implementation of the governance model of choice and 
competition started with the creation of a quasi-market (i.e. 1989) and were further advanced 
with the implementation of Primary Care Groups (PCGs) in 1999, which were renamed Primary 
Care Trusts in 2002 (Klein, 2013). They continued with the introduction of the choice of an 
alternative provider for patients (2002) and an increase in taxes in 2003 to fund extra spending 
in the NHS (Stevens, 2004). In 2004, reforms followed with the creation of NHS Foundation 
Trusts; the introduction of payment-by-results; the creation of Monitor; and the Commission 
for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI). CHAI had the mission of incorporating patients’ 
views of services, allowing users to make informed decisions about where to receive care (i.e. 
enabling informed choice) and promoting a culture of continuous quality improvement within 
the NHS (Haslam, 2007). These reforms were seen as a way to increase the incentives to 
improve efficiency and quality since strong performance management is effective for short 
periods of time (Stevens, 2004, Le Grand and Hunter, 2006, Timmins, 2010), and in the past 
only using competition had not been enough to drive improvements11 (Stevens, 2004). Again, 
the institution regulating the quality of the health service (i.e. CHAI) was in charge of producing 
an annual ‘health check’, which provided information on how well each provider was doing; 
however, the primary mechanism to govern quality and drive improvement was based on 
patient and purchaser choice and competition. The rating provided through the annual health 
check was obtained by combining a self-assessment of performance, the views of third parties 
on the accuracy of the declaration, CHAI’s desktop-based assessment of the trust, and the 
results of the inspection (if there was one) . Box 2 highlights the functions of CHAI and the 
standards assessed during the annual health check. 
                                                             
11 The reforms implemented in 1990s had a limited effect on patient choice and were mainly based on 
increasing contestability of the market (Maynard, 1991). 
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The regulatory functions of the CHAI 
The CHAI was responsible for: 
 Assessing the performance of each NHS organisation and awarding an annual rating 
 Regulating independent sector health care providers 
 Investigating serious service failures in the NHS 
 Carrying out reviews of the economy and efficiency of the provision of health care 
 considering complaints about NHS bodies that had not been resolved locally 
 Reporting annually to parliament on the state of health care in England and Wales 
 Promoting the effective co-ordination of reviews or assessments of health care provision. 
Core and developmental standards for the annual health check 2006/2007 
Safety Health care processes, working practices and systemic activities prevent or reduce 
the risk of harm to patients 
Clinical and cost-
effectiveness 
Health care meet their individual needs through health care decisions and services 
that provide effective clinical outcomes 
Governance Leadership and accountability, and the organisation’s culture, systems and working 
practices ensure that probity, quality assurance and improvement, and patient 
safety are central to all the activities of the health care organisation 
Patient focus Health care respects needs, preferences and choices of patients and carers. It is co-
ordinated with other organisations that can impact patient well-being 
Accessible and 
responsive care 
Services are prompt, patients have choice of services and treatments, and do not 
experience unnecessary delay at any stage of delivery or along the care pathway 
Care environment 
and amenities 
Care environments promote patient and staff well-being. They are designed for the 
effective and safe delivery of treatment, care or a specific function, provide privacy, 
are well maintained and are cleaned 
Public health Services are designed and delivered in collaboration with communities to promote, 
protect and improve health and reduce health inequalities 
Box 2 CHAI functions and standards for the annual health check. Adapted from Bevan (2011). 
 
Three econometric studies provide evidence about the effectiveness of the choice and 
competition model that advanced the market-like reforms introduced in the 1990s. Bloom et 
al. (2010) analysed the effect of selective contracting12 on managerial practices and Acute 
Myocardial Infarction (AMI) mortality rates using an instrumental variable analysis. They found 
that more competition was associated with lower emergency AMI mortality rates and better 
management practices. An increase of three hospitals in an area would be associated with a 
reduction of 5.7% points in AMI mortality rates. These findings were robust after adjusting for 
population density, number of admissions, patients’ age and case-mix, hospitals’ 
characteristics, and sensitivity analyses using different measures of competition. 
                                                             
12 Selective contracting was created as a way to integrate pathways of care for patients with chronic 
conditions. Primary, community and mental health care providers would liaise with the hospital sector 
to bid for package of services; therefore, competition was for the market (Siciliani et al., 2017). 
58 
Two other econometric studies showed lower emergency AMI and 28-day all-cause mortality 
rates after the introduction of competition and patient choice (Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor et 
al., 2011). Cooper et al. (2011) used a difference-in-difference design to assess market 
concentration in seven different scenarios using Herfindahl‐Hirschman Indexes (HHI), which 
measures competition for equal market share hospitals. Their findings were robust after 
adjusting for severity of illness, age, foundation trust status, volume of patients treated with 
AMI and changes in how competition was measured. The only confounding factor remaining is 
extra funds injected and the growth of the workforce in the same period. However, Gaynor et 
al. (2011) had similar findings even when adjusting for hospital expenditure. Their results come 
from a difference-in-difference analysis that adjusted for case-mix, health status and income of 
the catchment population, as well as distance from hospital, teaching status of hospital, total 
number of admissions, and proportion of doctors and nurses in the clinical staff. 
Despite these promising results, questions have been raised about whether competition 
mechanisms that apply largely to elective surgery are likely to reduce acute mortality rates. In 
addition, there is a lack of association between Patient Reported Outcomes Measures (PROMs) 
and risk-adjusted mortality rates during the same period (Bevan and Skellern, 2011). Another 
plausible explanation for the changes observed is competing interventions such as external 
inspections and performance monitoring through the “annual checks” (Bevan, 2014). 
During choice and competition, the NHS improved regarding efficiency, patient choice, and the 
care of long-term conditions; but the implementation of layered reforms with different 
objectives and messages makes it difficult to attribute changes to any specific reform and 
might have hindered a greater effect of the reforms (Mays and Dixon, 2011). Mays and Dixon 
(2011) contest that the impact of the market reforms was modest, mainly due to patchy 
implementation, although none of the fears about market-related changes materialised (ibid). 
Competition increased mainly in suburban areas between conurbations (i.e. adjacent cities), 
choice improved for diagnostic studies and elective procedures, whilst payment-by-results 
increased efficiency (Mays and Dixon, 2011).  
The unintended consequences arising from this period were that continuously implementing 
reforms creates a sense of uncertainty in the NHS and confusion about priorities. The 
discourse of Labour followed three lines: meeting targets, increasing completion, and 
improving cooperative work. For providers, these may be competing goals, which makes the 
task of meeting NHS priorities difficult because it is not clear how these goals are ranked. 
3.2.5 Macro level inquiries 
Between 2010 and 2013 there was a transition period dominated by inquiries and reviews into 
the care provided by the NHS, which partly changed the tone of the reforms for governing 
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quality. Before this point, the views of management and economics were imposed on 
healthcare professionals following the maxim that the service could be more efficient, whereas 
external oversight institutions had a marginal role providing information on the quality of the 
services with variable success. The lighter touch approach to regulation of CHAI allowed Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust to prioritise finances over quality (Bevan, 2015). The trust 
managed to reduce its deficit by cutting nursing staff whilst demanding waiting time targets 
were met, although the care provided was inadequate and mortality rates higher than 
expected (Bevan, 2015). 
The first Francis Report (2010) investigated this failure of care, finding that the care provided 
was below the expected standard. Patients were not treated with dignity and respect, whilst 
there was a bullying culture that was not open to learning from previous mistakes (Francis, 
2010). In 2010, a second Inquiry was commissioned to explore what actions had been taken by 
the regulatory structure in place between 2005 and 2009 (Francis, 2013). The Inquiry found 
that monitoring systems were ineffective, inspections lacked sensitivity to detect problems or 
prevent harm, commissioners and regulators did not share intelligence when they had it, and 
responses to any potential concern were slow (Francis, 2013). 
Under the suspicion that the failures of Mid-Staffordshire could be happening in other 
hospitals, Sir Bruce Keogh, the Chief Medical Officer, reviewed the functioning of 14 acute 
trusts that had been outliers for two consecutive years on the Summary Hospital Mortality 
Index (SHMI) or the Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio (HSMR). Keogh (2013) found five 
problematic areas associated with high mortality:  
- Use of data: hospitals were dismissing data on mortality alleging it was inaccurate. 
- Recruitment and retention of skilled staff. 
- Management of the flow of patients in and out of the hospital, particularly elderly 
patients. 
- Poor and defensive management of complaints. 
- Board members and clinical leaders had inadequate competence to devise a quality 
improvement strategy, and triangulation of information was insufficient to identify 
main risk areas. 
Thorlby et al. (2014) found that one year after the publication of the Francis Inquiry Report; 
NHS trusts were making efforts to change the culture, increasing openness, transparency and 
candour, but it was still difficult to balance financial constraints and the delivery of quality. 
Another consequence of the Francis Inquiry was the Berwick report (2013) into safety and 
avoidable harm in the NHS. Its findings are particularly salient for this thesis since safety is one 
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of the domains assessed by the CQC. The report highlighted problems that had been identified 
in the past, for instance, the lack of a clear supervisory system had been identified in the 
Griffiths Report (1983); whereas patients who were not empowered and fully involved in 
clinical decision making, and lack of transparency with performance data were elements 
underscored after the Kennedy Inquiry (2001). Prioritising quality of care and patient safety, 
and ensuring that services were adequately staffed in terms of number, experience, and skill-
mix were elements that resonated with the Francis Inquiry recommendations.  
The Berwick Report also recommended simplifying the regulatory system since it was deemed 
of “bewildering” complexity, with areas not being regulated and others having agencies with 
overlapping functions. The level of coherence in the system was considered key; with goals, 
incentives, and regulations pointing in the same direction to maximise their effectiveness. 
Regarding the CQC, the Berwick Report (2013) suggested that the Trust Development 
Authority, Monitor, and CQC should cooperate with each other and any other agency 
managing care quality intelligence to detect failings early and streamline information requests 
from providers. Additionally, judgements about care quality should be made based on a 
thorough assessment by expert inspectors, founded on the principles of responsive regulation, 
where the CQC would have a range of enforcement options. Many of these recommendations 
were later implemented (e.g. using the principles of responsive regulation) to make the CQC 
more responsive (see section 3.3). 
This period relied on the legal view of governance; therefore, it increased regulation and 
legislation as policy instruments to protect the right to health and deter any inappropriate 
behaviour. Consequently, the legal framework changed (2014), and several reviews were 
commissioned into the specific recommendations of the Francis Inquiry (e.g. the Cavendish 
Review (2013) into support workers in the NHS and social care, and the Clwyd and Hart Review 
(2013), looking into NHS hospitals complaints management systems). One of the consequences 
of this period was establishing the legal framework for more regulation. This involved the 
creation of fundamental standards of care enforceable by law, giving the CQC legal powers to 
issue sanctions, merging Monitor and the Trust Development Authority into NHS 
Improvement, and a revision of the CQC regime of inspections to prevent another gross failure 
of care. The legacy of this period was creating consensus that improving the safety and 
patient-centeredness of care was urgent, and that the case of Mid-Staffordshire was 
unacceptable. This created an adequate environment for providers to accept tougher 
regulations and more public scrutiny for regaining the population’s trust in the service. 
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3.3  The current model of governance: the “inspection state” 
The Care Quality Commission (CQC) was created in 2008 as the independent regulator for 
quality across the health and social care sector, inheriting the risk-based regulatory model 
previously used by the CHAI (Adil, 2008). However, a series of events led to a change of CQC 
inspection regime in 2013: 
- The Health Select Committee (2011) criticised the CQC for not performing its duty as it 
was behind schedule with registrations of providers and was not performing enough on-
site inspections. Additionally, despite being alerted by a whistleblower about poor care 
in the Winterbourne View Hospital - which appeared in BBC’s Panorama - it had not 
investigated the potential issues or had contacted the whistleblower. The Health Select 
Committee said that the CQC was performing too much desktop monitoring and it was 
not possible to be confident that a provider was meeting the standards unless there was 
at least one announced visit per year. 
- All CQC senior management was replaced after covering up poor care in the maternity 
services of Morecambe Bay NHS Trust (Health Select Committee, 2013). In 2010, the 
CQC had given false assurances to Monitor and the public about the quality of care 
provided by University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Trust, which led to the 
authorisation of the trust to become a Foundation Trust. At that time, the trust had 
higher than expected mortality rates and there were several allegations that the 
maternity services were providing poor care. Senior management had ordered staff to 
delete and replace the report highlighting these failures. 
- The Francis Inquiry questioned the CQC’s ability to detect failures to comply with 
minimum standards (Francis, 2013). The many agencies, regulators, professional bodies, 
and commissioners, which were expected to detect and take action to ensure 
compliance with acceptable standards of care, failed to do so (Francis, 2013). 
Additionally, annual checks relied on self-reported information instead of putting more 
emphasis on actual inspections.13 These self-assessments of compliance put emphasis 
on the presence of theoretical systems, rather than on patients' outcomes. This, 
together with a passive approach to regulation that did not challenge the information 
provided by hospitals, led to ineffective operation. 
These three events in combination with all the recommendations of the Keogh Review (2013) 
and the Berwick Report (2013) led to the implementation of a more-resource intensive regime 
                                                             
13 Between 2005 and 2009, which is the period that the Francis Inquiry examined, hospitals were subject 
to annual checks conducted by the CHAI. These included a self-assessment of performance and an 
inspection of those hospitals deemed at risk of failure (Bevan, 2011). 
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of inspections intended to detect any potential failures of care. It was conceived to move away 
from “tick-box” judgements of quality to more thorough, quantitative and qualitative 
intelligence-based assessments of performance (Care Quality Commission, 2013b). Before the 
change of regulatory regime, CQC assessed compliance with the essential standards and could 
issue an enforcement action when a trust was deemed non-compliant. Box 3 highlights the 
functions of the CQC up to 2013 and the essential standards assessed during on-site visits. 
 
The regulatory functions of the CQC 
The CQC was to monitor: 
 The medical and clinical treatment given to people of all ages in hospitals, by the ambulance 
service and mental health services. Also, primary care (e.g. GP and dental practices) 
 The care provided in residential homes, in the community, in adult patients’ own homes, and 
in residential care homes for children 
 The services provided for people whose rights are restricted under the Mental Health Act 
 The care provided by the NHS and the independent sector. 
 
CQC essential standards of quality and safety of care up to 2014. 
 respecting and involving people who use services 
 consent to care and treatment 
 care and welfare of people who use services 
 meeting nutritional needs 
 co-operating with other providers 
 safeguarding vulnerable people who use services 
 cleanliness and infection control 
 management of medicines 
 safety and suitability of premises 
 safety, availability and suitability of equipment 
 requirements relating to workers 
 staffing 
 supporting workers 
 assessing and monitoring the quality of service provision 
 complaints 
 Records 
Box 3 CQC regulatory functions and essential standards of care. Adapted from Bevan (2011) 
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In assessing the effect of this change of regime, it must be considered that the CQC operates in 
a context in which all previous mechanisms to govern quality already exist: targets and 
standards, a split between providers and purchasers, commissioners’ ability to buy services 
from any willing provider, payment-by-results, and some freedom of choice for patients. 
However, perhaps the most significant moderator of the potential effectiveness of the CQC is 
the complexity of the current structure of the NHS (Figure 3.1). As highlighted in the Berwick 
Report (2013), there are commissioning organisations and regulatory institutions with various 
degrees of power to oversee the delivery of quality. The CQC is one more of them. For 
example, NHS Improvement (formerly the Trust Development Authority and Monitor), the 
CQC, and the local Health Watch all exert regulatory functions over acute hospitals. Hospitals 
are also accountable to their clinical commissioning group (and NHS England for specialised 
services). This implies that incentives might not always be aligned and these institutions can 
convey mixed messages about priorities for improvement, making it difficult to isolate the 
influence of all these actors. 
 
Figure 3.1 Diagram of current NHS structure. Modified from the Commonwealth Fund (2017) 
 
3.3.1 The new regime of CQC inspections 
The methodology used in the investigation led by Sir Bruce Keogh served as the basis for the 
new inspection model that the CQC piloted between September 2013 and September 2014 
(Walshe et al., 2014). Although the main domains guiding inspections were re-organised to 
match the new definition of care quality, the fundamental standards and the definition of high 
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quality of care were changed after the Inquiry (Care Quality Commission, 2014a). The most 
important standards, therefore, should be clear to providers. Currently, high quality of care 
should be safe, effective, caring, responsive to people’s needs and well-led (Care Quality 
Commission, 2015b). These characteristics are aligned with the “key lines of inquiry”, which 
are the main topics that inspection focuses on, and with the fundamental standards that need 
to be met by law. 
The current inspection regime of the CQC (see Appendix Chapter 3, Figure 3.2) is guided by a 
risk-based assessment called “intelligence monitoring”, similar to the one employed by the 
CHAI (Haslam, 2007). The information collected is used to prioritise where to inspect first and 
guides which services within a provider may be failing, although all health and social care 
providers should be inspected in a three-year cycle (Care Quality Commission, 2015c). The 
method of inspection officially introduced since October 2014 was a radical change from the 
previous regime. Between 2009 and 2013, the CQC assessed a selection of 28 essential 
standards during each visit, judging compliance as “meeting standards”, “requiring 
improvement” or “enforcement action required”. Teams comprised two to five inspectors 
visiting for two to three days (Care Quality Commission, 2010a). In the case of the regime 
implemented in 2013, inspection teams comprised between 30 to 100 people depending on 
the size and variety of services given by the providers, including healthcare professionals with 
different backgrounds and experts by experience (Walshe et al., 2014). This model is similar to 
quality governance assessments of the CHI, which involved a small number of inspectors on-
site for a week and was changed because it was time-consuming and reports were inconsistent 
(Day and Klein, 2004, Benson et al., 2004, Adil, 2008). 
3.3.2 Is the “new” CQC regime of inspections effective? 
Given the complexity of the regulatory environment with its competing priorities, a self-
assessment of CQC performance was inadequate; therefore, the CQC commissioned The King’s 
Fund to review the new inspection model during the first wave of inspections in 2013 (Walshe 
et al., 2014). In general, hospitals that were inspected found this process time-consuming, 
although knowing that the inspection was imminent was reported to have served as a catalyst 
for change and started mobilising leaders within each team (ibid). Several hospitals valued the 
inspections because it reflected some of the problems managers were trying to address and it 
helped them look for strategies to improve their service (ibid). 
The definition of quality, fundamental standards and key lines of inquiry in the new inspection 
model are aligned with each other,14 but there are problems of validity and reliability of the 
                                                             
14 For example, the definition of quality says that care should be safe, which is one of the domains the 
CQC assesses. This domain contains five key lines of enquiry. The second one (lessons are learnt and 
65 
measurements (Boyd et al., 2014, Boyd et al., 2017). The CQC adopted an approach of 
“learning by doing” (Walshe et al., 2014), which was translated into changes in the regulations 
twice within one year (i.e. September 2014 and April 2015). The CQC developed the prompts 
for the inspection, the rationale to determine the ratings, and the format for the final report 
before the pilot implementation in September 2013, polishing it during the first six months. 
This produced anxiety among health and social care providers because they did not know how 
the inspection was going to go or how to prepare for it (Walshe et al., 2014). This approach of 
“learning by doing” has also produced inconsistent ratings, since the criteria for assessment 
are subjective and still under development (ibid). 
CQC inspections aim to assure high quality of care and promote continuous improvement of 
the services provided by inspected institutions. Quality summits are held so that providers can 
present and agree on a plan for improvement (Walshe et al., 2014). One of the major problems 
to achieve the CQC’s main goal is the depth of monitoring for the “action plan” (ibid). High 
performing institutions make considerable efforts to empower their employees to “own” 
change; they have a culture that learns from mistakes, and good leadership (Ham, 2014a). 
Currently, the CQC reviews how much of the action plan has been implemented after six 
months (Care Quality Commission, 2015b), without monitoring how this process is carried out 
or the impact it has on health outcomes (e.g., changes in mortality or waiting times). This 
poses the risk that providers can focus on “easy wins” without making more fundamental 
changes to the organisational culture that could be translated into better and safer care for the 
population. 
Day and Klein (2004) propose four factors necessary for the effectiveness of inspection 
regimes in general:  
i) Inspectors with experience in the service,  
ii) Ability to balance local needs with national standards,  
iii) Risks that are proportional to the cost of the inspection,  
iv) Clear and explicit goals for the inspected organisation, and for the inspection 
regime.  
CQC highlights that efforts have been made to address these factors (Care Quality 
Commission, 2015c). However, it is not clear yet if the costs of the inspection are proportional 
to the risk of failure. In 2016, CQC reported that the average cost of an inspection in the 
hospital directorate was £108,581, without specifying if there was a relationship between their 
                                                             
improvements made after adverse events) elicits the assessment of the fundamental standard of “duty 
of candour”. This is measured by three indicators of the intelligent monitoring tool: proportion of 
reported patient safety incidents that are harmful, potential under-reporting of patient safety incidents, 
and proportion of staff who stated that the incident reporting procedure was fair and effective. 
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expenditure and the risk of failure of the trust (Care Quality Commission, 2016b). Moreover, 
the lack of a standard threshold to determine if a health policy is cost-effective hinders making 
a judgement as to whether this cost is reasonable for what the CQC delivers. 
3.3.3 Why should CQC inspections improve quality? 
The new regime of CQC inspections is embedded within the broader governance model of the 
“inspection state”. This model (as suggested in Table 3.1) has as the main systemic drivers for 
improvement the anticipatory pressure and the potential enforcement actions of CQC15. When 
sanctions are not imposed, trusts would respond due to reputational concerns, since they do 
not want to be seen as inferior to trusts that are perceived as similar (Garcia et al., 2013). For 
individual trusts, Robertson et al. (2017) propose eight mechanisms of change regarding how 
CQC influences organisational performance and behaviour: anticipatory, directive, relational, 
organisational, informational, lateral, stakeholder, and systemic. For example, the publication 
of new standards incites providers to assess if they are meeting these new standards, and to 
implement remedial changes if they are not (i.e. systemic). Before the inspection, 
organisations may perform self-assessments to determine their level of compliance (i.e. 
anticipatory), or consult with similar providers previously inspected to obtain “inside 
information” (i.e. lateral). The anticipatory and lateral mechanisms can trigger remedial action 
or increase awareness about quality standards. During the inspection, CQC may use soft 
influence to suggest improvements (i.e. relational). After a CQC visit, the regulator may 
mandate changes to service provision (i.e. directive), but an organisation can decide to make 
changes that have not been requested, based on what they learned during the inspection 
process (i.e. organisational). Furthermore, stakeholders, such as commissioners and patients’ 
groups, can influence organisations to make improvements after an inspection (i.e. 
stakeholders). Finally, the publication of the findings may lead to further changes to maintain 
or improve reputation (i.e. informational). 
Based on Robertson et al. (2017); a formative qualitative assessment of the pilot phase of the 
new regime of inspections (Walshe et al., 2014); the CQC guidance for providers (Care Quality 
Commission, 2015c); and the findings from the Keogh Review (2013); a two-level logic model 
was constructed for this thesis. The logic model aims to explain how CQC inspections of acute 
NHS trusts could drive improvements in quality of care. The macro-level logic model (Figure 
3.2) addresses the contextual variables that can influence the response of an acute NHS trust, 
considering the trust as a single unit. The micro-level logic model (Figure 3.3) depicts the steps 
                                                             
15 When a trust is found non-compliant, CQC can enforce action and impose sanctions. Options available 
to them include compliance actions, modify conditions of registration, issue warning notices, 
recommend trusts are put under ‘special measures’ and even prosecute Trust Boards (CQC, 2015a). 
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taken by acute NHS trusts to implement improvements and how they relate to potential 
changes in selected measures of quality of care before and after the inspection and following 
the quality summit. 
Regardless of how CQC inspections might drive changes, the final effect depends on the 
internal context of NHS trusts, where leadership and culture determine the size and depth of 
changes implemented before an inspection (Jacobs et al., 2013). Nevertheless, NHS trusts do 
not function in isolation; therefore, the external context is also seen to influence the 
performance and outcomes of each institution. Features of the catchment population such as 
rural or urban area, size, age, health status, socioeconomic level, and ethnicity mix will 
influence the overall level of measures of process of care and clinical outcomes (Buchan et al., 
2017, Braithwaite et al., 2017a). It could be hypothesised that if two trusts have the same level 
of performance in one measure, the trust serving a more disadvantaged population might 
need to invest more resources for obtaining the same degree of improvement than the one 
serving a less disadvantaged population. This difference could, to some extent, be 
compensated for by the NHS funding formula that tends to allocate more resources to a 
materially-deprived area. There are also issues over the adequacy of the allowance for market 
forces on differences in costs of staff, which it is argued causes particular problems for the 
acute hospitals in London that are not teaching hospitals (Bevan, 2009). 
The macro-context will also affect NHS trusts’ capacity to respond in the face of an inspection. 
During the period used for the interrupted time-series studies (see Chapters 5 to 8) some 
important contextual events occurred. Firstly, the political decisions and systemic constraints 
of “austerity” from June 2010 (Seely and Webb, 2010). Secondly, the reform of the 
commissioning system that occurred between October 2012 and April 2013 (NHS 
Commissioning Board Authority, 2012). Thirdly, the more general trends of rising demands and 
costs, diminished funding for social care, and older patients with increasingly complex health 
needs (i.e. multi-morbidity or multi-speciality) (The King's Fund, 2017). Although these factors 
affected the whole system, their existence means the service is under stress, and its capacity 
to respond to an inspection might be reduced. Nonetheless, the internal context of the NHS 
trust is the key factor determining how much a trust can adapt to increasing environmental 
pressures (West et al., 2013, Taylor et al., 2015). 
Inspections can also raise awareness about the quality of reporting standards. Safety incidents, 
waiting times, and patient case-mix for the estimation of risk-adjusted mortality rates require 
data to be reported by each hospital. If the hospital changes its reporting behaviour, then 
these indicators might artificially show an increase (or decrease) that is not related to changes 
in performance (Taylor, 2013). Conversely, the pressure of the inspection might trigger gaming 
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where data is modified to the advantage of the hospital or targets are met by neglecting other 
areas of care (Bevan and Hood, 2006). Another potential unintended consequence of external 
inspections and the imposition of targets is impaired self-determination (Frey, 1997). This 
refers to the process where an imposed external system of control, in particular in individuals 
with high levels of independence such as managers, doctors and healthcare professionals, can 
diminish self-determination by shifting the locus of control from inside to outside (Frey, 1997). 
Macro context and contextual factors of the population served were considered potential 
confounders of the relationship between CQC inspections and measures of process and clinical 
outcomes because inspections are adapted based on these contextual factors (Care Quality 
Commission, 2015c), whilst at the same time, they can affect the performance of acute NHS 
trusts. 
 
Figure 3.2 Macro level logic model of CQC inspections of acute NHS Trusts in England 
 
A more detailed analysis of how CQC inspections might drive changes in acute NHS trusts is 
shown in Figure 3.3. Around 16 to 20 weeks before the inspection, the CQC announces its visit 
by sending out a provider information request (PIR). This announcement might lead to a self-
assessment of performance against the standards used by the regulator and engagement with 
other trusts already inspected to obtain insight into the process. Once the trust identifies areas 
for improvement, senior management and clinical divisional managers agree on feasible 
actions that could lead to improvement in the time available. If necessary, managers will 
review risk registries, update policies, and review the management and security of drugs and 
patients’ records since these are actions that can have an impact on their CQC rating and can 
be done within 16 weeks. 
69 
Clinical divisional managers are usually in charge of leading and transferring trust’s plans to 
address the CQC inspection to the general staff working in each of the eight core services. In 
Figure 3.3, under the name of each of the core service, there is a simplified version of areas of 
care that could be improved during the announcement phase, eventually leading to 
improvement in measures of process of care and clinical outcomes. Once the CQC visits the 
trust, Robertson et al. (2017) suggest that there are three mechanisms that could trigger 
further changes in the delivery of care: i) the regulator can direct or advise changes based on 
the findings of the inspection; ii) inspectors can use soft intelligence or informal feedback to 
influence changes; and iii) the trust could decide to make changes not directed by the CQC but 
based on what they learnt during the visit. 
After the visit, the trust’s senior managers agree on an improvement plan to address the CQC 
findings, which are shared verbally at the end of the inspection. This starts a cycle of 
improvement where clinical divisional managers lead the implementation of changes, collect 
information on how it is progressing and feed back to the trust to make adjustments. This 
process itself can produce improvement in organisational performance and clinical outcomes. 
Three to six months after the inspection, the Clinical Commissioning Group(s), the trust board, 
patients’ groups, and key stakeholders meet at a Quality Summit, where all the attendees 
agree on an action plan to remedy any problems found during the inspection. For instance, 
changes required could be opening extra beds, hiring more staff, changing triage systems in 
the Accident & Emergency (A&E) Department, improving risk assessments, or improving the 
storage of medications. The publication of a report following the Quality Summit can also 
trigger a request for improvements by other stakeholders such as local government and 
patients’ groups not present at the actual meeting. With a new action plan, another 
improvement cycle starts, potentially leading to further improvements. 
CQC’s mission is to “make sure health and social care services provide people with safe, 
effective, compassionate, high-quality care and encourage care services to improve”. This 
includes a component of quality assurance and one of quality improvement. If we were to 
assess the effectiveness of CQC, this could be performed from both perspectives, but for the 
purpose of this thesis, the quality improvement component is being tested Given the 
timeframe, the number of steps and the number of people involved in delivering any 
improvement of quality of care in response to a CQC inspection, the probability of producing 
improvements in measures of quality of care is limited. Although CQC’s mission of 
“encouraging care services to improve” (Care Quality Commission, 2013) might be achieved as 
a process, it is difficult to see how CQC can achieve the outcome of improvement (or at least to 








Clinical professionalism remains a relative constant throughout the evolution of quality 
governance, but was dominant in the pre-1990s when governments relied largely on trust and 
altruism to maintain and improve quality of care. Between 1991 and 1997, more “economic” 
perspectives gained traction, and 2000 to 2005 saw explicitly managerial perspectives laying 
the foundations for more components of the economic perspective on governance, which 
stretched from 2006 to 2009 (see Appendix Chapter 3, Figure 3.1). 
Of these models, the combination of “targets and terror” and “naming and shaming” most 
demonstrably achieved policy goals (for example, reducing waiting times). Possible 
explanations include a limited number of targets, strong sanctions for unmet targets, and 
league tables enabling naming and shaming. 
The inspections conducted by external oversight institutions during this time provided 
information about the quality of services to meet a purpose within the governance of quality 
agenda. For instance, the CHI produced the star ratings that were used to name and shame, 
whilst the CHAI conducted the annual health checks that could be used to choose providers. 
In 2010, after recognising the poor care provided by Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, 
efforts to govern the quality of care became guided by inquiries and reviews, which served as a 
means of aligning priorities and redirecting efforts to solve the problems identified. This led to 
the current environment, the “inspection state”, where CQC inspections dictate the direction 
of quality improvement efforts, although the main components of other models of governance 
are still present, creating competing priorities for NHS providers, and potentially, affecting the 
effectiveness of CQC inspections. 
The method used for CQC inspections provides several potential pathways for impact; 
however, it is not clear to what extent the on-site visit modifies measures of process and 
clinical outcomes. Given that institutions similar to the CQC exist in other countries and this 
thesis examines the theoretical assumption that external regulation improves organisational 
performance and clinical outcomes, Chapter 4 tests this by systematically reviewing the global 
literature on inspection-based regulation. 
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4 Effectiveness of external inspections 
or accreditation on organisational 
behaviour and health outcomes: 
overview of reviews and update of 
the latest systematic review 
 
The currently dominant quality governance strategy – the inspection state – relies on 
regulation to guide quality improvement efforts in health and social care in England, 
specifically, the work performed by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The UK is not the only 
country that relies on this general approach to quality governance. Examining other 
jurisdictions with similar interventions for effectiveness may offer clues as to potential 
contained in the CQC’s approach as well as when they have an effect and the size of it (if any), 
study designs used in the past, and outcomes that are sensitive to the intervention. 
The inspection state model uses external oversight regulation (Sutherland and Leatherman, 
2006), such as accreditation or external inspections, as an instrument to govern quality. 
Regulators are third party, independent of providers and users of the services, and use several 
interventions in tandem to modify behaviour: setting standards, monitoring performance and 
enforcement of compliance (Sutherland and Leatherman, 2006). External oversight is a 
complex intervention because the context, the content, the delivery, and the outcomes of the 
intervention vary for each provider (Walshe, 2007, Moore et al., 2014, Ng et al., 2013), which is 
one of the difficulties in assessing the impact of external oversight. 
Accreditation is a widespread intervention with at least 23 different institutions worldwide 
performing similar functions at various levels of healthcare providers (e.g. laboratories, 
radiology departments, hospital care, and primary care) (World Health Organization, 2003); it 
is, therefore, crucial to provide information on its effectiveness to inform policy decision-
making. 
This chapter summarises the evidence on the effect of external inspection or accreditation 
regimes on organisational behaviour and health outcomes using a systematic approach. The 
first section is an “overview of [systematic] reviews”; whilst the second updates the highest 
quality systematic review identified to provide a state of the art of the effectiveness of 
inspection-based systems on improving quality in healthcare. This informs the methodological 
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design of this thesis and tests whether the theoretical relationship between external oversight 
visits and changes in organisational and clinical outcomes is based on empirical evidence. 
4.1 Overview of systematic reviews 
4.1.1 Why a review of systematic reviews?  
External inspection and accreditation exist to ensure and encourage improvements on quality 
of care (Walshe, 2003). Consequently, it would be plausible to expect a relationship between 
the external oversight visit and better organisational and clinical outcomes; however, this 
association remains unclear (Flodgren et al., 2011). Since there are several systematic reviews 
looking into the effect of accreditation and external inspection on a variety of indicators, 
performing an overview of systematic reviews was deemed valuable to inform decision-making 
and methodological aspects of this thesis. 
4.1.2 Description of external oversight based interventions 
Regulation is a "sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities 
which are valued by a community" (Selznick 1985: 383; taken from Walshe 2003, p9). 
Regulation centralises authority by giving power to an agency to oversee activities on society's 
behalf (Walshe 2003, p 10), as is the case in the CQC.  
Besides being regulatory instruments, external inspection and accreditation mechanisms can 
be considered external approaches to quality improvement (Walshe, 2003). They have in 
common that they use several instruments to produce an effect, but there are subtle 
distinctions. 
Accreditation can be voluntary (e.g. United Arab Emirates [Devkaran and O'Farrell, 2014]) or 
mandatory (e.g. Denmark [Falstie-Jensen et al., 2015a]). In general, institutions are required to 
establish a committee to lead the process, perform a self-assessment against accreditation 
standards, and a mock survey three to six months before the visit (Devkaran and O'Farrell, 
2014, Bogh et al., 2016). The outcome of the accreditation visit could be full, partial or denial 
of accreditation (ibid). The relevance of the accreditation status is that it carries recognition, 
and for example in Denmark, hospitals must be accredited to provide care (Bogh et al., 2016). 
In the case of external inspection regimes, like the CQC, the regulator is a governmental 
agency with certain freedoms to act. Visits are announced 3 to 4 months in advance (Walshe et 
al., 2014). Providers are requested to submit data in advance and help arranging engagement 
events with the service users (ibid). After the visit, organisations receive a rating, which carries 
certain prestige, but it does not limit their ability to provide services unless the external 
inspection agency withdraws the organisations’ license (Care Quality Commission, 2015a). 
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4.1.3 How inspection and regulation works 
The mechanism of action of external oversight is rarely articulated (Hovlid et al., 2017). 
However, by examining the theories underpinning each component of the inspection and 
regulatory model insight into possible mechanisms can be obtained. External standards – with 
which regulated organisations should comply - set a direction and a level of performance that 
should be reached, where that goal helps regulate behaviour by orienting attention, resources 
and strategic planning efforts toward its accomplishment (Locke and Latham, 2002b, Locke 
and Latham, 2006). Surveillance and public reporting of performance are intended to drive 
improvements by increasing competition, transparency, and public accountability (Walshe, 
2003). Lastly, the enforcement actions should discourage non-compliance or unacceptable 
behaviour (Sutherland and Leatherman, 2006). 
4.1.4 Methods 
4.1.4.1 Research question 
What is the effectiveness of external inspection or accreditation at institutional level on 
organisational performance and patients’ health outcomes?  
4.1.4.2 Criteria for considering studies for this review 
4.1.4.2.1 Types of studies 
Systematic reviews, defined as a secondary research study with explicit a priori inclusion 
criteria and search strategy and a quality assessment of the evidence. The process of the 
systematic review should be transparently reported and replicable. 
4.1.4.2.2 Types of participants 
Secondary and tertiary acute care institutions being subject to external inspection or 
accreditation interventions of the whole institution or a department. 
4.1.4.2.3 Types of interventions 
Intervention: External oversight in the form of inspection or accreditation. 
Comparison: could be the period before intervention or a contemporary group receiving 
control or no intervention. 
4.1.4.2.4 Types of outcome measures 
Organisational performance: safety measures (e.g. falls, pressure ulcers, prescription errors, 
healthcare-associated infections), waiting times, institutional governance, composite measures 
of quality of care. 
Patients’ health outcomes (e.g., mortality, PROMs, readmission) 
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4.1.4.2.5 Language 
No language restrictions were made. 
4.1.4.3 Search methods for identification of studies 
The terms “inspection”, “accreditation”, “external review” and “external oversight” were used 
as free text and controlled language to identify relevant systematic reviews. The search 
strategy was adapted to the individual search engines to maximise its sensibility. The reference 
lists of identified systematic reviews were also searched to identify more relevant studies.  
4.1.4.3.1 Electronic searches 
To identify systematic reviews the following resources were searched in February 2018 
 Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) since 2003 
 Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) since 2003 
 Centre for Review and Dissemination (CRD) databases since 1994 
 Health Systems Evidence since 1978 
 PDQ-Evidence since 1975 
 Trip Database since 1970 
 Electronic Theses Online (Ethos) since 1900 
 International Society for Quality in Healthcare (ISQua) since 2009 
4.1.4.3.2 Other sources 
Reference lists of previous systematic reviews and institutional websites for Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), Commonwealth Fund, King’s Fund, the 
Health Foundation, the Welcome Trust and the Nuffield Trust. 
4.1.4.4 Data Collection and analysis 
4.1.4.4.1 Selection of studies 
All the records obtained were downloaded to a reference manager software (i.e. Endnote). 
One reviewer performed the initial screening of titles and abstracts, classifying citations in 
three groups: eligible, excluded or uncertain about eligibility. This information was stored in a 
Microsoft Excel file. Records deemed eligible and uncertain about eligibility were reviewed in 
their full-text version. The reasons and number of articles excluded were recorded to generate 
the PRISMA flow diagram. The decision whether a study meets the inclusion criteria was 
primarily based on the abstract using the inclusion criteria above mentioned. If there was not 
enough information to determine its inclusion, the lacking information was looked in the 
methods section of the full-text version. In the case there was still missing information to 
decide its inclusion, the author was contacted. 
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4.1.4.4.2 Data extraction and management 
One reviewer extracted the data. For systematic reviews, data were obtained about the study 
designs included, aim and the question of the review, results reported, and conclusions. The 
data extraction form was piloted with one study screened as eligible and adapted to collect the 
relevant information. The authors were contacted in case of missing data because it was not 
available in the published study or was not clearly stated. 
Data were obtained for the population, intervention, comparison, setting, outcomes measured 
and reported results for primary studies. 
4.1.4.4.3 Assessment of quality of systematic reviews 
One reviewer assessed the quality of included reviews using the AMSTAR tool (Shea et al., 
2007).  
4.1.4.4.4 Analysis Plan 
High levels of heterogeneity among included reviews made it inappropriate to combine results 
in a meta-analysis; therefore, results are presented in a structured synthesis. The 
characteristics of the eligible reviews are displayed in a table including information about the 
design of the included studies, target population, details about the external inspection and 
comparison, and outcomes assessed. The quality assessment is shown in a table detailing, for 
every study included, whether each criterion is met and the overall score.  
Additionally, to make judgements about the effectiveness of the intervention using the 
evidence from the overview, vote counting was performed considering the number of 
outcomes per intervention category that favoured accreditation. The following decision rule 
was used (Weir 2010): 
 0% of studies (outcomes) favour intervention = no effect; 
 1% to 33% of studies (outcomes) favour intervention = generally ineffective; 
 34% to 66% studies (outcomes) favour intervention = mixed effects; 
 67% or more studies (outcomes) favour intervention = generally effective. 
 
Vote counting has two problems. One is that the definition of a positive study is made 
subjectively or based on statistical significance. In practice, the number of studies showing 
benefits and harms (regardless of effect size) should be reported (The Cochrane Collaboration, 
2011, Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC), 2017). The second issue is 
vote counting does not account for the sample size and, therefore, the relative weight of the 
estimate (ibid).  
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In this thesis, it was used as a last resort for summarising the large, heterogeneous body of 
literature available. 
Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis according to quality was not justified due to heterogeneity. 
4.1.5 Results 
4.1.5.1 Description of included reviews 
The search identified 1346 records. After removing 94 duplicated records and screening 1258 
titles and abstracts, 17 reviews were analysed in their full-text version (see Figure 4.1). 
Reasons for and references of excluded studies are shown in Appendix Chapter 4 (Table 4.3). 
Characteristics of the included reviews are contained in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Two included 
reviews were Cochrane reviews. Since their results are the same, they are presented together 
(Flodgren et al., 2011, 2016). 
The characteristics of the primary studies included in each review are summarised in Appendix 
Chapter 4, Table 4.2, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. 
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Figure 4.1: PRISMA flow diagram for the overview of systematic reviews 
 
Brubakk et al. (2015) 
Brubakk et al (2015) searched seven databases up to 2014, including three reviews (MATRIX 
knowledge group, 2010, Flodgren et al., 2011, Alkhenizan and Shaw, 2011) and one 
randomised clinical trial (Salmon et al., 2003) investigating the effect of any type of 
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accreditation or certification of hospitals on clinical outcomes or measures of process of care. 
Overall, evidence from 67 individual studies was summarised. In relation to the setting where 
the research took place, 26 studies sampled hospitals, 14 included other settings (e.g. primary 
care, psychiatric hospitals, trauma centres), 12 sampled patients within healthcare units, 9 
included healthcare professionals, and one sampled healthcare insurance plans. The unit of 
analysis varied among included studies: 31 analysed information at patient or individual level, 
22 at facility level, three at programme level, and one at healthcare insurance plan level. 
Thirty-three studies were based in the United States, nine in France, four in Australia, three in 
the United Kingdom, two in Zambia and the remaining sixteen studies were performed in 
different countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. In twenty-three of these 
studies, the accreditation agency was the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO), whilst the remaining 25 studies addressed national agencies from 
Europe, Asia, North America and Africa. 
Greenfield et al. (2012) 
Greenfield et al. (2012) searched five databases and 36 websites of accreditation agencies up 
to 2011, including 13 studies looking into empirical research to support the development and 
implementation of healthcare accreditation standards. This review included research on 
standards development, implementation issues, and the impact on healthcare organisation of 
these standards. In consequence, the focus of this review was broader than that of this 
overview; therefore, four studies were relevant. Two studies sampled acute hospitals, one 
trauma centres, and one stroke centres. In relation to the level of analysis, all studies used 
patient-level data. Three studies were based in the United States, and one was based in South 
Africa. The accrediting agency was JCAHO for two of these studies (Stradling et al., 2007, 
Thornlow and Merwin, 2009), the Council for Health Service Accreditation of Southern Africa 
(COHSASA) for one of them (Salmon et al., 2003) and the American College of Surgeons for one 
study (Piontek et al., 2003). 
Flodgren et al. (2011), (2016) 
Flodgren et al. (2011) searched 14 databases and four websites of accreditation or quality in 
healthcare organisations up to 2011. Flodgren et al. (2016) searched eight databases and four 
websites of accreditation agencies up to June 2015. Both included two studies investigating 
the effect of external inspection system on organisational change, healthcare professionals 
behaviour or patient’s outcomes (Salmon et al., 2003, OPM evaluation team, 2009). Despite 
having a broader aim than this overview, no articles were found addressing the effect of 
external inspection on professionals’ behaviour. Both studies sampled acute hospitals, but one 
of them analysed the data at patient-level (Salmon et al., 2003) and the other at hospital-level 
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(OPM evaluation team, 2009). One study was based in South Africa, and one in the United 
Kingdom (UK). The external oversight body was COHSASA (Salmon et al., 2003) or the 
Healthcare Commission (OPM evaluation team, 2009). 
Alkhenizan and Shaw (2011) 
Alkhenizan and Shaw (2011) searched four databases up to 2009, including 26 articles 
assessing the impact of accreditation programmes on the quality of healthcare services. The 
setting where units were sampled were: 10 studies sampled hospitals, seven included other 
settings (e.g. substance abuse centres, primary care, laboratories, psychiatric hospitals, trauma 
centres), eight sampled patients within healthcare units, and one sampled healthcare 
insurance plans. Fifteen studies analysed data at patient or individual level, nine at facility-
level, one analysed information at programme level and one at healthcare insurance plan 
level. The majority of studies (n=16) were carried out in the United States; whilst the rest took 
place in Canada, South Africa, Zambia, Egypt, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Philippines, Denmark, 
and Australia. For ten studies, the accrediting agency was JCAHO, in the case of seven articles 
the accrediting body was a professional or scientific organisation, and in nine studies, 
accreditation was carried out by a national agency. 
MATRIX knowledge group (2010) 
MATRIX knowledge group (2010) searched seven academic databases and several websites of 
accreditation agencies in French-speaking countries, including 56 studies. This review had two 
aims: to review the results and methodologies used to assess the impact of accreditation or 
certification of hospitals, and to assess the methodological approaches used. The definition of 
impact considered quantifiable effects or any change that could be attributable to 
accreditation. Consequently, results from qualitative and quantitative research were 
combined. MATRIX knowledge group (2010) classified their outcomes in three categories: 
clinical impact or patient satisfaction; managerial, organisational or cultural change; and 
change in professional practice. This implies that only a few studies within this review assessed 
the effect of accreditation or external inspection on the outcomes of interest for this overview. 
For instance, in the category “organisational change”, some measures reflect organisational 
performance, but most of them relate to organisational management and processes; 
therefore, they are not relevant for this piece of work. Fourteen studies reported relevant 
outcomes. Eleven studies sampled hospitals and three sampled patients. The unit of analysis 
was at patient-level in nine studies and facility-level in five studies. Nine studies were based in 
the United States, and one in South Africa, Zambia, and Australia. One study used information 
from six countries in Europe (Suñol et al., 2009). The accrediting agency was JCAHO for seven 
82 
articles, a professional organisation for two studies, and a national accreditation agency for 
five studies.  
Greenfield and Braithwaite (2008) 
Greenfield and Braithwaite (2008) searched six databases and 22 websites of accreditation or 
healthcare quality organisations, including 66 studies researching into accreditation and the 
accreditation process. The aim of this review was ill-defined, considering a broad spectrum of 
research into any aspect related to accreditation. Outcomes were also loosely defined. The 
results were organised in ten topic areas. Two of these areas were of interest for this 
overview: organisational change and quality measures. Twenty-three studies fell under these 
categories. The sampling frame comprised hospitals in fourteen studies, patients or individuals 
in five studies, and other setting in four studies (e.g. trauma centres, psychiatric hospitals). The 
unit of analysis was individual or patient-level in ten studies, facility-level for nine studies, 
programme-level in three studies, and healthcare insurance plan level in one study (Beaulieu 
et al., 2002). Sixteen studies were carried out in the United States, three in Australia, and one 
in South Africa, France, Canada, and Italy. The accrediting agency was JCAHO for eight 
references, a professional organisation for three studies, and a national accreditation agency 
for four studies. Only five studies included had relevant comparisons for this overview: Salmon 
et al (2003), Williams et al (2005), Barker et al (2002), Simons et al (2002), and Chen et al 
(2003). 
Sutherland and Leatherman (2006) 
Sutherland and Leatherman (2006) searched seven databases and several websites of policy 
think-tanks and patients’ organisations, including 56 studies investigating the impact of 
interventions to improve performance and quality of care. Since the scope of this review was 
broader than the aim of this overview, only the evidence about external oversight 
interventions (i.e. accreditation or external inspection) is included. Sixteen studies explored 
the impact of external oversight schemes on performance. The sampling frame comprised 
hospitals in ten studies, patients in two articles, psychiatric hospitals in two studies, trauma 
centres in one article, and healthcare insurance plans in one reference. Only twelve studies 
analysed quantitative data: seven analysed the data at facility-level, four at patient-level, and 
one at healthcare insurance plan level. JCAHO was the accrediting agency in eight articles, 
professional organisations in three studies, and a national accreditation agency in one study. 
Only five studies included in this review of literature had relevant comparisons for the aim of 
this overview: Salmon et al (2003), Piontek et al (2003), Barker et al (2002), Simons et al 
(2002), and Chen et al (2003). 
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Aim declared Study designs included Databases (start-end date included) 








To systematically assess the 
effects of accreditation and/or 
certification of hospitals on 







Controlled before and 
after studies 
Interrupted time series 
studies 
Searches performed in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2014. Last 
search performed in July 2014. 
• MEDLINE (from 1948) 
• EMBASE (from 1980) 
• Centre for Review and Dissemination (CRD) 
• Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) 
• Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE) 
• Health Technology Assessment Database (HTA) 
• Google 
The standard of 
healthcare 
accreditation 







et al. (2012) 
To identify and analyse the 
research literature in the 
following topics: 
-The rationale for standard 
development methodologies in 
use. 
-Research demonstrating how 
standards should be structured 
in order to be understandable, 
assessable and reliable. 
-Research into implementation 
in everyday practice of 
standards. 




The last search was performed in August 2011 
• MEDLINE (from 1980) 
• PsycINFO (from 1980) 
• EMBASE (from 1980) 
• Social work databases (from 1980) 
• CINAHL (from 1982) 
• Websites of 31 healthcare accreditation agencies 






Aim declared Study designs included Databases (start-end date included) 
Effectiveness of 
external inspection 














To evaluate the effectiveness of 
external inspection of 










Controlled before and 
after studies 
Interrupted time series 
studies 
The last search was performed in May 2011 
• Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) 
Cochrane Library 2011 Issue 1, May 2011* 
• Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) 
• Cochrane Library 2010 Issue 2, May 2011 
• Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE)* 
• Cochrane Library 2010 Issue 2, May 2011 
• MEDLINE, Ovid (from 1950)* 
• EMBASE, Ovid (from 1980)* 
• CINAHL, EBSCO (from 1980) 
• Science Citation Index, Web of Knowledge (from 1970) 
• Social Science Citation Index, Web of Knowledge (from 
1970) 
• ISI Conference Proceedings, Web of Knowledge (from 1970) 
• PsycINFO, Ovid (from 1806) 
• HMIC, Ovid (from 1983)* 
• Intute (www.intute.ac.uk) (searched May 2011) 
• Electronic Theses Online  
• Clinicaltrials.gov# 
• World Health Organization International Clinical Trials 
Registry Platform# 
• Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) (http://www.jointcommission.org/)* 
• Accreditation Canada (www.accrediation.ca) * 
• ACHSI-Australian Council for Healthcare Standards 
International (www.achs.org.au/ACHSI) * 







Aim declared Study designs included Databases (start-end date included) 
Impact of 
accreditation on the 
quality of healthcare 
services: a 





To evaluate the impact of 
accreditation programmes on 





The last search was performed in June 2009 
• MEDLINE (from 1996) 
• EMBASE (from 1980) 
• CINAHL (from 1982) 
• HealthStar (from 1980) 
Literature review on 







- To produce a general overview 
of the results obtained and 
methodologies used to assess 
the impact of certification of 
hospitals 
- To assess the methodological 
approaches of the studies 
reviewed 









• British Nursing Index (BNI) 
• Pascal 
• Banque de Données en Santé Publique 















To identify and analyse the 




or accreditation process 
The last search was performed in May 2007 
• MEDLINE (from 1950) 
• EMBASE (from 1980) 
• CINAHL (from 1982) 
• 22 national agencies and ISQua (Irish Health Services 
Accreditation Board (IHSAB), the United Kingdom CHKS, 
Australian Council on Healthcare Standards (ACHS), 
Australian General Practice Accreditation Limited (AGPAL), 
Haute Autorité de santé (HAS), Italian Society for Quality of 
Health Care, JCAHO, Canadian Council on Health Services 
Accreditation (CCHSA) and the Spanish accreditation 
organization Fundación Avedis Donabedian (FAD)).  
• Web-of-science 











To assemble available evidence 
on the impact of interventions 
designed to improve 









Before and after studies 
Multi-site case studies 
Statistical studies such 
as multivariate analyses 
Date of the last search not declared 
• MEDLINE 
• Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 
• Database of Reviews of Effects (DARE) 
• King's Fund Library 
• Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
• World Health Organization (WHO) 
• Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 
• Websites of policy think tanks and patient organisations 
*Databases also searched up to June 2015 in Flodgren et al. (2016). # Databases searched up to June 2015 only in Flodgren et al. (2016) 
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Table 4.2 Components of the question being addressed by each systematic review included 
Author 
(year) 
Population Intervention Comparison Outcomes 
Instrument for 
assessment of 
quality or risk of bias 
Authors' conclusions Studies included 
Brubakk et 
al. (2015) 
All types of 
hospitals 




Any hospital not 
being accredited or 
certified, because 
of failure to comply 
or to apply for 
accreditation. 
• Clinical and processes 
outcomes 
AMSTAR tool 
Cochrane risk of bias 
assessment tool 
Due to lack of 
methodologically strong 
evidence was not possible 
to conclude which 
strategies are effective 
3 Systematic reviews 
1 RCT 
Greenfield 







• Standard development 
• Implementation issues 
• Impact of standards 
Australian National 
health and medical 
research council 
guidelines for level 
of evidence 
Checklist adapted 
from Cunningham et 
al. (2011) 
The evidence on the 
impact of accreditation 
standards on healthcare 
organisations' and staff 
behaviour, and clinical 
outcomes is equivocal and 
highly influenced by 
circumstances. 
Impact of standards 
1 RCT 
1 Interrupted time-series 






Population Intervention Comparison Outcomes 
Instrument for 
assessment of 
quality or risk of bias 






































organisational change (e.g. 
organisational 
performance, waiting list 
times, inpatient hospital 
stay time) 
• Healthcare professional 
behaviour (e.g. referral 
rate, prescribing rate) 
• Patients’ outcome (e.g. 
mortality and condition-
specific measures of 
outcome related to 
patients’ health) 
Other outcomes 
• Patient’s satisfaction and 
patient involvement 
• Unanticipated or adverse 
consequences 
• Economic outcomes 
Cochrane risk of bias 
assessment tool. 
GRADE system. 
The scale, content and 
generalisability of the 
evidence found is limited. 
It is difficult to generate 
conclusions about the 
effectiveness of external 
inspection beyond the 
effect reported by the two 














• Quality of the health 
service 
US preventive 
services task force 
quality assessment  
Evidence consistently 
shows that general 
accreditation programmes 
improve processes of care 
given by health services. 






1 Time series 
1 Prospective cohort 
3 Retrospective cohorts 




6 Cross-sectional studies 




Population Intervention Comparison Outcomes 
Instrument for 
assessment of 
quality or risk of bias 


























• Clinical impact 
• Organisational change 
• Change in professional 
practice 
• Patient satisfaction 
Critical appraisal 
Most studies suggest a 
positive effect of 
accreditation programmes 
on organisational and 
professional performance, 
but the impact on health 
outcomes has not been 
proved yet. 
1 RCT 
3 Time series studies  
2 Prospective cohorts 
2 Retrospective cohorts 
23 Cross-sectional 
analytical 
8 Cross-sectional studies 
3 Before and after 
studies 
3 Descriptive studies 











• Professions’ attitudes to 
accreditation. 
• promote change. 
• Organisational impact. 
• Financial impact. 
• Quality measures. 
• Program assessment. 
• Consumer views or 
patient satisfaction. 
• Public disclosure. 
• Professional 
development. 
• Surveyor issues. 
None 
This literature review 
shows a complex picture 
about the accreditation of 
healthcare institutions. 
The findings are 
inconsistent and the views 
mixed. The impact of 
accreditation on quality 
measures was inconsistent 
and the methodological 
rigour variable. 
1 RCT 
1 Prospective Cohort 
1 Retrospective Cohort 




5 Cross-sectional studies 
1 Time-series 




Population Intervention Comparison Outcomes 
Instrument for 
assessment of 
quality or risk of bias 


























have focused on 
participants’ perception of 
the potential benefits, 
instead of objectively 
measure the effect on 
processes of care and 
clinical outcomes.There is 
some evidence that 
external inspection 





already identified by 
managers, helping to focus 
attention on potential 
solutions. 
1 RCT 
1 Interrupted time-series 
1 Prospective Cohort 
5 Cross-sectional 
analytical 
4 Cross-sectional studies 
1 Qualitative study 
3 Multi-methods studies. 
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4.1.5.2 Methodological quality of included reviews 
4.1.5.2.1 Quality of included reviews 
AMSTAR scores for each review included are presented in Table 4.3. Only one review scored 10 
out of 11 points in the AMSTAR tool, being considered of high (score 8 to 11) methodological 
quality (Flodgren et al., 2011, 2016). Two reviews were deemed of moderate (score 5 to 7) 
quality (Brubakk et al., 2015, Greenfield et al., 2012), whilst the other four reviews (Greenfield 
and Braithwaite, 2008, MATRIX knowledge group, 2010, Sutherland and Leatherman, 2006, 
Alkhenizan and Shaw, 2011) were judged of low quality (score below 5). 
4.1.5.2.2 Quality of evidence in included reviews 
Brubakk et al. (2015) report that one study was of high quality (Flodgren et al., 2011), two 
included reviews were of moderate quality (Alkhenizan and Shaw, 2011, MATRIX knowledge 
group, 2010), whilst the risk of bias of the primary study was unclear (Salmon et al., 2003). 
Overall, the quality of the evidence was moderate. 
Greenfield et al. (2012) included four studies relevant for this overview with moderate overall 
quality. They provided an overall measure of quality. The RCT (Salmon et al., 2003), the ITS 
(Piontek et al., 2003) and the time-series study (Stradling et al., 2007) were deemed of 
moderate quality, whilst the cross-sectional study (Thornlow and Merwin, 2009) of high quality 
(i.e. all the quality criteria fulfilled). 
Flodgren et al. (2011, 2016) found that the RCT (Salmon et al., 2003) and the ITS (OPM 
evaluation team, 2009) provided very low quality of evidence since the uncertainty about the 
estimates is very high. 
Alkhenizan et al. (2011) included nine studies with relevant comparisons with fair quality of 
evidence. The RCT (Salmon et al., 2003) and one retrospective cohort (Ross et al., 2008) were 
deemed of fair quality, whilst quality was good for the prospective cohort (Barker et al., 2002) 
and two retrospective cohorts (Duckett, 1983, Pasquale et al., 2001). The quality of the 
evidence was considered good for two cross-sectional studies (Chandra et al., 2009, Simons et 
al., 2002), and fair for two articles (Chen et al., 2003, Sekimoto et al., 2008). 
MATRIX knowledge group (2010) included fourteen studies relevant for this overview of 
moderate quality. Since this review did not use a standardised tool to assess quality, the 
judgements here given are an interpretation of critical appraisal performed by the authors. 
The RCT (Salmon et al., 2003), both retrospective cohorts (Duckett, 1983, Ross et al., 2008) and 
six cross-sectional studies (Landon et al., 2006, Longo et al., 2007, Sekimoto et al., 2008, 
Chandra et al., 2009, Lutfiyya et al., 2009, Suñol et al., 2009) were judged of moderate quality. 
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The two time-series studies (Stradling et al., 2007, Weeks et al., 2007) and one prospective 
cohort (Quality assurance project, 2005) were considered of poor quality. One prospective 
cohort (Barker et al., 2002) and one cross-sectional study (Casey et al., 2005) were deemed of 
good quality. 
The reviews by Greenfield and Braithwaite (2008), and Sutherland and Leatherman (2006) did 
not use a standardised tool to assess the quality of evidence. Additionally, the description 
provided does not make judgements about the methodological rigour of the studies; 
therefore, it is not possible to establish the quality of the evidence included. 
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Table 4.3 Assessment of quality of included systematic reviews using the AMSTAR tool 



















1. Was an ’a-priori’ design provided? Can't answer Can't answer Yes Can't answer Can't answer Can't answer Can't answer 
2. Was there duplicate study selection and 
data extraction? 
Yes Yes Yes No Can't answer Yes Can't answer 





















4. Was status of publication (e.g. grey 
literature) used as an inclusion criterion? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
5. Was a list of studies (included/excluded) 
provided? 
Yes No Yes No No No No 
6. Were the characteristics of included 
studies provided? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7. Was the scientific quality of the included 
studies assessed and reported? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
8. Was the scientific quality of the included 
studies used appropriately in formulating 
conclusions? 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
9. Were the methods used to combine the 






Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
10. Was the likelihood of publication bias 
assessed? 
No No Yes No No No No 
11. Was the conflict of interest stated? Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
AMSTAR SCORE 7/11 6/11 10/11 2/11 3/11 4/11 3/11 
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4.1.5.3 Effects of interventions 
Table 4.4 displays outcome measures used by each individual study categorised by review. The 
classification of included studies per comparison category is available in the Appendix Chapter 
4, Table 4.1. The cross-tabulation of primary studies and the review that included them is 
available in Appendix Chapter 4, Table 4.2. The summary of the numerical results for each 
study included is available in Appendix Chapter 4, Table 4.6. 
4.1.5.3.1 Accredited compared to non-accredited institutions 
Measures of disease-specific organisational performance 
Accreditation had mixed effects on disease-specific organisational performance measures, 
improving 26/53 outcomes from six studies (Weeks et al., 2007, Ross et al., 2008, Chen et al, 
2003, Chandra et al., 2009, Lutfiyya et al., 2009, Landon et al., 2006) reported in four reviews. 
None of them was a randomised controlled trial. The effect on measures of quality of care for 
Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) was mixed, generally ineffective on measures of quality of 
care for Pneumonia and had mixed effects for Heart Failure (HF). There was no effect on 
measures of prevention of surgical infection. Accreditation was generally effective in 
improving composite measures of treatment and diagnosis, and counselling and prevention. 
Measures of generic hospital-level organisational performance 
The intervention had mixed effect on hospital-level organisational performance measures, 
improving 23/46 outcomes from eight studies (Salmon et al., 2003, Casey et al., 2005, 
Sekimoto et al., 2008, Duckett, 1983, Suñol et al., 2009, Barker et al., 2002, Longo et al., 2007, 
Quality Assurance Project, 2005) reported in seven reviews. Only one study was an RCT 
(Salmon et al., 2003). 
Measures of patients’ outcomes 
Accreditation was generally effective in improving patients’ outcomes with 21/28 outcomes 
favouring the intervention from six studies (Pasquale et al., 2001, Simons et al., 2002, Chen et 
al., 2003, Quality assurance project, 2005, Chandra et al., 2009, Weeks et al., 2007) reported in 
four reviews (Alkhenizan and Shaw, 2011, Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2008, MATRIX 
knowledge group, 2010, Sutherland and Leatherman, 2006). None of these were an RCT. The 
intervention was generally effective on surgical mortality and survival from trauma injuries. 
Accreditation was generally ineffective in improving AMI outcomes, whilst it was generally 
effective in reducing all-cause in-hospital mortality.  
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4.1.5.3.2 Low performance compared to high performance 
When comparing high-performing to low-performing institutions in Hospital Compare 
measures, 16/17 outcomes showed a higher rate of improvement in low-performing hospitals 
at baseline. High performance at baseline had no effect on inpatient AMI mortality 
4.1.5.3.3 Performance before and after accreditation 
Accreditation was generally effective in improving performance measures for stroke care. The 
intervention had mixed effects on hospital-level organisational performance, whereas 
accreditation was generally ineffective on patient’s outcomes. There was no effect on 
complications or readmissions to the hospitals within 31 days, whilst mortality was reduced 
after accreditation. 
4.1.5.3.4 Association between quality measures and clinical outcomes 
The implementation of safety practices assessed by the accreditation survey had a mixed 
effect on measures of hospital-level performance with 2/4 outcomes favouring those 
organisations with better implementation of safety practices.  
4.1.5.3.5 Effectiveness of external oversight by study design. 
Measures of organisational performance 
Evidence from an RCT showed that accreditation was generally ineffective (2/9 outcomes 
favouring intervention). The results from quasi-experimental designs suggest that external 
oversight is generally ineffective (10/43 outcomes favouring intervention); while the findings 
from observational studies suggest the intervention has mixed effects (43/75 outcomes 
favouring intervention) (Table 4.5). 
Measures of patients’ outcomes 
Evidence from quasi-experimental designs suggest that external oversight is generally effective 
(13/18 outcomes favouring intervention); while the findings from observational studies 
suggest the intervention has mixed effects (9/14 outcomes favouring intervention) (Table 4.5). 
4.1.5.3.6 Effectiveness of accreditation by Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organisations (JCAHO). 
Measures of organisational performance 
Evidence from included studies showed that accreditation was generally ineffective (20/64 
outcomes favouring intervention) on improving organisational performance (Table 4.5). 
Measures of patients’ outcomes 
 The findings suggest that JCAHO accreditation was generally effective (13/16 outcomes 
favouring intervention) on improving patients’ outcomes (Table 4.5). 
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4.1.5.3.7 Effectiveness of accreditation by professional associations. 
Five studies explored the effect of accreditation by professional Societies. For Simons et al. 
(2002), this institution was the Trauma Association of Canada. The accrediting body for 
Chandra et al. (2009) and Ross et al. (2008) was the Society of Chest Pain Centres (SCPC), and 
for Pasquale et al. (2001) and Piontek et al. (2003) was the American College of Surgeons 
(ACS). 
Measures of organisational performance 
The studies measuring the effect of SCPC accreditation focused on indicators of care quality for 
AMI. Chandra et al. (2009) found that 2/5 outcomes favoured the intervention. In the case of 
Ross et al. (2008), 8/8 measures favoured the accreditation group. There was consistent 
evidence that accreditation improved administration of Aspirin and Beta-Blockers at arrival 
and discharge from hospital. 
One study assessing the effect of ACS accreditation reported the impact on measures of 
organisational performance (Piontek et al., 2003). It found that length of stay and overall costs 
were reduced after accreditation compared to another non-accredited centre. 
Measures of patients’ outcomes 
ACS and Trauma Association of Canada accreditation seems to improve mortality rates. Simons 
et al. (2002) found lower than expected mortality rates; whilst Pasquale et al. (2001) found 
better survival for 6/9 trauma injuries after accreditation. In the case of Piontek et al. (2003), a 
lower mortality rate was also found. However, no effect was detected on rates of readmission 
and complications. 
SCPC accreditation does not seem to influence patients’ outcomes, since in-hospital deaths 
and post-admission infarction rates remained similar. However, this evidence comes from one 
study (Chandra et al., 2009) 
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Table 4.4 Measures of effect included in each review by type of outcome 
 




Overall compliance with accreditation standards 
(Salmon et al., 2003) 
8 measures of quality of care (Salmon et al., 2003) 
 
Greenfield 
et al. (2012) 
3 measures of hospital performance for 
stroke (Stradling et al., 2007) 
Overall compliance with accreditation standards 
(Salmon et al., 2003) 
8 measures of quality of care (Salmon et al., 2003) 
4 measures of patient safety performance 
(Thornlow and Merwin, 2009) 
5 measures of hospital performance (Piontek et 
al., 2003) 
Mortality (Piontek et al., 2003) 
Readmission within 30 days (Piontek et al., 
2003) 




Overall compliance with accreditation standards 
(Salmon et al., 2003) 
8 measures of quality of care (Salmon et al., 2003) 





8 measures from Hospital Compare 
database assessing care for AMI (Ross et al., 
2008) 
3 measures from hospital compare database 
assessing care for AMI (Chen et al., 2003) 
2 measures from hospital compare assessing 
care for AMI (Chandra et al., 2009) 
3 measures related to care of AMI (Chandra 
et al., 2009) 
Overall compliance with accreditation standards 
(Salmon et al., 2003) 
8 measures of quality of care (Salmon et al., 2003) 
Medication errors (Barker et al., 2002) 
6 indicators of hospitals' performance (Duckett, 
1983) 
13 measures of implementation of infection 
control programmes (Sekimoto et al., 2008) 
Survival for 9 types of trauma injuries 
(Pasquale et al., 2001) 
Observed mortality compared to predicted 
mortality (Simons et al., 2002) 
Risk-standardised 30-day AMI mortality 
(Chen et al., 2003) 
In-hospital AMI mortality (Chandra et al., 
2009) 









17 measures from Hospital compare 
database assessing care for AMI, HF and 
Pneumonia (Weeks et al., 2007) 
Opportunity score for AMI, HF and 
Pneumonia indicators from Hospital 
Compare database (Landon et al., 2006) 
2 composite measures common to AMI, HF, 
and Pneumonia (Landon et al., 2006) 
2 measures from hospital compare assessing 
care for AMI (Chandra et al., 2009) 
3 measures related to care of AMI (Chandra 
et al., 2009) 
16 measures from Hospital Compare 
database assessing AMI, HF, Pneumonia and 
surgical infection prevention (Lutfiyya et al., 
2009) 
8 measures from Hospital Compare 
database assessing care for AMI (Ross et al., 
2008) 
3 measures of hospital performance for 
stroke (Stradling et al., 2007) 
Overall compliance with accreditation standards 
(Salmon et al., 2003) 
8 measures of quality of care (Salmon et al., 2003) 
Pharmacists full-time equivalents (Casey et al., 
2005) 
4 medication safety practices (Casey et al., 2005) 
13 measures of implementation of infection 
control programmes (Sekimoto et al., 2008) 
6 indicators of hospitals' performance (Duckett, 
1983) 
Clinical, Safety, Patient-centeredness, and Cross-
border patient-centeredness intermediate 
outputs (Suñol et al., 2009) 
Medication errors (Barker et al., 2002) 
7 measures of hospital performance (Quality 
Assurance Project, 2005) 
Composite measure of implementation of 7 
patient-safety systems (Longo et al., 2007) 
Mortality for 14 surgical conditions (Weeks et 
al., 2007) 
In-hospital mortality within two days of 
admission (Quality Assurance Project, 2005) 
In-hospital AMI mortality (Chandra et al., 
2009) 






17 measures from Hospital Compare 
database assessing care for AMI, HF, 
Pneumonia (Williams et al., 2005) 
3 measures from hospital compare database 
assessing care for AMI (Chen et al., 2003) 
Overall compliance with accreditation standards 
(Salmon et al., 2003) 
8 measures of quality of care (Salmon et al., 2003) 
Medication errors (Barker et al., 2002) 
Observed mortality compared to predicted 
(Simons et al., 2002) 
Risk-standardised 30-day AMI mortality 
(Chen et al., 2003) 









3 measures from hospital compare database 
assessing care for AMI (Chen et al., 2003) 
Overall compliance with accreditation standards 
(Salmon et al., 2003) 
8 measures of quality of care (Salmon et al., 2003) 
Medication errors (Barker et al., 2002) 
5 measures of hospital performance (Piontek et 
al., 2003) 
Observed mortality compared to predicted 
(Simons et al., 2002) 
Mortality (Piontek et al., 2003) 
Readmission within 30 days (Piontek et al., 
2003) 
Complications (Piontek et al., 2003) 
Risk-standardised 30-day AMI mortality 
(Chen et al., 2003) 
Abbreviations. AMI: Acute Myocardial Infarction; HF: Heart Failure; MRSA: Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus 
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Table 4.5 Summary of results by study design. 
Studies Sample Quality measures Results 
RCT      
Salmon et al (2003) 18 Overall compliance with standards 1 Positive effect 
 








2/9 (22%) favouring 
intervention 
    
Quasi-experimental      
Piontek et al (2003) 7811 5 measures of hospital performance 2 Positive effect 
 
patients 
 3 Negative effect  
 
 3 clinical outcomes 1 Positive effect 
   2 No effect 
    
OPM report (2009) 168 trusts MRSA infection rates 1 No effect 
    
Weeks et al (2007)§ 3446 17 measures of hospital   5 Positive effect 
 
hospitals performance 12 No effect 
 
 Mortality for 14 surgical conditions 12 Positive effect 
 
 
 2 No effect 
    
Williams et al (2005)§ 3087 17 measures of hospital  16 Negative effect  
hospitals performance 1 No effect 
 
 Inpatient AMI mortality 1 No effect 
    
Stradling et al (2007)§ 1161 
patients 
3 measures of hospital performance 3 Positive effect 




23/61 (38%) favouring 
intervention 
    
Observational studies      
Barker et al (2002)§ 36 
hospitals 
Medication errors 1 No effect 
    
Quality assurance  8 7 measures of hospital  2 Positive effect 
project (2005) hospitals performance 5 No effect 
 
 In-hospital mortality < 48hrs 1 Positive effect 
    
Ross et al (2008) 4197 
hospitals 
8 measures of hospital performance 8 positive effect 
    
Pasquale et al (2001) 24 trauma Survival for 9 trauma injuries 6 Positive effect 
 
centres 
 3 No effect 
    
Chen et al (2003)§ 134579 3 measures of hospital performance 3 Positive effect 
 
patients Risk-adjusted 30-day AMI mortality 1 Positive effect 
    
Chandra et al (2009) 33238 5 measures of hospital performance 2 Positive effect 
 
patients 
 3 No effect 
 
 In-hospital AMI mortality  1 No effect 
 
 Post-admission infarction 1 No effect 
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Studies Sample Quality measures Results 
Landon et al (2006) 4059 3 opportunity score measures 3 Positive effect 
 
hospitals 2 Cross-cutting performance 
measures 
2 Positive effect 
    
Lutfiyya et al (2009)§ 218290 16 measures of hospital  4 Positive effect 
 
patients performance 12 Negative effect 
    
Sekimoto et al (2008) 460 13 measures of implementation of 6 Positive effect 
 
hospitals infection control programmes 5 No effect 
 
 
 2 Negative effect 
    
Simons et al (2002) 3 trauma 
centres 
Observed vs predicted mortality 1 Positive effect 
    
Longo et al (2007)§ 107 
hospitals 
Composite measure of 7 safety 
practices 
1 Positive effect 
    
Suñol et al (2009) 389 4 Intermediate outputs for patient-  2 Positive effect 
 
hospitals centeredness 2 No effect 
    
Casey et al (2005)§ 387 
hospitals 
2 measures of safe dispensing of 
drugs 2 Positive effect 
    
Thornlow and Merwin 115 4 measures of patient safety 2 Positive effect 
(2009)§ hospitals 
 
2 No effect 
    
Duckett (1983) 23 
hospitals 
6 measures of hospital performance 6 Positive effect 




52/89 (58%) favouring 
intervention 
§ Studies where intervention was a JCAHO accreditation visit. 
 
4.1.5.3.8 Overall effectiveness across intervention categories 
When the effect of accreditation is assessed across outcomes categories (Table 4.6), it had 
mixed effects on disease-specific organisational performance with 29/73 outcomes favouring 
the intervention (eight studies in five reviews). In the case of hospital-level organisational 
performance, the effect was mixed with 28/56 outcomes favouring accreditation (eleven 
studies in seven reviews). In terms of the effect on patients’ outcomes, the intervention was 
generally effective with 22/32 outcomes improving (eight studies in five reviews). Overall, the 
effect of accreditation across outcomes and intervention categories was mixed with 79/161 
outcomes showing improvement. The summary of the negative effects of accreditation are 
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Eight reviews were identified examining the effect of external inspection or accreditation on 
organisational performance or patients’ outcomes. These reviews included 88 individual 
studies, but only 21 of them provided relevant comparisons for this overview. The 
methodological quality of the reviews was low to high, and the rating of the quality of the 
evidence from primary studies was low to moderate. 
4.1.6.1 Summary of main results 
Accreditation showed mixed effects on disease-specific and hospital-level performance, whilst 
it was generally effective in improving patients’ outcomes. Overall, the intervention showed 
mixed effects when all comparisons and outcome measures were combined. Regarding the 
negative effects of accreditation or external inspections, overall 5% reported negative effects, 
whilst 46% reported no effect (see Appendix Chapter 4, Table 4.7). Only one interrupted time-
series study (Piontek et al., 2003) reported a high proportion of negative effects (i.e. three of 
five outcomes) associated with increased hospital spending. 
When studies were grouped by study design, the RCT showed the most conservative results, 
whilst observational studies presented more positive findings. The subgroup analysis including 
only those studies where JCAHO accreditation was the intervention showed that these are 
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generally ineffective on improving organisational performance, but they were generally 
effective on improving patients’ outcomes. 
ACS and Trauma Association of Canada Accreditation had mixed effects on lowering mortality 
rates for trauma with 8/13 outcomes favouring the intervention. SCPC accreditation was 
generally effective in improving organisational performance with 10/13 outcomes favouring 
the intervention. 
4.1.6.2 Overall completeness and applicability of evidence 
Despite the number of individual studies identified by the included reviews, only one of them 
assessed the effect of an external inspection regime on organisational performance (OPM 
evaluation team, 2009). Most research studies on the subject have focused on the effect of 
accreditation, mainly by the Joint Commission in the United States or overseas. 
The active components of accreditation or the hypothesised theory of change were rarely 
described; although JCAHO accreditation was the intervention assessed in 48% of the studies. 
The categories used to organise the results were created based on the studies included instead 
of being defined “a priori”. They reflect the study designs of the research found and not the 
intensity of intervention or different types of external oversight. 
Likewise, the classification of measures of organisational performance was based on the 
outcomes reported by the included studies. The main purpose of this classification was to 
maximise the number of studies within each category and to draw meaningful conclusions 
about the effect of the intervention. This implied that a myriad of hospital-level performance 
measures was combined together even when they reflected different aspects of care. 
Most outcomes fell under the category of disease-specific measures. These studies were all 
carried out in the United States, and seven of them used a public database named Hospital 
Compare that reports performance in several conditions. When it was first set-up, it had 18 
measures reflecting the use of standardised processes for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Heart 
Failure and Pneumonia; which were the main outcomes included in these studies. Therefore, 
the results for disease-specific performance measures have restricted applicability to other 
conditions in other settings. 
The country of origin of the research included was mainly the United States, Australia, several 
countries in Europe and two countries in Africa. The applicability of the evidence here 
presented to developing and low-income countries is very restricted due to the limited amount 
of published research coming from those settings. Only one study was carried out in England 
(OPM evaluation team, 2009). 
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Most research studies were carried out between 2000 and 2010; therefore, the evidence is at 
least 8 years old. It is not clear to what extent the spread of accreditation as a quality 
improvement intervention might diminish its effect over time (i.e. diminishing returns).  
4.1.6.3 Quality of evidence 
The review traded-off only including methodologically rigorous reviews and comprehensively 
capturing research on the effects of accreditation in healthcare. There were two main 
consequences: the quality of the included reviews was low to moderate, and individual studies 
had a high risk of bias due to study design and low-quality review processes. 
Differences in study design and outcome measures negated combining the results 
quantitatively. Instead, a vote counting method was used to determine the direction of the 
effect; therefore, there is a high level of uncertainty around the estimates. Vote counting is not 
a reliable method because it does not account for the relative weight of each study and only 
considers the number of studies with positive and negative results. In addition, when a study 
shows no effect, it is not possible to determine if there is no effect or the study was 
underpowered for that measure. In the case of this overview, only two studies (Salmon et al., 
2003, Quality assurance project, 2005) finding accreditation generally ineffective were 
potentially underpowered. Despite the limitations of vote counting, this method was used as a 
last resort to condense a large body of literature. The true effect of external oversight remains 
unknown. 
In the case of patients’ outcomes, 23 measures were retrieved from two studies looking into 
mortality of surgical procedures (Weeks et al., 2007) and mortality of patients with traumatic 
injuries (Pasquale et al., 2001). If only these two studies are combined, 78% of outcomes 
favoured the intervention. If these results were removed, the effect of accreditation changes 
from generally effective to mixed effects. 
In the case of disease-specific indicators, seven studies used outcome measures from the 
Hospital Compare database with 37 indicators reflecting processes of care for AMI. If the 
results for these indicators are removed, only 27% of measures of effect favoured the 
intervention, which makes it generally ineffective. There were two measures showing 
consistent positive results: receiving aspirin and beta-blockers within 24 hours after admission. 
These indicators reflect processes of care that do not involve complex decision-making, which 
suggest that accreditation might be encouraging a tick-box culture to improve the quality of 
care. 
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4.1.6.4 Potential biases in the overview process 
The processes of screening, quality assessment and summarising of results have been 
performed by one assessor, which reduces the reliability of the results. 
Additionally, only 25% of all the studies included in the reviews addressed the effect of 
accreditation on organisational performance or health outcomes, making subject to 
questioning the process of selection of reviews and individual studies to be summarised. 
4.1.6.5 Agreements and disagreements with other studies or reviews 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no other overview of reviews addressing the effect of 
accreditation or external inspection on organisational performance and health outcomes. 
Individual reviews’ discussions and conclusions support the findings of this overview. 
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4.2 Update of systematic review 
When the first version of the overview was finished in 2015, the most rigorous systematic 
review identified was four years old, and at least one new publication eligible was identified 
(Devkaran and O'Farrell, 2015). Therefore, it was deemed worthwhile to update the review by 
Flodgren et al. (2011) to have a more recent knowledge base for methodological decision-
making. In 2016, Flodgren et al. published an update of their review; however, their results 
remained the same. This section was updated again in February 2018 combining the search 
strategy of Flodgren et al. (2011) and Flodgren et al. (2016). 
4.2.1 Methods 
4.2.1.1 Criteria for considering studies for this review 
The systematic review with the highest quality was updated. For this purpose, randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs), non-randomised controlled trials, controlled before-after studies (CBA) 
and interrupted-time-series studies (ITS) were included. In the case of ITS, at least three time 
points before and after the intervention should be reported to include the article. 
The criteria for type of participant, intervention, and outcomes are the same than the ones 
used for the overview of systematic reviews. 
4.2.1.2 Search methods for identification of studies 
The search strategy used by Flodgren et al. (2016) was updated for the databases searched in 
that systematic review to find other relevant primary research. 
This review was chosen because of its rigorous methods and quality was the highest. 
4.2.1.3 Electronic searches 
To identify other primary studies, the following databases were searched from 2011 to 
February 2018: 
 CENTRAL and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews Issue 2, February 2018 
 Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE) 
 MEDLINE, Ovid 
 EMBASE, Ovid  
 CINAHL, EBSCO 
 Science Citation Index, Web of Knowledge  
 Social Science Citation Index, Web of Knowledge 
 ISI Conference Proceedings, Web of Knowledge  
 PsycINFO, Ovid 
 The Healthcare Management Information Consortium (HMIC), Ovid 
 Electronic Theses Online 
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4.2.1.4 Data collection and analysis 
The strategy for selection of studies and data extraction was the same than the one used for 
the overview of systematic reviews. 
4.2.1.4.1 Assessment of quality of individual studies 
In the case of new primary research, the criteria suggested by the Effective Practice and 
Organisation of Care (EPOC) Cochrane group was used for randomised controlled trials, 
controlled before-and-after studies, and interrupted time series studies. For controlled studies, 
this tool considers sequence generation, concealed allocation, similar baseline characteristics, 
management of missing data, blinding of primary outcome assessor, prevention of 
contamination, selective reporting of outcome, and other potential biases. For ITS, it is also 
assessed that intervention effect is independent of other changes, intervention effect shape is 
pre-specified, and data collection is independent of the intervention. 
4.2.1.4.2 Analysis plan 
Research studies identified were heterogeneous, thus a structured synthesis was planned. The 
GRADE tool was used to generate conclusions based on the available research. Information 
regarding population, intervention, comparison, outcomes measured, setting, study design 
and risk of bias assessment are presented in tables. Results are presented as medians (range) 
for ordinal variables, means ± standard deviations for continuous or discrete data, proportions 
(95% CI) for categorical outcomes and pre-post slope differences for ITS. For graphical 
information, PlotDigitizer (http://plotdigitizer.sourceforge.net/) was used to extract data. 
4.2.2 Results 
4.2.2.1 Results of the search 
The PRISMA flowchart detailing the screening and reviewing process is in Figure 4.2. Using the 
search strategy, 9608 records were retrieved. After removing 1068 duplicated records and 
screening 8451 titles and abstracts, only 58 primary studies were analysed in their full-text 
version. Reasons and references excluded are shown in the Appendix Chapter 4, Table 4.10. 
Table 4.7 displays the characteristics of the five primary studies included. 
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Figure 4.2: PRISMA Flow diagram of primary studies for the update of the best systematic review 
 
4.2.2.2 Included studies 
Four ITS studies and one CBA study met the inclusion criteria. All of them were performed in 
high-income countries. One included one hospital applying for voluntary accreditation 
(Devkaran and O'Farrell, 2015), another included 58 hospitals going through mandatory 
accreditation (Towers and Clark, 2014); whilst the other three included all accredited hospitals 
in Denmark (Bogh et al., 2015, Bogh et al., 2016, Bogh et al., 2017). All accreditation regimes 
were applied at the organisational level. 
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4.2.2.3 Targeted behaviour 
Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) and Towers and Clark (2014) assessed regimes targeted to 
improve a wide range of behaviours, processes and outcomes across the healthcare 
organisation, reflecting the accreditation approach of The Joint Commission. The three studies 
performed in Denmark assessed The Danish Healthcare Quality Programme, which established 
a framework for high-quality work in hospitals, making mandatory the evaluation and use of 
clinical registries data. 
4.2.2.4 Participants and settings 
In the case of Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015), the setting was a 150-bed private hospital in Abu 
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Towers and Clark (2014) included data for 10 years from 58 
hospitals in New Jersey, United States. No further information about the setting is provided. 
Bogh et al. (2015) included data in 2004, 2006 and 2008 of 33 public hospitals in Denmark of 
which six had been accredited. Bogh et al. (2016) and Bogh et al. (2017) used data for 5 years 
from 25 public hospitals accredited between 2010 and 2013 by The Danish Healthcare Quality 
Programme. 
4.2.2.5 Outcomes 
In the study of Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015), 27 measures of quality of care and one 
composite indicator were used to determine the effect of the on-site accreditation visit. These 
indicators were grouped into nine categories: patient assessment, laboratory safety, surgical 
procedures, medication error use and near misses, anaesthesia and sedation use, 
completeness of medical records, healthcare-associated infections, mortality and international 
safety goals. These were chosen to reflect most aspects of care assessed by the JCI. 
In the study of Towers and Clark (2014), risk-adjusted mortality was used as outcome. 
Additionally, the effect of belonging to a network of healthcare providers, technological 
development, financial buffer capacity, and unannounced accreditation visits were explored. 
The three studies from Denmark assessed process of care performance measurements for 
stroke, heart failure, and ulcers (perforated or bleeding) at different time points. Bogh et al. 
(2015) present compliance for each measure plus two composite measures: an opportunity-
based and an all-or-none score for each condition. Bogh et al. (2016) and Bogh et al. (2017) 
used more measures for the three conditions aforementioned and added measures for breast 
cancer, lung cancer and diabetes totalling 43 indicators. 
4.2.2.6 Data Collection 
For Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015), 12000 patients’ records were checked retrospectively, 
representing 24% of patients treated between January 2009 and September 2012. 
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For Towers and Clark (2014), data about mortality for a 10-year period was collected from the 
healthcare cost and utilization state inpatient database. No information on the size of sample 
size is provided. 
The three studies from Denmark used national disease-specific clinical registries, but sample 
sizes differed. Bogh et al. (2015) included data from 27,274 patients, whilst Bogh et al. (2016, 
2017) analysed data from 1,624,518 processes of care provided during 5 years. 
4.2.2.7 Risk of bias of included studies 
The risk of bias assessment for included studies is in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. 
In the case of Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015), five methodological aspects were assessed with a 
low risk of bias: Intervention independent of other changes, pre-specified shape of 
intervention, intervention unlikely to affect data collection, selective reporting of outcomes, 
and risk of other biases. The two remaining aspects were considered unclear: knowledge of 
allocation adequately protected and incomplete outcome data. 
For Towers and Clark (2014), three methodological aspects had a low risk of bias: knowledge of 
allocation adequately protected, selective reporting of outcomes, and risk of other biases. The 
remaining four criteria were deemed as low risk of bias. 
Three methodological aspects of Bogh et al. (2015) were deemed at high risk of bias: 
generation of allocation sequence, allocation concealment, and similar baseline characteristics. 
Other five features were deemed at low risk of bias (i.e. similar baseline outcomes, 
management of incomplete outcome, protection of allocation, selective reporting and other 
biases) and one as an unclear (protection against contamination). 
Bogh et al. (2017) is an extension of Bogh et al. (2016) analysis; therefore, they share most of 
methodological aspects. Five of them were deemed at low risk of bias: intervention unlikely to 
affect data collection, knowledge of allocation protected, incomplete outcome data, selective 
reporting of outcomes, and risk of other biases. It was not clear if the intervention was 
independent of other changes and only Bogh et al. (2016) specified the shape of the 
intervention. 
4.2.2.8 Effects of interventions 
The effect of the interventions is reported in detail in the Appendix Chapter 4, Table 4.9. The 
summary of finding for the main comparison are reported in Table 4.10. 
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4.2.2.8.1 Mortality 
The effect of accreditation on mortality was mixed: Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) found no 
difference in mortality rates the month after the inspection (β=-0.01 [-0.016 to 0.14]), whilst 
Towers and Clark (2014) found a significant positive effect on risk-adjusted mortality (β=-
0.0454; p<0.05). 
4.2.2.8.2 Composite measure of quality of care 
Using a composite measure of quality, Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) found an improving trend 
before inspection (β=2.19; p<0.001), an abrupt decrease in compliance the month after the 
inspection (β=-3.95 [-6.39 to -1.51]) and a maintained trend towards decline of compliance 
(β=-2.16 [-2.52 to -1.8]).  
Bogh et al. (2016) had similar findings. More than 6 months prior to the accreditation, the 
probability of meeting the 43 process performance measures under assessment increased by 
0.7% per week (p<0.001). In the 6 months before the accreditation visit, the improvement 
further increased by a non-significant 0.2% per week. After the visit, the improvement trend 
flattened compared to the pre-accreditation periods (-0.6% change per week, p=0.04). Bogh et 
al. (2017) present a subgroup analysis of Bogh et al. (2016) for six conditions finding that 
compliance improved more than 6 months before the visit, and then remained static. 
Bogh et al. (2016) also present a subgroup analysis including only processes with sub-standard 
compliance 6 months before the accreditation. For this subset of measures, improvement was 
significant but slower more than 6 months prior to the visit (0.4% per week, p<0.001). It 
accelerated in the next 6 months by 0.6% per week (p=0.04) and stagnated after the visit 
(change by -0.08% per week, p=0.04). In the subgroup analyses by condition (Bogh et al., 2017) 
this pattern -improvement, accelerated improvement and stagnation- was only observed for 
diabetes standards. These data represented 58.8% of processes of care analysed, which could 
explain the findings of Bogh et al. (2016). For the other five conditions analysed by Bogh et al. 
(2017), there was a significant improvement only more than 6 months before the 
accreditation. 
Bogh et al. (2015) found that between 2004 and 2008, non-accredited hospitals improved 
more their overall opportunity-based composite score than accredited hospitals (absolute 
difference 3.8; 95% CI 0.8 to 8.3). In addition, non-accredited hospitals improved their 
opportunity-based and all-or-none scores for stroke and heart failure; whilst accredited 
hospitals only improved their stroke opportunity-based score. 
112 
Table 4.7 Characteristics the five extra studies included in the update of the systematic review 




























- Initial medical assessment done within 24 h of admission 
- Initial nursing assessment within 24 h of admission 
- % of pain assessments completed per month 
- % of completed pain reassessments per month 
- Hours for complete blood count as routine lab result 
- Turnaround time of troponin lab results (in minutes) 
- Completion of the surgical invasive procedure consent 
- % of operating room (OR) cancellation of elective surgery (transformed) 
- Unplanned return to OR within 48 h (transformed) 
- Reported medication errors (transformed) 
- % of completed anaesthesia, moderate and deep sedation consents 
- % of completed modified Aldrete scores (pre, post, discharge) 
- % of completed pre-anaesthesia assessments 
- % of completed anaesthesia care plans 
- % of completed assessments of patients receiving anaesthesia 
- Effective communication of risks, benefits and alternatives of anaesthesia 
- Hospital-acquired MRSA rate (transformed) 
- Healthcare-associated infections at hospital level 
- Surgical site infection rate (transformed) 
- % of typed post-operative report completed within 48 h 
- Mortality rate (transformed) 
- Compliance with surgical site marking 
- Compliance with the time-out procedure 
- Screening for patient fall risk 
- Overall hospital hand hygiene compliance rate 
- Patient fall rate 
- Fall risk assessment and reassessment 
- Mean Composite score (It includes only 23 measures) 
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Authors explored the association between system affiliation and 
technological status with risk-adjusted mortality. Additionally, the effect of 
an unannounced visit was determined. 





















- An opportunity-based (proportion of care recommended provided) and 
an all-or-none score (patients receiving 100% of care recommended). 
Stroke:                    -   Early admission to a stroke unit 
- Early antiplatelet therapy initiated   
- Oral anticoagulant therapy initiated 
- Early examination with CT/MRI 
- Early assessment by a physiotherapist  
- Early assessment by an occupational therapist 
- Early assessment of nutritional risk 
Heart failure:         -   Echocardiography  
- NYHA classification  
- ACE/ATII inhibitors therapy 
- Beta-blockers therapy  
- Physical training  
- Patient education  
Perforated ulcer:  -   Early surgery 
- Control of body weight 
- Control of fluid balance 
- Control of blood pressure, pulse, temperature, 
saturation, respiratory rate and level of consciousness 
Bleeding ulcer:      -   Endoscopy 
- Therapeutic endoscopy   
- Endoscopic treatment of recurrent bleeding 
- Avoided surgical treatment 
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Study Study design Participants Intervention Comparison Outcomes 
















(6 months in 




(more than 6 
months before 
visit) and post 
accreditation (a 
week after the 
visit) periods 
Probability of meeting 43 processes of care performance measures for six 
conditions: stroke, heart failure, diabetes, ulcers (perforated and bleeding), 
breast cancer and lung cancer. 
















(6 months in 




(more than 6 
months before 
visit) and post 
accreditation (a 
week after the 
visit) periods 
Probability of meeting the standards for each of the six conditions included: 
stroke, heart failure, diabetes, ulcers (perforated and bleeding), breast 
cancer and lung cancer. 
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Table 4.8 Risk of bias assessment for interrupted time-series studies 
Domain 
Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) and 
Devkaran and O'Farrell (2014) 
Towers and Clark (2014) Bogh et al. (2016) Bogh et al. (2017) 
Intervention independent of other changes 
Judgement Low risk Unclear risk Unclear risk Unclear risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Page 2 paragraph 3, 2015 
The hospital analysed did not undergo 
any significant organisational changes 
between 2009 and 2012. Thus, both the 
leadership, organisational structure and 
the scope of services remained the same. 
There is no reference to 
other potential changes 
during the observation 
period (i.e. 10 years) 
It does not refer to any other 
potential changes during the 
observation period (i.e. 5 years). 
It does not refer to any other 
potential changes during the 
observation period (i.e. 5 years). 
Pre-specified shape of intervention 
Judgement Low risk Unclear risk Low risk High risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Pages 2-3, 2014 
The initiation phase will be characterised 
by a gradual positive change in slope.  
A marked improvement (ramp up) in 
compliance is expected to occur during 
the pre-survey phase. We hypothesise 
that a sharp drop in levels of compliance 
will occur immediately following the 
accreditation survey followed by a 
negative change in slope over time. 
During this stagnation phase, we 
hypothesise that there will be an 
undulating plateau of compliance 
characterised by sporadic changes but at 
an overall level above the pre-
accreditation values. 
Potential shape of the 
effect of the interventions 
is not mentioned 
Page 716, paragraph 3 
Hypothesis 1: an increased trend 
in process performance 
measures during accreditation 
compared to prior to 
accreditation.  
Hypothesis 2: the improved trend 
would decrease post-
accreditation.  
Hypothesis 3: the improvement 
effect would be more evident for 
process performance measures 
where the hospitals prior to the 
accreditation delivered quality of 
care at an unsatisfactory level. 
It is not specified 
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Domain 
Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) and 
Devkaran and O'Farrell (2014) 
Towers and Clark (2014) Bogh et al. (2016) Bogh et al. (2017) 
Intervention unlikely to affect data collection 
Judgement Low risk Unclear risk Low risk Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Patients’ records were checked 
retrospectively; therefore, the 
interventions could not have affected 
data collection. 
Data about mortality was 
collected from the 
healthcare cost and 
utilization state inpatient 
database. There is no 
information about a 
potential effect of site visits 
and this database. 
Page 716, paragraph 7 
Patient-level data were obtained 
from national clinical quality 
registries. To be approved as a 
national clinical quality registry at 
least 90% of all patients treated 
at hospitals should be included. 
Reporting to these registries is 
mandatory for all hospitals 
according to Danish law. 
Page 478, paragraph 8 
43 different process performance 
measures were included from 
national clinical quality registries 
that related to the six included 
conditions. Data on the processes 
of care were prospectively 
collected. It is mandatory all 
hospitals report to the registries 
under Danish law. 
Knowledge of allocation adequately protected 
Judgement Unclear risk Low risk Low risk Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
It is not clear if the person extracting 
information was aware of the period 
covered by each patient's record (i.e. pre 
or post-accreditation). 
Most outcomes are objective (e.g. 
mortality rate, healthcare-associated 
infection), but a minority was subject to 
assessor judgement (i.e. effective 
communication of risks, benefits and 
alternatives of anaesthesia explained to 
patients) 
The primary outcome was 
mortality, therefore, the 
measure is objective. 
Performance measurement was 
collected for the National 
Registry, regardless of the 
intervention. 
Performance measurement was 
collected for the National 




Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) and 
Devkaran and O'Farrell (2014) 
Towers and Clark (2014) Bogh et al. (2016) Bogh et al. (2017) 
Incomplete outcome data (attrition bias) 
Judgement Unclear risk Unclear risk Low risk Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
There is no reference to a percentage of 
incomplete outcome data. 
There is no reference to a 
percentage of incomplete 
outcome data. 
Page 717, paragraph 2 
We excluded processes with 
missing data from our analyses, 
but the proportion of missing 
data for the individual processes 
of care was in general low (<10%) 
and expected to be missing 
completely at random. 
Page 479, paragraph 2 
Processes with missing data were 
excluded from the analyses; 
however, it should be noted that 
the proportion of missing data for 
the individual processes of care 
was generally low (<10%) and 
expected to be missing at 
random. 
Selective reporting (reporting bias) 
Judgement Low risk Low risk Low risk Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Results were reported for all outcomes 
described in the methods section. 
Results were reported for 
all outcomes described in 
the methods section 
Results were reported for all 
outcomes described in the 
methods section  
Results were reported for all 
outcomes described in the 
methods section. 
Other bias 
Judgement Low risk Low risk Low risk Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
No other risk of bias were identified The analysis accounted for 
monthly, yearly and 
hospital effects; therefore, 
potential bias due to 
autocorrelation, seasonality 
and clusters is low. 
No other risk of bias were 
identified. 




Table 4.9 Risk of bias assessment for the controlled before and after study 
Domain Bogh et al. (2015) 
Adequate generation of allocation sequence 
Judgement High risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Page 2, paragraph 3 
In 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011 five hospitals were accredited by the Joint 
Commission International (JCI), whilst four hospitals in 2004 were 
accredited by the Health Quality Service (HQS). 
Allocation concealment 
Judgement High risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Hospitals accredited applied voluntarily. 
Similar baseline outcome measurements 
Judgement Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
19 of 21 measures were similar at baseline. Although there was no 
adjustment in the analysis for these differences, results are presented as 
absolute difference, which takes into consideration the baseline values. 
Similar baseline characteristics 
Judgement High risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Accredited hospitals were more likely to be located in the capital region. 
Incomplete outcome data (attrition bias) 
Judgement Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Page 2, paragraph 4 
The proportion of patients with missing data for the individual process of 
care performance measures was in general low (i.e. <10%). We excluded 
patients with missing data from the analyses of the individual performance 
measures. 
Knowledge of allocation adequately protected 
Judgement Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Performance measurement was collected for the National Registry, 
regardless of the intervention. 
Protection against contamination 
Judgement Unclear risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Hospitals apply to be accredited, and accreditation became mandatory in 
2010; therefore, control hospitals were probably preparing for their visit. 
Selective reporting (reporting bias) 
Judgement Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
Results were reported for all outcomes described in the methods section. 
Other bias 
Judgement Low risk 
Support for 
judgement 
No other risk of bias were identified. 
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4.2.3 Discussion 
4.2.3.1 Summary of main results 
Four interrupted time-series studies and one controlled before and after study were added in 
this updated systematic review. Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) found an inconsistent effect of 
accreditation on individual measures of organisational behaviours and health outcomes. 
However, a composite measure shows steady improvement before the accreditation visit, a 
drop in performance the month after the visit, and a declining trend afterwards (Devkaran and 
O'Farrell, 2014). The findings of Bogh et al. (2016, 2017) support this pattern of improvement 
before the visit and stagnation of performance afterwards. Bogh et al. (2015) found greater 
improvement of performance for non-accredited than accredited hospitals over four years. 
Towers and Clark (2014) found a significant decrease in risk-adjusted mortality the month after 
the accreditation. 
The studies included in Flodgren et al. (2016) suggest that accreditation improves compliance 
with accreditation standards, but it does not affect measures of care quality (Salmon et al., 
2003). Also, the inspections of the Healthcare Commission in England were not associated with 
changes in rates of in-hospital MRSA infection (change in trend 24.27 infections per quarter, 
95% CI -10.4 to 58.9; p = 0.15) (OPM evaluation team, 2009) 
4.2.3.2 Overall completeness and applicability of evidence 
The results of this systematic review are limited in terms of generalizability and translation to 
other settings. All studies but one (Salmon et al., 2003) were implemented in high-income 
countries. The seven studies were conducted in secondary care, and the intervention was an 
accreditation visit; therefore, this information is unlikely applicable to other contexts. 
The finding of Salmon et al. (2003) suggest that elements related to the management of 
healthcare services improved more in accredited than non-accredited hospitals (21 out of 28 
service elements. Overall improvement in compliance 30 [23 to 37] points, p<0.001). Results 
from Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) and Bogh et al. (2016, 2017) highlight that the pressure of 
a future accreditation visit seems to drive improvement, whilst performance declines after the 
visit. Although more research would be needed to assure consistency, these findings suggest 
cyclic changes of performance driven by the accreditation visit. Additionally, accreditation 
seems to drive the implementation of protocols and standard management processes, which 
are not affecting clinical outcomes. Apparently, the cyclical changes of performance produce a 
transient drop of risk-adjusted mortality in the short term. 
In Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) only five (18.5%) performance measures are clinical/health 
outcomes and only one of them improved before the accreditation visit (i.e. MRSA infection 
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rate). In the case of measures of organisational performance, 50% improved before the visit. 
Salmon et al. (2003) found a similar pattern, where the quality measures improved equally in 
accredited and non-accredited hospitals, except nurses’ perception of quality of care that 
improved more in hospitals receiving accreditation. However, 75% of the organisational 
processes improved. This suggests that hospitals prepare for on-site visits by implementing 
quick fixes for simple processes (for example, time-out procedure before starting a surgery). 
Nevertheless, evidence is sparse to draw strong conclusions about this.  
4.2.3.3 Quality of evidence 
Overall quality of evidence is low to moderate with small, inconsistent and imprecise effects. 
4.2.3.4 Potential biases in the review process 
The processes of screening, quality assessment and summarising of results have been 
performed by one assessor, which introduces biases and decreases the reliability of the results. 
4.2.3.5 Agreements and disagreements with other studies or reviews 
These results are in line with those of Flodgren et al. (2011) and Flodgren et al. (2016) that 
found inconsistent evidence on the effect of external oversight on organisational behaviour or 
health outcomes, although the inclusion of the three studies from Denmark has improved the 
quality of evidence available. 
The greatest limitation of the available evidence is the methodological design and limited 
applicability of results to different contexts. 
4.3 Conclusion 
Despite the large number of articles analysed (7 reviews and 90 individual studies) addressing 
whether external inspection or accreditation improves organisational behaviour or health 
outcomes, effects remain highly uncertain. 
The overview of systematic reviews found mixed evidence on the effect of the interventions. 
These findings were driven by a large body of studies using disease-specific measures to 
determine effectiveness; when these are removed, the intervention is generally ineffective. 
The studies included in the update of the systematic review support the conclusion that the 
effect of accreditation is cyclical; therefore, evaluations of external oversight regimes should 
consider time as a moderating variable. 
There is still a lack of robust studies using generic measures of quality of care to increase 
certainty around the real effect of external oversight regimes. The costs associated with 
external oversight are still rarely explored and reported, leaving room to determine the cost-
effectiveness of the intervention. 
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Table 4.10 Summary of findings 
Accreditation for improving organisational behaviour and health outcomes 
Patient or population: improving organisational behaviour and health outcomes  
Setting: Secondary care  
Intervention: Accreditation  
Comparison: Pre-accreditation period  
Outcomes Impact № of participants  
(studies)  
Quality of the evidence 
(GRADE)  
Composite measure of quality of care 
follow up: 3 years  
Trend before accreditation: 2.19; p<0.001  
Immediately after accreditation: -3.95 [-6.39 to -1.51]  
Trend after accreditation: -2.16 [-2.52 to -1.8]  
12000 
(1 observational study)  
⨁◯◯◯ 
VERY LOW 1 
Composite measure of process of care 
follow-up: 5 years 
Trend >6 m before accreditation: 1.007 [1.005 to 1.008] 
Change in trend during accreditation: 1.002 [0.997 to 1.006] 
Change in trend after accreditation: 0.99 [0.988 to 0.999] 
1624518 




follow up: range 7 months to 3 years  
Risk-adjusted mortality: Beta -0.045; p<0.05  
Mortality: Beta -0.01 [-0.16 to 0.14]  
12000? 
(2 observational studies)  
⨁◯◯◯ 
VERY LOW 1 
1 The evidence was downgraded on the basis of small effect, imprecision and inconsistency. 
GRADE Working Group grades of evidence 
High quality: Author is very confident that the true effect lies close to that of the estimate of the effect 
Moderate quality: Author is moderately confident in the effect estimate: The true effect is likely to be close to the estimate of the effect, but there is a 
possibility that it is substantially different 
Low quality: Author is confident that the effect estimate is limited: The true effect may be substantially different from the estimate of the effect 
Very low quality: Author has very little confidence in the effect estimate: The true effect is likely to be substantially different from the estimate of effect  
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5 Design of the evaluation of CQC 
inspections 
 
The CQC, an external oversight regulatory agency, is not the first one of its kind in the NHS or 
worldwide. Evidence from other similar institutions suggests mixed effects on improving 
disease-specific and hospital-level organisational performance, whilst external oversight 
appears to be generally effective to improve patients’ outcomes. However, much of this 
evidence comes from low quality, and heterogeneous studies. 
In the case of the NHS, evaluations of the work of the CQC predecessors have used qualitative 
methods and surveys (Benson et al., 2004, Day and Klein, 2004, Healthcare Commission, 
2008a, Healthcare Commission, 2009), without assessing the premise that the mission of 
encouraging improvement should translate into better health outcomes and organisational 
performance. 
Based on a large body of literature, in this chapter different study designs available for 
evaluating the effect of a health policy are considered along with their strengths and 
weaknesses. Then, it is explained what design choices were made and the potential 
measurement issues associated with answering the overarching research question: 
What is the effect of CQC inspections of NHS acute trusts in England on measures of process of 
care and clinical outcomes? 
This research examines the potential contribution of inspections to the improvement of acute 
hospitals’ care quality and does not assess the effectiveness of the Care Quality Commission as 
a whole. 
5.1 Objectives 
The objectives of the empirical analyses that follow are to: 
1. Determine the effect of CQC inspections of NHS acute trusts on measures of process of 
care and clinical outcomes. 
2. Compare the effect of the old and new CQC inspection regime of NHS acute trusts on 
measures of process of care and clinical outcomes. 
3. Compare the effect of the old and new CQC inspection regime of NHS acute trusts on 
measures of process of care and clinical outcomes when accounting for the previous level 
of improvement to address how ability to improve affects the response to an inspection. 
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4. Determine the incremental costs for CQC and the opportunity costs for acute NHS trusts of 
performing an inspection cycle. 
5. Consider the cost-effectiveness of the new CQC inspection regime considering measures of 
process of care and clinical outcomes. 
5.2 Methodology 
In health services and policy research, the pragmatic approach has become more predominant 
in the recent years, because it allows gaining a greater understanding of the phenomena under 
study (O'Cathain et al., 2007). Shortly after this thesis started, Walshe et al. (2014) published 
the findings of their qualitative assessment of CQC new regime of inspections. Consequently, it 
was considered that taking a quantitative approach to research would provide more valuable 
results than expanding on the qualitative knowledge available (Benson et al., 2004, Day and 
Klein, 2004, Healthcare Commission, 2008a). 
A quasi-experimental approach was chosen(Cook and Campbell, 1986) because it was not 
possible to manipulate the intervention. This encompasses the use of quantitative methods, 
assuming that procedures are systematic, reproducible and valid (Broom and Willis, 2007). 
Also, this approach assumes it is possible to measure the effect of the intervention on quality 
of care whilst controlling sources of bias and confounding (Cook and Campbell, 1986, Bowling 
et al., 2012). Nonetheless, it does not intend to provide a prediction or full explanation of the 
relationship between intervention and outcomes, because of the difficulties conceptualising 
social objects (such as quality of care) and dealing with human behaviour as a causal force 
(Cook and Campbell, 1986). Moreover, quasi-experimentation assumes that the particular, 
complex, multivariate causal relationships under study behave in a probabilistic way, which 
makes it difficult to predict exactly the response of one unit at a given time (ibid). 
CQC inspections are complex interventions taking place in a complex adaptive system 
(Braithwaite et al., 2017a) and theory around the mechanism of change of inspections and 
factors associated with an effect are underdeveloped and rarely articulated (Hovlid et al., 
2017). There is no direct evidence to select confounding variables, and exploring the potential 
influence of context on the effect estimates is limited by sample size and data quality. This 
means that the number of analyses and outcomes measures had to be carefully selected to 
avoid finding spurious relationships associated with familywise error rate16 (Bartroff and Song, 
                                                             
16 Familywise error rate refers to the expected rate of type I errors when testing multiple times pairwise 
comparisons (i.e. a family of null hypothesis). This rate increases with the number of tests performed 
(Hochberg and Tamhane, 2008). 
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2014). This research contributes to the overall information on the effect of the CQC on quality 
of care, which can inform pragmatic research exploring when and why the intervention works. 
The following sections explore study design options within the framework of quasi-
experiments, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, and how these relate to the 
limitations of this thesis regarding the availability of data and features of the intervention. 
5.2.1 The analysis of the effectiveness of health policies 
As with any other intervention, the best study design to make causal inferences, such as 
estimating the effect of a health policy, is a randomised controlled trial (Stuart and Naeger, 
2017). However, researchers rarely have a chance to devise an experiment to test the effect of 
a health policy before it is implemented. Therefore, the second best option is a quasi-
experiment (Shadish et al., 2002). Among quasi-experiments, Shadish et al. (2002) highlight 
regression discontinuity designs followed by interrupted time-series studies as the options 
yielding more robust conclusions. Economists suggest a third quasi-experimental design to 
estimate the effect of a health policy: difference-in-difference analyses (Dimick and Ryan, 
2014).  
The validity of quasi-experiments relies heavily on assumptions, especially about plausibility, 
that is, the existence of a logical, evidence-based explanation for the cause-effect relationship 
(Bradford Hill, 1965). The concept of plausibility plays a pivotal role in deciding which threats 
to validity (or risk of bias) are relevant, which design elements should be added to rule out or 
minimise the effect of a threat to validity, to what extent biases have been reduced, and 
whether the additive effect of all remaining biases might be greater than the hypothetical 
effect size (Shadish et al., 2002). In consequence, the choice of study design is bound to 
meeting the underlying assumptions and the possibility of adding elements to control biases 
and sources of confounding. 
In the following sections, the three quasi-experimental designs available to assess the effect of 
a health policy are explored, highlighting assumptions, strengths and limitations of each of 
them to justify the design selected. 
5.2.1.1 Regression discontinuity studies 
Regression discontinuity designs require a treated and a control group and perfect knowledge 
of the selection process (Shadish et al., 2002). The variable or algorithm that defines who 
receives the treatment or control is what is called the forcing variable. However, one 
fundamental assumption is that individuals cannot precisely manipulate their own values of 
the forcing variable; therefore, individuals close to the cut-off point will have a similar 
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probability of being assigned to the control or intervention group (Lee and Lemieux, 2009), 
which makes allocation almost random. The analysis then looks at the behaviour of the 
outcome of interest depending on the value of the forcing variable (ibid) (Figure 5.1). This is 
the first option when conducting quasi-experiments since it is the most robust design if the 
assumptions are met (Shadish et al., 2002, Lee and Lemieux, 2009). However, if there is no 
knowledge about the forcing variable, this design is not feasible. 
 
Figure 5.1 Scheme of a regression discontinuity design 
In the case of CQC inspections, the process to define who and when will receive an inspection 
is not entirely clear. This is particularly problematic when it comes to defining who received 
the new regime inspection during the pilot and early implementation phase, which is the 
intervention under consideration in this thesis. The use of a regression discontinuity design to 
answer the research question posed was unfeasible because there is no forcing variable.  
5.2.1.2 Difference-in-difference studies 
Difference-in-difference studies estimate the effect of an intervention with regression 
techniques modelling longitudinal data from two groups: one exposed to an intervention and 
another group that serves as a comparison (Ryan et al., 2015). One of the assumptions is that 
trends for these groups are parallel before the intervention (Dimick and Ryan, 2014). This 
allows determining the differential effect of the intervention by calculating the difference 
between treatment and control at the beginning (i.e. difference 1) and the difference at a later 
time point (i.e. difference 2 or 3) (Figure 5.2). If this assumption is not met, estimates from a 
difference-in-difference analysis will be biased. Therefore, another comparison group should 
be sought or a different analytical strategy used (Dimick and Ryan, 2014). The second 
assumption is that shocks are common, that is if an event occurs before or after the 
implementation of the policy its effect will be similar for both groups (Ryan et al., 2015).  
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Figure 5.2 Scheme of a difference-in-difference design 
 
In this thesis, the assumption of parallel pre-intervention trends was met for most of the 
datasets used, but not all (see Chapter 7), and consequently, a different analytical strategy 
should have been used to answer the same research question, making the overall 
interpretation more difficult. Difference-in-difference analyses can provide information on the 
overall effect of an intervention, but they do not allow making inferences about changes in 
level and slope. Regarding the assumption of common shocks, the intrinsic features of acute 
NHS trusts such as culture or leadership of senior staff may affect their ability to respond to 
shocks; therefore, it is not clear to what extent this assumption was met. Consequently, a 
difference-in-difference design was ruled out, because all datasets did not meet the 
assumption of pre-intervention parallel trends and obtaining more information than the 
difference between two groups after the intervention was being sought.  
5.2.1.3 Interrupted time-series studies 
Interrupted time-series analysis refers to a variety of analytical strategies used to determine 
the effect of an intervention, where the general features are longitudinal data pre and post-
intervention and a specific time point when the intervention was introduced (Shadish et al., 
2002). Changes in level and trend after the intervention are usually calculated using a 
segmented regression (Wagner et al., 2002) (Figure 5.3). Since the effect of the intervention is 
determined based on the pre-intervention trend for each group, comparison groups can be 
non-equivalent (Shadish et al., 2002). 
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Figure 5.3 Scheme of an interrupted time-series 
 
Estimates are not as robust as findings of an RCT (as with any observational study), but certain 
design features can reduce the potential for bias (Cook et al., 2008). These are adding a 
comparison group with similar characteristics, increasing the number of data points before and 
after the intervention, and adding other variables correlated with selection into treatment and 
the outcome (Cook et al., 2008). Given that this is a robust design to analyse the effect of 
health policies (Wagner et al., 2002, Penfold and Zhang, 2013, Kontopantelis et al., 2015a) and 
it is more versatile than the other quasi-experimental designs explored, the three research 
questions regarding the effectiveness of CQC inspections were answered using an interrupted 
time series design. 
To understand design elements and main features of interrupted time-series studies, it is 
necessary to expand on one of its fundamental elements: time-series. 
5.2.1.4 Time-series 
Since time-series modelling violates fundamental assumptions of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression models, such as independence of observations and uncorrelated error terms, some 
assumptions must be checked before using that type of analysis (Ostrom, 1990). 
The first assumption refers to being stationary, which means that mean and variance of the 
time-series are constant (ibid). However, the time-series can be analysed as a trend-stationary 
time-series when the trend (i.e. average changes over time) is included in the model (ibid). 
Another option is to integrate the time-series by working with the first differential (i.e. the 
previous data point is subtracted to each one of them) (Ostrom, 1990). To test statistically if 
the time-series is stationary, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used (Dickey and Fuller, 
1979). 
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When modelling observations that are not independent, such as the case of time-series, OLS 
regression can generate smaller and biased standard errors, increasing the probability of 
finding spurious statistically significant results (McDowall et al., 1980). Therefore, data must be 
tested for autocorrelation. 
There are two types of autocorrelation (ibid): 
 Autoregressive (AR): when error term at time t (εt) is correlated with the error term of 
previous observations (εt-n).For example, an autoregressive process of order 1 AR (1) 
means that the error term at time 2 is correlated in a magnitude φ with the error term 
at time 1 plus a random disturbance νt, which it is denoted: 
εt= φ εt-1 + νt 
 Moving average (MA): when random disturbances (νt) are correlated to each other (νt-n) 
and to the error term (εt). For example, a moving average process of order 1 MA (1) 
means that the random variation at time 2 is correlated, by a magnitude ϑ, with the 
random variation at time 1, which it is denoted: 
εt= ϑ νt-1 + νt 
Box and Jenkins (1976) suggested a three-step iterative process to model time-series: model 
identification, estimation and validation. Three strategies are recommended to identify the 
autocorrelation structure: 
1. Durbin-Watson test, where values close to two indicates no autocorrelation, below 
two may indicate positive autocorrelation and above two may indicate negative 
autocorrelation. The number of lags that are significant indicates what AR structure 
should be used. 
2. Visual inspection of residuals to detect patterns of correlation or seasonality. 
3. Autocorrelation plots against time, such as autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF) (Figure 5.4).  
In the case of autoregressive processes, ACF will show exponential decay, whilst PACF 
will have some lags significant, before dropping to 0. The number of significant lags will 
indicate the number of previous error terms correlated, which is denoted by p or AR(p) 
(McDowall et al., 1980). 
In the case of moving average processes, PACF will show an exponential decay, whilst 
ACF will have some lags significant, before dropping to 0. The number of significant 
lags will indicate the number of random disturbances correlated, which is denoted by 
q or MA(q) (McDowall et al., 1980). 
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Figure 5.4 Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function for AR (1) and MA (1) using simulated data 
When autocorrelation is present, different regression techniques capable of accounting for 
these processes should be utilised (McDowall et al., 1980). What these techniques do is to 
calculate a coefficient for each AR or MA lag that is significant and then, adds them to the 
model (ibid). The most used one is called ARIMA (Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) 
regression, which accounts for AR and MA processes and can integrate the time-series 
(McDowall et al., 1980). Given that these techniques add terms to the regression model, 
traditional model selection techniques are used to determine the best structure (e.g. likelihood 
ratio tests). 
Since interrupted time-series are particular cases of time-series, the iterative process of 
identifying the correct form, estimating and checking model assumptions are an essential part 
of the statistical analysis. 
5.2.1.5 Consideration of the design of interrupted time-series studies to establish a causal 
relationship 
A counterfactual scenario is needed to determine a causal relationship between an 
intervention and changes in an outcome (i.e. an effect). In an experiment, the counterfactual 
represents what would have happened in the absence of the intervention. Therefore, "an 
effect is the difference between what did happen and what would have happened" (Shadish et 
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al., 2002). In an interrupted time-series, the counterfactual is constructed based on the pre-
intervention trend. 
The effect can be described in terms of its form (i.e. changes in level, slope, and variance), 
permanence (i.e. continuous or one-time effect), and immediacy (i.e. immediate or delayed) 




Figure 5.5 Examples of effects used in interrupted time-series. Adapted from Lopez Bernal et al. (2017). 
 
The ability of this design to detect a post-treatment change depends heavily on the effect 
occurring at a specific time point and on having a data set with short time intervals (Cook and 
Campbell, 1986, Shadish et al., 2002). When the effect is gradual instead of producing an 
abrupt change, it is important to know the form of the diffusion process or use analytical 
strategies that can account for the stepped implementation (ibid). For CQC inspections to have 
an abrupt effect, all wards and departments within an acute trust should implement measures 
to improve an outcome immediately after the visit. Despite this being unlikely, the form of the 
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diffusion process is unpredictable and might differ for each acute trust; therefore, for 
simplicity, it has been assumed that the effect is abrupt and detectable in the next time 
interval. 
Having a theory about what pattern will be observed depending on what factors are in play 
can help rule out alternative explanations (Shadish et al., 2002). For CQC inspections, it was 
expected that the announcement of the visit would produce an increase in the rate of 
improvement in those outcomes that can be modified in a short span, such as waiting times, 
which suggest that adding a segment to measure this anticipatory effect could help testing this 
hypothesis. Given the frequency of measurement, it was less likely to detect changes prior the 
inspection for variables measured on a yearly or quarterly basis, for instance, risk-adjusted 
mortality and patients’ perception of quality of care. 
Delayed effects can be problematic when there is no background theory to support a 
particular lag between the intervention and its impact (Shadish et al., 2002). When a theory is 
not available, delayed effects can be obscured by historical events taking place between the 
intervention and the lagged effect (ibid). Switching-replication designs, that is comparing two 
or more time-series with intervention points at different times, allows testing whether the 
delay between treatment and effect is similar across time-series, reducing the potential impact 
of history bias (ibid).  
For external inspections, there is no theoretical background to predict clearly when the effect 
of the on-site visit will manifest. It not only depends on the actions mandated by the 
inspectorate but on trusts capacity to implement changes effectively. Pressures from other 
stakeholders such as CCGs and groups of patients might affect the size and how fast the effect 
is apparent (Robertson et al., 2017); therefore, it is not possible to include in the model a 
specific lag. However, since inspections were spread out over a 12-month period (allowing the 
use of switching replications designs), the potential effect of historical events is reduced.  
It is noteworthy that causal inference is particularly challenging when delayed effects are 
combined with slow diffusion (Shadish et al., 2002). Hence, it is fundamental to test the 
robustness of the hypotheses and findings through a process of falsification (i.e. deliberately 
trying to falsify the conclusion it wants to be drawn). Popper (2005) argued that premises 
withstanding falsification are accepted as true until better evidence is produced. This process 
is done during the discussion of findings (see Chapter 10), but the identification of variables 
correlated with the null hypothesis can help rule out alternative explanations. 
Adding a control group can improve the validity of the estimations, producing similar estimates 
to those of experiments, when sampling of the comparison group(s) is designed to minimise 
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initial differences in outcomes (Cook et al., 2008). When more than one group is included in 
the analysis, changes will be statistically significant when they are different to what is observed 
in the control group. For example, in Figure 5.6 the level change in the intervention group will 
be significant if it differs, in magnitude and/or direction, from the change observed in the 
control group; consequently, there are two counterfactuals: the pre-intervention trend and 
the control group. 
 
Figure 5.6 Scheme of a controlled interrupted time-series 
 
Potential bias of the estimates can be further reduced by matching or adjusting for variables 
determining the selection process to the intervention or comparison group, which is a superior 
alternative to using demographic variables to match intervention and comparison groups 
(Cook et al., 2008). When the selection process is unknown, as the case of CQC inspections, it 
is crucial to use strategies to rule out the influence of potential confounders to obtain 
estimates of the treatment effect that are more valid (Shadish et al., 2002). 
Even when several strategies can be used to improve the rigour of interrupted time-series 
studies, there are at least four biases that should be considered (Shadish et al., 2002): 
 Selection-maturation: this refers to the intrinsic ability of each group to improve, 
therefore, if the treated group has more ability to improve, an effective intervention 
will increase the baseline gap. 
 Selection-instrumentation: this happens when pre-test performance of non-equivalent 
groups lies in different points of the performance scale and detecting change is easier 
in a specific range, for instance, in the middle of the distribution.  
The bias is greater when initial or pre-post intervention differences are larger and 
mean performance of a group is closer to the extreme of the measurement scale. 
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This bias can also occur when there is a change in the measurement instrument before 
and after the intervention. In the case of having a control group, the change is 
problematic when is implemented for one group only. 
 Selection-regression: this happens when the distribution of performance of two 
matched groups do not overlap at the beginning. The impact is that when a researcher 
tries to match them, individuals from one group come from the lowest end and 
individuals from the other group are at the highest end of the distribution. That means 
that their possibility of improvement is different tending towards the average of their 
group and consequently, differences in treatment effect can be explained by a 
selection-regression phenomenon. 
 Selection-history: this refers to historical events happening between the pre and post 
intervention period, and that affect one group more than the other. 
For example, a greater proportion of trusts inspected by the new regime had been or 
were part of the Keogh review and subsequently put under special measures. 
For this thesis, it was not possible to select the control groups to avoid selection-maturation, 
selection-instrumentation, and selection-regression biases; therefore, these biases were 
controlled for in the analysis. In the case of selection-history bias, the use of a switching-
replication design was used as a method to control for differential macro shocks.  
Other problems may arise from underdeveloped theories about what variables may mediate 
or confound the cause-effect relationship under test (Cook and Campbell, 1986). For instance, 
variations in effect size might not be detected because relevant underlying theories are 
underdeveloped. Therefore, there is restricted knowledge about potential mediators or 
moderators, outcome measures are not entirely valid, treatment contrast is attenuated, or the 
sample available for variables implicated in the causal pathway is too small to test their 
influence (Shadish et al., 2002). The rationale to pose three research objectives regarding the 
effectiveness of CQC inspections is that the knowledge about the underlying mechanism of 
action is limited. Hence, posing three objectives with increasing complexity could help 
elucidate whether the type of inspection mediates the size of the effect or if the response may 
be different depending on previous performance. 
When different populations are aggregated to test a hypothesis, as is the case for the first 
research objective, results will inform the strength of a causal relationship despite the many 
sources of variability present in the analysis (Shadish et al., 2002). Consequently, using 
subgroup analyses would help to determine which of the potential sources of variability used 
explain the different effect sizes observed. 
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Shadish et al. (2002) suggest that using more than one theory to explain observations and 
valuing the rigour of independent replications can yield more robust conclusions, which is the 
rationale to assess the effect of the intervention on different process and outcomes measures 
since they are proxies of the various features of care quality. 
5.2.1.6 Multi-level modelling 
Techniques such as ARIMA regression can be used with a single time-series, but when the 
analysis involves looking at several time-series (or several panels) at the same time, other 
strategies capable of accounting for clustering should be used (Goldstein, 2005). This implies 
that ARIMA regression could have been used to answer the research questions of this thesis if 
data were aggregated. Although this is feasible, aggregating data involves losing granularity, 
where acknowledging the multilevel structure of data can yield useful inside into variables 
associated with different effect sizes. Therefore, instead of using an ARIMA regression, a 
multilevel modelling strategy was employed. 
The advantage of using multilevel models, instead of other strategies to account for clustering 
such as White-Huber sandwich estimators or robust standard errors, is that the hierarchical 
structure is not considered a nuisance, but a feature that can enrich the analysis and help 
exploring sources of variability at different levels (Leyland and Goldstein, 2001). This allows the 
researcher to avoid atomistic fallacies (i.e. transferring conclusions from individuals to 
populations) or ecological fallacies (i.e. transferring conclusions from populations to 
individuals) (Diez Roux, 2002) since the influence of time-varying variables (level 1) can be 
explored in conjunction with variables varying at trust level (level 2). 
Multilevel models fit a regression line for the average trust, and then, the model estimates the 
random variation of the other units in respect of the trust with average performance (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). As any other regression model, covariates can be introduced to 
explain better variability in the data, making it possible to control for sources of bias and 
explore potential mediator variables. When a variable is added as a fixed effect, the model 




Figure 5.7 Example of a random intercept model 
 
Conversely, when a variable is introduced as a random effect, the model estimates a different 
slope for each unit depending on the value of that variable (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). 
When fixed and random effects are introduced, the model is called “random coefficients” 
(Figure 5.8). 
 
Figure 5.8 Example of a random coefficients model 
 
In summary, the effect of CQC inspections was estimated using an interrupted time-series 
design given that regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference designs were not 
feasible. The estimations were obtained from a segmented multilevel random coefficients 
regression model to test for the influence of different variables on the estimates of effect and 
control for potential biases. A switching-replication design was also employed to control for 
history bias. Two interruptions (i.e. announcement and on-site visit) were added since the 
literature suggested an anticipatory effect of inspections (Robertson et al., 2017). Control 
groups were used to compare the effectiveness of CQC inspections depending on the type of 
inspection received and the performance before the inspection, which increases the 




All acute NHS acute Trusts in England with available data for the selected process and outcome 
measures and in operation in June 2016 (n=155). 
5.3.2 Intervention 
The Care Quality Commission officially implemented a new regime of inspections to health and 
social care providers in October 2014; however, the new regime was phased-in between 
September 2013 and September 2014, which allows comparison of the old and new regime. 
This new, more resource-intensive approach was adapted from the Keogh review and involves 
several changes to the previous regime:  
 a simplification of the fundamentals standards of care which are enforced by law;  
 the incorporation of intelligent monitoring of over 150 indicators to guide the 
inspection into services that might be failing;  
 an increase in the length of inspections and the size of inspection teams;  
 the addition of ratings for core services, sites and the whole trust;  
 an unannounced visit after the inspection;  
 a new understanding of agreement with Monitor/TDA (now named NHS Improvement) 
to perform joint inspections. 
5.3.3 Comparison 
The old regime of inspections focused on a selection of the 28 essential standards (Care 
Quality Commission, 2010) and compliance with each standard was judged as “met standards”, 
“requires improvement” or “enforcement action”. Inspection teams comprised two to five 
inspectors and visits averaged 2 to 3 days. 
5.3.4 Outcome measures 
Using the CQC’s definition of care quality (i.e. Care provided should be safe, effective, caring, 
responsive and well-led), at least one measure was chosen for each domain. The overview of 
reviews did not provide a definitive answer regarding what indicators were more sensitive to 
external inspections and accreditation. Hence, the selection of measures that could reflect 
quality of care according to the CQC’s definition was performed through a qualitative 
documentary analysis (see Appendix Chapter 5, Table 5.1). This analysis mapped the 
fundamental standards reinforced by law; the Key Lines of Enquiry (KLOE) and the prompts 
used during on-site inspections, intelligent monitoring measures, two CQC reports and the 
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recommendations from the Francis Inquiry. The criteria to choose an outcome measure were 
pragmatic and are listed below:  
 Data freely and publicly available at least since September 2012 to have data from 
one-year pre-inspection. When possible, data reported monthly were preferred over 
quarterly or yearly data. 
 The indicator was associated with a prompt for the inspection and was included in the 
intelligent monitoring tool. 
 Performance on that measure was highlighted in CQC’s reports indicating it was a 
relevant measure for its own regime. 
 The Francis Report made judgements or recommendation related to the performance 
measure. 
 The measure is a nursing-sensitive outcome or reflects desirable qualities of good 
governance. 
For Instance, the caring domain has three key lines of inquiries and 16 prompts. Patients’ 
perception of being treated with dignity and respect was the only indicator meeting all the 
criteria; hence, it was included in the analysis (Table 5.1). The full list of outcomes selected is 
available in Table 5.2. 
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Pressure ulcers and falls with harm are outcome measures not assessed as part of the 
intelligent monitoring; therefore, they were included to test for the presence of managerial 
tunnel vision (i.e. focus only on those performance indicators under assessment). 
It must be noted that due to the number of outcome measures chosen and the number of 
research questions, there is a risk of finding spurious statistical significant associations because 
the family-wise error rate increases with more comparisons (Bartroff and Song, 2014). 
5.3.5 Data sources, data collection processes and definitions 
Data on adverse events, waiting times, and risk-adjusted mortality were publicly available from 
NHS Digital. Information on patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect was 
obtained in February 2017 from the Picker Institute Europe and NHS Digital provided the 
dataset of rate of leavers in July 2016 upon formal request. 
5.3.5.1 Avoidable harm 
Falls with harm and pressure ulcers are measures of avoidable harm and nursing-sensitive 
outcomes (Currie et al., 2005, Butler et al., 2011), which reflect the quality of nursing care.  
Data on these adverse events are collected through the NHS Safety Thermometer (NHS ST) and 
are aggregated at ward, provider, regional and national levels (Power et al., 2012). NHS ST was 
implemented in two phases as a national collaborative quality improvement initiative to 
reduce the number of adverse events related to the four most common harms (i.e. falls with 
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harm, pressure ulcers, urinary infection in patients with catheters and venous 
thromboembolism) (Power et al., 2014, Power et al., 2016). The first phase ran between 
September 2010 and April 2012 with the aim of testing the instrument and achieving 
consistent definitions for the adverse events under assessment (ibid). The second phase 
(implemented between April 2012 and March 2013) rolled the thermometer out to all NHS 
providers in England. A financial incentive was used – the Commissioning for Quality and 
Innovation (CQUIN) scheme - to reward providers meeting data collection standards (ibid). 
An NHS ST census survey is carried out on one day of the month by trained frontline staff. 
These data are entered via a website to allow trends over time and institutional comparison to 
national and regional estimates to occur (Power et al., 2014).  
The NHS ST is the only database on adverse events in acute NHS trusts publicly available, 
collected nationally using the same definitions and standards on a monthly basis. However, 
data can be inconsistent due to variable data entry skills, flexible interpretations of operational 
definitions, and variations in patients’ case-mix across sites (Power et al., 2014). Sari et al. 
(2006) performed a study in a large acute NHS Trusts comparing the number of incidents 
reported through the routine incident reporting system with the number found by reviewing 
medical records. They found that 56% of falls and 23% of pressure ulcers were reported to the 
routine system (Sari et al., 2006). This means that adverse events are underreported, and 
inspections could improve performance or reporting behaviour; however, without central 
information on the magnitude of the problem in a wide variety of trusts, it is not possible to 
isolate the cause of any observed effect. Despite the reliability issues of the data from the NHS 
ST, this information was used because hospital and the CQC itself assess progress on these 
indicators based on that data. Therefore, the NHS ST provided a picture of performance. 
Fall with harm and pressure ulcers are indicators considered within CQC documentation and 
inspection reports (e.g. CQC report Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, p.19); 
however, they are not included in the CQC intelligent monitoring. Consequently, its analysis 
can show if inspections affect other outcome measures not formally included in the 
assessment. 
Falls with harm are an unplanned or unintentional descent to the floor with injury, regardless 
of cause (slip, trip or fall from a bed or chair). It is considered to have produced harm when the 
patient at least requires first aid, minor treatment or extra observation or medication 
(Madsen, 2014). 
Pressure ulcers are any pressure ulcer developed 72 hours or more after patient admission. 
The European Pressure Ulcer Scale is used to categorise them (Madsen, 2014). 
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For the analysis, the number of events divided by the number of patients surveyed was used 
for these two measures. 
5.3.5.2 Risk-adjusted mortality 
Mortality is contested as a measure of quality of care (Park et al., 1990, Pitches et al., 2007, 
Goodacre et al., 2015, Hogan et al., 2015, Kobewka et al., 2017b). When it is used as crude 
mortality rates, large variations between trusts could be attributed to differences in case-mix 
(Pitches et al., 2007). Risk-adjusted measures can account for case-mix; however, these 
measures are not perfect, and some residual variation is still present due to randomness and 
differences in disease severity (Thomas and Hofer, 1999, Pitches et al., 2007, Goodacre et al., 
2015). The residual variation that can be attributed to preventable death, and therefore, to 
poor quality of care is low ranging between 3.6% and 8.4% (Hayward and Hofer, 2001, Hogan 
et al., 2015, Kobewka et al., 2017a). This means that only a small proportion of variation in 
risk-adjusted mortality is associated with preventable deaths, which makes it difficult to 
differentiate actual poor care from random variation (Hogan, 2016). Girling et al. (2012) 
estimated that the predictive value of risk-adjusted mortality to detect hospitals providing 
poor care was around 9% when the proportion of preventable deaths was 6%. However, 
mortality is an undesirable outcome, highly visible, and although, by itself it cannot indicate 
what the sources of preventable deaths are (Kobewka et al., 2017b), it can prompt further 
investigations. 
The Summary Hospital-level Mortality Index (SHMI) is a measure of risk-adjusted mortality. It is 
calculated as a ratio between observed in-hospital or within 30 days of discharge deaths and 
the expected number of deaths for a Trust. The expected number of deaths is calculated using 
a risk-adjusted model, which includes patient case-mix of age, gender, admission method, year 
index, Charlson comorbidity index and diagnosis grouping (Campbell et al., 2012). 
The measure is produced by HSCIC using information from the Hospital Episodes Statistics 
(HES) and the Office of National Statistics (ONS). Crude mortality rates are highly reliable, but 
some problems can arise from the reporting of variables for the risk adjustment (Clinical 
Indicators Team, 2017). The main problem with SHMI is that data is not extracted directly from 
patients’ records. Instead, the information is stored in one database for internal purposes (i.e. 
Patient Administration System), which is later submitted to the Secondary Uses Service (SUS). 
NHS Digital (formerly HSCIC) uses the latter to create HES data (Clinical Indicators Team, 2017). 
This means that a trained coder must transform the primary diagnosis and all the 
comorbidities into ICD-10 codes (ibid). NHS Digital reports that there are some variations 
between organisations in the accuracy of clinical coding, but these do not affect the calculation 
of SHMI (ibid). Other factors that might affect the indicator such as palliative care are not 
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included due to high inconsistency in the coding (HSCIC, 2013b). The data submitted by the 
providers have to comply with validation rules and goes through an audit (Clinical Indicators 
Team, 2017); therefore, the possibility of manipulating data to the advantage of the trust is 
low. 
This indicator is used to compare the performance of hospitals across the country even when 
the risk of dying is different. Data is published quarterly at NHS Trust level since October 2011. 
The first publication included data from March 2010 to March 2011, being label as April 2011 
for the analysis. Thus, SHMI were not assigned to their publication date, but to the month after 
the 12-month period used to calculate it. 
According to the researchers that devised the model to calculate the SHMI, 82% of the 
variance can be explained by the model. Therefore, a proportion of the deaths might be falsely 
identified as outliers (Campbell et al., 2012). The main issue with standardised indicators is 
that variation in measurement error can lead to higher than expected values in the index 
(ibid), whilst, hospitals can game by making patients look sicker than they are (Hawkes, 2010). 
An analysis of the effect of coding practices on another standardised mortality ratio (i.e. 
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio) showed that increasing the number of deaths coded as 
palliative care from 8% to 37% reduced the HSMR by a third in Medway NHS Foundation Trusts 
(Taylor, 2013). Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trusts was another hospital increasing the 
number of patients coded as palliative care to reduce risk-adjusted mortality, which coincided 
with the announcement of an investigation of the trust (Taylor, 2013). These examples are 





Figure 5.9 Impact of changing coding practices on a standardised mortality ratio. Taken from Taylor (2013). 
 
5.3.5.3 Waiting times 
As an initiative to reassure the general public about the government’s commitment to quality 
of care and the reduction of waiting lists, waiting times standards were introduced in 2002. 
A&E and RTT waiting times were established first as a political commitment to quality that 
later turned into legal rights in the NHS constitution (DOH, 2009). The reporting is mandatory 
for all healthcare providers. NHS England collects and publishes the information which serves 
as an accountability measure.  
Although improving access was the primary purpose of imposing waiting times targets, later 
research has shown an association of long waits and patients outcomes (Day, 2013, Carter et 
al., 2014). For instance, seven days after an A&E visit, non-admitted patients have an 
incremental increase in the risk of admission with each extra hour of wait (adjusted odds ratio 
for mean wait > 6 hours: 1.95 [1.79 to 2.13]) (Guttmann et al., 2011). A potential pathway 
explaining these findings is that in overcrowded A&E departments some processes of care 
might be altered or shortened, leading to wrong or missed diagnoses, incomplete or delayed 
treatment, or miscommunication of treatment plan after discharge (Guttmann et al., 2011, 
Carter et al., 2014). 
In the case of long waits for elective non-urgent care, evidence suggests that the risk of 
adverse events and poor outcomes increases with the length of wait (Day, 2013, Barua et al., 
2014). For example, the findings of 17 studies looking at the effect of waiting times for patients 
requiring cardiovascular surgery (i.e. coronary angioplasty or angiography, coronary artery 
bypass graft, valve replacement, and cardiac catheterisation) suggest an increased risk of 
adverse events such as myocardial infarction and death whilst waiting (Day, 2013). Likewise, 
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longer waiting times diminishes physical function and quality of life of patients with spinal 
stenosis (Braybrooke et al., 2007, Bailey et al., 2016) and requiring joint replacement surgery 
(Montin et al., 2008, Vergara et al., 2011, Desmeules et al., 2012).  
A&E waiting times measures the time spent from arrival until admission, transfer or discharge. 
The target is that 95% of attendances should be resolved within 4 hours (since April 2011). 
Until the first quarter 2010, the target was 98% of attendances resolved within 4 hours. Data 
were published weekly at NHS Trust level between November 2010 and June 2015, which is 
the period used for the analyses. 
The number of patients waiting more than 4 hours in A&E divided by the number of all 
attendances was used for the analysis. 
Waiting times are official statistics reported to Unify2, which is the standard tool for the 
collection of performance data in the NHS (NHS England, 2015a). These statistics have to 
comply with the code of practice for official statistics and the national statistician’s guidance 
(UK Statistics Authority, 2009, UK Statistics Authority, 2016), which should suggest data are 
accurate and reliable 
Consultant-led referral to treatment (RTT) waiting time – admitted pathways measures the 
time since referral (i.e. referral letter is received by the hospital or patient books first 
appointment) until admitted treatment is received. The target is that 90% of admitted and 95% 
of non-admitted treatment should start within 18 weeks. Data is published monthly at NHS 
Trust level since April 2007. 
The number of patients waiting more than 18 weeks to see a consultant divided by the number 
of patients referred was analysed. 
Reporting standards of RTT waiting times are higher since providers submit data to Unify2 and 
the database used to determine payment for services (SUS) (NHS England, 2015c). However, 
before October 2015 the rules for reporting of RTT waiting times were open to interpretation, 
leading to incorrect recording (National Audit Office, 2014). The application of different rules 
to measure waiting times means that comparability of data decreases and it can give way to 
data manipulation to avoid fines (ibid). In October 2015, the Department of Health published a 
new rules suite to ensure consisting reporting and eliminated the possibility of pausing or 
suspending the waiting time (DOH, 2015c). This change of rules might have affected the trend 
observed in the post-inspection period, but it occurred at least one-year after the end of the 
pilot period. Consequently, it should not affect the estimates of effect. 
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Although the statistics are collected centrally, data is reported by each trust, therefore can be 
prone to gaming as econometric studies during the implementation of the star ratings have 
shown (Locker and Mason, 2005, Besley et al., 2009). Locker and Mason (2005) found that 
although the 4-hour wait target was being met, 12.3% of admitted patients and 3.6% of 
discharged patients waited between 220 and 239 min, meaning that a higher proportion of 
admitted attendances were resolved just before missing the target. Consequently, the average 
waiting time had not decreased as much as expected (Locker and Mason, 2005). In the case of 
referral to treatment waiting times, Besley et al. (2009) found that the introduction of more 
stringent targets (i.e. 15- and 18-month target) translated into an increase in the number of 
patients waiting between three and nine months. Therefore, observed average waiting time 
was higher than the expected. The magnitude of gaming is not assessed on a regular basis, and 
there is no information examining if inspections affect the size of it. Consequently and similarly 
to what happens with adverse events and risk-adjusted mortality, it is not possible to model 
the effect of changes in reporting behaviour on the estimates of the effect of the inspection. 
5.3.5.4 Patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect 
Patients’ perception of care has been linked to staffing levels, staff skill mix, safety outcomes 
(Aiken et al., 2016) and the working environment (NHS Confederation, 2011, NICE, 2012, The 
Point of Care Foundation); therefore, to certain extent, it reflects the climate and culture of 
each NHS trust (The Point of Care Foundation). 
It is measured through the NHS adult inpatient survey since 2004. The Picker Institute Europe 
collects the data and publishes the annual results on behalf of the Care Quality Commission. 
The response rate to this survey has dropped over time from 59% in 2005 to 47% in 2015 
(Boyd et al., 2007, Care Quality Commission, 2016a). Most of the data collection occurs in July 
of the year of the survey, and only small trusts collect information from patients discharged in 
previous months (Care Quality Commission, 2016a). These two features make data prone to 
bias (i.e. non-response bias and seasonal effect). To control for the potential effect of changes 
in case-mix, the results of the survey were standardised. 
This question in the inpatient survey has three options: 1) Yes, always; 2) Yes, sometimes; and 
3) No. These three options were transformed, assigning 0 to the most critical responses and 
100 to the most favourable, so results are comparable to other studies (Raleigh et al., 2015b). 
Demographic characteristics of patients responding to the survey differ by question, among 
Trusts and over time. Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies suggest that there is a positive 
correlation between better perception of care and age, male sex, planned admission and being 
white British (Sizmur, 2011, Raleigh et al., 2015a, Raleigh et al., 2015b). Whilst, female 
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respondent, individuals admitted through A&E and patients from ethnic minorities tend to 
perceive care as of lower quality (Sizmur, 2011). In consequence, to make comparisons 
between different trusts, the perception of care was standardised to account for the 
composition of patients’ sample (see Statistical analysis). 
5.3.5.5 Staff leaving acute NHS trusts (staff turnover or rates of leavers) 
Staff turnover is associated with quality of care through two interrelated pathways: the work 
environment and staffing levels. Research on factors associated with intention to leave is 
mainly focused on nurses, is low quality and inconsistent. It suggests that high workload 
(Coomber and Barriball, 2007, Yin and Yang, 2002), lack of stability due to work schedule, low 
group cohesion (Shader et al., 2001), ineffective supervision (Hellman, 1997, Coomber and 
Barriball, 2007) and time pressure affecting quality of care (Estryn-Behar et al., 2010) are 
contributing factors to job dissatisfaction that increase intention to leave and turnover. 
Therefore, staff turnover might serve as a proxy for working environment and culture in each 
trust. The other pathway comes from the relationship between staffing levels and work stress 
(Coomber and Barriball, 2007). Low retention or poorly staffed wards are related to high 
workload, high levels of job dissatisfaction, burnout (Aiken et al., 2002) and work stress. In 
addition, once staff have decided to leave, their productivity and efficiency decrease, which 
affects those remaining by increasing their work pressure and decreasing their morale (Gauci 
Borda and Norman, 1997). Therefore, high turnover rates can reflect or can lead to inadequate 
staffing, which is linked to adverse events and mortality (Aiken et al., 2008, Aiken et al., 2016, 
Griffiths et al., 2016). 
NHS Digital generates the NHS workforce statistics using information trusts report to the 
electronic staff records (ESR), where rates of leavers are part of these official statistics 
published quarterly (Electronic Staff Record Programme, 2017). The definitions are 
standardised through Information Standards Notices to achieve consistent reporting (ibid). 
Since April 2012, NHS Digital performs validation checks of the workforce data in ESR, including 
crosschecking and validation rules (HSCIC, 2013a). The results of this exercise produce a score 
for each trust with suggestions on how to improve data quality. The areas with more errors are 
pay bands, job roles, and missing information (NHS Digital, 2017). Since rates of leavers are 
linked to the payment for services of staff, it was expected to be accurate, but there is no 
formal study validating the dataset included. 
NHS Digital publishes rates of leavers as an official workforce statistics quarterly since April 
2012. However, monthly data were requested to improve the robustness of results for this 
measure. Rate of leavers is the number of staff leaving each acute NHS trusts every month, 
regardless of the reasons for leaving, divided by the average number of staff employed during 
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that period. It excludes personnel that transfer to another unit or move from a clinical to a 
managerial position. 
It was initially planned to use the staff stability index as another measure of governance since 
it provides information on the proportion of members of staff that have worked in the trusts 
for at least one year. However, the rate of staff leaving acute NHS trusts is negatively 
correlated to the staff stability index (r= -0.99, p<0.0001), being almost perfectly 
complementary. This means that analysing the staff stability index was not going to provide 
more insight on the effect of CQC inspections on measures of care quality and, consequently, it 
was removed from the analyses. 
5.3.5.6 Descriptive information and potential confounders 
From the CQC website (http://www.cqc.org.uk/) the following information was retrieved: 
- Descriptive information on acute NHS trusts (including number of beds, location, type 
of trust, number of sites, catchment population). 
- Reporting culture rating by the CQC (2016). 
- Z-score for potential underreporting of safety incidents reported by the National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). 
- Dates and number of inspections since September 2012. 
- Type of inspection. 
- Ratings given during the first inspection under the new regime. 
Performance ratings given in 2009 were retrieved from the archived CQC website. Information 
on financial performance (i.e. continuity of service or escalation score), mergers, and 
enforcement actions were obtained from other regulatory agencies (Monitor, Trust 
Development Authority, NHS Improvement). Information on the main commissioner was 
obtained from the annual account report of each acute NHS trust. Data on the multiple 
deprivation index of the main commissioner and the monthly number of staff members were 
obtained from NHS Digital. 
5.3.6 Statistical analysis 
To address the first three aims of this research, an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis was 
used, which is considered a strong quasi-experimental design to assess the impact of policies 
that cannot be randomised (Penfold and Zhang, 2013). The design was adapted for each 
measure under analysis and each scenario under testing. Two interruptions were added: the 
month of the inspection and four months prior when the inspection was officially announced. 
Two interruptions meant it could be determined whether the announcement or the inspection 
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itself had a greater effect since previous studies had reported that the announcement 
triggered more changes than the visit (Healthcare Commission, 2008a). 
To model an interrupted time-series, time is introduced as an explanatory variable, indicating 
the rate of change before the intervention (i.e. counterfactual). For each interruption, two new 
variables are added: a dummy and time indicating the period post-intervention. The coefficient 
for the dummy variable represents the change in level, whilst the coefficient for the post-
intervention time variable indicates the change in slope. Since inspections were spread out 
across one year, time was centred on the inspection month, with negative values before the 
inspection and positive values after. 
Since data over time is nested within acute NHS Trusts, a multilevel random-coefficients model 
was used. The unit of analysis was individual acute NHS trusts, and one single unadjusted 
model was fitted to each outcome measure.  
For a single time-series, the autocorrelation structure can be determined using a Durbin-
Watson test, but this is not applicable to panel data. In the case of multilevel longitudinal 
models, the Woolridge test can be employed instead. However, it can only test for the 
presence of autocorrelation with the previous data point (i.e. AR=1) (Drukker, 2003), but if this 
correlation occurs with data points further away, it cannot be tested. For these analyses, auto-
correlation structures from 1 to 12 were introduced and the different models were compared 
using a likelihood ratio test. The model with the most parsimonious AR structure is reported. 
To account for potentially confounding variables, the following were included as fixed effects: 
 Number of beds,  
 Trust size,  
 Foundation trust status,  
 Number of trust hospitals and locations,  
 Number of inspections since September 2012,  
 Months since previous CQC inspection,  
 Number of staff members per month,  
 Merger activity,  
 Region,  
 Financial performance and  
 Reporting culture.  
These variables were chosen as proxies of performance over time and trusts’ capacity to 
respond to an inspection. Additionally, to account for the potential effect of the reform of the 
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commissioning system, a dummy variable was introduced for the period between October 
2012 and April 2013. Variables with a p-value <0.2 in the univariate model were entered into 
the adjusted model. The most parsimonious model is reported based on the lowest Bayesian 
Information Criterion (Gurka, 2006). 
Adverse events, waiting times and rate of leavers were logarithmically transformed to have a 
linear relationship between explained and the explanatory variables. Once the model was 
fitted, the exponential of the coefficients was calculated to express them in the original scale. 
The assumptions of uncorrelated and normally distributed model residuals were met for all the 
models. 
Since demographic features, which vary across NHS trusts, influence patients’ perception, data 
had to be standardised to be comparable. Estimated marginal means were calculated using the 
transformed responses from 2005 to 2015 for all acute NHS trusts. This analysis calculates the 
relative influence of age, sex, ethnicity, and route of admission into patients’ perception of 
care and estimates for each year and trust, a mean value weighted by the sample composition. 
Strategies such as adding cosine and sine functions and a squared time term were tested to 
account for seasonal patterns and obtain the correct functional form. The model for pressure 
ulcers included a cosine function, whilst A&E waiting times included sine and cosine functions. 
In the case of RTT waiting times and rate of leavers, a Fourier function (i.e. cosine, sine, 
cosine*2 and sine*2) were added to the models. Additionally, to obtain a correct functional 
form for RTT waiting times, a squared time term was included. Rates of leavers had a regular 
pattern of outliers in August of each year, which coincides with the rotation of junior medical 
staff. Therefore, a term reflecting this phenomenon was added. 
Trusts inspected by the new, old regime and those not inspected significantly differed 
regarding Foundation Trust status, number of inspections and reporting culture rated by the 
CQC. To check the robustness of the findings, the models were run on a smaller sample of 
trusts matched by these variables. Since the results remained unchanged, the models with the 
whole sample are reported. 
For each model, coefficients with 95% confidence intervals are reported, the rate of change 
before and after both announcements and inspections, change in levels and trends the month 
after inspection, and the rate of change one-year post inspection. 
P-values <0.05 were considered significant. Analyses were performed in Stata SE/14.0. 
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5.3.6.1 Model specification 
To determine the effect of any inspection, the model specification for each outcome was as 
follows: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗  +  𝛽1𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽2𝑗𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽3𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑗𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 +
 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑈1𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗  + 𝑈3𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 +
 𝑈5𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 +  𝜙𝑛𝑗 (𝑡 − 𝑛)  + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   
This model was used as the basis to build the other models by introducing six interaction terms 
for each comparison group added. This means that for the comparison of the effect of the new 
and old regime of inspections, the model had 18 fixed effect coefficients, whilst the model 
accounting for previous performance had 36 fixed effects coefficients. 
𝛽 denotes the coefficient for the average trust, 𝑈0 represents the random variation in level of 
each trust in relation to the average trust, 𝑈1 𝑈3 𝑈5 represent the random variation in slope of 
each trust in relation to the average trust, 𝜙 is the coefficient for each AR component of the 
model and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the error term of the model. 
5.3.7 Ethics 
Given that this study does not involve measurements of human participants and all data used 
was freely and publicly available, it was not viewed as requiring Research Governance 
Committee approval. Findings will be published to disseminate the knowledge and, potentially, 
benefit the public. 
5.4 Summary of methodology and methods 
An interrupted time-series design is a strong quasi-experimental design to determine the 
effect of an intervention when randomisation is not feasible. Adding a control group, 
interventions at different time points and measuring varied aspects of the same construct are 
strategies to reduce confounding, which have been implemented in this thesis. 
Three research aims were posed to determine the effect of CQC inspections of acute NHS 
trusts on rates of falls with harm, pressure ulcer, risk-adjusted mortality, waiting times in A&E 
and for referral to treatment, patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect, 
and rate of staff leaving their job. The increasing complexity of the research aims allows testing 
for the effect of previous performance and different CQC inspection regimes, separately and in 
combination. 
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The use of a multilevel random coefficient regression model enriched the analysis and enabled 
us to test for sources of variability, which is not possible when aggregate measures are used or 
with different modelling strategies such as difference-in-difference analyses. 
Features of the NHS trusts regarding number of beds, region, members of staff, financial 
position, governance rating, and proxies of reporting culture were introduced to the models to 
test their potential influence on the effect of the inspections. 
In summary, an Interrupted time series study using a multilevel random-coefficients model 
was chosen to determine the effect of CQC inspections, regardless of the type of inspection. A 
subgroup analysis by quality rating in 2009 was performed to test for a differential effect of 
inspections depending on historical performance. Then, two control groups were added to 
estimate the effect of the new regime of inspections of the English NHS acute trusts in 
comparison to non-inspected trusts and those inspected under the old regime between 
September 2013 and September 2014. Furthermore, the effect of the new and old regime of 
CQC inspections was compared accounting by previous performance (i.e. improving or not 
improving before on-site visit) using an interrupted time-series with control. 
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6 The effect of Care Quality 
Commission inspections on clinical 
and health outcomes 
 
The overarching question for this thesis is whether CQC inspections have an effect on 
measures of quality of care. Previous chapters have given the historical context on how quality 
of care and quality improvement is understood within the National Health Service in England, 
the rationale for institutional regulation in healthcare, evidence regarding the effect of 
external oversight on organisational and clinical outcomes, and lastly, the methodological 
approach chosen to address the overarching research question. 
Three scenarios were analysed to provide evidence to answer this question. Firstly, the effect 
of any inspection on measures of quality of care (Chapter 6). Secondly, the comparison of the 
new and old regimes of inspections (Chapter 7), and finally, the effect of both regimes 
accounting for previous performance (Chapter 8). Performance ratings given in 2009 were 
considered as another measure of previous performance, and therefore, a subgroup analysis 
was carried out to test for any differential effect. 
6.1 Findings of the analysis of any inspection 
The universe for this analysis is 155 acute NHS trusts in England (Table 6.1). A third of them are 
located in the North, whilst in terms of size, medium acute trusts are the most common (29%). 
In the South and North regions, large and medium trusts are predominant (63.9% and 58%, 
respectively). Medium and small trusts are more common in the Midlands (53.3%), whilst in 
London, teaching and specialist trusts (50%) are more predominant. 
In terms of new regime CQC ratings, 90 (60%) were deemed as “requiring improvement”, 40 
(26.7%) as “good”, eight (5.3%) were rated as “outstanding” and 12 (8%) as “inadequate”. 
Regarding the geographical distribution of ratings, 42% of trusts rated as “outstanding” or 
“good” are located in the North, whilst 58% of trusts rated as “inadequate” are in the Midlands 
and East region. Considering trusts that were deemed as “requiring improvement”, 14% were 
in London, whilst the other regions had a similar proportion of trusts in this category (31% 
North, 30% Midlands and 26% South). Regarding type of trust, acute specialist trusts were 
more likely to be rated as “outstanding”; whilst large trusts more likely to be “inadequate”. 
Trusts rated as “good” or “requiring improvement” has a similar distribution across trust types 
(between 77% specialist and 89% medium trusts). 
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The Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) of acute trusts in the South region had lower values 
for the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) compared to trusts in other regions (16.8 vs 26.9 
North, 22.4 Midlands, and 22.8 London, p=0.002). In contrast, the North region has the highest 
IMD for the health domain compared to the other regions (0.6 vs 0.00007 Midlands, -0.36 
South, and -0.2 London, p<0.0001). 
Monitor sustainability rating was similar across regions; however, the governance rating 
differed. All acute trusts in London were rated as “no evident concerns”, whilst 58% of trusts 
subject to enforcement actions were located in the Midlands.  
The CQC aims to inspect acute trusts every 2 to 3 years, but the median (P25-P75) months since 
the previous inspection is 10 (7-15) months, which illustrates the level of scrutiny these 
institutions have been subject to in the previous five years. 
Table 6.1 Descriptive information for all acute NHS trusts 
 All acute NHS trusts 
 n=155 
Foundation Trust 100 (64.5%) 
Type of trust 
Large acute trust 41 (26.5%) 
Medium acute trust 45 (29.0%) 
Small acute trust 26 (16.8%) 
Acute teaching trust 25 (16.1%) 
Acute specialist trust 18 (11.6%) 
NHS England region 
North 50 (32.3%) 
Midlands and East 45 (29.0%) 
South 36 (23.2%) 
London 24 (15.5%) 
Number of beds, median (IQR) 703 (488, 1020) 
Population in thousands, median (IQR) 453.3 (340, 600) 
Number of hospitals, median (IQR) 3 (2, 5) 
Number of locations, median (IQR) 4 (2, 7) 
Special measures 19 (12.3%) 
Inspection Sep 2013 to Sep 2014 
New regime 67 (43.2%) 
Old regime 48 (31.0%) 
No inspection 40 (25.8%) 
Overall rating 
Outstanding 8 (5.3%) 
Good 40 (26.7%) 
Requires improvement 90 (60.0%) 
Inadequate 12 (8.0%) 
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 All acute NHS trusts 
 n=155 
Merged trusts 13 (8.4%) 
Index Multiple Deprivation17, median (IQR) 21.46 (16.64, 27.58) 
Index Multiple Deprivation-Health17, median (IQR) 0.075 (-0.38, 0.54) 
Monitor Sustainability rating 
Significant risk 8 (8.2%) 
Material risk 10 (10.2%) 
Emerging or minor concerns 52 (53.0%) 
No evident concerns 25 (25.5%) 
Lowest risk 3 (3.1%) 
Monitor Governance rating 
Subject to enforcement action 19 (19.4%) 
Under review 12 (12.2%) 
No evident concerns 67 (68.4%) 
TDA escalating score 
Enforcement action 6 (10.5%) 
Significant delivery issues 22 (38.6%) 
Some delivery issues 16 (28.1%) 
Limited/no issues 11 (19.3%) 
Sound FT application 2 (3.5%) 
Number of inspections, median (IQR) 4 (3, 5) 
Months since previous inspection, median (IQR) 10 (7, 15) 
Reporting culture 2016 
Poor 26 (16.8%) 
Significant Concerns 54 (34.8%) 
Good 65 (41.9%) 
Outstanding 10 (6.5%) 
Performance rating - Overall Quality 2009 
Excellent 37 (24.2%) 
Good 73 (47.7%) 
Fair 37 (24.2%) 
Weak 6 (3.9%) 
Performance rating - Financial 2009 
Excellent 72 (47.1%) 
Good 58 (37.9%) 
Fair 19 (12.4%) 
Weak 4 (2.6%) 
                                                             
17 The index of multiple deprivation (IMD) is a relative measure of deprivation across England 
considering seven domains: income, employment, health, education, barriers to housing, crime, and 
living environment deprivation. The IMD average scores for the main CCG is presented in Table 6.1. The 
index is calculated for each Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) and then a population-weighted 
average is obtained considering the average score of all LSOAs within a CCG. Higher values indicate 
more deprivation. A value of 21.46 corresponds to a CCG ranked 103 out of 209. In the case of the 
Health IMD average score, a value of 0.075 corresponds to a CCG ranked 105 out of 209 in 2015 
(Ministry of Housing, 2015). 
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Data for all the indicators assessed were available at least from April 2012. Inspections 
included in this analysis were performed between September 2012 and April 2015; therefore, 
there are at least five data points before and after the inspection for each trust. November 
2013 had the highest number of inspections (23 [15%]), but they are spread out in the 
observation period, which reduces the possibility of finding an effect attributable to other 
competing interventions. One trust was excluded from this analysis because it was not 
inspected in this time period. Since changes in level and slopes were very small in magnitude, 
these are shown per 10,000 events/month in order to have meaningful figures. The regression 
model used interaction terms to obtain changes in level and slope. The values presented in the 
tables are absolute numbers. 
 
Figure 6.1 Frequency distribution of CQC inspections of all acute NHS trusts in England 
 
6.1.1 Adverse events 
There were 5 specialist trusts not reporting data to the NHS thermometer, which were 
Foundation trusts, were rated as “no evident concerns” by Monitor, and had fewer beds than 
those trusts with available data (253.5 [230, 328.5] vs 707 [500, 1024]). 
Over time, rates of adverse events have decreased although compared to falls with harm, 
pressure ulcers are more common, present a higher variability for each period and the 




Figure 6.2 Rates of falls with harm and pressure ulcers in all acute NHS trusts in England 
 
6.1.1.1 Falls with harm 
In April 2012, the rate of falls with harm (95% CI) was 0.0098 (0.0079 to 0.011), whilst in June 
2016 it was 0.004 (0.003 to 0.005) showing a decrease over time. One trust was excluded from 
this analysis because it did not report data before the inspection. 
For an average trust before the inspection, there were -2.77 (-4.26 to -1.28) fewer falls with 
harm per 10,000 patients/month. The announcement and the inspection itself did not produce 
a significant change in the level or slope of falls with harm. After the inspection for an average 
trust, there were -0.59 (-0.82 to -0.37) fewer falls with harm per 10,000 patients/month which 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































an increase for an average trust of 5.52 (-2.67 to 13.7) falls per 10,000 patients 12 months 
after the inspection compared to the counterfactual (Figure 6.3). Tables with the model 
coefficients are available in the Appendix to Chapter 6, table 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3 Predicted rates of falls with harm for an average acute NHS trust before, after the announcement and 
CQC inspection 
Key: Lines represent the mean rate of falls with harm obtained from the multilevel model for each period. The first 
vertical line signals the announcement, while the second the inspection. Dash lines show the trends observed 
during the pre-inspection period, which were extended for the post-announcement and post-inspection periods. 
Long-dash lines represent the observed trends in the period between the announcement and the inspection. Solid 
lines show the trends after the inspection. The same applies for all graphs in this chapter. 
 
6.1.1.2 Pressure ulcers 
In April 2012, the rate of pressure ulcers (95% CI) was 0.056 (0.05 to 0.06), whilst in June 2016 
it was 0.04 (0.038 to 0.045) showing a downward trend for this particular adverse event. One 
trust was excluded from this analysis because it did not have any pressure ulcers during the 
observation period. 
For an average trust before the inspection, there were -6.28 (-10.05 to -2.5) fewer pressure 
ulcers per 10,000 patients/month. No change was observed in level or slope after the 
announcement or the inspection itself. After the inspection for an average trust, there were -
1.38 (-2.42 to -0.34) fewer pressure ulcers per 10,000 patients/month which represents a 
lower speed of improvement (Table 6.2). This change in trend produces an increase for an 
average trust of 20.89 (-20.86 to 62.66) pressure ulcers per 10,000 patients 12 months after 


































Figure 6.4 Predicted rate of pressure ulcers for an average acute NHS trust before, after the announcement and 
CQC inspection 
 
Table 6.2 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for falls with harm and 
pressure ulcers 
 Unadjusted model of rates of 
falls with harm (95% CI) 
Unadjusted model of rates of 
pressure ulcers (95% CI) 
Baseline rates 118.15 (96.62, 144.5) 586.89 (520.03, 662.35) 
Pre-inspection slope -2.77 (-4.26, -1.28)* -6.28 (-10.05, -2.5)* 
Change in level   
Post-Announcement -3.19 (-9.25, 2.86) -8.95 (-28.92, 11.02) 
Post-inspection 1.55 (-3.54, 6.63) -0.98 (-18.32, 16.35) 
Slope   
Post-announcement -2.02 (-4.89, 0.84) -7.86 (-17.84, 2.11) 
Post-inspection -0.59 (-0.82, -0.37) -1.38 (-2.42, -0.34) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
Values presented in number of events per 10,000 patients/month. Figures were calculated using model 
coefficients to present the absolute instead of relative value. For example, the pre-inspection slope is 
calculated as exp(β0j + β1j*corrected time ij). The same applies for all tables in this chapter. 
 
6.1.2 Summary Hospital Mortality Index 
The Summary Hospital Mortality Index is not calculated for specialist trusts. In comparison 
with all other acute trusts, these are smaller in terms of number of beds (219.5 [157 to 255] vs 
719.5 [536 to 1047], p<0.001) and numbers of hospitals (1 [1 to 2] vs 3 [2 to 5], p<0.001), are 
more likely to have a Monitor sustainability rating of “no evident concerns” or “lowest risk” 
(86% vs 16.9%, p<0.00001) and are more likely to have a CQC reporting culture rating of 
“outstanding” or “good” (83.3% vs 47.2%, p=0.004). Summary Hospital Mortality Indexes 




































Figure 6.5 Summary Hospital Mortality Index for all acute NHS trusts in England from April 2011 to October 2015 
Sine and cosine functions were introduced to the model to attempt to correct for seasonal 
patterns, but the period was not consistent across trusts; therefore, these functions did not 
improve the goodness of fit. Woolridge test for autocorrelation in longitudinal datasets 
revealed the presence of autocorrelation; however, models with an autoregressive structure 
from 1 to 12 did not converge. 
The average (95% CI) SHMI has remained relatively constant over time with a value of 1.007 
(0.98 to 1.02) in April 2011 and 1.004 (0.98 to 1.019) in October 2015.  
Before the inspection, for an average trust SHMI remained stable. No change in level or trend 
of SHMI was observed after the announcement or the visit on-site. After the inspection for an 
average trust, there was an increase of 0.0009 (-0.002 to 0.004) points in the SHMI per month 
(Table 6.3). For a trust with an expected mortality of 2,000 patients, this increase translates 
into 1.8 (-4 to 8) deaths. The change in trend produces an increase for an average trust of 
0.015 (-0.04 to 0.07) points in the SHMI 12 months after the inspection compared to the 
counterfactual (Figure 6.6). 
Table 6.3 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for Summary Hospital 
Mortality Index 
 Unadjusted model of the Summary 
Hospital Mortality Index (95% CI) 
Baseline rates 1.005 (0.98, 1.02) 
Pre-inspection slope -0.0001 (-0.0007, 0.0005) 
Change in level  
Post-Announcement 0.0005 (-0.007, 0.008) 
Post-inspection -0.003 (-0.008, 0.001) 
Slope  
Post-announcement 0.002 (-0.01, 0.014) 




































































































































































































































Figure 6.6 Predicted Summary Hospital Mortality Index for an average acute NHS trust before, after the 
announcement and CQC inspection 
 
6.1.3 Waiting times 
6.1.3.1 Accident and Emergency department (A&E) waiting times 
Accident and Emergency department waiting times are not reported by specialist trusts 
without these facilities (12 trusts). In comparison with all other acute trusts, these are smaller 
in terms of number of beds (219.5 [193 to 255] vs 706 [520 to 1024], p<0.001) and numbers of 
hospitals (1 [1 to 2] vs 3 [2 to 5], p<0.001), but have a greater catchment population (3.2 [2.3 
to 3.5] millions vs 450 [350 to 600] thousands, p<0.001). In terms of Monitor sustainability 
rating, trusts without A&E department are more likely to be rated as “no evident concerns” or 
“lowest risk” (70% vs 23%, p=0.002) and are more likely to have a CQC reporting culture rating 
of “outstanding” or “good” (83.3% vs 45.5%, p=0.01). Rates of all attendances to A&E waiting 
more than 4 hours over time are shown in Figure 6.7. 
Sine and cosine functions were introduced to the model to correct for seasonal patterns with 
higher rates of attendances waiting more than 4 h during the winter months (December and 
January) and beginning of the Spring (March and April). The most parsimonious model 
included an autoregressive structure of 8 periods. 
The average (95% CI) rate of over 4 h A&E wait was 0.035 (0.03 to 0.04) in November 2010 and 
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Figure 6.7 Rate of all attendances to A&E departments waiting more than 4 hours in all acute NHS trusts in 
England 
Before the inspection for an average trust, attendances to A&E waiting more than 4 h have 
increased at a pace of 0.75 (0.63 to 0.87) per 10,000 attendances/month. No change in the 
trend of over 4h A&E wait was observed after the announcement or the visit on-site. After the 
announcement, for an average trust, there was an abrupt decrease of 44.5 (63.7 to 25.2) fewer 
cases waiting over 4h per 10,000 attendances/month. After the inspection for an average 
trust, the speed of change is 2.4 (1.8 to 3) extra attendances waiting more than 4 h in A&E per 
10,000 attendances/month (Table 6.4). The change in trend produces an increase for an 
average trust of 20.7 (-40.7 to 82.1) attendances waiting more than 4 h 12 months after the 
inspection compared to the counterfactual (Figure 6.8). 
 
Figure 6.8 Predicted rate of all attendances waiting more than 4 h in A&E before, after the announcement and 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.1.3.2 Consultant-led referral to treatment (RTT) waiting times (admitted) 
Consultant-led referral to treatment waiting times were not available for three acute NHS 
trusts, which were similar to all other acute trusts. The rates of all admitted referrals to 
treatment waiting more than 18 weeks since August 2007 are shown in Figure 6.9. 
 
Figure 6.9 Rate of admitted referrals to treatment waiting more than 18 weeks in all acute NHS trusts in England 
 
Given the rapid decline at the beginning of the observation period, the model included a 
quadratic term for time. Sine and cosine functions were introduced to the model to correct for 
seasonal patterns with higher rates of referrals waiting more than 18 weeks during the winter 
months (December and January) and beginning of the Spring (March and April). Woolridge test 
was significant for autocorrelation; however, models with an autoregressive structure from 1 
to 12 did not converge. 
Average (95% CI) rate of referrals to treatment waiting over 18 weeks was 0.43 (0.4 to 0.46) in 
August 2007 and 0.22 (0.21 to 0.24) in July 2016, which gives the impression of a downward 
trend, but the pattern over time reveals a rapid decrease during the first year and a constant 
increase since October 2013. 
Before the inspection for an average trust, referrals waiting more than 18 weeks have 
decreased at a pace of 614 (895.7 to 332.4) per 10,000 referrals/month. After the 
announcement, no change in trend was observed, but for an average trust, there was an 
abrupt decrease of 44.5 (63.7 to 25.2) fewer referrals waiting more than 18 weeks per 10,000 
referrals. After the inspection for an average trust, the speed of change is 8.8 (5.65 to 11.95) 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Introducing a polynomial function of degree 2 for the variable time in the pre-inspection 
period improved the fit of the model, but it creates a counterfactual for the post-inspection 
period with quadratic growth. Since it is questionable how appropriate this counterfactual is, 
the gap between the observed and hypothetical trend 12 months after the inspection was 
calculated for two scenarios: flat rates and quadratic growth after the on-site visit. For the 
former, the gap is 166.6 (54.2 to 279.1) extra referrals waiting more than 18 weeks (Figure 
6.11), whilst for the latter, the difference is 946 (1236.5 to 655.5) fewer patients waiting more 
than 18 weeks (Figure 6.10). 
 
Figure 6.10 Predicted rate of referrals to treatment waiting more than 18 weeks before, after the announcement 
and after CQC inspection. The pre-inspection trend includes a quadratic term for time 
 
Figure 6.11 Predicted rate of referrals to treatment waiting more than 18 weeks before, after the announcement 


































































Table 6.4 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for rates of 
attendances to A&E waiting over 4 h and rate of referrals to treatment with a wait longer than 18 weeks 
 Unadjusted model of rates of 
over 4 h A&E wait (95% CI) 
Unadjusted model of rates of 
over 18 weeks RTT wait (95% CI) 
Baseline rates 233.1 (203.97, 266.5) 7697.2 (6437, 9204) 
Pre-inspection slope 0.75 (0.63, 0.87)* -614 (-895.7, -332.4)* 
Change in level   
Post-Announcement -44.5 (-63.8, -25.2)* -44.5 (-63.8, -25.2)* 
Post-inspection -20.7 (-42.8, 1.5) 16.5 (-9.7, 42.7) 
Slope   
Post-announcement 3.5 (1.0, 5.9) 44.2 (-3.6, 92.1) 
Post-inspection 2.3 (1.8, 2.9) 8.8 (5.7, 11.95) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
6.1.4 Treatment of patients with dignity and respect 
Patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect is collected as part of the adult 
inpatient survey; therefore, it is not reported for the four acute children’s specialist trust 
existing in England. In comparison with all other acute trusts, these are smaller in terms of 
number of beds (331 [270.5 to 389] vs 700 [491 to 1020], p=0.01) and numbers of locations 
(1.5 [1 to 2] vs 4 [2 to 7], p=0.03). In terms of Monitor sustainability rating, acute children 
specialist trusts are more likely to be rated as “no evident concerns” (100% vs 22%, p=0.02). 
Patients’ perceptions of being treated with dignity and respect over time for all trusts in 
England are shown in Figure 6.12. 
Average patients’ perception was 88.4 (87.9 to 88.9) in 2005 and 90.4 (90 to 90.8) in 2015, 
which reflects an upward trend over time. 
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Before the inspection for an average trust, patients’ perception has improved at 0.0035 
(0.0002 to 0.007) points per month. No change in level was observed after the announcement 
or the visit on-site. After the CQC inspection for an average trust, the pace of improvement 
increased 0.08 (0.06 to 0.09) more points per month (Table 6.6). The change in trend produces 
an increase for an average trust of 1.02 (0.75 to 1.29) points 12 months after the inspection 
compared to the counterfactual (Figure 6.13). 
 
Figure 6.13 Predicted patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect before, after the 
announcement and after CQC inspection 
 
Table 6.5 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for patients’ 
perception of being treated with dignity and respect 
 Unadjusted model of patients’ perception of 
being treated with dignity and respect (95% CI). 
Baseline rates 88.2 (87.7, 88.6) 
Pre-inspection slope 0.0035 (0.0002, 0.007)* 
Change in level  
Post-Announcement 0.48 (-0.07, 1.04) 
Post-inspection -0.07 (-0.92, 0.78) 
Slope  
Post-announcement -0.06 (-0.42, 0.31) 
Post-inspection 0.08 (0.06, 0.09) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
6.1.5 Staff leaving acute NHS trusts 
There were three trusts without data for rate of staff leaving a trust, which were similar to 
those with available data. Over time, rates of staff leaving acute NHS trusts have remained 







































The mean (min-max) rate of staff leaving a trust has remained stable over time with 0.017 
(0.0078 to 0.055) in May 2012 and 0.018 (0.0089 to 0.038) in March 2016. 
 
Figure 6.14 Rate of staff leaving trusts in all acute NHS trusts in England 
For an average trust before the inspection, there were 0.39 (0.07 to 0.71) members of staff 
leaving per 10,000 staff/month. The announcement did not produce a significant change in the 
level or slope of rate of leavers. After the inspection for an average trust, there was a 
significant change in the slope (0.017 [-0.18 to 0.22] per 10,000 staff/month) which represents 
a decrease in the rate of change (Table 6.6). This change in trend did not produce a significant 
difference 12 months after the inspection compared to the counterfactual (Figure 6.15). 
 






























































































































































































































































































Table 6.6 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for rates of staff 
leaving a trust 
 Unadjusted model of rates of staff 
leaving (95% CI) 
Baseline rates 199.8 (191.4, 208.6) 
Pre-inspection slope 0.39 (0.07, 0.71)* 
Change in level  
Post-Announcement 3.62 (-3.77, 11) 
Post-inspection 3.86 (0.39, 7.32) 
Slope  
Post-announcement -3.85 (-11.3, 3.6)* 
Post-inspection 0.017 (-0.18, 0.22) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
6.2 Subgroup analysis by performance rating 
Acute NHS trusts were classified according to their overall quality performance rating in 2009 
in order to explore whether performance affected the response to a CQC inspection. 
Trusts rated as excellent were more likely to be Foundation trusts (78%), located in the North 
region (38% vs 22% Midlands, 16% South, and 24% London), and be acute teaching trusts (27% 
vs 22% large, 22% medium, 8% small, and 21% specialist). In contrast, trusts rated as weak 
were more likely to be large (83% vs 17% medium), located in the South (50% vs 17% 
Midlands, and 33% London) and not have foundation trusts status (83%). Full table with details 
according to performance rating is available in the Appendix Chapter 6, Table 6.4. 
6.2.1 Adverse events 
6.2.1.1 Falls with harm 
The rates of falls with harm have decreased over time for all the groups and there was no 
difference between groups at the beginning or at the end of the observation period. For trusts 
rated as weak, fair and good, there was no change in level or trend after the announcement or 
the inspection. Those trusts rated as excellent showed a significant increase in level (23 [5 to 
40.9] extra falls per 10,000 patients) and decrease in the slope after the announcement of the 
inspection (-13.4 [-3.4 to -23.5] falls per 10,000 patients/month) (Table 6.7). 
Any potential change in slope after the inspection did not produce significant changes 12 
months after the visit regardless of performance rating (Figure 6.18). 
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Table 6.7 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for rate of falls with 
harm by performance rating 
 Unadjusted model of rates of fall with harm (95% CI) 










Pre-inspection slope -2.7 (-6.1, 0.6) -3.1 (-5.4, -0.7)* -2 (-4.5, 0.4) -5.5 (-16, 5) 
Change in level     
Post-Announcement 23 (5, 40.9)* -3.3 (-11.7, 5) -17 (-29.3, -4.7) -10.7 (-33.7, 12.3) 
Post-inspection 11.1 (0.6, 21.5) -1.9 (-9.3, 5.5) 1.2 (-9.9, 12.3) 3 (-18.6, 24.6) 
Slope     
Post-announcement -13.4 (-23.5, -3.4)* -0.7 (-4.5, 3.2) 0.5 (-4.7, 5.7) 1.3 (-8, 10.7) 
Post-inspection -0.8 (-1.4, -0.3) -0.6 (-0.9, -0.3) -0.5 (-1, -0.07) -0.25 (-1.1, 0.7) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
Figure 6.16 Predicted rate of falls with harm before, after the announcement, and CQC inspection by 
performance rating 
6.2.1.2 Pressure ulcers 
Cross-sectional rates of pressure ulcers at the beginning and end of the observation period are 
similar across groups. However, for those trusts rated as excellent, rates remained stable over 
time; whilst rates of pressure ulcers were improving before the inspection for trusts rated as 
good, fair and weak (Table 6.8). 
No changes in trend or level of pressure ulcers were observed for any of the groups after the 
announcement or the CQC visit. The change in trend after the inspection in those trusts rated 
as weak produced an increase of 121.4 (6.8 to 236) pressure ulcers per 10,000 patients 12 
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Table 6.8 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for rate of pressure 
ulcers by performance rating 
 Unadjusted model of rates of pressure ulcers (95% CI) 










Pre-inspection slope -0.3 (-5.6, 4.9)* -9.9 (-16.2, -3.6)* -4 (-10.1, 2) -38.8 (-82.4, 4.9) 
Change in level     
Post-Announcement -3.7 (-49.1, 41.6) -6.5 (-34.7, 21.8) -4.4 (-46.3, 37.6) -50.7 (-129, 27.6) 
Post-inspection -26 (-65.9, 13.9) -7.4 (-31.9, 17.2) 24.2 (-12.1, 60.5) 24.3 (-41, 89.6) 
Slope     
Post-announcement -4.7 (-27.1, 17.6) -6.3 (-20.3, 7.8) -13.9 (-35.5, 7.6) -5 (-41.5, 31.4) 
Post-inspection -2.5 (-4.7, -0.2) -1.1 (-2.5, 0.3) -1.1 (-3.4, 1.1) -0.4 (-4.5, 3.6) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
Figure 6.17 Predicted rate of pressure ulcers before, after the announcement, and CQC inspection by 
performance rating 
 
6.2.2 Summary Hospital Mortality Index 
The values of SHMI at the beginning and end of the observation period have remained similar 
for the four groups. However, for those trusts rated as fair, there was a downward trend in the 
pre-inspection period of -0.0009 (-0.0017 to -0.00009) points per month (Table 6.9), which 
translates into 2 fewer deaths per month for a trust with 2,220 expected deaths.  
No changes in trend or level of SHMI were observed for any of the groups after the 
announcement or the CQC visit. Any potential change in slope after the inspection did not 
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Table 6.9 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for summary hospital 
mortality index by performance rating 
 Unadjusted model Summary Hospital Mortality Index (95% CI) 
 Excellent Good Fair Weak 










Change in level     










Slope     










* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
Figure 6.18 Predicted summary hospital mortality index before, after the announcement, and CQC inspection by 
performance rating 
 
6.2.3 Waiting times 
6.2.3.1 Accident and Emergency department (A&E) waiting times 
In November 2010, rates of attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E were higher for trusts rated 
fair compared to those rated as good (323.4 [249.5 to 419.2] vs 201.1 [167.5 to 241.4]). There 
were no differences across groups at the end of the observation period (i.e. June 2015). The 
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attendances waiting over 4 h, whilst for the other groups these rates were increasing before 
the inspection (Table 6.10). 
No changes in trend or level were observed for any of the groups after the announcement or 
the CQC visit. For the group of trusts rated as fair, the observed change in slope after the 
inspection translated into a significant increase of 220.8 (102.2 to 339.3) attendances waiting 
over 4 h 12 months after the visit (Figure 6.19). 
Table 6.10 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for rates of 
attendances waiting more than 4 hours in A&E by performance rating 
 Unadjusted model of rates of attendances to A&E waiting over 4 hours (95% CI) 
 Excellent Good Fair Weak 
Baseline rates 221.6 (167, 294) 201.1 (167.5, 241.4) 323.4 (249.5, 419.2) 211.5 (112, 399.5) 
Pre-inspection slope 0.6 (0.4, 0.9) 0.8 (0.7, 0.9)* 0.5 (-1.4, 2.4) 1.3 (0.8, 1.8) 
Change in level     
Post-Announcement -72.9 (-110, -35.8) -54.6 (-82.5, -26.7) -53.5 (-91.9, -15) -35.6 (-191.7, 120.6) 
Post-inspection -26.6 (-69.6, 16.3) -9.1 (-38.1, 19.8) 5.7 (-45.1, 56.6) 56.3 (-103.6, 216.1) 
Slope     
Post-announcement 4.3 (0.07, 8.6) 1.4 (-2.2, 4.9) 6.7 (2.1, 11.4) 1.271 (-19.8, 22.3) 
Post-inspection 1.5 (0.4, 2.6) 2.4 (1.6, 3.2) 3.3 (1.8, 4.7) 0.8 (-4.1, 5.8) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
Figure 6.19 Predicted rates of attendances waiting over 4 hours in A&E before, after the announcement and CQC 
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6.2.3.2 Consultant-led referral to treatment (RTT) waiting times (admitted) 
Rates of referrals to treatment waiting more than 18 weeks are similar across groups at the 
beginning (i.e. August 2007) and at the end of the observation period (August 2016). However, 
improvements occurred at different rates. Trusts rated as good or fair had a similar speed of 
improvement, around 600 fewer referrals waiting over 18 weeks per 10,000 referrals/month 
(good: -691.6 [-1018.4 to -364.9] and fair: -559.5 [-843.2 to -275.8]). In the case of trusts rated 
as excellent, this speed of improvement was slower with 135.8 (36.1 to 235.5) fewer cases per 
10,000 referrals/month waiting more than 18 weeks (Table 6.11). 
No changes in trend were observed for any of the groups after the announcement or the CQC 
visit. However, there was a significant decrease the month after the announcement for all 
groups except the group rated as weak (Table 6.11). If the curve with a quadratic term for time 
is used as counterfactual (Figure 6.20), trusts rated as excellent (-0.12 [-0.17 to -0.07]), good (-
0.08 [-0.12 to -0.05]) and fair (-0.1 [-0.15 to -0.05]) had lower rates of referrals waiting over 18 
weeks 12 month after the inspection. 
 
Table 6.11 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for rates of referrals 
waiting more than 18 weeks by performance rating 
 Unadjusted model rate of referrals to treatment waiting over 18 weeks (95% CI) 
















































Post-inspection 7.2 (2.1, 12.3) 8.8 (4.9, 12.8) 10.4 (4, 16.8) -2.4 (-24.1, 19.2) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
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Figure 6.20 Predicted rates of referrals waiting over 18 weeks before, after the announcement and CQC 
inspection by performance rating 
 
6.2.4 Treatment of patients with dignity and respect 
During the observation period, patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect 
was higher for trusts rated as excellent. This difference was significant in 2005 when compared 
with trusts rated as good and weak (89.7 [88.6 to 90.7] vs 88.2 [87.3 to 88.6] and 86.1 [83.4 to 
88.8]), and in 2015, compared to trusts rated as good and fair (89.7 [88.6 to 90.7] vs 88.2 [87.3 
to 88.6] and 86.1 [83.4 to 88.8]). Overall, patients’ perception remained stable over time 
before the inspection (Table 6.12). 
The CQC visit produced no change in level, but it increased the rate of improvement for all 
trusts, with trusts rated as weak having the greatest improvement (Table 6.12). When 
compared to the counterfactual, this change in slope translated 12 months after the inspection 
into a significant improvement for trusts rated as good (1.05 [0.66 to 1.44]), fair (1.4 [0.9 to 2]) 
and weak (1.38 [0.02 to 2.7]) (Figure 6.22). However, post-inspection trend considers only two 

































-100 -50 0 50
Corrected time (months)
Weak rating
Predicted rates of referrals waiting >18 weeks by performance rating
175 
Table 6.12 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for patients’ 
perception of being treated with dignity and respect 
 Unadjusted model patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect 
(95% CI) 
 Excellent Good Fair Weak 










Change in level     
Post-Announcement 0.4 (-0.85, 1.6) 1.1 (0.29, 1.9) -0.46 (-1.59, 0.68) -0.13 (-2.28, 2) 
Post-inspection -1.46 (-3.1, 0.24) 1.05 (-0.18, 2.28) 0.4 (-1.5, 2.3) -5.7 (-15.4, 4) 
Slope     
Post-announcement 0.29 (-0.5, 1.09) -0.59 (-1.13, -0.05) 0.2 (-0.56, 0.9) 1.7 (-1.8, 5.2) 
Post-inspection 0.08 (0.04, 0.12) 0.07 (0.04, 0.09)* 0.08 (0.04, 0.13) 0.19 (0.07, 0.3) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
Figure 6.21 Predicted patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect before, after the 
announcement and CQC inspection by performance rating 
 
6.2.5 Staff leaving acute NHS trusts 
Rates of staff leaving NHS trusts are similar across groups at the beginning and end of the 
observation period. However, for those trusts rated as excellent, there was an upward trend in 
the pre-inspection period of 0.95 (0.3 to 1.6) staff leaving per 10,000 staff/month (Table 6.13), 
whilst for the other groups rates remained stable.  
For trusts rated as excellent, the announcement of the inspection produced a significant 
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trend (12.7 [5.1 to 20.2] per 10,000 staff/month), whilst after the inspection, this index 
continued to increase, but at a slower pace (0.5 [0.2 to 0.9] staff per10,000 staff/month). 
No changes in trend or level were observed for the other groups after the announcement or 
the CQC visit. Any potential change in slope after the inspection did not produce significant 
changes 12 months after the visit regardless of performance rating (Figure 6.22). 
 
Table 6.13 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for rates of staff 
leaving NHS trusts by performance rating 
 Unadjusted model rate of staff leaving NHS trusts (95% CI) 










Pre-inspection slope 0.95 (0.3, 1.6) 0.4 (-0.05, 0.9) 0.4 (-0.2, 0.96) -0.7 (-3, 1.7) 
Change in level     
Post-Announcement -13.4 (-29.9, 3)* 6.5 (-5, 18) 5.6 (-11.1, 22.2) 22 (-21.6, 65.6) 
Post-inspection -21.8 (-39.9, -3.6) 4.5 (-6.7, 15.7)* 7.8 (-8.9, 24.5) -19 (-65.2, 27.1) 
Slope     
Post-announcement 12.7 (5.1, 20.2)* 1.4 (-4, 7) 1.9 (-6.1, 10) 8.7 (-11.8, 29.1) 
Post-inspection 0.5 (0.2, 0.9)* -0.09 (-0.4, 0.2) -0.5 (-0.9, -0.08) -0.7 (-1.7, 0.4) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
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6.3 Summary 
In summary, the analysis of the effect of CQC inspections on measures of quality of care 
suggests no significant changes after the announcement or the visit on-site. It seems to 
produce a decrease in waiting times after the announcement, but these changes are not 
sustained over time. Similarly, it produced a shift in the slope for rates of leavers, but this did 
not translate into a significant change in the long run (Table 6.14). 
 





Level change Change of slope 
Announcement Inspection Announcement Post-inspection 
Falls with harm  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait   ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait   ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Leavers  ̶ ̶  ̶ 
Key: Arrows are placed where a significant effect was observed. Blue arrows signal a positive effect, 
whilst yellow arrows signal a negative effect. The direction of the arrow indicates whether there was an 
increase (upwards) or decrease (downwards). 
 
In the case of the subgroup analysis by performance rating in 2009, no changes in level or 
trend were observed after the announcement or the on-site CQC visit for those trusts rated as 
fair or weak. Conversely, trusts rated as excellent showed a significant increase in the rate of 
falls with harm after the announcement and a downward shift in trend. For rates of staff 
leaving NHS trusts, there was a significant drop after the announcement and an upward shift in 
trend, which was compensated by a downward shift in the slope after the inspection. In the 
case of trusts rated as good, the only significant changes observed were a significant decrease 
in the rate of referrals waiting over 18 weeks after the announcement of the inspection, a 
significant increase in the rate of staff leaving NHS trusts after the inspection and an increase 
in the rate of improvement of patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect 
after the inspection. 
For falls with harm, summary hospital mortality index and staff leaving NHS trusts, these 
changes did not produce a significant difference one year after the inspection. However, they 
generated a significant increase in pressure ulcers for trusts rated as weak, a significant 
increase in attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E for trusts rated as fair and significant increase 
in patients’ perceptions for trusts rated as good, fair, and weak. 
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Given that potential explanations for these results are common to the analyses presented in 
Chapters 7 and 8, the discussion of all the empirical studies conducted for this thesis is 
available in Chapter 10. 
 






Level change Change of slope 
Announcement Inspection Announcement 
Post-
inspection 
Excellent      
Falls with harm ̶  ̶  ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Leavers ̶  ̶   
Good      
Falls with harm  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait   ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect  ̶ ̶ ̶  
Leavers ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶ 
Fair      
Falls with harm ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Leavers ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Weak      
Falls with harm ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Leavers ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Key: Arrows are placed where a significant effect was observed. Blue arrows signal a positive effect, 
whilst yellow arrows signal a negative effect. The direction of the arrow indicates whether there was an 
increase (upwards) or decrease (downwards). 
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7 Comparison of the effect of the old 
and new Care Quality Commission 
inspection regimes on measures of 
process of care and clinical outcomes 
 
The previous chapter presented the results of the effect of any CQC inspection on seven 
selected measures of care quality: falls with harm, pressure ulcers, risk-adjusted mortality, 
waiting times in A&E, waiting times for a referral to treatment, patient’s perception of care 
and staff leaving NHS trusts.  
These measures were selected to represent the domains the CQC uses for its assessment of 
acute trusts. Overall, it could be seen that the CQC inspection was not associated with a 
clinically significant effect on the measures selected; whilst the announcement produced a 
statistically significant drop in waiting times. 
In this chapter, results of the comparison of the new and old regime are presented. Between 
September 2013 and September 2014, a new more resource-intensive regime of inspections of 
acute care was introduced. At the same time, the previous regime of inspection was still in use, 
which allows the comparison of the effect of both regimes of inspections on measures of care 
quality (see a full description of the components of the new and old regime of inspections in 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.2). 
7.1 Findings of the comparison of CQC inspection regimes 
This analysis comprises 155 acute NHS trusts, of which 67 (43%) were inspected under the new 
regime, and 40 (26%) did not receive an on-site CQC visit in the period between September 
2013 and September 2014 (Table 7.1). The regression model used interaction terms to obtain 
changes in level and slope using the old regime group as control. 
Trusts inspected under the new regime were less likely to be Foundation trusts (53% vs 71%, 
p=0.02), more likely to be in special measures (28% vs 1%, p<0.001), more likely to have low 
financial and governance ratings by Monitor (significant financial risk: 18% vs 3%, p=0.01; 
under review or subject to enforcement actions: 50% vs 22%, p=0.004) and more likely to be 




Table 7.1 Descriptive information for all acute NHS trusts by type of inspection 
 Old regime New regime No inspection p-value 
 n=48 n=67 n=40 
Foundation trust 33 (69%) 36 (54%) 31 (78%) 0.035 
Type of trust 
Large acute trust 14 (29%) 18 (27%) 9 (23%) 0.69 
Medium acute trust 14 (29%) 19 (28%) 12 (30%)   
Small acute trust 7 (15%) 13 (19%) 6 (15%)   
Acute teaching trust 5 (10%) 13 (19%) 7 (18%)   
Acute specialist trust 8 (17%) 4 (6%) 6 (15%)   
NHS England region 
North 16 (33%) 18 (27%) 16 (40%) 0.63 
Midlands and East 17 (35%) 18 (27%) 10 (25%)   
South 9 (19%) 18 (27%) 9 (23%)   
London 6 (13%) 13 (19%) 5 (13%)   
Beds, median (IQR) 637 (453, 980) 738 (544, 1020) 719 (485, 1024) 0.55 
Population in thousands, 
median (IQR) 
465 (325.7, 610) 462.5 (350, 600) 450 (320, 600) 
0.98 
Number of hospitals, median 
(IQR) 
2 (1, 4) 3 (2, 5) 3 (1, 4) 
0.21 
Number of locations, median 
(IQR) 
3 (2, 6) 5 (2, 7) 4 (1.5, 7) 
0.30 
Special measures 0 (0%) 18 (27%) 1 (3%) <0.001 
Overall rating 
Outstanding 3 (7%) 2 (3%) 3 (8%) 0.81 
Good 12 (27%) 16 (24%) 12 (32%)   
Requires improvement 27 (60%) 42 (63%) 21 (55%)   
Inadequate 3 (7%) 7 (10%) 2 (5%)   
Merged trusts 2 (4%) 8 (12%) 3 (8%) 0.32 







(16.38, 27.4) 0.44 
Index Multiple Deprivation-






(-0.39, 0.64) 0.99 
Monitor Sustainability rating 
Significant risk 0 (0%) 6 (18%) 2 (6%) 0.024 
Material risk 6 (18%) 1 (3%) 3 (10%)   
Emerging or minor concerns 18 (55%) 17 (50%) 17 (55%)   
No evident concerns 9 (27%) 10 (29%) 6 (19%)   
Lowest risk 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (10%)   
Monitor Governance rating 
Subject to enforcement 
action 
2 (6%) 12 (35%) 5 (16%) 0.022 
Under review 5 (15%) 5 (15%) 2 (6%)   
No evident concerns 26 (79%) 17 (50%) 24 (77%)   
TDA escalating score 
Enforcement action 0 (0%) 6 (18%) 0 (0%) 0.11 
Significant delivery issues 7 (47%) 10 (30%) 5 (56%)   
Some delivery issues 7 (47%) 7 (21%) 2 (22%)   
Limited/no issues 1 (7%) 9 (27%) 1 (11%)   
Sound FT application 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 1 (11%)   
Number of inspections, median 
(IQR) 
4 (3, 5) 4 (3, 5) 3 (2, 4) 0.001 
Months since previous 
inspection, median (IQR) 
10 (7, 13.5) 11 (8, 14) 9.5 (6, 16) 0.46 
181 
 Old regime New regime No inspection p-value 
 n=48 n=67 n=40 
Reporting culture 2016 
Poor 6 (13%) 18 (27%) 2 (5%) 0.010 
Significant Concerns 14 (29%) 27 (40%) 13 (33%)   
Good 23 (48%) 21 (31%) 21 (53%)   
Outstanding 5 (10%) 1 (1%) 4 (10%)   
Performance rating - Overall Quality 2009  
Excellent 12 (26%) 15 (23%) 10 (25%) 0.73 
Good 24 (51%) 29 (44%) 20 (50%)   
Fair 9 (19%) 18 (27%) 10 (25%)   
Weak 2 (4%) 4 (6%) 0 (0%)   
Performance rating - Financial 2009  
Excellent 21 (45%) 29 (44%) 22 (55%) 0.16 
Good 21 (45%) 21 (32%) 16 (40%)   
Fair 4 (9%) 13 (20%) 2 (5%)   
Weak 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 0 (0%)   
Inspections under the old regime were concentrated between September and November 2013 
(58%), whilst inspections under the new regime were spread out across the intervention 
window. Most inspections under the new regime were carried out within two waves, one 
between September and December 2013 comprising 17 (25%) trusts, and a second one 
comprising 30 (45%) trusts between February and May 2014. 
 
Figure 7.1 Inspections per month by type of regime 
 
7.1.1 Adverse events 
7.1.1.1 Falls with harm 
The average (95% CI) rate of falls in April 2012 was 0.9% (0.5% to 1.2%) for the old regime 











Month of inspection for the two groups
Old regime New regime
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Rates of falls with harm were improving before the CQC inspection for all groups, but the 
speed of improvement was faster for the old inspection regime (Table 7.2). 
Announcing the inspection did not produce a significant increase or decrease in level or trend 
for any of the groups; however, the response to the announcement was different for trusts 
inspected under the old and new regime. Whilst rates of falls with harms increased for trusts 
inspected under the old regime, these decreased for the new regime group (8.75 [-2.87 to 
20.37] vs -7.52 [-15.18 to 0.15] falls per 10,000 patients/month). 
The CQC inspection had no immediate effect on the rate of falls with harm for either group, 
but a non-significant decrease in the speed of improvement was observed for all the groups. 
The change in speed of improvement after the inspection would translate one year later into 
2.89 (-7.25 to 13.02) per 10,000 patients/month extra falls with harm for the new regime, 
20.87 (11.36 to 30.39) extra falls with harm for the old regime and -1.35 (-20.36 to 17.67) for 
the group not inspected. No significant changes were found in a subsample analysis matched 
by foundation trust status, special measures and reporting culture. 
 
Figure 7.2 Predicted falls with harm for an average acute NHS trust before, after the announcement, and after 
inspection by type of inspection 
Lines represent the mean rate of falls with harm obtained from the multilevel model for each period. The first 
vertical line signals the announcement, while the second signals the inspection. Dash lines show the trends 
observed during the pre-inspection period, which were extended for the post-announcement and post-inspection 
periods. Long-dash lines represent the observed data in the period between the announcement and the inspection. 
Solid lines show the trends after the inspection. Data for the hospitals inspected by the old regime is shown in blue, 
new regime in red and hospitals not inspected in black. The same applies for all figures in this chapter. 
 
When adjusting for confounding, the coefficients for NRLS z-score, type of trust, specialist, IMD 
score, beds and number of staff members were significant, but the most parsimonious model 































-40 -20 0 20 40
Corrected time(months)
Old regime No inspection New regime
183 
When compared to large trusts, small trusts had 26% (2% to 56%) extra falls with harm, whilst 
specialist trusts had 99% (47% to 169%). In the case of teaching trusts, the rate of fall with 
harm was 27% (9% to 41%) lower. Adjusting the model for potential confounders changed the 
magnitude of the model estimates, but did not modify the conclusions. 
 
Table 7.2 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for falls with harm by 
type of inspection. Values are number of events per 10,000 patients 
 Unadjusted model rates of falls with harm 
(95% CI) 
Adjusted model rates of falls with harm 
(95% CI) 
 
New regime Old regime 
No 
inspection 























































 (-5, 12.8) 
-6.8  
(-18.1, 4.5) 



























 (-1, -0.1) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
Values presented in number of events per 10,000 patients/month. Figures were calculated using model 
coefficients to present the absolute instead of relative value. For example, the pre-inspection slope for 
hospitals inspected by the new regime is calculated as exp(β0j + β1j*corrected time ij + β6j*new inspection 
j+ β7j*corrected time new inspection ij) . 
 
7.1.1.2 Pressure ulcers 
The average (95% CI) rate of pressure ulcers in April 2012 was 5.7% (4.7% to 7%) for the group 
inspected using old regime, 5.9% (5% to 7%) for the group inspected using new regime and 5% 
(4% to 6%) for the group not inspected.  
Given that pressure ulcers have a seasonal pattern with higher rates in the spring (i.e. March 
and April) and autumn (i.e. September and October), a cosine function was introduced. 
Rates of pressure ulcers were improving before CQC inspection for these three groups (Figure 
7.3). After announcing the inspection there was no change in level, whilst the rate of 
improvement remained similar to the pre-inspection period. After CQC inspection, no 
detectable effect was observed on the level or trend for the three groups analysed (Table 7.3). 
The non-significant change in trend after the inspection would translate one year later into 
15.3 (-40.0 to 70.7) per 10,000 patients/month extra pressure ulcers for the new regime, 21.9 
(-48.8 to 92.6) extra pressure ulcers for the old regime and 52.3 (-16.1 to 120.8) for the group 
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not inspected. No significant changes were found in a subsample analysis matched by 
foundation trust status, special measures and reporting culture. 
 
Figure 7.3 Predicted pressure ulcers for an average acute NHS trust before, after the announcement and after 
inspection by type of inspection 
 
Catchment population, type of trust, specialist trust, and IMD score were significant when 
introduced to the model, but the most parsimonious was the one adjusted by specialist trust. 
Compared to all other types of trusts, specialist trusts had on average 47% (37% to 55%) lower 
rates of pressure ulcers. Adjusting the model for potential confounders changed the 
magnitude of the model estimates, but did not modify the conclusions. 
Table 7.3 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for pressure ulcers by 
type of inspection. Values are number of events per 10,000 patients 
 Unadjusted model rates of pressure ulcers  
(95% CI) 
Adjusted model rates of pressure ulcers  
(95% CI) 
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7.1.2 Summary Hospital Mortality Index 
The average (95% CI) summary hospital mortality index for the period March 2010-11 was 1.02 
(0.99 to 1.04) for the group inspected using old regime, 1.00 (0.97 to 1.03) for the group 
inspected using new regime and 0.99 (0.96 to 1.02) for the group not inspected.  
The index was improving before the inspection for trusts inspected by the new regime, whilst 
for the other two groups the SHMI remained constant. After the announcement and the on-
site visit, there were no changes in the level or trend for the three groups analysed (Table 7.4). 
The non-significant change in trend after the inspection would translate one year later into 
0.02 (-0.04 to 0.09) extra points in the index for the new regime, -0.003 (-0.08 to 0.08) points 
for the old regime and 0.03 (-0.06 to 0.11) for the group not inspected. None of these changes 
were statistically significant. 
 
Figure 7.4 Predicted summary hospital mortality index for an average acute NHS trust before, after the 
announcement and after inspection by type of inspection 
 
NHS region, governance rating, type of trust, IMD health domain and catchment population 
were significant when introduced to the model. 
The model adjusted by NHS region was the most parsimonious. Compared to the North region, 
the South has 0.04 (0.02 to 0.07) fewer points and London has 0.17 (0.14 to 0.21) fewer points 
in the Index. For a trust with 1,000 expected deaths, this difference would translate into 40 
fewer deaths in the South and 170 fewer deaths in the London area. Adjusting the model for 
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Table 7.4 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for summary hospital 
mortality index by type of inspection 
 Unadjusted model summary hospital mortality 
index (95% CI) 
Adjusted model summary hospital mortality 
index (95% CI) 




















































































* Significant values at 0.05 level 
7.1.3 Waiting times 
7.1.3.1 Accident & Emergency department waiting times 
The average (95% CI) rate of attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E in November 2010 was 3% 
(2.5% to 4%) for the group inspected using old regime, 4% (3% to 4.5%) for the group 
inspected using new regime and 0.03 (0.026 to 0.04) for the group not inspected.  
Rates of attendances waiting over 4h in A&E were worsening before CQC inspection for all 
three groups. After announcing the inspection there were no changes in level or trend for any 
of the groups. After the CQC inspection, there was a significant drop for the group inspected 
by the old regime, whilst the one inspected by the new regime showed an increase in rate of 
attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E (-55.6 [-106.4 to -4.9] vs 60.8 [5.5 to 116.1] attendances 
waiting over 4 h per 10,000 attendances) (Table 7.5). 
The non-significant change in trend after the inspection would translate one year later into 
66.1 (-27.7 to 160) extra attendances per 10,000 patients waiting over 4 h for the new regime, 
3 (-96.9 to 102.9) for the old regime and 16.4 (-103.6 to 136.4) for the group not inspected. 
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Figure 7.5 Predicted attendances waiting over 4h in A&E for an average acute NHS trust before, after the 
announcement and after inspection by type of inspection 
The coefficients for number of inspections, Foundation trust status, type of trust, specialist 
trust, IMD score for health domain, catchment population, beds, NHS reform, CQC reporting 
culture, and number of staff members were significant when introduced to the model. 
The model adjusted by reporting culture according to the CQC was the most parsimonious. 
Compared to a trust with a poor reporting culture, trusts with significant concerns have 20% 
(3% to 35%) fewer attendances waiting over 4 h, trusts with good reporting culture have 31% 
(16% to 43%) lower rates and trusts with an outstanding reporting culture have 46% (23% to 
62%) fewer attendances waiting over 4 h. Adjusting the model for potential confounders 
changed the magnitude of the model estimates, but did not modify the conclusions. 
Table 7.5 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for attendances 
waiting over 4 h in A&E by type of inspection. Values are number of episodes per 10,000 patients 
 Unadjusted model rates of over 4 h A&E 
wait (95% CI) 
Adjusted model rates of over 4 h A&E wait 
(95% CI) 
















0.8 (0.6, 0.9) 0.7 (0.5, 0.9)* 0.7 (0.5, 0.9) 0.8 (0.6, 0.9) 0.7 (0.5, 0.9)* 0.7 (0.5, 0.9) 











































Post-inspection 0.98 (-0.3, 2.3) 2.6 (1.8, 3.4) 3.2 (2.2, 4.3) 0.9 (-0.3, 2.3) 2.6 (1.8, 3.4) 3.3 (2.3, 4.3) 
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7.1.3.2 Consultant-led referral to treatment waiting times (admitted) 
The average (95% CI) rate of referrals waiting over 18 weeks in August 2007 was 44% (38% to 
49%) for the group inspected under the old regime, 46% (43% to 50%) for the group inspected 
under the new regime and 38% (33% to 43%) for the group not inspected.  
Rates of referrals waiting over 18 weeks were improving at a similar pace before the CQC 
inspection. After announcing the inspection there was a significant decrease for the new and 
old regime group of similar magnitude (-149.8 [-232 to -67.5] and-151.3 [-200.4 to -102.2] 
fewer referrals per 10,000 cases waiting over 18 weeks), whilst the rate of improvement 
flattened for the three groups. After the CQC inspection, there was a significant increase and a 
shift in trend for both groups which no longer were improving, but worsening over time (Table 
7.6). 
When the curve with a quadratic term is used as counterfactual, the change in trend after the 
inspection would translate one year after into 10 (13.5 to 6.5) fewer referrals per 100 cases 
waiting over 18 weeks for the new regime, 10.6 (13.9 to -7.3) fewer referrals for the old regime 
and 4.4 (7 to 1.8) fewer for the group not inspected (Figure 7.6). In the case of using a flat 
trend as counterfactual, the change in trend after the inspection translates into 2.9 (1.2 to 4.6) 
extra referrals per 100 cases waiting over 18 weeks for the new regime, 0.1 (-1.1 to 1.4) extra 
referrals for the old regime and 1.1 (-0.3 to 2.5) extra referrals for the groups not inspected 
(Figure 7.7). 
 
Figure 7.6 Predicted referrals waiting over 18 weeks for an average acute NHS trust before, after the 





Figure 7.7 Predicted referrals waiting over 18 weeks for an average acute NHS trust before, after the 
announcement and after inspection by type of inspection. The pre-inspection trend includes a quadratic term for 
time only before inspection 
Reporting culture, Foundation trust status, NHS reform, type of trust, IMD score in the health 
domain, beds and number of staff members were significant when introduced to the model. 
After combining these variables into different models, the model adjusted by NHS reform and 
beds was the most parsimonious.  
During the implementation of the NHS reform between October 2012 and April 2013, referrals 
waiting over 18 weeks decreased by 16% (13% to 18%). On the contrary, there was a 3% (1% to 
4%) increase in referrals waiting over 18 weeks per 1,000 beds. Adjusting the model for 
potential confounders changed the magnitude of the model estimates, but did not modify the 
conclusions. 
Table 7.6 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for referrals waiting 
over 18 weeks by type of inspection 
 Unadjusted model rates of referrals waiting over 
18 weeks (95% CI) 
Adjusted model rates of referrals waiting over 
18 weeks (95% CI) 
















-310.5 (-457.5,  
-163.6) 
-340.2 (-502.9,  
-177.5)* 








Change in level       
Post-
Announcement 








-226.9 (-283.1,  
-170.7)* 




























Post-inspection 13.2 (7.8, 18.6)* 9.4 (4.9, 13.9)* 8.8 (3.1, 14.5) 12.1 (6.7, 17.6)* 8.5 (3.9, 13.1)* 7.8 (2, 13.6) 
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7.1.4 Treatment of patients with dignity and respect 
The average (95% CI) patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect in 2005 
was 88.4 (87.5 to 89.25) for the group inspected under the old regime, 87.8 (87.1 to 88.5) for 
the group inspected under the new regime and 89.4 (88.5 to 90.2) for the group not inspected. 
Perception of being treated with dignity and respect was improving for trusts inspected under 
the old regime but it was stable over time for trusts inspected under the new regime similarly 
for those not inspected (Table 7.7). After the CQC inspection, there was a significant decrease 
for the old regime group (-2 [-0.3 to -3.7] points), whilst there was a shift in trend that was 
now improving for the three groups. 
This change in trend after the inspection would translate one year later into 1.53 (1.13 to 1.93) 
more points in the inpatient survey for this question for those trusts inspected under the new 
regime, 0.72 (0.23 to 1.21) more points for the old regime and 0.88 (0.29 to 1.47) more points 
for the group not inspected (Figure 7.8). In real terms and if patient-mix remains unchanged, 
for a trust with a score of 85, one extra point means two more people per 100 patients 
answering that they always felt they were treated with dignity and respect. 
 
Figure 7.8 Predicted patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect for an average acute NHS trust 
before, after the announcement and after inspection by type of inspection 
 
Reporting culture, Foundation trust status, time as Foundation trust, type of trust, beds, 
population and specialist trust were significant when introduced to the model. After combining 
these variables into different models, the one adjusted by Foundation trust (FT) status and 
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Compared to a non-FT trust, patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect is 
1.21 (0.68 to 1.75) points higher in trusts with FT status. In the case of specialist trusts, the 
perception was 4.71 (3.82 to 5.6) points higher compared to other types of acute trusts. 
Adjusting the model for potential confounders changed the magnitude of the model estimates, 
but did not modify the conclusions. 
Table 7.7 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for patients’ 
perception of being treated with dignity and respect by type of inspection 
 Unadjusted model patients’ perception of 
being treated with dignity and respect  
(95% CI) 
Adjusted model patients’ perception of 
being treated with dignity and respect  
(95% CI) 




















































































* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
7.1.5 Staff leaving acute NHS trusts 
The average (95% CI) rate of staff leaving NHS trusts was 2% (1.8% to 2%) in May 2012 for the 
three groups.  
Rates of staff leaving NHS trusts were stable and similar for all trusts included in this analysis. 
There were no changes in level or slope for any of the groups after the announced inspection. 
After the CQC inspection, there was an increase in rate of staff leaving NHS trusts, which had a 
greater magnitude for trusts inspected under the old regime compared to those inspected 
under the new regime (3 [-11.8 to 17.9] vs 0.6 [-12 to 13.3] staff leaving per 10,000 members 
of staff) (Table 7.8). 
The non-significant change in trend after the inspection would translate one year later into 2.8 
(-9 to 14.7) extra people leaving per 10,000 staff for the new regime, 17 (-0.04 to 34) extra 
people leaving for the old regime and 18.9 (-2.5 to 40.3) for the group not inspected. None of 





Figure 7.9 Predicted staff leaving NHS trusts for an average acute NHS trust before, after the announcement and 
after inspection by type of inspection 
 
Region, governance rating, type of trust, specialist trust, IMD score in the health domain, the 
number of locations and the number of hospitals were significant in the univariate model. 
After combining these variables into different models, the one adjusted by region and type of 
trust was the most parsimonious.  
By comparison with large acute trusts, rates of staff leaving for medium trusts were 6% (1% to 
10%) higher, teaching trusts were 9% (3% to 14%) higher and in specialist trusts were 13% (7% 
to 20%) higher. In contrast, compared to rates of trusts in the North, trusts in the Midlands had 
8% (4% to 12%) higher rates of staff leaving, whilst the South had 6% (2% to 11%) higher rates 
and London area had 36% (30% to 43%) higher rates. Adjusting the model for potential 
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Table 7.8 Slopes and changes in level before, after the announcement and CQC inspection for staff leaving NHS 
trusts by type of inspection. Values are number of events per 10,000 staff 
 Unadjusted model rates of staff leaving 
NHS trusts (95% CI) 
Adjusted model rates of staff leaving NHS 
trusts (95% CI) 
















0.5 (0.1, 0.9) 0.1 (-0.6, 0.8) 0.3 (-0.6, 1.1) 0.6 (0.1, 0.9) 0.1 (-0.6, 0.8) 0.3 (-0.6, 1.1) 
























































* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
7.2 Summary 
In the case of adverse events, rates were improving for falls with harm and pressure ulcers 
before the inspection. No changes were observed after the announcement or the on-site visit, 
except for an abrupt decrease of falls with harm after the announcement of the new regime 
inspection. 
For waiting times in A&E, rates of attendances waiting over 4 h were worsening before the 
inspection for all the groups. The announcement had no effect on level or slope, but after the 
CQC visit, there was a decrease for trusts inspected under the old regime and an increase for 
those inspected under the new regime.  
For referral to treatment waiting times, referrals waiting over 18 weeks were improving before 
the inspection for all the groups. There was a decrease in the level after the announcement, 
whilst the improving trend flattened. After the CQC visit, the trend shifted, and it worsened for 
all groups. 
Neither the announcement nor CQC visit had an effect on the level or trend of the summary 
hospital mortality index. 
Patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect was improving for trusts 
inspected under the old regime. After the inspection, this indicator improved over time for all 
groups. 
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Level or trend of rates of staff leaving NHS trusts were not affected by the announcement of a 
CQC inspection; however, after the visit, there was an increase for the group inspected by the 
old regime and a decrease for the group inspected by the new regime. 
 





Level change Change of slope 
Announcement Inspection Announcement 
Post-
inspection 
Old regime      
Falls with harm  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶  ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait      
Dignity and respect  ̶  ̶  
Leavers ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶ 
New regime      
Falls with harm   ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶  ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait    ̶  
Dignity and respect ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶  
Leavers ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶ 
No inspected      
Falls with harm  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶  ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait   ̶ ̶  
Dignity and respect ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶  
Leavers ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Key: Arrows are placed where a significant effect was observed. Blue arrows signal a positive effect, 
whilst yellow arrows signal a negative effect. The direction of the arrow indicates whether there was an 
increase (upwards) or decrease (downwards). 
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8 Comparison of the effect of old and 
new Care Quality Commission 
inspection regimes on measures of 
process of care and clinical outcomes 
by previous performance 
 
Chapter 6 addressed the effect of any CQC inspection, including a subgroup analysis by 
previous level of performance, whilst Chapter 7 presented the results for the comparative 
effect of the old and new regime of inspections on selected measures of care quality. 
According to these previous analyses, if CQC inspections have any effect on the performance 
of acute NHS trusts, this has not been detected on the outcomes selected. 
Trusts’ ability to respond, implement changes, and improve measures of care quality in 
preparation for an inspection may differ depending on measurable and unmeasurable intrinsic 
characteristics of the trust. Previous performance may be a proxy for improvement culture, 
which might affect the way clinical and managerial teams respond to a coming inspection. 
Therefore, this chapter expands on the subgroup analyses presented in Chapter 6, by exploring 
how the trend of improvement, instead of the level, influences the effect of new and old 
regime CQC inspections. The a priori hypothesis is that inspections will have a greater effect on 
trusts with improving performance compared to the effect on those trusts with worsening 
performance, assuming that previous improvement is a proxy of the trust’s capacity to manage 
and implement changes for quality improvement. 
 
8.1 Findings of comparison of inspection regimes by previous 
performance 
This analysis included 155 acute NHS trusts, of which 100 (65%) had data available to estimate 
a pre-inspection trend for all seven measures of process of care and clinical outcomes. Trusts 
with missing data for at least one measure were more likely to be Foundation Trusts (78.2% vs 
57%, p=0.008), to be acute specialist trusts (32.7% vs 0%, p<0.001) and not to have been 
inspected between September 2013 and September 2014 (72.7% vs 0%, p<0.001). However, 
these were less likely to have been under special measures (2% vs 18%, p=0.003). Additionally, 
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they were more likely to have a Monitor Financial Sustainability rating of “no evident 
concerns” or “lowest risk” (42% vs 18%, p=0.01), a Monitor Governance rating of “no evident 
concerns” (81% vs 58%, p=0.01) and a CQC reporting culture rating of “good” or “outstanding” 
(61.8% vs 41%, p=0.01). 
Within those trusts without missing data, only one trust had improving performance for all 
seven measures, whilst improving performance for three measures was the most common 
pattern (36%).  
Overall, 99 different combinations of improvement were observed, with improvement of falls 
with harm, pressure ulcers and patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect 
the most common combination (i.e. 7 trusts). 
Trusts that had information available for 6 or more measures and had improving performance 
for at least 50% of them (i.e. 69 trusts) were more likely to be medium or teaching trusts (63% 
vs 32%, p<0.001) and less likely to be specialist trusts (1% vs 20%, p<0.001). In terms of 
geographical location, these trusts were more likely to be in the South or London (47% vs 31%, 
p=0.04) and less likely to be in the North (22% vs 41%, p=0.01). 
Trusts with improving performance of clinical outcomes before the inspection (i.e. falls with 
harm, pressure ulcers, and summary hospital mortality index) were more likely to have been in 
special measures (21.6% vs 9.3%, p = 0.05) and less likely to be Foundation Trusts (45.9% vs 
70.3%, p=0.007). 
The regression model included interaction terms to obtain changes in level and slope. Trusts 
inspected under the old regime that were not improving were used as controls. Values here 
presented are the absolute number of events per 10,000 patients/month. The model 
coefficients are available in the Appendix to Chapter 8, tables 8.1 to 8.5. 
 
8.1.1 Adverse events 
8.1.1.1 Falls with harm 
Trusts with improving safety records were more likely to be small or teaching trusts (40.4% vs 
18%) and to have been inspected between September 2013 and 2014 (79% vs 62%). 
Trusts that improved adverse events before the inspection had higher rates of falls with harm 
at the beginning and changed performance at a faster pace than those with steady or 
worsening performance. The announcement of the old regime inspection produced a 
significant but small change in the trend, decelerating progress in trusts that were improving 
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and accelerating improvement in trusts with worsening performance (Figure 8.1). After the 
inspection, the rate of falls dropped for trusts with worsening performance receiving a new 
regime inspection (-27.1 [-0.4 to -53.8] falls per 10,000 patients). No other changes in level or 
slope were observed after the inspection (Table 8.1). 
At 12 months after the inspection there is a difference between the expected (i.e. 
counterfactual) and the observed rates of falls with harm. For trusts with improving 
performance inspected under the old regime, this difference equals an increase of 24.5 (16.9 
to 32.1) falls per 10,000 patients, and for the new regime is 12.2 (5.7 to 18.8) falls per 10,000 
patients. For trusts with worsening performance inspected under the new regime the 
difference is equal to a decrease of 106.8 (183.8 to 29.8) falls per 10,000 patients. 
 
Table 8.1 Slopes and level changes after the announcement and on-site inspections for rates of falls with harm by 
previous performance 
 
Not improving Improving 
 





























































































* Significant values at 0.05 level 
Values presented in number of events per 10,000 patients/month. Figures were calculated using model 
coefficients to present the absolute instead of relative value. For example, the pre-inspection slope for 
hospitals inspected by the new regime that were improving is calculated as exp(β0j + β1j*corrected time 
old inspection not improving ij + β6j*new inspection improving j+ β7j*corrected time new inspection 









Figure 8.1 Rates of falls with harms before the inspection, after the announcement and the inspection by 
previous performance 
Key: Lines represent the mean rate of falls with harm obtained from the multilevel model for each period. The first 
vertical line signals the announcement, while the second signals the inspection. Dash lines show the trends 
observed during the pre-inspection period, which were extended for the post-announcement and post-inspection 
periods. Long-dash lines represent the observed data in the period between the announcement and the inspection. 
Solid lines show the trends after the inspection. Data for the hospitals inspected by the old regime that were 
improving are shown in blue and those not improving in green. Hospitals inspected by the new regime that were 
improving are in red and those not improving in yellow. Trusts not inspected that were improving are in black and 
those not improving in grey. The same applies for all figures in this chapter. 
 
8.1.1.2 Pressure ulcers 
Both groups of acute trusts were similar, except that trusts with improving performance were 
greater in terms of number of hospitals (2 [1 to 4] vs 3 [2 to 5], p=0.04) and locations (3 [1 to 6] 
vs 5 [2 to 7], p=0.04). 
The pattern is similar to that observed for falls with harm, where trusts with improving 
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faster. The announcement of the old regime inspection produced a significant shift of the 
previous trend, slowing down progress in trusts that were improving and speeding up 
improvement in trusts with worsening performance (Figure 8.2). Trusts inspected under the 
new regime showed a similar pattern, but changes were not significant. After the inspection, 
the rate of pressure ulcers increased for trusts with improving performance receiving an old 
regime inspection (38.8 [5.9 to 71.7] pressure ulcers per 10,000 patients). No other changes 
were observed after the inspection (Table 8.2). 
At 12 months after the inspection the change of slope results in a significant increase for trusts 
with improving performance inspected under the old (102.8 [48.5 to 157.2] pressure ulcers per 
10,000 patients) and new regime (94.9 [55.1 to 134.7] pressure ulcers per 10,000 patients) and 
a significant decrease for trusts not improving inspected by the old (-362.8 [-616.7 to -108.8] 
pressure ulcers per 10,000 patients) and new regime (-337.9 [-523.5 to -152.2] pressure ulcers 
per 10,000 patients). 
 
Table 8.2 Slopes and level changes before, after announcement and inspections for rates of pressure ulcers by 
previous performance 
 
Not improving Improving 
 



































































































Figure 8.2 Rates of pressure ulcers before the inspection, after the announcement and the inspection by previous 
performance 
 
8.1.2 Summary Hospital Mortality Index 
Trusts with improving safety records were more likely to have been in special measures (23% 
vs 7%, p=0.005) and to have been inspected between September 2013 and 2014 (71% vs 52%, 
p=0.05). 
Trusts with improving records before the visit and inspected under the new regime had higher 
SHMI values at the beginning compared to those with worsening performance inspected under 
the old and new regimes (1.06 [1.02 to 1.095] vs 0.97 [0.94 to 0.99] and 0.97 [0.93 to 1]); 
however, in terms of magnitude the speed of change was similar for trusts with improving and 
worsening performance. The old regime inspection produced a significant but small change in 
the level for trusts with improving SHMI (Figure 8.3). No changes in level or slope were 
observed after the announcement and changes in the rate of improvement after the 
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Table 8.3 Slopes and level changes before, after announcement and inspections for summary hospital mortality 
index by previous performance 
 
Not improving Improving 
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* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Summary Hospital Mortality Index before the inspection, after the announcement and the inspection 
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However, 12 months after the inspection the change of slope translate into a significant 
increase for those trusts with improving performance (old regime: 0.04 [0.009 to 0.07] new 
regime: 0.06 [0.04 to 0.08] and no inspection 0.07 [0.04 to 0.11]) and in a significant decrease 
for trusts with worsening SHMI pre-inspection (old regime: -0.05 [-0.07 to -0.02] new regime: -
0.05 [-0.07 to -0.02] and no inspection -0.04 [-0.06 to -0.01]) (Figure 8.3). For a trust with an 
expected mortality of 2,000 patients, an increase of 0.02 points translates into 40 extra deaths. 
The SHMI is a standardised measurement calculated as the ratio between observed and 
expected deaths, therefore it is difficult to interpret changes in level and slope without looking 
at how crude mortality rates have changed. The same classification of improving and not 
improving trusts and modelling strategy were used. The coefficients of this model are available 
in the Appendix Chapter 8, Table 8.6.  
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In the case of trusts classified as not improving based on the values of SHMI, there was a 
significant transient decrease of crude mortality rates after the inspection under the old 
regime (1.7 [1 to 2] fewer deaths per 1,000 patients). Since these changes were not observed 
in the SHMI, this reduction can be attributed to a decrease of similar magnitude in expected 
and observed mortality. In the case of the post-inspection trend, in the analysis of SHMI this 
was going downward, whilst the analysis of crude mortality is going upward. Therefore, the 
increase in crude mortality would be related to an increase of greater magnitude of expected 
mortality, which would yield a lowering SHMI. 
Crude mortality rates for improving non-inspected trusts remained stable during the 
observation period; however SHMI was improving, therefore, expected deaths for this group 
were increasing. For trusts inspected under the old regime, there was a transient non-
significant increase of slope for crude mortality rates after the announcement (0.6 [-0.1 to 1] 
extra deaths per 1,000 patients/month) and a significant step decrease after the inspection (2 
[0.9 to 3] fewer deaths per 1,000 patients), which was also observed for the SHMI, 
consequently the reduction can be attributed to a decrease in observed deaths. The analyses 
of SHMI and crude mortality rates showed an upward trend after the inspection; therefore, 
there was an increase in observed deaths, whilst expected deaths remained relatively stable. 
8.1.3 Waiting times 
8.1.3.1 Accident & Emergency department waiting times 
Trusts with improving A&E waiting times were more likely to be specialist trusts (15.6% vs 
0.9%, p=0.002) and more likely to have received a rating of “outstanding” or “good” in the 
latest CQC inspection (50% vs 24%, p=0.008). 
Trusts that improved rates of attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E before the inspection and 
were inspected under the new regime had higher rates at the beginning and improved at a 
faster pace than those not inspected or inspected under the old regime (Table 8.4). No 
changes in level were observed after the announcement, but the slope shifted and became 
steeper for those trusts with improving performance inspected under the new regime (-2.6     
[-4.6 to -0.6] fewer attendances waiting over 4 h per 10,000 patients/week vs 9.8 [4 to 15.6] 
extra attendances waiting over 4 h per 10,000 patients/week). For trusts with improving 
performance inspected under the new regime, there was a step increase after the inspection 




Table 8.4 Slopes and level changes before, after announcement and inspections for rates of attendances waiting 
over 4 h in A&E by previous performance 
 
Not improving Improving 
































































Slope       
Announcement 0.1 (-5.5, 5.8) 3.2 (-1.8, 8.3) -8.2 (-13.8, -2.5)* 1.1 (-4.5, 6.8) 9.8 (4, 15.6)* -0.2 (-5.2, 4.9) 
Post-inspection 2.8 (1.8, 3.9) 1.1 (-0.4, 2.6) 3.3 (2.1, 4.4)* 1.8 (0.5, 3.1) 0.2 (-2.5, 2.9)* 2.6 (1.4, 3.7) 
* Significant values at 0.05 level 
 
 
Figure 8.5 Rates of attendances waiting over 4h in A&E before the inspection, after the announcement and the 
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At 12 months after the inspection the change of slope results in a significant increase for trusts 
with improving performance inspected under the old (176.4 [69.7 to 283.2) attendances 
waiting over 4 h per 10,000 patients), new regime (326.1 [185.9 to 466.4] attendances waiting 
over 4 h per 10,000 patients) and for those not inspected (156 [36.5 to 275.6] attendances 
waiting over 4 h per 10,000 patients). In the case of trusts not improving, the change in slope 
results in a significant decrease for trusts inspected by the old regime (-362.8 [-616.7 to -108.8] 
pressure ulcers per 10,000 patients). 
8.1.3.2 Consultant-led referral to treatment waiting times (admitted) 
The rapid improvement of rates of referrals waiting over 18 weeks during the first two years of 
implementation of this performance measure meant that 95.5% of acute trusts had improving 
performance before the inspection. To address this problem, the first 24 months of data were 
excluded from this analysis and previous performance was estimated using data from August 
2009 onwards. Trusts with improving referral to treatment waiting times were similar to those 
not improving in all the variables analysed (see Appendix Chapter 8, Table 8.8). 
Trusts that improved rates of referrals waiting more than 18 weeks before the inspection had 
higher rates at the beginning and the magnitude of the speed of change was greater compared 
to those with steady or worsening performance (Table 8.5). In the case of improving trusts that 
were inspected under the new regime, the announcement produced a step increase of 213 
(102.6 to 323.5) extra referrals per 10,000 waiting over 18 weeks (Figure 8.6). For all other 
trusts, the announcement did not produce a change in level or slope. No changes in level or 
slope were observed after the inspection (Table 8.5). 
Table 8.5 Slopes and level changes before, after announcement and inspections for rates of referrals waiting over 
18 weeks by previous performance 
 
Not improving Improving 
































































































Figure 8.6 Rates of referrals waiting over 18 weeks before the inspection, after the announcement and the 
inspection by previous performance 
 
If the counterfactual with the actual rates 12 months after the inspection is used, there was a 
significant increase for trust with improving performance inspected under the old (367 [246.3 
to 491.7] referrals per 10,000 patients), new regime (967.2 [778.2 to 1156.2] referrals per 
10,000 patients) and those not inspected (389.9 [249.9 to 530] referrals per 10,000 patients). 
In the case of trusts that were not improving before the inspection, there was an increase for 
those inspected under the new regime (313.3 [183 to 443.6] referrals per 10,000 patients). 
 
8.1.4 Treatment of patients with dignity and respect 
Trusts with improving patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect were 
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“significant risk” by Monitor financial sustainability rating (3% vs 21%, p=0.005) and less likely 
to receive a Monitor Governance rating of “subject to enforcement action” (13% vs 38%, 
p=0.005). 
Patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect was similar across groups in 
2005, and the magnitude of the slope before the inspection was similar for trusts that 
improved and those with worsening performance (Table 8.6). No changes in level were 
observed after the inspection in any of the groups, however, there was an upward shift in the 
trend for trusts with worsening performance inspected under the old regime (0.07 [-0.008 to 
0.14] points), the new regime (0.13 [0.07 to 0.2] and for those not inspected (0.18 [0.09 to, 
0.3]). In the case of trusts with improving performance, the rate of improvement improved for 
those inspected under the old regime (0.07 [0.02 to 0.1] points) (Figure 8.7). 
One year after the inspection the change of slope translates into a significant improvement 
compared to the counterfactual, for those trusts with worsening patients’ perception 
inspected by the old regime (1.44 [0.7 to 2.18] points), the new regime (2.37 (1.8 to 2.89] 
points) and trusts not inspected (1.19 [0.39 to 1.99] points) (Figure 8.7). For a trust with an 
adjusted patients’ perception of 90 points and if patient-mix and distribution of the scores 
remain the same (e.g. 80 patients giving a score of 100 points and the remaining 20 patients 
giving a score of 50 points), one extra point means two more people per 100 patients 
answered that they always felt treated with dignity and respect. 
 
Table 8.6 Slopes and level changes before, after announcement and inspections for patients’ perception of being 
treated with dignity and respect by previous performance 
 
Not improving Improving 










































































Figure 8.7 Patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect before the inspection, after the 
announcement and the inspection by previous performance 
 
 
8.1.5 Staff leaving acute NHS trusts 
Trusts with improving rates of staff leaving were more likely to be located in the South (37% vs 
16%, p=0.03) and less likely to be located in the North or London (35% vs 54%, p=0.03). Trusts 
that improved their rates of staff leaving before the inspection had higher rates than those 
with steady or worsening performance at the beginning of the time series (Table 8.7). For 
trusts with improving performance inspected by the old regime, the announcement produced 
a significant increase of 36.5 (11.3 to 61.7) members of staff leaving the trusts per 10,000 
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17.4 (34.1 to 0.7) fewer members of staff leaving the trusts per 10,000 employees after the 
inspection. No other changes in level or slope were observed for the other trusts (Table 8.7). 
For trusts with improving rates of staff leaving, the change of slope results one year after the 
inspection in 44.75 (20.44 to 69.1) extra members of staff leaving for those inspected by the 
old regime, 31.34 (13.8 to 48.88) extra members of staff leaving for trust inspected by the new 
regime and 59.86 (33.63 to 86.09) for those not inspected (Figure 8.8). 
 
Table 8.7 Slopes and level changes before, after announcement and inspections for rates of staff leaving NHS 
trusts by previous performance 
 
Not improving Improving 











































































































In the case of trusts with worsening or stable performance before the inspection, rates of 
adverse events had no level change after the announcement or inspection under the old 
regime, but there was a decrease of falls with harm after the new regime inspection. The slope 
did not change after the announcement or inspection under the new regime, but there was a 
downward shift of the trend of falls with harm and pressure ulcers after the announcement of 
the old regime inspection. 
Neither the announcement nor the CQC visit influenced the level or trend of the summary 
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For waiting times, the only change observed was a step decrease in attendances waiting over 4 
h in A&E after an old regime inspection and a step increase for those inspected under the new 
regime. No changes were detected for referrals to treatment. 
The rate of change of patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect improved 
after the inspection for the three groups. 
Level or trend of rates of staff leaving NHS trusts were not affected by the announcement or 
CQC inspection under the new regime; however, after the old regime visit, there was a 
significant decrease in level. 
In the case of trusts with improving performance before the inspection, no level change was 
seen for adverse events after the announcement of an inspection, but in the case of trusts 
inspected by the old regime, the improving trend flattened after the announcement for falls 
with harm and pressure ulcers. Additionally, a step increase of pressure ulcers was observed 
after the old regime inspection. 
Summary Hospital Mortality Index had a decrease immediately after the old regime inspection, 
but no other changes were observed for both groups inspected. However, those trusts not 
inspected showed worsening values of SHMI after July 2013. 
No change in level or slope of waiting times was observed after the announcement or 
inspection under the old regime. However, trusts inspected by the new regime exhibited a 
steep increase in attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E after the announcement, whilst the level 
worsened and the improving trend flattens after the CQC inspection. In the case of referrals 
waiting over 18 weeks, there was an increase after the announcement of a new regime 
inspection. No other changes were observed for this outcome measure. 
The old regime CQC visit improved the rate of change of patients’ perception of being treated 
with dignity and respect, which was not observed for trusts not inspected and for those 
inspected under the new regime. 
After the announcement of an old regime inspection, an increase in the rate of staff leaving 
NHS trusts was observed; however, the same phenomenon was seen in those trusts not 
inspected. No other changes in level or slope were seen for this indicator. 
A summary of these results is shown in Table 8.8. 
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Level change Change of slope 
Announcement Inspection Announcement Post-inspection 
Old regime not improving 
Falls with harm  ̶ ̶  ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶  ̶ 
SHMI  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶  ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect   ̶   
Leavers  ̶  ̶ ̶ 
New regime not improving 
Falls with harm  ̶  ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶  ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect   ̶   
Leavers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
No inspection not improving 
Falls with harm ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers ̶  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶ ̶   
>18w RTT wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect   ̶   
Leavers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Old regime improving 
Falls with harm  ̶ ̶  ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶   ̶ 
SHMI  ̶  ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect   ̶   
Leavers   ̶ ̶ ̶ 
New regime improving 
Falls with harm  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶    
>18w RTT wait   ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect   ̶  ̶ 
Leavers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
No inspection improving 
Falls with harm  ̶ ̶  ̶ 
Pressure Ulcers  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
SHMI  ̶ ̶  ̶ 
>4 h A&E wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
>18w RTT wait  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dignity and respect   ̶  ̶ 
Leavers   ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Key: Arrows are placed where a significant effect was observed. Blue arrows signal a positive effect, 
whilst yellow arrows signal a negative effect. The direction of the arrow indicates whether there was an 
increase (upwards) or decrease (downwards). 
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9 Costs of the new regime of CQC 
inspections 
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 reported the findings for the overarching question whether CQC 
inspections have an effect on selected measures of process of care and clinical outcomes. The 
overall result was that new or old regime CQC inspections are not associated with changes in 
the measures selected. 
A cost-effectiveness analysis of CQC new regime inspections was planned using adverse events 
and risk-adjusted mortality as measures of effectiveness; nonetheless, as no effect was 
detected on these outcomes, it was not possible to estimate cost-effectiveness. Costs 
associated with any intervention are important because resources are scarce; therefore, only 
interventions providing value for money should be funded. Contrary to the standards for 
assessing health technologies, in the case of health policies, the methods for assessing cost-
effectiveness are underutilised and underdeveloped (Kristensen et al., 2015). Given the large 
scale of transformation required for the implementation of system-level health policies, 
opportunity costs are particularly relevant since the potential health gains forgone by not 
funding alternative treatment are potentially substantial and widespread (Kristensen et al., 
2015). 
This chapter presents the findings of the opportunity costs of CQC new regime of inspections 
for a sample of trusts representing the regions and type of trusts of the English NHS. 
Additionally, the incremental costs of implementing the new regime of inspections and the 
average operational cost per inspection for the CQC are presented based on the information 
publicly available in its annual accounts. Incremental costs were calculated because the CQC 
was already in operation when the new regime was implemented, having the infrastructure in 
place for monitoring and inspecting trusts, hence, the extra costs of changing the regime could 
only be estimated. 
9.1 Methods for estimating the incremental cost of the new regime of 
inspections to the CQC 
To obtain the costs borne by the CQC, information about the overall operational expenses, 
income from fees and income from the government grant-in-aid were retrieved from their 
annual accounts report from 2009/10 to 2016/17. The increment in operational expenses was 
calculated to have an estimation of the incremental cost of changing the regime of inspection, 
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which started to be implemented in the period 2012/13, being officially launched in 2014/15. 
Information on activities performed (e.g. number of inspections and registrations), staff costs, 
the proportion of the budget spent on inspections and average costs per inspection were 
retrieved when available. When costs were only available graphically, data was extracted using 
WebPlotDigitizer (http://arohatgi.info/WebPlotDigitizer/). 
9.1.1 Estimations 
A series of failures to act or prevent failures to comply led to a change of regime in 2013 (see 
Chapter 3). The first changes were set out in the annual account 2012/13 including appointing 
chief inspectors for each sector, developing the fundamentals standards of care, changing the 
definition of quality of care, recruiting inspectors with knowledge in particular areas of care 
and the introduction of a programme to deal with failing acute trusts (Care Quality 
Commission, 2013a). The incremental costs associated with the increase of inspections 
performed and the initial changes to the regime of inspections were £16 million. 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Operating budget of the CQC between 2009/10 to 2016/17. The proportion of income coming from 
NHS trust was only available from 2012/13 onwards 
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Figure 9.2 Activity and staff costs of the CQC from 2009/10 to 2016/17 
 
The 2013/14 financial year, when the old and new regime of inspections were in operation, 
had the greatest increase in the number of inspections and registrations performed (Care 
Quality Commission, 2014a). The new regime of inspections finished the first wave in June 
2016; therefore, the incremental cost of implementing this regime was £53 million from April 
2013 until the end of March 2016. 
The CQC calculates that on average, an inspection under the new regime of the hospital 
directorate cost £108,581 in the financial year 2015/16 (Care Quality Commission, 2016b) and 
this cost was reduced to £43,119 in the next year (Care Quality Commission, 2017a) (Table 
9.1). During 2015/16 the cost of an inspection of the hospital directorate was reduced from 
£182,068 during the first quarter to £74,759 in the fourth quarter. The high cost during the 
first quarter was attributed to the recruitment of new staff needing training, whereas the 
reduction in the subsequent quarters was attributed to an increase in the number of 
inspections of independent hospitals, which are smaller and have fewer specialities than NHS 
trusts (Care Quality Commission, 2016b).  




Primary medical services 
directorate 
Adult social care 
directorate 
2015/16 £108,581 £6,641 £4,051 
2016/17 £43,119 £4,902 £3,283 
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The cost per inspection reported by the CQC do not differ greatly from the annual fee paid by 
the acute hospitals, therefore for the estimation of the cost of an inspection, the CQC fee has 
been used as a proxy for the costs borne by the regulatory body. The costs borne by the CQC 
include the development of standards of care and a methodology for their assessment, the 
salaries of the inspectors and analysts drawing up data packs, and per-diem and 
accommodation costs of inspectors. 
9.2 Methods for costing new regime CQC inspections 
To obtain the opportunity cost of a new regime CQC inspection on hospital  Trusts, four case 
studies were initially planned representing the four regions in England. However, after four 
large trusts from the Midlands declined to participate, it was not possible to approach, recruit, 
and collect data within the timeframe available in another trust from that region. The locations 
were chosen considering different sizes of NHS Trusts, Foundation Trust status, governance 
ratings, number of inspections since 2012, and deprivation index of the main funding Clinical 
Commissioning Group (CCG). Table 9.2 shows the chosen NHS Trusts for the costing case 
studies. 
Table 9.2 Characteristics of chosen NHS Trusts for case studies 
Name Case study 1 Case study 2 Case study 3 Case study 4 




















Number of beds 1100-1200 400-500 1700-1800 700-800 
Number of 
inspections 
5 2 4 3 
 
The Health Sciences Research Governance Committee of the University of York reviewed and 
approved the protocol for this study, including the costs audit tool, in July 2016. The 
information sheet sent to potential interviewees is available in the Appendix Chapter 9, Figure 
9.1. This study did not need approval from an NHS research ethics committee since it only 
involved members of staff sharing information in a professional capacity, without referring to 
their views of experiences with CQC inspections. 
This empirical research is based largely on methods outlined in Mumford et al. (2015) for 
collecting costs associated with one inspection cycle. Mumford et al. (2015) performed a 
mixed methods study to estimate the cost of an accreditation cycle in Australia. Their methods 
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included stakeholder analysis, survey design, activity-based costing, and review of findings by a 
panel of experts. Mumford et al. (2015) identified hospitals, the accreditation agency, and 
agencies developing the programme as the main sources of expenditure. The costs associated 
with the accreditation agency were used as proxies for the development of standards and its 
assessment since these were performed by the same agency. To develop the cost audit tool, a 
team of researchers followed and observed accreditation surveyors during their visits to three 
hospitals. With this information and through an iterative process, they created the cost audit 
tool with the activities representing an extra cost. The audit tool was later modified based on 
the feedback from the accreditation agency staff and surveyors and the research team. The 
collection of costs was carried out through interviews with key stakeholders to obtain 
documentary evidence of the costs over a 4-year accreditation cycle. Lastly, they performed a 
sensitivity analysis with different rates of on-cost multiplier, operating and staffing costs. 
For this thesis, the Finance Director of each trust was first contacted by email, where an 
information sheet with details about the study (see Appendix Chapter 9, Figure 9.1) and the 
cost audit tool was attached. If the trust was willing to participate, the researcher and the 
chosen person to provide the costing information arranged a date for a phone call or a face-to-
face meeting at least two months in advance. In this way, the trust had enough time to collate 
the information needed. 
In each of these Trusts, a semi-structured interview, which was recorded, was carried out with 
the finance director, director of quality governance, or equivalent position using the audit tool 
(Table 9.3). The aim of the interview was to clarify the timeline of the preparation for the 
inspection and how the estimations were made. The information provided by these key 
stakeholders was cross-checked with documentary evidence when possible (e.g. schedules for 
interviews, emails with data requests). The recordings were used as a back-up for the 
calculations and will be kept until December 2019. 
The audit tool was adapted from Mumford et al. (2015) to reflect the reality of CQC 
inspections and the English NHS. A preliminary version of this tool was piloted in a mental 
health trust to determine the appropriateness of each item and adapted based on the 
feedback received.  
Table 9.3 Incremental costs audit tool—activity groups and activities (adapted from Mumford et al. (2015)) 




Workshops with board members 
Review of clinical standards and self-assessment by clinical teams to 
identify areas of improvement 
Drawing up briefing material for staff (Quality unit) 
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Engagement and communication briefings with all staff (Quality unit). 
Attending pre-inspection briefings given by each division (General staff) 
Meetings of each working group to coordinate implementation of 
remedial changes pre-inspection. 
External consultancy fees. 
Update of all policies organisational wide. 
Environment (e.g. deep cleaning, painting) 





Collecting data in response to the CQC's first data request to provider 
Drawing up a report in response to the CQC's first data request to 
provider 
Collecting and drawing up a report in response to the CQC's second data 
request to provider 
 Reviewing and approving documentation to be sent before the inspection. 
Review and reply to pre-inspection data pack for factual inaccuracies 
Reply to inspection report due to factual inaccuracy 
During 
inspection 
Organising meetings between inspection teams and management, staff 
and/or board 
Introduction to the organisation (day 0) 
Command room 
Extra data requests on-site 
Focus groups and interviews 
Hiring of venues for listening events, meetings with staff and/or quality 
summit 
ID badges for inspectors, clinical chaperones, boxes for comments, 
parking fees and any other extra cost 
After inspection Implementation of changes after verbal feedback given by the CQC 
Action plan to improve deficient aspects of care after inspection 
Organising quality summit 
Quality summit 
Implementation of quality improvement initiatives in response to action 
plan agreed during the quality summit. 
Meetings to monitor improvement 
CQC fee CQC’s annual subscription fee 
 
In the first case study, the interviewee provided an estimation of the average number of hours, 
number of people, number of times and pay band for those involved in each activity. Given the 
imprecision of the estimates, which are subject to memory bias, for the following case studies 
the interviewees were asked to estimate the lowest and highest estimate of: 
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 Number of hours invested in each activity;  
 Number of people, role and pay band of those involved in each activity; and 
 Number of times each activity was performed. 
To have a better estimate of the costs per hour, these were calculated using two approaches: 
Agenda for Change average pay bands (NHS Staff Council, 2014, 2015) and Unit Cost of Health 
and Social Care (UCHSC) for the year of the inspection and then adjusted by the Hospital and 
Community Health Services (HCHS) index when needed (Curtis and Burns, 2015, 2016). The 
main difference between these two approaches is that pay bands include the raw estimate of 
annual pay; whilst unit costs include overheads, payment for annual leave, contributions to 
national insurance and superannuation. The payment of doctors is not included in the Agenda 
for Change pay bands; therefore, for activities carried out by doctors, the pay and conditions 
circular for the year of inspection was used (NHS employers, 2014, 2015), following the 
assumptions below: 
- Consultants: 10 years completed as a consultant on a 2003 contract, 52 working weeks 
a year and 43.3 hours of work per week. 
- Junior doctor: Year 2 foundation training, grade 1 salary, 52 working weeks a year and 
40 hours of work per week. 
The average pay per hour of work using these methods are summarised in Table 9.4. 
Table 9.4 Average rate per hour for healthcare professionals and doctors 
 Agenda for Change pay bands Unit Costs for Health and Social Care 
 2014 2015 2016 
Nurses and midwives Basic pay 
 2015 2016 2015 2016 
Average pay band 1 7.49 7.79 7.95   7.68 7.87 
Average pay band 2 8.04 8.33 8.50   8.39 8.57 
Average pay band 3 9.11 9.24 9.43   9.47 9.56 
Average pay band 4 10.48 10.58 10.80 10.34 10.46 10.83 10.91 
Average pay band 5 12.50 12.62 12.88 13.21 13.28 13.07 13.14 
Average pay band 6 15.29 15.44 15.75 16.37 16.47 16.18 16.29 
Average pay band 7 18.18 18.34 18.73 19.66 19.77 19.45 19.58 
Average pay band 8A 22.04 22.24 22.71 23.20 23.18 23.12 23.12 
Average pay band 8B 26.09 26.34 26.87 27.80 27.66 27.71 27.64 
Average pay band 8C 31.20 31.29 31.92 32.79 32.47 33.04 32.75 
Average pay band 8D 37.33 37.33 38.08 38.62 38.39 39.72 39.40 
Average pay band 9 44.93 44.92 45.83 46.62 45.57 47.62 47.24 
Consultant  43.40 43.40 43.83   105 104 
Associate specialist 38.75 38.75 39.14   101 101 
Foundation Training year 1 11.56 11.56 11.68   29 29 
Foundation Training year 2 14.82 14.82 14.90   36 35 
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In the case of activities carried out by board members, the annual salary was retrieved from 
the annual accounts of the trust. Salaries are provided in bands of £5,000; therefore, the 
average of the highest and lowest band were used. For example, if a salary was declared as 
£110,000-115,000 then the annual salary was £112,500. This number was later divided by 52 
working weeks and 37.5 hours per week to obtain the cost per hour. Non-executive directors 
were assumed to work 7.5 hours per week (i.e. equivalent to four to five days/month).18 
For simplicity, the narrative description of the costs was performed using the Agenda for 
Change costing strategy since, proportionally, the results using Unit Cost for Health and Social 
Care are similar. 
9.3 Case studies 
After collecting data using the cost audit tool (Table 9.3) through interviews with the director 
or deputy director of quality governance, these estimations were transformed into a cost per 
activity and summarised into five domains: preparation for the inspection (Trust approach and 
mandatory work), during the inspection, after the inspection and the CQC fee. These results 
are presented below as net costs and as a proportion of the total cost of the inspection for 
each of the participating trusts. 
9.3.1 Case Study 1: Medium acute trust from the North 
The cost per activity considering number of people and hours used are presented in Table 
9.5.The total expenditure on the inspection calculated for this trust was £357,557 in 2015 
prices (Table 9.6), which represents a 0.08% of its operating budget in the financial year 
2014/15. The costs associated with the CQC fee represent 55.4% of the expenditure on the 
inspection. The costs borne by the NHS trust are £159,557. Considering the total costs of the 
inspection, the greater proportion was spent on preparatory work the trust decided to carry 
out (22.8%), followed by the opportunity costs associated with the implementation of 
improvements after the inspection (13.9%). The mandatory preparatory work represents 4.3% 
of the total cost of the inspection, whilst the on-site visit represents 3.7%. The full details 
regarding the costing of the activities carried out by this trust are available in the Appendix 
Chapter 9, Table 9.1. The most expensive single activity performed by this trust was a review of 
clinical standards and self-assessment to identify areas of improvement, which cost £40,032 
using Agenda for Change pay bands and £41,760 using Unit Costs for Health and Social Care. 
Responding to data requests from the CQC cost approximately £12,291 for this trust using 
Agenda for Change pay bands. 
                                                             
18 Number obtained from the profile of non-executive directors published by NHS improvement in 
https://improvement.nhs.uk/news-alerts/?keywords=&articletype=appointment. 
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Table 9.5 Details of cost per activity using Agenda for Change pay bands for case study 1 
Group in 







Average payment band Total 
Board level 
committee 
Workshops with board members 1 1.5 15+1 15 directors+8D £1,415.09 
Discussions regarding:           
- Action plan to improve deficient aspects of care after inspection 2 37.5 2 8D+8B £4,756.00 
- Reply to inspection report due to factual inaccuracy 1 4 9 Executive directors £3,669.23 
- Implementation of quality improvement initiatives in response to 
action plan agreed during quality summit         £0.00 
Management Collecting data in response to CQC's first data request to provider 12 4 1 8B £1,252.08 
Drawing up a report in response to CQC's first data request to 
provider 3 37.5 2 8D+8B £7,134.00 
Collecting and drawing up a report in response to CQC's second 
data request to provider 1 37.5 2 8D+8B £2,378.00 
Review and reply to pre-inspection data pack for factual 
inaccuracies 1 37.5 1 8B £978.19 
Quality and 
safety unit 
Review of clinical standards and self-assessment by clinical teams 
to identify areas of improvement 2 7.5 120 8A £40,032.00 
Engagement and communication briefings with all staff 4 1 100 5 £5,000.00 
Drawing up briefing material for staff 1 15 2 8D+8B £951.20 
General staff Attending pre-inspection briefings given by each division 12 1 10 8B £3,130.20 
Hours of extra staff hired to maintain clinical care during 
inspection 0 0 0 0 £0.00 
Working 
groups 
Meetings of each working group to coordinate implementation of 
remedial changes pre-inspection 0 0 0 0 £0.00 
Organising meetings between inspection teams and management, 
staff and/or board 1 2.5 3 
















Introduction to the organisation (day 0) 
2 7.5 3 
Chief executive+ medical 
director+ director of nursing 
£4,288.46 
Quality summit 1 4 10 Executive directors+ chair £3,471.17 
During 
inspection 
Focus groups and interviews 1 29 79 8C £3,802.11 
Command room 4 13 3 8D+8B+7 £4,242.68 




3 1.5 5 
2 directors+ deputy director 
of operations + Trust board 
secretary + assistant 
director of governance 
£1,198.90 
Other costs ID badges for inspectors      £75.00 
  External consultancy fees     £6,000.00 
  CQC’s annual subscription fee     £198,000.00 
  Hiring of venues for listening events, meetings with staff and/or 
quality summit 
    £0.00 
  Remedial changes in preparation for inspection that would not 
have been implemented in a different circumstance 
    £0.00 
  - Update of all policies organisational wide     £5,453.00 
  - Environment (e.g. deep cleaning, painting)     £14,500.00 
  - Quality of care (i.e. directorates were asked to review serious 
incidents reports and check recommendations were implemented. 
Knowing the profile of reported incidents) 
    £681.63 
  - Quality of care (i.e. Organisational risk registers: consistency)     £4,296.50 
  Implementation of changes after verbal feedback given by CQC     £40,200.00 
Total           £357,556.80 
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Unit costs for health 
and social care 2015 
Preparation for the inspection (Trust’s approach) £81,459.61 £84,425.75 
Preparation for the inspection (mandatory) £15,411.50 £16,027.40 
During inspection £13,059.63 £14,528.29 
After inspection £49,626.06 £49,898.49 
CQC fee £198,000.00 £198,000.00 
Total £357,556.80 £362,879.93 
Adjusted to 2016 prices £362,314.47 £367,708.42 
Approx. operating income £440 million £440 million 
% operating income 0.081 0.082 
 
9.3.2 Case Study 2: Small acute trust from the South 
The cost per activity for the most conservative scenario using pay bands and considering 
number of people and hours used are presented in Table 9.7. The total expenditure on the 
inspection calculated for this trust ranged from £169,691 to £256,378 in 2016 prices (Table 
9.8), which represents a 0.1 to 0.16% of its operating budget in the fiscal year 2015/16. The 
costs associated with the CQC fee represent between 30.5% and 46.1% of the expenditure on 
the inspection. The costs borne by the NHS trust ranged from £91,483 in the most conservative 
estimation to £178,170 in the highest estimation. Considering the total costs of the inspection, 
the greater proportion was spent on preparatory work the trust decided to carry out (30.7 to 
42.6%), followed by the opportunity costs associated with the implementation of 
improvements after the inspection (11.1 to 13.2%). The mandatory preparatory work 
represents 8.5 to 9.5% of the total cost of the inspection, whilst the on-site visit represents 3.7 
to 4.2%. The full details regarding the costing of the activities carried out by this trust are 
available in the Appendix Chapter 9, Table 9.2. The most expensive single activity performed 
by this trust was responding to data requests after the inspection, which cost between 
£10,188 and £12,735 using Agenda for Change pay bands and between £10,869 and £13,587 
using Unit Costs for Health and Social Care. Responding to data requests from the CQC cost 
approximately between £15,786 and £24,991 for this trust using Agenda for Change pay 
bands. 
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Table 9.7 Details of cost per activity using Agenda for Change pay bands and the lowest estimate provided for case study 2 
Group in 












Workshops with trust board members 4 2 8 7 £3,935.10 
Workshops with non-executive directors 2 2 8 7 £1,324.20 
Workshops with senior management (divisional managers) 3 2 8 8A £1,067.52 
Discussions regarding: 
- Action plan to improve deficient aspects of care after inspection 
(initial set-up) 
4 1.5 30 
COO+ director of nursing+ 
10*band 6 + 10*band 7 + 
8*band 8A 
£3,633.72 
- Action plan to improve deficient aspects of care after inspection 
(long term follow-up) 3 1.5 6 
Director of nursing+ 2*band 6+ 
band 7+ band 8A 
£726.06 
- Reply to inspection report due to factual inaccuracy 
1 33 7 
COO+ band 6 + 5 divisional 
managers (8A) 
£5,913.63 
- Implementation of quality improvement initiatives in response to 
action plan agreed during quality summit 6 1 5 
COO or CEO + band 4+ 3*band 
7 
£1,957.31 
Management Collecting and drawing up a report in response to CQC's first data 
request to provider 1 7.5 7 8 £3,294.93 
Approval session for first data request 
2 to 3 1 4 
COO + band 6+ secretary + 
director communication (8B) 
£225.38 
Collecting and drawing up a report in response to CQC's second 
data request to provider 
1 10 12 
COO+ 5 divisional managers 
(8A)+ trust secretary+ clinical 
quality (6)+ associate director 
(8A)+ HR+ Info (2*6) 
£3,134.79 
Approval session for second data request 
4 to 5 1 4 
Director operations + secretary 
+ director communication (8B) 
+ clinical quality (6) 
£450.75 
Review and reply to pre-inspection data pack for factual 
inaccuracies 1 3 7 

















Self-assessment by clinical teams to identify areas of improvement 16 1 4 8A £1,423.36 
Drawing up booklets for general staff 1 4 1 8A £88.96 
Engagement briefings with all staff 29 0.5 10 1 £1,889.65 
Teaching afternoon with medical staff 1 1 20 10 junior Drs + 10 consultants £679.63 
General staff Attending pre-inspection briefings given by each division 2 1 40 5 £1,009.90 
Hours of extra staff hired to maintain clinical care during 
inspection         £0.00 
Working 
groups 
Meetings of director of nursing (or equivalent) with working 
groups 50 2 4 3*band 6 + band 8C £7,760.33 
Review of clinical standards: meetings of the lead of working group 




Organising meetings between inspection teams and management, 
staff and/or board 2 4 1 4 £84.66 
Introduction to the organisation (day 0) 1 2 6 CEO + executives £841.96 
Preparation of presentation for day 0 1 4 1 CEO £517.95 
Quality summit 
1 3 14 
CEO+ all board members+ 




Focus groups and interviews 9 1 5 5 £1,860.47 
Command room 3 7 2 8A £1,124.20 
Extra data requests on-site 3 7 1 6 £324.17 
Daily briefings with chief of inspection 2 0.3 15 Executive team + 9*band 6 £335.95 
After 
inspection 
Responding to data requests after the inspection 
22 30 1 6 £10,188.20 
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Group in 







Average payment band 
Total lowest 
estimate 
Other costs ID badges for inspectors        £100.10 
  Cards for comments        £7.95 
  External consultancy fees - KPMG        £19,613.00 
  External consultancy fees        £9,891.00 
  CQC’s annual subscription fee        £78,208.00 
  Hiring of venues for listening events, meetings with staff and/or 
quality summit 
       £1,080.00 
  Remedial changes in preparation for inspection that would not 
have been implemented in a different circumstance        £0.00 
  - Update of all policies organisational wide        £0.00 
  - Environment (e.g. deep cleaning, painting)        £0.00 
  - Quality of care (i.e. directorates were asked to review serious 
incidents reports and check recommendations were implemented. 
Knowing the profile of reported incidents) 
       £0.00 
  - Quality of care (i.e. Organisational risk registers: consistency)        £0.00 
  Implementation of changes after verbal feedback given by CQC        £0.0019 
Total 
 
    £169,690.85 
 
                                                             
19 The interviewee from this trust said changes implemented after verbal feedback had no costs associated since these were minor (e.g. changing where milk was stored). 
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Table 9.8 Summary of the cost of work carried out before, during and after the CQC inspection- case study 2 
 
Agenda for Change 2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 










Preparation for the 
inspection (Trust’s approach) 
£52,003.96 £103,617.65 £53,634.44 £109,217.11 
Preparation for the 
inspection (mandatory) 
£14,337.44 £23,438.76 £14,745.72 £24,393.28 
During inspection £6,277.41 £10,341.12 £6,433.23 £10,725.77 
After inspection £18,864.04 £31,205.45 £19,844.87 £33,833.80 
CQC fee £78,208.00 £78,208.00 £78,208.00 £78,208.00 
Total £169,690.85 £246,810.98 £172,866.26 £256,377.96 
Approx. operating income £160 million £160 million £160 million £160 million 
% operating income 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.16 
 
9.3.3 Case study 3: Large teaching acute trust from London 
The cost per activity for the most conservative scenario using pay bands and considering 
number of people and hours used are presented in Table 9.9. The total expenditure on the 
inspection calculated for this trust ranged from £351,100 to £418,136 in 2016 prices (Table 5), 
which represents a 0.035 to 0.042% of its operating budget in the fiscal year 2015/16. The 
costs associated with the CQC fee represent between 30.7% and 36.6% of the expenditure on 
the inspection. The costs borne by the NHS trust ranged from £222,616 in the most 
conservative estimation to £273,532 in the highest estimation. Considering the total costs of 
the inspection, the greater proportion was spent on preparatory work the trust decided to 
carry out (57.7 to 60.8%), followed by the mandatory preparatory work for the inspection (2.4 
to 3.1%). The opportunity costs associated with the implementation of improvements after the 
inspection represents 1.1 to 1.5% of the total cost of the inspection, whilst the on-site visit 
represents 1.9 to 4.9%. The full details regarding the costing of the activities carried out by this 
trust are available in the Appendix Chapter 9, Table 9.3. The most expensive single activity 
performed by this trust was remedial changes in the environment (e.g. deep cleaning or 
painting), which cost £125,000. The next most expensive activity was reviewing and approving 
documentation to be sent before the inspection, which cost between £21,377 and £42,754 
using Agenda for Change pay bands and between £23,216 and £46,432 using Unit Costs for 
Health and Social Care. Responding to data requests from the CQC cost approximately 
between £8,243 and 12,048 or this trust using Agenda for Change pay bands. 
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Table 9.9 Details of cost per activity using Agenda for Change pay bands and the lowest estimate provided for case study 3 
Group in 
charge 










Workshops with board members 
4 1 15 
Executives +4*NED+ clinical 
division managers (5) 8D 
£3,786.84 
Discussions regarding:           
-Action plan to improve deficient aspects of care after inspection 8 1 4 3*band 8A + 1*band 9 £1,116.4 
-Reply to inspection report due to factual inaccuracy 10 1 5 2*band 7 + 3*band 8D £1,486.64 
-Implementation of quality improvement initiatives in response to 
action plan agreed during quality summit 4 1 2 8A+8D 
£238.26 
Management Collecting and drawing up a report in response to CQC's first data 
request to provider 8 1 15 10*band 8A + 5*band 8D 
£3,272.2 
Collecting and drawing up a report in response to CQC's second 
data request to provider 3 1 15 10*band 7 + 5*band 8D 
£1,110.21 
Review and reply to pre-inspection data pack for factual 
inaccuracies 8 1 11 6*band 7 + 5*band 8D 
£2,373.53 
Meetings of director of nursing (or equivalent) with working groups 10 1 9 2*band 8C + 7*band 8D £3,238.62 
Quality and 
safety unit 
Review of clinical standards and self-assessment by clinical teams 
to identify areas of improvement 64 1 10 7*band 5 + 3*band 8D 
£12,821.84 
Engagement and communication briefings with all staff 
6 4 20 
2*band 1 + 2*band 2 + 2*band 3 
+2*band 4 + 2*band 5 +2*band 6 
+ 2*band 7 +1*band 8A + 1*band 
8B +1*band 8C + 3*band 9 
£9,104.38 
Reviewing and approving documentation to be sent before the 
inspection 64 2 6 3*band 7 + 3*band 8D 
£21,377.07 
General staff Attending pre-inspection briefings 
10 1 20 
2*band 1 + 2*band 2 +3*band 3 
+3*band 4 +3*band 5 +3*band 6 
+2*band 7 +2*band 8A 
£2,570.80 














Meetings of each working group to coordinate implementation of 
remedial changes pre-inspection 





Organising meetings between inspection teams and management, 
staff and/or board 36 1 2 band 8A + 8D 
£2,144.34 
Drawing up welcome packs for inspectors 2 6 2 band 4 + 8D £574.89 
Organising quality summit 1 7 2 band 4 + 8D £335.36 
Quality Summit 1 3 11 Executives +5*NED £2,376.41 
Focus groups and interviews 19 1 209 band 3 £3,832.84 
Other costs ID badges for inspectors, clinical chaperones, boxes for comments, 
parking fees and any other extra cost 
       
£100.00 
  External consultancy fees (additional project support costs)        £25,080.00 
  CQC’s annual subscription fee        £128,484.00 
  Hiring of venues for listening events, meetings with staff and/or 
quality summit 
       
£0.00 
  Remedial changes in preparation for inspection that would not 
have been implemented in a different circumstance 
       
£0.00 
  -Staff (e.g. mandatory training)        £0.00 
  -Environment (e.g. deep cleaning, painting)        £125,000.00 
  -Quality of care (e.g. update of procedures, familiarise staff with 
specific processes) 
       
£0.00 




    351,099.98 
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Table 9.10 Summary of the cost of work carried out before, during and after the CQC inspection- case study 3 
 
Agenda for Change 2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 










Preparation for the 
inspection (Trusts approach) 
£203,654.90 £244,350.16 £206,726.80 £249,788.15 
Preparation for the 
inspection (mandatory) 
£8,242.58 £12,048.04 £8,911.41 £13,024.06 
During inspection £6,652.08 £11,380.94 £10,160.65 £20,463.62 
After inspection £4,066.43 £5,752.44 £3,935.84 £6,376.52 
CQC fee £128,484.00 £128,484.00 £128,484.00 £128,484.00 
Total £351,099.98 £402,015.59 £358,218.71 £418,136.35 
Approx. operating income £1000 million £1000 million £1000 million £1000 million 
% operating income 0.035 0.04 0.036 0.042 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
The overall incremental cost of implementing CQC’s new regime of inspections for health, 
social and mental health care organisations is approximately £69 million.  
One of the issues that this chapter raises is that the opportunity cost to a hospital for a CQC 
inspection ought to be assessed in comparison with a baseline position, i.e. that it has effective 
systems to assure and maintain quality. Updating policies and reviewing the consistency of risk 
registries should be a routine process in effective systems and not necessarily a cost to the 
hospital of a CQC inspection. It could be observed during the interviews that this is not always 
the case. Acute NHS trusts implement several strategies to ensure all staff are prepared for the 
CQC visit and that the institution can show its best performance. Some of these activities 
include reviewing clinical standards, performing a self-assessment against the CQC standards, 
updating policies and risk registries. The implementation of these processes has a cost that 
ranged between £16,864 for case study 2 and 139,613 for case study 3. Given the small size of 
the sample, it is not possible to judge whether this is a justifiable expense or not. Although 
these processes are essential to delivering quality care, it is not clear if they will produce an 
effect in the long-term. The question remains whether trusts would perform these activities if 
the CQC were not visiting for an inspection. If this is the main effect of inspection, then it is 
questionable if they are cost-effective. 
The costs collected from the different acute NHS trusts showed that one CQC new regime 
inspection costs between 0.035 to 0.16% of a hospital’s annual operating budget, which is 
within the range of 0.03 to 0.6% reported for an accreditation visit in Australia for different 
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sizes of acute hospitals (Mumford et al, 2015). It is noteworthy that Mumford et al. (2015) 
spread the costs of the accreditation over the 4-year cycle, whilst in this thesis costs were 
collected for the period starting 4 to 6 months prior the visit up to one year after. It was not 
possible to collect the costs associated with an old regime inspection since hospitals did not 
keep records of activities performed three to four years ago. 
Collecting information for data requests before, during and after the inspection does not 
represent a large proportion of the operational budget (i.e. between £8,243 and £24,991, 
which represents 0.0008% and 0.016% of their operational budget); however, it is an aspect 
that could be streamlined considering trusts are regularly reporting data to the NHS. This task 
involves time of very senior managers, and the trust cannot make use of this information until 
several months later. Consequently, creating a single platform where regulatory agencies can 
extract information and trusts could use it for quality improvement could help reduce costs 
and the burden of regulation. 
The estimates here presented have some limitations. They are subject to recall bias and 
depend largely on the quality of the record keeping of the senior management of the hospital. 
Documentary evidence was requested when available, but this usually involved the focus 
groups and individual interviews CQC carried out during the on-site visit, number of data 
requests, and consultancy fees. Time spent in the self-assessment and engagement meeting 
were broad estimations. Overall, the precision of the costs here presented could be improved. 
Inspections may also carry hidden costs. From the point of view of clinicians and managers 
there is no consensus on the value of inspections. Some clinicians think that inspections 
impose an extra burden that can have detrimental effect on their practice; whilst managerial 
staff sometimes perceived inspections as a distraction (Schaefer and Wiig, 2017). Although, it 
is possible to calculate the opportunity cost of an inspection, it is not possible to establish a 
causal relationship between the time invested preparing for the inspection and potential 
detrimental effects on care quality. 
Since there is no threshold to establish the cost-effectiveness of system-level health policy, it is 
difficult to make a judgement regarding whether CQC inspections are good value for money 
overall. The lack of apparent effect of individual inspections (chapters 6-8), alongside the 
demonstrable opportunity costs of these inspections casts doubt on their value. However, it 
should be kept in mind that in the past when inspection regimes did not exist or were light-
touch and reliant on desktop monitoring, scandals such as the case of Bristol Royal Infirmary, 
deaths associated with care by Dr Shipman and poor care in Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust happened. If the main effect of inspectorates is simply due to their existence, then it is 
not possible to isolate the effect of CQC from other quality governance interventions. 
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10 External inspections and the value 
for money of the CQC in a complex 
health system: discussion, findings 
and suggestions for change and 
improvement 
 
In this thesis, the evolution of the regulatory environment of the English NHS has been 
explored, highlighting the theoretical basis of four perspectives for the various models of 
governance used. Additionally, the effectiveness of external oversight on changing 
organisational and patient outcomes has been reviewed and the effectiveness of CQC 
inspection regimens in three different scenarios evaluated (i.e. any inspection, comparing the 
old and new regime, and accounting for previous performance). Incremental costs of 
inspections were estimated, and finally, the overarching question of this thesis “do the CQC 
inspections of acute NHS trusts affect quality of care?” was addressed using a carefully 
selected suite of measures for care quality. 
In this chapter, the findings will be synthesised and explored within the current context of the 
NHS, the body of evidence available on the effectiveness of regimes similar to CQC inspections, 
and the theories explored in previous chapters. Additionally, a reflection on the strengths and 
limitations of the methodological decisions taken is provided. Finally, I offer evidence-based 
and theoretically informed suggestions for researchers, service evaluators and policymakers 
(including the CQC) regarding potential strategies for improving the effectiveness and value for 
money of external inspections and regulation as part of the mixed economy of quality 
assurance that the NHS and government employ. 
10.1 Synthesis and discussion of findings 
The effect of CQC inspections was variable, as the overview of reviews suggested it would be. 
This finding can largely be explained because the health system is a complex adaptive system. 
This translates into a lack of universal definition of quality (given it is an abstract concept), the 
combination of several regulatory instruments targeting various aspects of the health system 
to govern quality, and that the various self-governing subsystems (i.e. wards and teams within 
hospitals and acute trusts) adapt differently to the demands of the environment. The other 
factor explaining the lack of effect is that oversight institutions influence quality of care by 
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their very existence, providing a continuous expectation that they might visit, instead of 
through on-site inspections alone; however, this could not have been detected in this analysis. 
The findings from the different empirical studies carried out as part of this thesis are 
summarised in Table 10.1 and reviewed using thematic analysis to identify the common 
themes. Seven main themes that integrate the theoretical aspects of regulation of quality of 
care and the quantitative findings were identified and are used to organise the discussion of 
this research.  
Table 10.1 Summary of key findings 
Chapter Summary of findings Theme 
 Theoretical perspectives on quality and quality governance 
 
2 
Attempts to define an abstract concept such as quality in a complex adaptive 
system such as healthcare have resulted in multiple definitions and 
frameworks for measuring quality of care. Consequently, operationalisations 





 Governance of quality in the English National Health Service  
3 
The NHS has gone through constant change since its creation. The evolution 
of perspectives on how to govern quality coming from economics and 
management has led to the implementation of successive reforms for 
governing the quality of care delivered, creating a crowded regulatory 







External oversight institutions have competed with other regulatory 
agencies since their creation; although, some periods of history have given 
more relevance to the work of the healthcare inspectorates (For instance, 
during the "targets and terror" that took place between 2000 and 2005). 
In the current NHS, CQC inspections have become the central means by 
which to govern the quality of healthcare institutions; however, their ratings 
are not associated with strong incentives and clear sanctions, which 






 Overview of reviews of the effectiveness of external oversight 
 
4 
Evidence shows that external oversight (accreditation or external 
inspections) has mixed effects on changing organisational behaviour and 
clinical outcomes. These findings were driven by a large body of studies 
using disease-specific measures to determine effectiveness. When these are 
removed, the intervention is generally ineffective.  
The findings from an update of the most methodologically rigorous 
systematic review support the conclusion that the effect of external 
oversight interventions is mixed, at best. Out of 53 measures assessed, four 
improved, 31 showed no change and 15 got worse after an accreditation or 
inspection visit. Mortality and MRSA infection rates were assessed in two 




The myriad outcomes used to measure the effect of external oversight 
underscores the difficulties of finding adequate, relevant and sensitive 
indicators to determine the effect of this intervention. The synthesis of 
seven reviews did not yield a definitive answer regarding the best set of 





 Effect of any inspection 
 
6 
Overall, the on-site visit of CQC was not associated with changes of level or 





Chapter Summary of findings Theme 
6 
The announcement of a CQC inspection was associated with a step decrease 
of A&E and RTT waiting times and a temporary improvement of the rate of 
leavers. This suggests that the pressure of the visit triggers quick 
improvements with temporary effect. 
The effect of 
anticipatory 
pressure 
When the effect of the inspection was analysed depending on the 
performance rating of the trust in 2009, the announcement or the inspection 
did not affect the level or slope of any of the measures analysed in trusts 






However, trusts rated as good had a step increase in the rate of leavers after 
the inspection; whereas, trusts rated as excellent had a transient increase in 
falls with harm and a temporary decrease in rates of leavers after the 
announcement of an inspection. 
 Comparison of the old and new regime of inspections 
 
7 
The old regime on-site visit produced a step decrease of A&E waiting times, 
whilst new regime inspections were associated with a step increase of A&E 
waiting times. 
For rates of leavers, the announcement of an old regime CQC inspection was 
related to a step increase, whereas the new regime inspection was 




old vs new 
regime. 
The announcement of a new regime CQC inspection produced a step 
decrease of falls with harm, whereas RTT waiting times showed a step 
decrease regardless of the type of inspection. 








It was assumed that performance before the inspection could be a good 
proxy of improvement culture and capacity to respond to the inspection. 
Therefore, CQC visits would have the largest impact on trusts with improving 
performance. However, findings showed the opposite scenario: worsening 
performance after the inspection in improving trusts, whilst performance 
improved after the visit in not improving trusts. Except for RTT waiting times 
and patients’ perception that had a similar pattern for all groups. 
Not improving trusts had better performance in each indicator and the 
stable trend reflected a floor effect. After the inspection, this upward trend 
returned to a “normal” low. 
Conversely, improving trusts were in the extreme of the distribution of 
worse performance for each indicator; therefore, their probability of 
improvement was higher. After the inspection, performance tended to 






The announcement of an inspection produced detrimental effects on 
improving trusts on four measures analysed: slower improvement of adverse 
events after any inspection, a worsening trend for A&E waiting times and a 
step increase of RTT waiting times after a new regime inspection, whilst rate 
of leavers had a step increase after an old regime inspection. 
The effects were mixed for not improving trusts: faster improvement of 
adverse events after any inspection and a step increase of the rate of leavers 
after the announcement of an old regime inspection. 
The effect of 
anticipatory 
pressure 
 Cost of the new inspection regime  
9 
The costs of a new regime CQC inspection, considering opportunity costs 
borne by acute NHS trusts and the operational costs of an inspection for 
CQC, ranged from £169,691 to £256,378 for a small trust and from £351,100 
to £418,136 for a large trust. 
If inspections were reviewed as an intervention in isolation and were 
submitted for review by NICE, the intervention would not be funded. 




10.1.1 The complexity of the concept of quality in healthcare 
Attempts to define an abstract concept such as quality in a complex adaptive system such as 
healthcare have resulted in multiple definitions and frameworks for measuring quality of care 
(see Chapter 2). Operationalisation for research, monitoring, or assessment of performance is 
usually achieved by balancing social, political, and healthcare goals (Pfeffer and Coote, 1991). 
The myriad of outcomes used to measure the effect of external oversight in previous research 
reflects the difficulties of identifying adequate, relevant and sensitive indicators representing 
care quality that can be used to determine the effect of this intervention. The synthesis of 
seven reviews did not yield a definitive answer regarding the best set of indicators to reflect 
the overall quality of care at hospital level because most research focused on disease-specific 
measures. Only six studies reported hospital-level organisational performance (Duckett, 1983, 
Piontek et al., 2003, Quality assurance project, 2005, Salmon et al., 2003, Thornlow and 
Merwin, 2009, OPM evaluation team, 2009), but they used 32 different indicators, with three 
of them repeated in two of these studies: hygiene and sanitation, patient satisfaction, and 
healthcare-associated infections. The effect of external oversight on these outcomes was not 
consistent across studies; therefore, there was no option for assessing the effect of 
inspections. 
Based on the findings from the overview of reviews, the CQC definition of care quality was 
used to select measures that could provide a broad picture of the effect of external 
inspections. The process of selecting indicators involved the careful analysis and interpretation 
of CQC documentation and an extensive search of data available (see Chapter 5). Using criteria 
established a priori, it was sought to balance the validity of the indicators to measure quality of 
care with pragmatic criteria (i.e. data publicly and freely available). However, using another set 
of indicators might have yielded different results. 
Four recent studies used more indicators and a composite, expert-driven measure of 
performance to determine the effect of accreditation. Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) assessed 
the effect of an accreditation cycle in one hospital using 27 measures of care quality and a 
composite measure combining 23 of them (Devkaran and O'Farrell, 2014). A research group in 
Denmark studied the effectiveness of an accreditation scheme on mortality, length of stay, 
readmission rates, and had a composite measure of 21 indicators for four diseases (Falstie-
Jensen et al., 2015a, Bogh et al., 2015, Falstie-Jensen et al., 2015b). Two other studies from 
this Danish research group assessed the effectiveness of accreditation in a composite measure 
of 43 processes of care indicators (Bogh et al., 2016, Bogh et al., 2017). Beyond mortality, none 
of the indicators used to measure quality coincide in these studies. Considering the ubiquity of 
external oversight in healthcare institutions, how difficult it is to define quality of care, and the 
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extensive body of literature on the topic, an expert-led and theory-driven definition of relevant 
hospital-level quality of care indicators to measure when examining the effectiveness of these 
regimes may be justified. Some potential indicators are emergency admission of patients with 
long-term conditions, adverse events (such as falls and pressure ulcers), 30-day readmissions, 
and in-hospital mortality of patients in palliative care. This consensus could enable a better 
understanding of when, and using which measures, external oversight works. 
10.1.2 Competing priorities for acute NHS trusts 
10.1.2.1 Crowded regulatory system 
In the last 20 years, the NHS has gone through constant reforms, often with the stated aim of 
improving quality (see Chapter 3). As a consequence, the institutions with regulatory and 
governing power have developed overlapping responsibilities for performance, resulting in 
duplication of effort (NHS Confederation, 2013). NHS trusts assert that the definition and the 
institutions responsible at the national level for finance and access are clear. However, in the 
case of quality, there are several bodies claiming responsibility for its assurance, whilst the 
definition and core set of outcomes to measure quality are not clear (NHS Confederation, 
2013). 
The impact of a crowded regulatory environment is threefold. Firstly, it is more complicated to 
isolate the effect of CQC inspections over other regulatory institutions. Secondly, mixed 
messages about trust performance from each agency make understanding and correcting poor 
performance harder. Thirdly, inspections and repeated and contradictory data requests come 
with high opportunity costs: making crafting and implementing an action plan for deficient 
aspects of care harder, whilst reducing any impact of external oversight.  
The complexity of the regulatory environment makes it more difficult to establish cause-effect 
relationships between inspection and improvements in the quality of care (Pollitt, 1995). 
Sutherland and Leatherman (2006) suggest that inspections catalyse efforts to measure and 
improve performance before their occurrence; whilst Wan and Connell (2003) propose that 
external oversight provides recommendations so that health managers can improve care and 
that inspectorates prevent failure in performance mainly through their existence. 
Regardless of the mechanism that explains how inspections might lead to changes in quality of 
care, it is impossible to disentangle the impact of all historical events happening near the 
inspection to estimate an unbiased measure of effect. However, common shocks (i.e. 
economic crises or increases in demand) are accounted for in the longitudinal study design. 
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In terms of contradictory messages and repeated requests from different regulatory agencies, 
a report from the NHS Confederation indicates that the health service lacks incentives for 
reducing the burden of data requests and striving for better regulation (NHS Confederation, 
2013). The reason given is that oversight institutions do not bear the costs and NHS providers 
are the ones who must find ways to streamline the process of answering multiple requests and 
inspections from regulators (ibid). In addition to the CQC, NHS improvement, and NHS 
England, professional bodies, the Department of Health and the Cabinet Office's 
Implementation Unit occasionally request data (NHS Confederation, 2013). Regarding 
opportunity costs, £1.4 million a year is the average estimated cost associated with finding and 
reporting nationally mandated data for each trust (NHS Confederation, 2013, Stevens, 2016). 
For clinical staff, the burden of collecting, reporting, and validating data is comparatively small, 
however, for managerial and administrative staff it is estimated that it takes between five to 
20 hours a week on average (NHS Confederation, 2013). 
In January 2017, the CQC and NHS Improvement merged the data collection functions. These 
two institutions used to collect, analyse, and present information to trusts in different ways, 
which produced confusion about their meaning regarding performance (Stevens, 2016). 
Unifying the process might help acute trusts to respond better to inspections by having a more 
precise picture of their performance and more resources (time) to prepare for it. 
10.1.2.2 Macro and meso level context 
The health system as a complex adaptive system encompasses several subsystems with 
blurred limits (The Health Foundation, 2010), which can be organised in levels: macro, meso 
and micro. Regulation functions as an intervention affecting the whole health system, which is 
the macro level. Acute NHS trusts are self-governing sub-systems belonging to the meso level. 
The importance of this difference is that some factors are common to every hospital, whilst 
others are particular to a region or trust. Consequently, the difference between levels allows 
making a more detailed analysis of the impact of their features on the effect of inspections. 
Context, understood as the factors creating the environment where implementation happens 
(Pfadenhauer et al., 2017), determines the effect of quality improvement initiatives (Kaplan et 
al., 2010, Øvretveit, 2011). The context where external oversight is implemented affects its 
potential effectiveness since it is a quality improvement intervention (Walshe, 2003). In the case 
of the healthcare inspectorates that have existed in the NHS, the quality governance models and 
contextual factors can be seen to differ. 
For instance, between 2000 and 2005, the star ratings given to acute NHS trusts after an 
inspection by the CHI were used as part of the "targets and terror" regime with strong 
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sanctions to Chief Executives if no improvement was shown. Consequently, ratings were 
associated with powerful incentives and sanctions. Between 2006 and 2009, quality 
governance was achieved through a “choice and competition” model where the Healthcare 
Commission (i.e. CHAI) carried out annual checks providing the quality performance 
information that patients could use to choose a provider, although, in healthcare, users rarely 
exercise choice (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013). In consequence, during these two periods, external 
inspections were a necessary element for quality governance, but there were reputational and 
financial incentives involved to obtain a “good” rating.  
In turn, “targets and terror” and “naming and shaming” were effective because there was a 
common belief that the service needed urgent improvement, incentives and sanctions were 
aligned with priorities (i.e. a dozen targets that had to be met), and failures were very public. 
These two models of governance of quality were paired with large increases in spending and 
workforce size (Mays et al., 2011), which can explain some of the improvements in 
performance. Additionally, during the first decade of the 21st century, the performance of the 
NHS needed to move from average to good, where targets and performance management can 
be effective (Ham, 2014b). However, targets are insufficient when a service needs to move 
from adequate to excellent (Barber et al., 2008), and where other approaches such as 
embedding a culture of improvement might work (Ham, 2014b). 
The current context where CQC inspections are implemented is very different to the context of 
other inspection regimes, which may explain the lack of or small effect observed. In contrast to 
the period between 2000 and 2008, since 2010, the NHS has been going through austerity 
measures, with minimal growth in spending and falling productivity (Lafond et al., 2017). Data 
from the Quality Watch (2017) shows that A&E waiting times, RTT waiting times and delays in 
care have consistently worsened since the last quarter of 2013/14 (i.e. January to March), 
which is the first financial year NHS providers had an overall deficit (Figure 10.1, arrows signal 
point when trend shifted). This suggests that NHS providers adapted to a more restricted 
budget for a couple of years, and then ran out of capacity to adapt to increasing demands on a 





Figure 10.1 Trends in A&E waiting times, patients being delayed, RTT waiting times (QualityWatch, 2017) and NHS providers surplus/deficit (DOH, 2010-2017)  
*Arrows signal when the trend shifted. 
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Another contextual difference is the change of priorities in the service. In the 2000s, the main 
priority was improving waiting times during a period of relatively generous funding. In 2017, 
after years of austere funding, challenges include achieving cooperation and integration of 
providers in a local area to manage a population with more complex care needs (NHS England, 
2015b). At the same time providers should strive to deliver 3% efficiency savings per year 
without compromising quality (NHS England, 2014). Therefore, although targets were effective 
in improving waiting times in the past, it is unlikely that they will be effective at improving 
coordination of care. The CQC’s endeavour will be to find ways to include value for money, 
plus integration and continuity of care in its assessments, so they can serve as incentives for 
the achievement of these goals. 
In terms of sanctions, the general deterrence theory (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.4) suggests 
that the certainty and severity of sanctions are associated with the potential of legal provisions 
for preventing deviant behaviour (Stafford and Warr, 1993). During the “targets and terror” 
period, sanctions were certain and severe (see Chapter 3). CQC has strong sanctions available, 
but their certainty of use is very low due to their potential impact on the population. The 
strongest sanction that CQC can impose is revoking a providers’ license, but this would involve 
relocating patients and services to the nearest provider; therefore, there is no record of this 
being used in acute NHS hospitals. Instead, hospitals have been temporarily closed until CQC 
recommendations can be implemented (Care Quality Commission, 2016d). The second 
strongest sanction available involves putting a provider into special measures, where the 
organisation is partnered with another trust to help them improve, an improvement director is 
appointed and, depending on the capability of the trust’s leadership, the management can be 
replaced. This is, in turn, the most commonly used sanction in extreme cases of non-
compliance,20 but it is not clear how much it deters trusts’ board members and senior 
management from allowing or preventing poor performance. 
In summary, the “Inspection state” has four main contextual differences with previous 
governance of quality models that influence (and hinder) its effectiveness. Firstly, it does not 
have extra resources to invest in improvements or increasing the workforce. Secondly, the 
main priority (i.e. delivering efficiency savings without compromising quality) is aligned with 
some incentives in the system (e.g. NHS Outcomes Framework, Quality Premium and CQUIN); 
however, CQC inspections and how quality of care is measured are not fully aligned with this 
                                                             
20 Nineteen acute hospitals were put in special measures during the observation period. Most of them 
were put in special measures after the Keogh Review (2013). Additionally, 740 health and social care 
providers were put into special measures in the 2016-17 fiscal year (Care Quality Commission, 2017a).  
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priority.21 Thirdly, sanctions are not certain, and failure is not associated with strong public 
reputational threats. Finally, the overall performance of services needs to go from adequate to 
good or outstanding, which means that improvements are slower and subtler. As a result, even 
if CQC inspections were an effective intervention, these contextual factors would interfere 
with their effect on the measures analysed here. Probably, a different context with financial 
resources, incentives to achieve an improvement culture (not just efficiency), and the addition 
of more time could have resulted in CQC inspections being more effective than found in this 
thesis. Given the contextual factors at play, the findings seem to reflect naturally occurring 
patterns.  
Considering that the preparation for these inspections demands time away from regular duties 
for clinical and managerial staff (which could negatively affect the quality of care provided), 
the fact that performance remains unchanged after a CQC inspection could be considered a 
positive finding. The overall existence of the CQC probably produces general (although 
unmeasurable and intangible) effects at the macro level, which could not be detected at the 
meso level (i.e. hospitals). 
10.1.3 The effect of anticipatory pressure 
CQC inspections comprise four interventions: an announcement, an on-site visit, a Quality 
Summit and the publication of an inspection report (see Chapter 3). Previous research suggests 
that inspections have an anticipatory effect (Healthcare Commission, 2008a, Robertson et al., 
2017).  
The announcement does not involve a direct intervention from the inspectorate. 
Consequently, its effect depends on board members’ leadership and ability to measure, 
analyse, and interpret soft and hard intelligence about the hospital’s performance, thus 
allowing them to benchmark performance and steer efforts for improvement based on local 
needs (Joshi and Hines, 2006, Millar et al., 2013). Despite the body of literature suggesting a 
link between board members’ leadership skills and hospital performance, it is not clear how 
board members’ competencies, skill-mix, and capabilities to draw and monitor a quality 
improvement project influence the anticipatory effect, the rating, and the effect of a CQC 
inspection.  
Six scenarios could explain the effect (or lack of effect) of CQC inspections (and any of their 
components) (Figure 10.2). 
                                                             
21 The CQC piloted the assessment of value for money as part of the inspections in 2016 and 
implemented it in 2017 (Care Quality Commission, 2016b). The evaluation of the coordination and 
integration of care has been implemented as a pilot since 2017 (Care Quality Commission, 2017b). 
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Figure 10.2 Potential options for explaining the effect (or lack) of CQC inspections 
Elucidating which of these options explains the observed effects would require another type of 
research method (see section 10.3). However, evidence assessing the impact of “targets and 
terror” (Besley et al., 2009, Mason et al., 2012) and external inspections of hospitals’ 
cleanliness in England (Toffolutti et al., 2017) shows that their beneficial effect was a mix of 
actual improvements and gaming. In the case of external inspections in general, there is no 
evidence exploring how and when hospitals respond. Consequently, the explanations provided 
below are largely based on evidence linking the internal features of hospitals and their 
performance. 
The analysis of the effect of any inspection on measures of quality of care serves as an 
indication of the overall impact of the intervention without factoring in other variables 
(Shadish et al., 2002). This analysis showed that the only significant effect was a step decrease 
in A&E and RTT waiting times after the announcement of an inspection. Moreover, the 
subgroup analysis by 2009 performance rating showed that trusts rated as excellent, good, and 
fair had a step decrease following the announcement of the inspection for both measures of 
waiting times.  
Two factors could explain the effect of the announcement on waiting times. One is that these 
measures have been a central component of performance management since 2000. Improving 
waiting times was a governmental commitment until 2005, they are a right for patients as set 
out in the NHS Constitution (DOH, 2015b), they are assessed as part of the NHS Outcomes 
Framework (DOH, 2016b), they are national targets which are priority for hospitals boards 
(Machell et al., 2010), and CQC includes these two measures as part of the intelligent 
monitoring tool (Care Quality Commission, 2014c). Another potential explanation is that the 
NHS modernisation agency worked to support the implementation of innovative strategies to 
achieve the targets imposed during the “targets and terror” period (Buchanan et al., 2006), 
244 
which suggest there is already the capacity and skills in-house for improving waiting times. This 
finding also highlights that hospitals try to implement quick fixes before an inspection, in 
particular, for those indicators deemed relevant for the inspection regime (i.e. tunnel vision). 
In comparing the effect of the old and new regime of inspections, the step reduction of waiting 
times after the announcement was significant only for patients waiting more than 18 weeks 
for a referral to treatment, regardless of the type of inspection. After the visit, all groups 
exhibited an upward trend. Common events instead of the inspection visit itself (e.g. austerity 
measures) could explain this pattern. In the case of A&E waiting times, no significant change 
was observed after the announcement of an old or new regime inspection, suggesting that the 
type of inspection does not explain the variability in effect observed for A&E waiting times. 
Rates of falls with harm had a significant step reduction after the announcement of a new 
regime visit, but after the inspection, trends were similar for the three groups. The 
introduction of quality improvement initiatives to reduce adverse events or changes in the 
reporting patterns of these trusts could explain this transient change. The fact that trusts 
inspected by the new regime had a worse reporting culture suggests that the second option is 
more plausible. 
The comparison of the old and new regimes of inspection accounting for previous 
performance showed that the announcement of an inspection produced detrimental effects 
on improving trusts on the four measures analysed, whereas it had mixed effects on not 
improving trusts. Table 10.2 summarises the significant changes detected after the 
announcement of an old or new CQC inspection when accounting for previous performance. 
Table 10.2 Summary of significant changes after the announcement of a new and old inspection accounting for 
previous performance 
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For the three groups, the improving trend flattened for both adverse events following the 
announcement. However, trusts classified as improvers for these two outcomes were more 
likely to receive a “requires improvement” rating when inspected by the new regime. 
Moreover, they were more likely to be rated with “significant delivery issues” by Monitor, 
which could partially explain why improvement slowed down after the inspection. It is equally 
plausible that the deceleration was produced by a floor effect or an increase in reporting. 
After the announcement of a new regime inspection, the improving trend of A&E waiting times 
shifted upwards (worsened) and there was a step increase in RTT waiting more than 18 weeks. 
In these two cases, trusts had worse Monitor governance and sustainability ratings, indicating 
potential financial difficulties. A combination of limited ability to adapt to increasing pressure, 
diversion of attention of managerial and clinical teams to prepare for the inspection, and 
contextual elements such as austerity measures could explain this change after the 
announcement of a resource-intensive inspection. 
Rate of leavers increased after the announcement of an old regime inspection. Results are 
counter-intuitive for trusts with improving performance inspected by the old regime since they 
are less likely to be in London (with the highest overall rates of leavers), are more likely to be 
medium size, have Foundation Trust status and be in the Midlands. Additionally, they were 
more likely to be rated as “good” or “outstanding” by the CQC. The most plausible explanation 
for this pattern is that 75% of inspections of these trusts occurred between November 2013 
and February 2014. Therefore, the announcement period took place between August and 
October 2013, when rates of leavers are higher every year compared to November-January. 
Without information about reasons for leaving, any potential explanation would be 
speculation. 
The announcement of an inspection for not improving trusts presented mixed effects. A step 
increase in rates of leavers was found after the announcement of an old regime inspection; 
however, this increase was transient. Trusts inspected under the old regime were more likely 
to have a Monitor sustainability rating of “material risk”, but there was no difference in 
distribution between improving and not improving trusts. Not improving trusts inspected 
under the old regime were more likely to have a governance rating of “no evident concerns”, 
potentially explaining why the increase was only temporary. In the post-inspection period, 
trends appear similar for all trusts, again suggesting that the contextual factors described 
above could be linked to the changes observed. 
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In the case of adverse events, the announcement of an old regime inspection was associated 
with a downward shift of the slope for falls with harm and pressure ulcers. This group of trusts 
was more likely to be rated as “good” or “outstanding” after the first new regime inspection, 
which might reflect a better self-efficacy and safety culture. These two factors relate to 
achieving goals (Locke and Latham, 2006); therefore, the announcement of the inspection 
could have triggered the effective implementation of improvement strategies explaining the 
changes observed. 
Overall, it seems that detrimental effects after the announcement of an inspection could be 
associated with previous financial and governance performance measured by Monitor ratings, 
and the rating after a new regime inspection since those groups with worse ratings tended to 
respond more badly to such announcements. 
 
10.1.4 The effectiveness of external inspections 
On-site inspections were not significantly associated with changes in measures of quality of 
care. This mirrors the findings of the review of reviews in Chapter 4. Perhaps, a different 
approach to synthesizing evidence such as a realist synthesis could yield different results, and 
help inform when and how institutions respond to external inspections. 
Falls with harm and pressure ulcers can be used as proxies for quality of nursing care (Aiken et 
al., 2016, National Institute For Health And Care Excellence, 2014) since they are nursing-
sensitive outcomes (Currie et al., 2005, Butler et al., 2011). Falls with harm, pressure ulcers and 
patients’ perception of care are associated with staffing levels; however, these measures are 
affected by both, the quantity and quality of nursing care (Griffiths et al., 2014, Griffiths et al., 
2016, Aiken et al., 2016). The relationship between CQC inspections and safe-staffing levels is 
not clear. Considering the expenditure in agency staff before and after an inspection could 
help elucidate if trust boards try to improve the quantity and quality of nursing care in 
preparation for the inspection or afterwards. However, monthly information is not publicly 
available, and a previous Freedom of Information request was denied because disclosing this 
data could affect the monitoring functions of NHS Improvement (NHS Improvement, 2016a). 
Regarding the sensitivity of these three measures to external inspections, previous evidence is 
scarce and low quality. A cross-sectional study found that implementing standard safety 
practices requested by the accreditation agency was associated with lower pressure ulcer rates 
(Thornlow and Merwin, 2009), whilst, an interrupted time-series study found a significant 
increase in the level and trend for falls after an accreditation visit (Devkaran and O'Farrell, 
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2015). In terms of patients’ perception of care, an RCT (Salmon et al., 2003) and a prospective 
cohort study (Quality assurance project, 2005) found no effect on patient satisfaction. The 
subgroup analysis by 2009 performance rating (see Chapter 6, section 6.2) showed that the 
behaviour of adverse events and patients’ perception of care after an inspection was similar 
for the four groups (i.e. excellent, good, fair, and weak). In the case of adverse events, the 
trends converged towards the mean; whilst for patients’ perception of care, all trusts showed 
improvement in the post-inspection period. The latter could be associated with an increase in 
awareness about treating patients with dignity after the publication of the Francis Inquiry. The 
patterns observed post-inspection suggest that changes are related to other system-wide 
underlying processes (e.g. austerity measures and the Francis Inquiry) instead of the on-site 
CQC visit. 
A&E and RTT waiting times were first established as a political commitment to quality that 
later turned into an issue of legal rights within the NHS Constitution (DOH, 2009). Although 
improving access was the primary purpose of imposing waiting times targets, later research 
has shown an association of long waits in A&E with patient outcomes (Guttmann et al., 2011, 
Day, 2013, Carter et al., 2014). In the case of long waits for elective non-urgent care, evidence 
suggests that the risk of adverse events and poor outcomes increases with the length of wait 
for cardiovascular surgery, cholecystectomies, orthopaedic and corrective eye surgery. (Barua 
et al., 2014, Day, 2013, Sobolev et al., 2003, Oudhoff et al., 2007, Braybrooke et al., 2007, 
Bailey et al., 2016, Montin et al., 2008, Vergara et al., 2011, Desmeules et al., 2012, Conner-
Spady et al., 2007, Hodge et al., 2007). Therefore, given the link between the length of wait for 
emergency and elective care and quality of care, it was deemed relevant to test the effect of 
inspections on these measures. 
The CQC assess A&E and RTT waiting times as part of intelligent monitoring; however, it is not 
clear if these two measures were affected by CQC inspections. Research on this topic has 
explored the relationship between the introduction of targets associated with “naming and 
shaming” and improvements in waiting times (Besley et al., 2009, Mason et al., 2012); but 
evidence on the impact of inspections is limited. The results suggest that inspections, 
regardless of type, are not associated with improvements in waiting times. Post-inspection 
patterns for A&E and RTT waiting times show a similar worsening trend for both indicators 
across all trusts (by 2009 performance ratings), which is only significantly different from the 
counterfactual for A&E waiting times of those rated as fair. This finding can be explained by a 
higher proportion of trusts with the lowest ratings in Monitor sustainability (i.e. significant or 
material risk) and governance ratings (i.e. subject to enforcement action or under review) in 
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this group, indicating that their ability to adapt to an extra burden may be more limited. 
Further subgroup analyses would be needed to confirm this hypothesis (see section 10.2). 
Mortality is a contested measure of quality of care (Park et al., 1990, Pitches et al., 2007, 
Goodacre et al., 2015, Hogan et al., 2015, Kobewka et al., 2017) due to the low predictive value 
of risk-adjusted mortality in detecting hospitals providing poor care (Girling et al., 2012). 
However, recent scandals such as Bristol (Kennedy, 2001) and Mid-Staffordshire (Francis, 
2013) had higher than expected mortality rates. Further investigations showed there was a 
culture of blame that did not learn from mistakes, and which could explain the failure of care 
(Kennedy, 2001, Francis, 2013). Other scandals such as those involving the care provided by 
Ledward (Ritchie, 2000) and Paterson (Kennedy, 2013) were not associated with high mortality 
rates, but they did leave patients with severe damage, whilst investigations revealed similar 
cultural failures (Ritchie, 2000, Kennedy, 2013). Risk-adjusted mortality should not be used in 
isolation to judge performance due to its low predictive value, but it can serve to prompt 
further investigation into the care provided by an organisation. The CQC uses 98 mortality 
indicators (including risk-adjusted and composite mortality measures) as part of intelligent 
monitoring to determine what trusts to inspect and when (Care Quality Commission, 2014c); 
consequently, it was deemed relevant to assessing the impact of the regime. 
The relationship between on-site visits and their effect on mortality is not clear. Two of the 
studies included in the update of the most rigorous systematic review found conflicting 
evidence on their effect (see Chapter 4). Whilst Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) found no 
significant changes in level or trend the month following the accreditation visit, and Towers 
and Clark (2014) detected a significant decrease in risk-adjusted mortality the month after the 
accreditation visit (β= -0.045, p<0.05). The most recent evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
accreditation comes from a research group in Denmark, who found that fully-accredited 
hospitals had lower risk-adjusted mortality rates than did non-accredited ones (OR [95% CI]: 
0.83 [0.72-0.96]) (Falstie-Jensen et al., 2015a).  
In the NHS, there is no quantitative assessment of the impact of external inspections on 
mortality, but Dr Foster (2015) analysed the effect of special measures on the 11 trusts 
subjected to this regime after the Keogh Review. The overall analysis showed a significant 
downward shift in the trend after the beginning of special measures (Dr Foster, 2015). 
Conversely, the findings of this thesis suggest there is no such association after an inspection. 
One explanation is regression to the mean, where extreme values tend to move towards the 
mean regardless of any intervention (Barnett et al., 2005). The scope of each intervention 
could also explain differences in effect. These 11 trusts were mortality outliers and the Keogh 
Review identified aspects of care contributing to high mortality; therefore, the interventions 
249 
implemented targeted areas of care with increased rates of avoidable deaths. The focus of 
CQC inspections changes depending on the results of intelligent monitoring, consequently, the 
analysis presented here includes trusts both where mortality is a concern and where it is not, 
so as to dilute any potential effect. 
Staff turnover is associated with quality of care through two interrelated pathways: the work 
environment and staffing levels. A poor working environment contributes to job dissatisfaction 
leading to staff turnover (Hellman, 1997, Yin and Yang, 2002, Coomber and Barriball, 2007, 
Estryn-Behar et al., 2010), whilst low staffing levels can increase work stress and intention to 
leave (Coomber and Barriball, 2007, Aiken et al., 2002, Gauci Borda and Norman, 1997). 
Additionally, staffing levels are also related to an increase in adverse events and mortality 
(Aiken et al., 2008, Aiken et al., 2016, Griffiths et al., 2016). However, this research, focused 
mainly on nurses, is inconsistent. The CQC uses staff turnover in conjunction with the staff 
stability index (i.e. the proportion of staff working more than 12 months in the organisation) to 
reflect the skill-mix and culture in the organisation. Although there is evidence suggesting a 
link between organisational culture and performance (Jacobs et al., 2013, West et al., 2013, 
Taylor et al., 2015), the relationship between inspections or accreditation visits and staff 
turnover had not been explored before.  
Rate of leavers was selected to reflect the trusts’ capacity to adapt to an additional external 
demand such as an inspection. The expected result was that trusts with a better culture would 
have lower overall rates of leavers and the inspections would not affect turnover, or it would 
do so to a lesser extent. The results of this thesis suggest that overall, the on-site visit is not 
associated with changes in the rate of leavers. The analysis by performance rating in 2009 
showed that the rates of leavers and the trend after the inspection were similar for the four 
groups. This can have three possible meanings: inspections do not affect turnover, the 
performance ratings might not be a good indicator of culture, or turnover does not reflect 
trusts’ capacity to adapt. Exploring differential turnover by profession or reasons for leaving a 
trust in more detail, might help elucidate the most probable cause, but this was outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
One of the difficulties of determining the effect of CQC inspections is that they are complex 
interventions (Walshe, 2007) that target different areas of care depending on the findings of 
the intelligent monitoring tool (Care Quality Commission, 2014b). Therefore, it is plausible to 
consider that in some trusts the measures analysed here exhibited poor performance and the 
CQC identified them as such, whilst in others the performance for these measures was not 
poor. This means that the effect might dilute when trusts are analysed together. Additionally, 
improving these measures is in itself a complex task (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1), where several 
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aspects of care have to be addressed to improve one measure. Therefore, trusts could have 
improved performance in an intermediate variable in the causal path (e.g. working 
environment that can affect turnover rates) but did not reach any significant difference in 
terms of the measure itself. 
Qualitative research assessing previous inspectorates suggests that inspections serve as a 
catalyser for improvements that were on hold (Day and Klein, 2004, Sutherland and 
Leatherman, 2006, Walshe et al., 2014). However, it is not clear how long this effect lasts and if 
it is enough to produce observable improvements in measures of care quality. The CQC strives 
to “encourage care services to improve” (Care Quality Commission, 2014b), but this statement 
can only be true if the catalyst effect translates into better performance and outcomes. 
Changes in practice based on the best evidence available are not synonymous with 
improvements (Berwick et al., 2003). The process of successful implementation of 
improvements requires senior management and a trust board with the abilities to detect 
aspects of poor care, the skills and knowledge to identify and adapt potential solutions for 
deficient areas to their context, and the leadership to guide their implementation. Therefore, 
quality improvement skills of board members could be a future area that CQC could assess. 
The CQC produces a detailed report about overall hospital performance following an 
inspection, which could be another opportunity to influence providers’ behaviour. When the 
CQC has serious concerns about performance, an enforcement action is issued. However, 
when improvements are requested without formal enforcement hospitals were unclear on 
how to proceed, the timescale for implementation, their accountability, and the expected 
standards (Walshe et al., 2014). This suggests that even when the CQC could influence 
improvements in hospitals after an inspection, unclear instructions may dilute and delay the 
potential effects, making it difficult to attribute any improvement in the quality of care to a 
CQC inspection. 
The CQC exerts its effect mainly through its existence by creating a constant pressure to 
maintain standards to avoid regulatory actions and to perform well during an inspection 
without any additional effort being required. The time available between the announcement 
and the visit is insufficient for the immediate implementation of interventions to improve the 
measures analysed in this research (see Appendix Chapter 10, Table 10.1); therefore, the CQC 
may be viewed as acting as an invisible (but ever present) reminder to meet standards of 





10.1.5 Differential effect of inspections 
10.1.5.1 Performance ratings 
Table 10.3 Summary of findings for the effect of any inspection by 2009 CQC performance rating 
 Poor Fair Good Excellent 
Falls with harm    
– 
↑ level post 
announcement 
Pressure ulcers     
SHMI     
A&E waiting times     
RTT waiting times     
Patients’ perception 
of care 
    
Rate of leavers   
– 
↑ level post-inspection 
(transient) 
+ 
↓ level post 
announcement 
 
Some differences in the features of trusts could explain the effect observed. Trusts rated as 
excellent and good were less likely to be large (21% vs 40%) and to have been under special 
measures (9% vs 21%), which could be associated with better capacity to respond to 
inspections than those rated as poor or fair. Additionally, trusts rated as good were more likely 
to have a lower Monitor sustainability rating and be subject to enforcement actions than trusts 
rated as excellent. Therefore, the transient increase in the rate of leavers after an inspection 
could be associated with attempts to retain staff in preparation for the inspection without a 
long-term strategy to retain an experienced workforce. Conversely, trusts rated as excellent 
were more likely to receive a good or outstanding CQC rating after a new regime inspection 
(47% vs 21%); this could reflect a better culture regarding retaining staff, which might have 
affected the rate of leavers after the announcement. This compounded with the transient 
increase of falls with harm suggests that this group of trusts invest resources in preparing for 
an on-site visit, recruiting more staff and, probably, improving reporting patterns for adverse 
events. It is equally plausible that the increase in falls with harm may be related to staff 
investing more time in preparatory administrative work instead of contact time with patients 
affecting negatively on care quality. Determining the causes behind the changes observed 




10.1.5.2 Old versus new regime 
Table 10.4 Summary of findings for the comparison of effect by type of inspection 
 New regime Old regime No inspection 
Falls with harm    
Pressure ulcers    
SHMI    
A&E waiting times 
– 
↑ level post inspection 
+ 
↓ level post inspection 
 




↑ trend post inspection 
+ 
↑ trend post inspection 
+ 
↑ trend post inspection 
Rate of leavers 
+ 
↓ level post announcement 
– 
↑ level post announcement 
 
 
The different effects on A&E waiting times might suggest that old regime inspections could 
have driven a transient improvement, whilst the new regime inspection might have diverted 
clinical and managerial attention away from improving practice during the preparatory phase 
and after the visit. The change could be reflected in A&E waiting times because data is weekly, 
and trusts might have more control over waiting times than other outcomes. It is equally 
plausible that changes may indicate a modification in reporting patterns. 
In the case of rates of leavers, the differing effect of the announcement could be explained by 
a higher proportion of trusts within the group inspected by the old regime with a Monitor 
sustainability rating of material risk. This group might have had difficulties retaining staff, 
which could explain the step increase. In the case of trusts inspected under the new regime, 
the step decrease suggests that they were improving retention before the on-site visit. It is 
noteworthy that 27% of trusts inspected by the new regime were under special measures; 
therefore, the improvement in rates of leavers could be associated with an increased effort to 
attract and retain experienced staff. 
Consistent with findings from the previous research question, no association was observed 
between CQC inspections and changes in adverse events, RTT waiting times, risk-adjusted 
mortality or rates of staff leaving an NHS trust. Conversely, patients’ perceptions of being 
treated with dignity and respect improved in the post-inspection period for all three groups, 
which was probably associated with recommendations by the Francis Inquiry regarding 
patients’ experience of care (Thorlby et al., 2014). In summary, although the responses to the 
visit and announcement differed for two indicators depending on the type of inspection 
received, this seems to reflect selection bias, instead of differential effectiveness of the 
interventions. 
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10.1.6 Culture as a mediator of the response to the inspection 
Table 10.5 Summary of changes post-inspection for the comparison of old and new regime of inspections 
accounting for previous performance 
*significant one-year after the inspection. 
 
Performance prior to the inspection was considered a proxy for a trust’s culture, assuming that 
improving organisations had the internal capacity and leadership to implement changes of 
practice. The findings suggest that the opposite was actually true. 
The analysis of adverse events considering previous performance showed a similar pattern 
regarding form and level for all groups following an inspection, suggesting the possibility of 
regression to the mean. Nonetheless, there were some small statistically significant changes: 
for trusts with worsening performance a drop in the rate of falls after a new regime inspection 
was observed; whilst for trusts with improving performance, there was a step increase in rates 
of pressure ulcers after an old regime inspection. 
Although there was a step increase in pressure ulcers after an old regime inspection of 
improving trusts, this change seems to be a statistical artefact produced by a non-significant 
decrease during the announcement phase, since a comparison with the counterfactual shows 
no difference. In the case of the decline in falls with harm after a new regime inspection in not 
improving trusts, this group had a higher proportion of trusts with significant concerns 
regarding their reporting culture (57% vs 34% in the other groups), which might imply an 
 Improving Not improving 
 
New regime Old regime 
No 
inspection 
New regime Old regime 
No 
inspection 
Falls with harm    
+ 
↓ level  
  
Pressure ulcers  
– 
↑ level  












Crude mortality  
+ 
↓ level  
  
+ and – 























↑ trend  
 + 
↑ trend  
+ 
↑ trend  
+ 
↑ trend  
Rate of leavers     
+ 
↓ level  
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observed change is due to gaming. No other differences were observed that could explain this 
pattern. After the inspection, the trends for all groups appeared to converge, suggesting a 
phenomenon of regression to the mean that could be explained by historical events. During 
the implementation of the NHS ST, the NHS Institute and the National Patient Safety Agency, 
which supported the initiative, were decommissioned and the CQC restructured (Power et al., 
2016). After the ST pilot phase ended in March 2013, providers became responsible for 
continued reporting and improvement. Efforts expended may conceivably have differed 
depending on trusts’ competing priorities and commitment to patient safety, thus diminishing 
the national, coordinated effort and explaining the deceleration of the improvement observed 
previously. 
The analysis of risk-adjusted mortality showed that there was a trend shift following the 
inspection for trusts with improving and worsening performances, which was significantly 
different from the counterfactual 12 months after the inspection. However, a comparison of 
the six groups showed no differences among them. When the crude mortality rates were 
analysed together with the SHMI, a step decrease in mortality was observed for trusts with 
worsening performance after an old regime inspection, whilst the SHMI remained the same. 
Therefore, the expected mortality for these trusts had a similar reduction in terms of observed 
mortality. The post-inspection trend goes downward for SHMI and upward for crude mortality 
rates, which means that the expected mortality increased more than the observed mortality. 
In practice, this implies that hospitals classified as not improving for SHMI were receiving 
patients with poorer health status over time. It could be presumed that this group of hospitals 
implemented measures to prevent the death of patients with high probabilities of dying, which 
would explain the decreasing SHMI. Another possible explanation for this pattern is a change 
in the coding behaviour of patients’ comorbidities to increase artificially the probability of 
dying (e.g. coding more comorbidities or coding conditions with higher weight in the 
probability of dying). 
For trusts with improving performance inspected by the old regime, a significant drop in 
mortality was observed after the on-site visit, which coincides with a significant decline in 
SHMI. This change can be attributed to a reduction of observed deaths whilst expected deaths 
remained stable. In practical terms, this improvement might be associated with the 
implementation of quality improvement initiatives that have shown positive effects on 
reducing mortality (Zegers et al., 2016). A qualitative study exploring the real causes of this 
decrease in mortality would be needed to increase certainty. When post-inspection trends for 
the six groups are analysed together, they follow a similar pattern that can be explained by 
regression to the mean. 
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Trusts with worsening performance in A&E waiting times showed a significant decrease in 
levels after an old regime inspection and an increase in levels after a new regime inspection. 
However, the latter represents a statistical artefact explained by a non-significant drop during 
the announcement phase. Trusts with improving performance in A&E waiting times had an 
increase in level and slope after the new regime on-site visit. The trends observed for trusts 
inspected by the new regime are similar regardless of previous performance, which suggests 
that there might be a common mechanism to explain these changes. The most plausible 
explanation is a diversion of managerial and clinical attention away from patient care. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, trusts inspected by the new regime were more likely to be in 
special measures; have a Monitor sustainability rating of “significant risk”; have a Monitor 
governance rating of “under review” or “subject to enforcement actions”; and have a reporting 
culture rating of “poor” or “significant concerns”. These trusts seemed to have less capacity to 
adapt and respond to increasing pressure. Therefore, the new regime inspection could have 
worsened performance, or it could have improved the accuracy of reporting. Nonetheless, 
although post-inspection trends are different among groups, at the end of the observation 
period there are no differences to rates of attendances waiting more than 4 hours in A&E, 
suggesting that a common shock, such as the delayed effect of austerity measures, could 
explain the worsening performance. 
A significant improvement in the post-inspection slope of patients’ perception of being treated 
with dignity and respect was observed for not improving trusts regardless of the type of 
inspection they received, whilst for improving trusts, only those inspected under the old 
regime had a significant improvement in the post-inspection rate of change. The two groups of 
trusts that did not show any statistically significant improvement (i.e. new regime and not 
inspected improving) had a higher proportion of trusts with a Monitor financial rating of 
material or significant risk.22 Additionally, these were more likely to have a Monitor 
Governance rating of “subject to enforcement actions”,23 which might indicate more restricted 
possibilities for investing in improvements, worse working environments affecting patients’ 
experience or lower staff:patient ratios. 
In the case of the significant rate drop for leavers after an old regime inspection of not 
improving trusts, there were no differences observed in the analysed variables among groups 
to explain this phenomenon. However, this change seems to be a statistical artefact since the 
                                                             
22 New regime improving 46%, not inspected improving 34% versus new regime not improving 5%, not 
inspected not improving 13%, old regime not improving 27% and old regime improving 0%. 
23 New regime improving 62%, not inspected improving 50% versus new regime not improving 21%, not 
inspected not improving 9%, old regime not improving 9% and old regime improving 0% 
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rate of leavers had a non-significant increase during the announcement phase, and in the post-
inspection period, rates appear similar to the counterfactual.  
The existing literature suggests that high performing hospitals have a positive organisational 
culture where innovation and quality improvement initiatives can excel, and performance 
monitoring is effective (Taylor et al., 2015). Their culture promotes interdisciplinary work and 
trust, through committed and visible management and a focus on excellence (Taylor et al., 
2015). This implies that quality and safety are at the heart of the organisation’s goals and 
mission, therefore, efforts are continuously made to act on data and fix potential problems 
(ibid). These features can make them respond differently to external inspections and 
consequently, the effect on quality measures might differ from other organisations. There is 
evidence suggesting that a critical component to quality improvement is that the organisation 
has a common, shared vision (West et al. 2013) and that the inspection could be a driver to 
having one or remembering what that shared vision is. 
Given the patterns observed in the data, it seems that high-performing hospitals were those 
that had stable or worsening performance because they had the lowest overall rates during 
the observation period (i.e. floor effect), whilst hospitals classified as improving were low-
performing because their improvement reflected the possibility of them improving more than 
their culture. As seen in Chapter 8, trusts with improving performance in clinical outcomes 
were more likely to be in special measures and less likely to be Foundation Trusts. 
It is noteworthy that a myriad of methods exists to identify a high-performing hospital (Taylor 
et al., 2015). The NHS star ratings (Mannion et al., 2005), risk-adjusted mortality rates (Cherlin 
et al., 2013), performance over time (Curry et al., 2011) and composite scores of quality 
(Kramer et al., 2008) are some of the measures previously used to classify high-performing 
hospitals. Considering hospitals not improving their performance as “high-performing” would 
be reductionist since it is not possible to infer hospitals’ organisational culture based on the 
previous performance of selected quality indicators. However, it is known that the 
performance and culture of acute trusts vary at every level and it is common to find “good” 
and “bad” organisational culture within wards, departments and sites (West et al., 2013). This 
highlights how complex it is to define high-performance and support the premise that 
hospitals not improving in the analyses presented might have had a “good” culture that makes 
them similar to institutions with a positive organisational culture. Qualitative research could 
help disentangle the relationship between historical performance and the response to an 
external inspection.Assessing the organisational culture during inspections could be an area 
that the CQC could explore, and further research could inform if there is a relationship 
between culture and the effect of an inspection. 
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10.1.7 Value for money 
Although a cost-effectiveness analysis of the new regime inspections was planned, it was not 
appropriate to calculate the cost per adverse event or death prevented due to these 
inspections’ lack of effectiveness. The costs of a new regime CQC inspection considering the 
opportunity costs borne by acute NHS trusts and the operational costs of an inspection for 
CQC ranged from £169,691 to £256,378 for a small trust and from £351,100 to £418,136 for a 
large trust. 
Contrary to the standards used by NICE to determine what interventions to fund in the NHS, 
when it comes to system-level policies, there is no exhaustive search for high-quality evidence 
to assess the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of a given intervention. If we viewed 
inspections in isolation as an intervention, and these findings regarding the effectiveness of 
the new regime of CQC inspections were submitted to a review by NICE, the intervention 
would not be funded. However, the value for money associated with CQC inspections remains 
a valid question. The work of the CQC involves the development of standards; the registration 
and monitoring of social, mental, and health care providers; and inspections; therefore, the 
value of regulatory institutions cannot be judged solely based on the effect of inspections. 
Evidence regarding the costs of external inspections or accreditation visits is scant. The cost 
audit tool used for data collection in this thesis was based on Mumford et al. (2013) who found 
that hospitals in Australia spent between 0.03% and 0.6% of their annual budget in one 
accreditation cycle, which is similar to what it was estimated in this research (i.e. between 
0.035% and 0.16% of the annual operating budget). In England, a study commissioned by the 
Healthcare Commission to determine the cost of their inspections for acute NHS trusts found 
that there was not enough information to calculate the costs because trusts were not keeping 
a log of the resources spent on preparing for a self-assessment (Healthcare Commission, 
2008a). 
Some aspects that could help increase the value for money of CQC inspections are the time 
commitment needed to perform the inspection, costs associated with goal displacement24 and 
monitoring how the action plan is carried out to ensure changes translate into improvements. 
Providers recognise CQC inspections as a form of external review that allow them to confirm 
and showcase the standards and care quality delivered (NHS Providers, 2017). Indeed, CQC 
visits may confirm what providers already know about deficient and outstanding areas of care 
(Walshe et al., 2014, NHS Providers, 2017). However, when NHS providers were asked if the 
                                                             
24 Duty managers have to stop performing to respond to CQC requirements. It also conveys an 
opportunity cost associated with using resources to meet consensus raised during the inspection, to the 
detriment of other interests. 
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benefits of CQC inspections justified the costs, answers were mixed: 38% agreed, and 38% 
disagreed. Moreover, providers stated, “the same benefits could be achieved through a more 
streamlined approach” (NHS Providers, 2017). In comparison, the views of trusts regarding the 
“annual health check” were more favourable. In that case, 53% (31 of 58 trusts) considered 
that the assessment of core standards outweighed the costs, 77% (94 of 122 trusts) thought 
the self-assessment provided assurance to the board, 82% (100 of 122 trusts) mentioned it 
helped identifying priorities for improvement, and 75% (92 of 122 trusts) claimed it put quality 
in a central position (Healthcare Commission, 2008a). This implies that trusts are willing to 
submit to some regulatory burden to ensure quality of care (i.e. compliance is seen as a moral 
act), but the new regime of CQC inspections between 2013 and 2016 was particularly 
burdensome.  
It is useful to remember that the failure of care by Mid-Staffordshire happened during the time 
of the annual health check, which was a more light touch approach to regulation (Bevan, 
2015); therefore, it was deemed appropriate to switch to a more controlling regime of 
inspection to prevent more failures and protect the public. 
The CQC has already taken actions to reduce the burden of on-site visits and increasing value. 
In June 2017, the CQC launched a new regime of inspections which is using the trust’s previous 
rating to determine the frequency of inspection, is focusing on one core service and the well-
led domain, and is including an assessment of the trust’s use of resources (Care Quality 
Commission, 2017c). Future research could examine whether this simpler approach is better 
value for money than the regime implemented until June 2017. 
10.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the thesis 
This is the first quantitative study estimating the effect and cost of external inspections of 
hospitals in England. The design chosen, an interrupted time series with control, is a robust 
method for assessing the impact of health policies when executing a controlled randomised 
trial is not possible (Penfold and Zhang, 2013, Shadish et al., 2002, Kontopantelis et al., 2015b). 
Estimations of the opportunity cost of inspection visits are largely unknown. This thesis 
provides the first insight into the activities NHS trusts carry out in preparation for an on-site 
visit and how much they cost. Lack of effectiveness meant that estimating the cost-
effectiveness of inspections was unnecessary. 
The robustness of the analyses in this thesis relies on the inclusion of a high proportion of 
acute trusts in England and a long time-series before and after an intervention, improving the 
validity of the conclusions. The use of two intervention points allows testing for both 
anticipatory and immediate effects. Additionally, intervention points (i.e. inspection and 
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announcement) were spread over a 12-month period, reducing confounding related to one 
specific time point (Shadish et al., 2002). The inclusion of several confounding and 
intermediate variables into the model improves the confidence in the estimates. The study 
design chosen can only assess the effect of inspections in isolation, and it does not allow for 
determination of the overall effectiveness of the CQC, in particular, because it would be 
difficult to find a good counterfactual for evaluating the effect of a regulatory institution.  
A weakness of this thesis is the lack of qualitative information that could shed light on the 
mechanism of change for CQC inspections. Despite the large body of literature exploring the 
effect of accreditation or external inspections (see Chapter 4), it remains largely unknown 
when (regarding temporality and circumstances), how, and why organisations respond to 
external oversight. This means that most of the potential explanations for the findings are 
based on theoretical relationships since empirical evidence linking features of organisations 
and response to inspections is limited. 
10.2.1 Data quality 
Data quality is a particularly challenging issue for observational comparative effectiveness 
studies (Hernan, 2011). The main difficulty is that routinely collected data does not always 
meet reliability and validity requirements for research; therefore, validation studies are often 
required before making inferences. For this thesis, acute NHS trusts reported all data; 
however, the requirements and quality checks for submission of the information for each 
indicator were different. 
Falls with harm and pressure ulcers are reported to the NHS safety thermometer (NHS ST), a 
publicly available dataset, collected nationally, on a monthly basis, using consistent definitions 
and standards. It provides data on adverse events in real time and allows trusts to act on this 
information (Power et al., 2012). However, data may be inconsistent due to variable data entry 
skills, flexible interpretations of operational definitions and variations in patients’ case-mix 
across sites (Power et al., 2014). The interpretation of these measures can vary within 
hospitals and over time, making it imprecise and at risk of gaming (Power et al., 2014).  
There is no published reliability assessment of the falls with harm component of the ST. 
However, Sari et al. (2006) found that only 56% of falls and 23% of pressure ulcers were 
reported to the routine system (i.e. NRLS) compared to incidents found in medical records. 
Whilst this number could have been used as a proxy of the magnitude of underreporting, it 
was not direct evidence of underreporting to the ST, with later research showing differences in 
the extent of underreporting to the NRLS and the ST (Smith et al., 2016). In the case of 
pressure ulcers, a pressure ulcer and wound audit (PUWA) found that 50.6% of pressure ulcers 
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were reported to the ST, which translates into weighted sensitivity of 48.2% (95% CI 35.4 to 
56.7%) (Smith et al., 2016). Although this study provides a nation-wide estimation of 
underreporting, to factor the impact of reporting behaviours in the model, two pieces of 
information are needed. One is the variation over time for each trust, and the other is how the 
announcement and on-site visit affect reporting of adverse events. The lack of this information 
hinders their inclusion into the model, and validation of the dataset was out of the scope of 
this thesis. 
Given the potential effect of reporting culture on data reliability, two measures were 
introduced into the model: a score given to assess potential under-reporting of patient safety 
incidents provided by the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) in October 2013, and 
reporting culture ratings provided by CQC in 2016. In the model for falls with harm, the NRLS 
score was statistically significant, but their trust type (large, teaching, medium, small, or 
specialist) better explained between-trust variability. The results of the analyses in groups 
matched by potential confounders remained the same, providing confidence in the 
estimations. 
Although waiting times are official statistics, audits and research performed during the 
“targets and terror” period indicate that reported A&E waiting times were overstated in the 
official statistics since patients and doctors reported longer waiting times (Healthcare 
Commission, 2008b, Jones and Schimanski, 2010) and the patterns of data suggested gaming 
(Locker and Mason, 2005, Locker and Mason, 2006, Mason et al., 2012). The lack of more 
recent audits measuring the extent of gaming and how it changes in relation to an upcoming 
inspection prevent including this factor into the model, but it is presumed waiting times in A&E 
are underreported, and gaming would increase prior to a CQC visit. 
RTT waiting times are submitted to the database used to determine payment for services (i.e. 
Secondary Uses Service [SUS]) (NHS England, 2015c); therefore, data quality standards should 
be higher. However, flexible interpretation of the rules (i.e. clock starts, pause and stops), led 
to incorrect recording and low comparability of data (National Audit Office, 2014). Recording 
errors produced a median of 11 days that were under-recorded, with the proportion of 
correctly timed cases ranging from 13 to 57% in the trusts audited (National Audit Office, 
2014). In October 2015, the Department of Health published a new suite of rules to ensure 
consistent reporting and eliminate the possibility of pausing or suspending the waiting time 
(DOH, 2015c). This change could be responsible for the increase in the rate of referrals waiting 
more than 18 weeks observed in the analyses. The lack of information on the accuracy of data 
at a national level and its relation to the pressure of an upcoming inspection prevent it being 
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accounted for. Similar to what it is expected for adverse events, trusts may manipulate their 
RTT waiting times before an on-site CQC visit, but at present, this remains speculation. 
Crude mortality rates are highly reliable, but some problems can arise from the reporting of 
variables for risk adjustment (Clinical Indicators Team, 2017). The main problem with SHMI is 
that data is not extracted directly from patients’ records. Instead, the information is stored in a 
single database for internal purposes (i.e. Patient Administration System), which is later 
submitted to the SUS. NHS Digital uses the latter to create HES data (Clinical Indicators Team, 
2017). This means that a trained coder has to transform the primary diagnosis and all the 
comorbidities into ICD-10 codes (ibid). NHS Digital reports that there are some variations 
between organisations in the accuracy of clinical coding, but these do not affect the SHMI 
calculation (ibid). Other factors that might affect the indicator such as palliative care are not 
included due to inconsistency in the coding (HSCIC, 2013b). The data submitted by the 
providers have to comply with validation rules and go through an audit (Clinical Indicators 
Team, 2017); therefore, the possibility of manipulating data to the advantage of a trust is low. 
In practice, variations in clinical coding are translated into higher variability between trusts, 
reducing the probability of finding statistically significant differences in the effect of 
inspections among groups, but gaming is expected to be low. 
NHS Digital does not recommend using SHMI to determine performance over time because the 
model for predicted deaths is recalibrated each quarter. This means that the SHMI value will 
vary depending on how much the performance of a trust changes compared to the variation in 
the national average (Clinical Indicators Team, 2017). Despite this, SHMI was chosen over 
HSMR because the latter is more prone to gaming or error via changing the number of patients 
coded as receiving palliative care (Taylor, 2013). Changes in crude mortality rates can be 
explained by variations in case-mix over time without reflecting the effort to improve death 
rates. In turn, SHMI was the best available measure of mortality. 
The National NHS Inpatient Survey is the source of information for patients’ perception of 
being treated with dignity and respect. The response rate to this survey has dropped over time 
from 59% in 2005 to 47% in 2015 (Boyd et al., 2007, Care Quality Commission, 2016a). Most of 
the data collection occurs in July of the year of the survey, and only small trusts collect 
information from patients discharged in previous months (Care Quality Commission, 2016a). 
These two features make data prone to bias (i.e. non-response bias and seasonal effects). 
These biases could affect the estimations via two scenarios: when the variation year to year 
makes the estimations of the trajectory invalid and when the magnitude of these biases is 
differential. The CQC reports response rates for each trust every year; nonetheless, there is no 
way to know if over time the samples represent variations in perception of care for each trust 
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or how these changes relate to CQC inspections. The solution to achieving comparability of 
data, which does not resolve the issue around validity, is to standardise responses by case-mix. 
This provides a picture of what patients’ perception of care would be if all trusts had the same 
population demographic. The impact of CQC inspections on the representativeness of the 
responding sample, and therefore, the validity of the responses to the survey, remains 
unknown. 
NHS Digital generates NHS workforce statistics using information trusts report to electronic 
staff records, where turnover rates are part of the quarterly published official statistics 
(Electronic Staff Record Programme, 2017). The definitions are standardised through 
Information Standards Notices to achieve consistent reporting (ibid). Since April 2012, NHS 
Digital has performed validation checks on the workforce data in ESR, including crosschecking 
and validation rules (HSCIC, 2013a). The results of this exercise produce a score for each trust 
with suggestions on how to improve data quality. The areas with more errors are pay bands, 
job roles, and missing information (NHS Digital, 2017). Since turnover rates are linked to the 
payment for staff services, it was expected to be accurate, but no formal study validating the 
dataset was included. The lack of reliability or validity information would affect the estimation 
presented here if reporting varied close to an inspection. However, manipulation of these 
statistics does not seem to produce an advantage for acute trusts; therefore, this was deemed 
unlikely. 
10.2.2 Statistical analysis 
The estimation of an intervention effect in an interrupted time series is based on a comparison 
with a counterfactual. In the case of a single time-series, this counterfactual is the trend 
observed before the intervention. When a control group is added, the counterfactual is 
constructed in comparison to the pre-inspection pattern and the change seen in the control. In 
an environment that is under constant change, such as healthcare organisations in the NHS, 
assuming that the previous pattern observed is a good representation of what would have 
happened should the inspection not have been conducted, is questionable. Moreover, acute 
trusts are subject to interventions by other agencies such as NHS Improvement and PLACE 
assessments (i.e. Patient-Led Assessments of the Care Environment), which can affect the 
trajectory of the time-series. Since all the organisations received these external interventions 
at a different time in relation to the inspection, the approach chosen for this thesis was to 
simplify modelling by ignoring other inspections and assuming that the pre-inspection trend 
would remain equal post-intervention. A different approach to modelling the counterfactual 
could have yielded a different picture about the effectiveness of CQC inspections. However, 
the lack of information regarding the impact of other interventions, and the potential 
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trajectory for each measure in the absence of an inspection prevented the use of a more 
complex approach. If the hypothesis that a delayed effect of austerity is responsible for the 
worsening or flat performance on the measures analysed is true, then, the counterfactual used 
is too optimistic, and the real effect would be smaller. 
The mechanisms leading to changes in the outputs of an inspection are poorly known. 
Robertson et al. (2017) explain what might trigger a shift in behaviour in organisations waiting 
for an inspection, but information is lacking about several aspects relevant for modelling. For 
instance, knowing the speed of diffusion of change (i.e. gradual or abrupt), the length that 
efforts are sustained, and whether or not the Quality Summit and the publication of the report 
should be factored in to determine the model’s specification. The modelling strategy chosen 
allows the detection of abrupt and gradual changes; however, it does not take into account the 
duration of the effect (i.e. permanent or short-term) or the potential impact of the Quality 
Summit and the publication of the report on quality measures. Two of the difficulties 
elucidating these three aspects are that they differ for each acute trust and that information 
on them is rarely available. This thesis did not look into the effect of the Quality Summit and 
the report, and exploring their impact is worth pursuing in the future. Regarding the duration 
of the effect, potential differences between the counterfactual and the observed level 12 
months following an inspection was tested; however, it is not clear if an inspection can trigger 
improvements that are sustainable for one year or if those changes are due to other 
interventions. A process evaluation could help clarify these uncertainties and increase 
confidence in the estimations of effect. 
The findings could also be explained by a statistical phenomenon produced by the point 
chosen for the interruption. Since to a certain degree, the quality measures selected vary 
randomly, the segmented regression could have artificially created changes to levels or trends 
not linked to the implementation of improvements, therefore, making them spurious. Since 
the changes were small and generally non-significant, performing a sensitivity analysis did not 
seem justified. 
10.2.3 Potential risks of bias 
Other events occurring during or around the inspection and which may change the behaviour 
of NHS trusts and the outcomes measured can produce history bias. One measure taken 
against this bias was the use of a switching-replication design (Shadish et al., 2002), where 
intervention points are spread over time. However, during the observation period, at least 
three historical events occurred that could have influenced the findings. Although they 
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affected all trusts, the relevance of these events relies on its potential to prevent or be 
synergetic to the effect of CQC inspections. 
Firstly, austerity measures were imposed in June 2010, constraining the NHS budget 
substantially, particularly towards the end of the time series. This might have affected trusts’ 
ability to maintain safe staffing levels during high demand periods and implement any new 
quality improvement initiatives. Secondly, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 was fully 
implemented in April 2013, changing the commissioning structure of the NHS in England. 
Although only 17 (11%) of the inspections occurred before this date, a reform of this 
magnitude could have had repercussions several months after its implementation. Any 
learning effect could effectively plateau, but it is not possible to predict for how long and to 
what extent the reform could have affected hospitals’ performance. Thirdly, there were high 
profile quality improvement initiatives contemporaneous to the time series (Keogh, 2013, 
National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in England, 2013). All these external factors 
could have produced a change in managerial and clinical priorities and behaviours that would 
explain the limited effect detected, without being a direct effect of CQC inspections. 
Another potential threat to the validity of the results is that the selection of trusts for the new 
regime of CQC inspections was not random and significant differences were detected. Trusts 
selected in the first round of new regime inspections were more likely to be in special 
measures, have a “poor” or “significant concerns” reporting culture rating and less likely to 
have Foundation Trust status. Hence, changes to trend in this group could be explained by 
regression to the mean, modification of reporting behaviour or the regulatory intervention to 
which they were subjected. The analyses performed in a subsample of acute trusts matched by 
these three features showed similar patterns, thus increasing the confidence in the reported 
estimates. 
Two other phenomena could modify the effect of CQC inspections: spillover effects and 
complementary interventions. The spillover effect refers to the impact of an intervention on 
other measures or groups that were not initially targeted. In this thesis, trusts not inspected 
and those inspected under the old regime could have modified their behaviour in response to 
the pressure of being the next in line to receive a new regime inspection. Another potential 
spillover may occur in relation to quality indicators, where implemented quality improvements 
initiatives could beneficially impact measures not assessed by this regime. This was one of the 
arguments to include falls with harm and pressure ulcers as care quality measures; however, 
the quality of these data affects the validity of these findings (see section 10.2.1). 
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Complementary interventions are those that affect the same indicators being studied, are 
implemented in parallel and can have a synergetic effect. For example, interventions 
promoted by NHS England (e.g. how to improve flow and demand), NHS Improvement (e.g. 
stop the pressure), foundations (e.g. the point of care patient’s experience programme) and 
institutes (e.g. pursuing perfection of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement) could be 
responsible for improvements observed without being associated with a CQC inspection. A 
process evaluation of the implementation of the new regime of inspection could have helped 
tease out how many of the changes are due to spillover or complementary interventions and 
how many are attributable to CQC visits; however, this was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
10.3 Policy implications and unanswered questions 
Four models of quality governance with various degrees of effectiveness have been used in 
combination throughout the history of the NHS in order to direct efforts for improvement: 
trust and altruism, choice and competition, targets and terror, and naming and shaming (see 
Chapter 3). During the review of the NHS services commissioned by Lord Darzi (2008), the 
findings of three independent organisations emphasised that the way reform was approached 
had some negative consequences. The constant change had produced organisational instability 
and interim leadership, targets had driven a culture of compliance and fear of sanctions, there 
was a divide between clinical professionals and managers, and expectations about 
commissioning as a driver for improvement were unrealistic (Ham, 2014b). The 
recommendations of these reports (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2008, McGlynn et 
al., 2008, Joint Commission International, 2008) and other experts (Ham, 2009b) were to 
engage clinicians on any type of reform, and to invest in fostering and increasing staff 
capabilities for quality improvement, whilst encouraging a culture of learning.  
The current model of quality governance in the NHS, the “inspection state”, assumes that 
board members have the skills and capacity to influence staff behaviour, and in that way, drive 
improvements and ensure compliance with external standards (Mannion et al., 2015). Another 
assumption is that the system has enough data about quality of care for allowing regulators, 
commissioners, and providers to monitor performance. 
Although the National Health Service collects information for several national audits on a 
regular basis, and every acute trust reports a standard set of indicators, the data collected do 
not always meet the requirement for supporting improvement. For example, clinical staff 
deem data gathered to respond to regulatory requests of great value, but they suggest there 
should be a national dataset of performance allowing comparison at the trust, speciality, and 
clinician levels to enable improvements in clinical care (NHS Confederation, 2013). Another 
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issue identified was timeliness of information, since trusts receive collated data months after 
the initial request. Therefore, a shorter turnaround time would increase the value of existing 
information (NHS Confederation, 2013). Additionally, for clinicians and patients the 
information available is not easy to access or understand, which hinders its potential impact on 
quality of care (ibid).  
Given these issues, the following are suggested: a single standardised platform where each 
NHS providers can upload information; the definition of a minimum set of quality indicators 
that every provider should report; and investment in improving the reliability and validity of 
regularly collected data. These suggestions could reduce the regulatory burden for providers 
since regulators could extract information from the aforementioned platform instead of 
requesting data for monitoring and inspection purposes. Real-time data paired with trained 
clinicians and senior managers would allow the identification of potential areas for 
improvement, enabling the creation of action plans to remedy any issue. Moreover, better 
information systems would impact commissioning, since CCGs could compare the performance 
of all providers in an area and establish realistic targets for the delivery of services and 
improvements in quality of care. Finally, the publication of ranked quality performance data 
has the potential to drive improvements by increasing competition among providers due to 
reputational threats (Hibbard et al., 2003). 
The CQC has the ability to monitor performance and apply enforcement measures to non-
compliant trusts. In a sense, constant scrutiny of hospitals’ activities and outcomes is already 
in place, which reinforces the idea that on-site visits could be reduced. The role of the CQC 
should be to exert a constant pressure on providers so they maintain a minimal standard of 
care continuously (i.e. quality assurance role), which in the long term could reduce the 
preparatory burden. In addition, the maintenance of those systems could lead to 
improvements of care quality over time (i.e. quality improvement role). The oversight strategy 
of NHS Improvement as financial regulator points to “reducing the reporting burden in order 
to allow providers to focus on improving quality and efficiency” (NHS Improvement, 2016b). 
Moreover, since June 2017, the CQC (again) changed the approach to inspections to make 
them less burdensome. These two examples illustrate the current efforts to improve the use of 
resources in regulation. The results suggest that the pressure or expectation of a future on-site 
inspection(s) may influence acute trust behaviour, but this does not lead to positive lasting 
changes. There may be more efficient uses of NHS resources than the current intensive 
inspection regime: the appropriate ‘dose’ of inspection in terms of maximising the efficiency of 
scrutiny that hospitals receive is unknown.  
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Bevan and Hood (2006b) suggest that telling institutions exactly how and when their 
performance will be measured is similar to an open invitation to game the monitoring system 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006b). Therefore, adding some randomness to oversight (with an 
associated evaluation) could increase certainty that the observed performance is a fair 
reflection of real performance.  
Over time, there have been several attempts to improve the external oversight system within 
the NHS: different types of rating systems have been employed, different risk stratification 
methods used, and a myriad of approaches to on-site visits considered. However, dissonance 
from everyday work in hospitals remains and with it, a limited ability to influence 
improvement (NHS Providers, 2017). Strategies that could lead to more effective regulatory 
schemes include risk stratification tools for prioritising the inspection of worse performers, 
proportional inspection methods that focus on care areas requiring more attention and the 
ability to use enforcement actions of differing strengths. The CQC has all these instruments at 
its disposal, but instead of making the inspection regime more effective, it has turned it into 
something that is overly burdensome (Limb, 2016). 
Oversight institutions have been in use for nearly 20 years within the NHS, each has been 
criticised and consequently replaced with ever more complex solutions; each promising to 
remedy the ills of past structures and institutions. If increasing regulation has not paid off, 
perhaps, it may be time to reduce the administrative burden of the inspections and institutions 
that prevail. Improving data systems and joint inspections of several regulators (e.g. CQC, NHS 
Improvement and PLACE assessments), could help reduce the burden of regulation. 
One question that remains unanswered relates to identifying the mechanisms explaining how 
and when inspections work. This could be informed by a realist process evaluation, first 
exploring the underlying medium level theories that could help understand how inspections 
work, and then, evaluating the process of preparing for the inspections and what happens 
afterwards in a selected sample of acute trusts, thus reflecting different contextual factors.  
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10.4 Conclusion 
The findings of this thesis suggest that neither the announcement of or inspections by CQC of 
acute hospitals are associated with changes in the seven measures of care quality selected. 
Even when some statistical differences were found, the magnitude of these indicates that they 
are unlikely to be clinically significant. The patterns observed are more likely to be related to 
other phenomena such as a lagged effect of austerity measures rather than the intervention of 
the CQC.  
The main contribution of this thesis is as the first rigorous, quantitative assessment of the 
contribution of external inspections to the quality of care provided by acute hospitals in 
England. Although such inspections were not associated with improvements in the seven 
measures selected, this evidence will help build a body of literature to inform future decision-
making. It remains unclear, however, if regulation can prevent poor care. 
Future research should renew the focus on understanding when, how and why some 









Appendix Chapter 2  
Table 2.1 Quotes referring to quality in key NHS policy documents from 1948 to 2012 
Policy document Structure Process Output Outcome 
Health and 
social care act 
2012 
"In discharging the duty under 
subsection (1) the Secretary of State 
must, in particular, act with a view to 
securing continuous improvement in 
the outcomes that are achieved from 
the provision of the services. 
The outcomes relevant for the 
purposes of subsection (2) include, in 
particular, outcomes which show— 
(a) the effectiveness of the services, 
(b) the safety of the services, and 
(c) The quality of the experience 
undergone by patients. (Part 1, 
section 2 and 3) 
In paragraph 14R, these same duties 




"[objectives of trust special 
administration] (3) The criterion is 
that ceasing to provide the service 
under this Act would, in the absence 
of alternative arrangements for its 
provision under this Act, be likely 
to— 
(a) have a significant adverse impact 
on the health of persons in need of 
"(4) In carrying out the duty under 
subsection (2) or (3) 
(standardisation of the 
specifications of health services), 
the Board and Monitor must have 
regard to whether, or to what 
extent, standardisation is likely to 
have a significant adverse impact on 
the provision of health care services 




"(1) In exercising its functions NICE 
must have regard to— 
(a) the broad balance between the 
benefits and costs of the provision 
of health services or of social care in 
England,  
(b) the degree of need of persons 
for health services or social care in 
England, and 
(c) The desirability of promoting 
innovation in the provision of health 
services or of social care in 
England." (section 233) 
 
 
"For the purpose of determining 
whether to make a payment under 
subsection (1) and (if so) the 
amount of the payment, the Board 
must take into account at least one 
of the following factors— 
(a) the quality of relevant services 
provided during the financial year; 
(b) any improvement in the quality 
of relevant services provided during 
that year (in comparison to [...] 
previous financial years); 
(c) the outcomes identified during 
the financial year as having been 
achieved from the provision at any 
time of relevant services; 
(d) Any improvement in the 
outcomes identified during that 
financial year as having been so 
achieved (in comparison to [...] 
previous financial years)". (Section 
223K, paragraph 2) 
"(1) The Board must conduct a 
performance assessment of each 
clinical commissioning group in 
respect of each financial year. 
(2) A performance assessment is an 
assessment of how well the clinical 
commissioning group has 
discharged its functions during that 
year. 
(3) The assessment must, in 
particular, include an assessment of 
how well the group has discharged:   
- Duty as to improvement of quality 
of services   
- Duty in relation to quality of 
primary medical services    
- Duty as to reducing inequalities 
- Public involvement and 
consultation by clinical 
commissioning groups 
- Financial duties of clinical 
commissioning groups: expenditure 




"(3) In this section a “quality 
indicator” means a factor by 
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Policy document Structure Process Output Outcome 
the service or significantly increase 
health inequalities, or 
(b) Cause a failure to prevent or 
ameliorate either a significant 
adverse impact on the health of such 
persons or a significant increase in 




"Each clinical commissioning group 
must, in the exercise of its functions, 
have regard to the need to— 
(a) reduce inequalities between 
patients with respect to their ability 
to access health services, and 
(b) Reduce inequalities between 
patients with respect to the 
outcomes achieved for them by the 




"The Secretary of State must specify 
in the mandate— 
(a) the objectives [...] the Board 
should seek to achieve in the exercise 
of its functions [...], and 
(b) Any requirements that the 
Secretary of State considers it 
necessary to impose on the Board for 
the purpose of ensuring that it 
[Referring to the Professional 
standards authority]"(3) If the 
Authority is satisfied that a 
voluntary register meets the 
accreditation criteria, it may 
accredit the register. 
(4) The Authority may carry out 
periodic reviews of the operation of 
registers accredited under this 
section for the purpose of 
stablishing whether they continue 
to meet the accreditation criteria. 
(5) If, on a review under subsection 
(4), the Authority is satisfied that a 
voluntary register no longer meets 
the accreditation criteria, the 
Authority may remove or suspend, 
or impose conditions on, the 
accreditation of the register. 
(6) The Authority may refuse to 
accredit a register, or to continue to 
accredit a register, unless the 
person who maintains the register 
pays a fee of such amount as the 
Authority may determine. 
(7) The Authority must publish such 
accreditation criteria as it sets." 
(section 229, subsection 25G) 
 
 
"(1) The Authority has the following 
functions— 
reference to which performance in 
the provision of services or care can 
be measured." (section 268) 
 
 
"The Board must establish and 
operate systems for collecting and 
analysing information relating to 
the safety of the services provided 




"The Board must give advice and 
guidance, to such persons as it 
considers appropriate, for the 
purpose of maintaining and 
improving the safety of the services 
provided by the health service 
(subsection 4). The Board must 
monitor the effectiveness of the 
advice and guidance given by it 




"(4) Subsection (5) applies if, having 
given a notice under subsection (1), 
the Secretary of State is satisfied 
that— 
(a) the bodies concerned have 
breached or are continuing to 
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achieves those objectives". Chapter 
A1, section 13A) 
 
 
"(2) The responsible local authority 
and each of its partner clinical 
commissioning groups must prepare 
a strategy for meeting the needs 
included in the assessment by the 
exercise of functions of the authority, 
the National Health Service 
Commissioning Board or the clinical 
commissioning groups (“a joint 




"(b) where it concludes that any of 
the matters specified in the reference 
operate, or may be expected to 
operate, against the public interest, 
must specify in the report the effects 
adverse to the public interest which 
those matters have or may be 
expected to have, and 
(c) Where it concludes that any 
adverse effects so specified could be 
remedied or prevented by changes in 
relation to the matters specified in 
the reference, must specify in the 
report changes which could remedy 
(a) to promote the interests of users 
of health care, users of social care in 
England, users of social work 
services in England and other 
members of the public in relation to 
the performance of voluntary 
registration functions, 
(b) to promote best practice in the 
performance of voluntary 
registration functions, and 
(c) To formulate principles of good 
governance in the performance of 
voluntary registration functions and 
to encourage persons who maintain 
or operate accredited voluntary 
registers to conform to those 




"(1) The relevant commissioner 
(NHS Board or Secretary of State) 
may direct NICE to prepare 
statements of standards in relation 
to the provision of— (a) NHS 
services, (b) public health services, 
or (c) social care in England.   
(2) In this Part such a statement is 




breach the duty or, the risk of a 
breach having materialised, are 
breaching the duty, and 
(b) The breach is having a 
detrimental effect on the 
performance of the health service 
(or, where the effect of the breach 
on the performance of the health 
service is both beneficial and 
detrimental, its overall effect is 
detrimental). 
(5) The Secretary of State may by 
order prohibit each body from 
exercising specified functions or 
from exercising specified functions 
in a specified manner, unless the 
other body concerned agrees in 
writing that the body may do so." 
(section 291) 
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or prevent those effects." (schedule 
10 section 6) 
 
 
"(1) Regulations may impose 
requirements on the National Health 
Service Commissioning Board and 
clinical commissioning groups for the 
purpose of securing that, in 
commissioning health care services 
for the purposes of the NHS, they— 
(a) adhere to good practice in 
relation to procurement; 
(b) protect and promote the right of 
patients to make choices with 
respect to treatment or other health 
care services provided for the 
purposes of the NHS; 
(c) Do not engage in anti-competitive 
behaviour which is against the 
interests of people who use such 
services". (Section 75) 
 
 
"The Board must make arrangements 
to secure that individuals to whom 
the services are being or may be 
provided are involved (whether by 
being consulted or provided with 
information or in other ways)— 
"(1) Regulations may confer 
functions on NICE in relation to the 
giving of advice or guidance, 
provision of information or making 
of recommendations about any 
matter concerning or connected 
with the provision of— (a) NHS 
services, (b) public health services, 




"(5) The regulations may make 
provision about—(a) the persons 
who may request or require 
[functions of NICE], (b) the 
publication or other dissemination 
of [functions of NICE] (c) the 
imposition by NICE of charges for or 




"(1) The main duty of Monitor in 
exercising its functions is to protect 
and promote the interests of people 
who use health care services by 
promoting provision of health care 
services which— 
(a) is economic, efficient and 
effective, and 
(b) Maintains or improves the 
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(a) in the planning of the 
commissioning arrangements by the 
Board, 
(b) in the development and 
consideration of proposals by the 
Board for changes in the 
commissioning arrangements where 
the implementation of the proposals 
would have an impact on the manner 
in which the services are delivered to 
the individuals or the range of health 
services available to them, and 
(c) In decisions of the Board affecting 
the operation of the commissioning 
arrangements where the 
implementation of the decisions 
would (if made) have such an impact. 
(section 13Q, paragraph 1-2) 
 
 
"Each clinical commissioning group 
must, in the exercise of its functions, 
act with a view to enabling patients 
to make choices with respect to 
aspects of health services provided to 
them". (Section 14V) 
 
 
"10A The general duties of the 
council of governors are— 
(a) to hold the non-executive 
directors individually and collectively 
quality of the services". (section 62) 
 
 
"(1) The Commission has the 
following functions in relation to 
the processing of relevant 
information— 
(a) to monitor the practice followed 
by registered persons in relation to 
such processing, and 
(b) To keep the National Health 
Service Commissioning Board and 
Monitor informed about the 
practice being followed by 
registered persons in relation to 
such processing. 
(2) The Commission must, in 
exercising those functions, seek to 
improve the practice followed by 
registered persons in relation to the 
processing of relevant information". 
(section 280) 
276 
Policy document Structure Process Output Outcome 
to account for the performance of 
the board of directors, and 
(b) To represent the interests of the 
members of the corporation as a 
whole and the interests of the 
public.” (section 151, paragraph 4) 
 
 
"(5) The function in this subsection is 
to provide the persons mentioned in 
subsection (6) with information and 
advice on— 
(a) the views of people who use 
health or social care services and of 
other members of the public on their 
needs for and experiences of health 
and social care services, and 
(b) The views of Local Healthwatch 
organisations and of other persons 
on the standard of provision of 
health and social care services and on 
whether or how the standard could 
or should be improved." (section 
45A, subsection 5) 
 
 
"(3) Each local authority may make 
such other arrangements as it 
considers appropriate for the 
provision of services in relation to its 
area providing assistance to 
individuals in connection with 
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complaints relating to the provision 
of services as part of the health 
service." (section 185) 
 
 
"(1) Monitor must publish guidance 
about— 
(a) compliance with requirements 
imposed by regulations under section 
75; 
(b) How it intends to exercise powers 
conferred on it by regulations under 
that section". (section 78) 
 
 
"Monitor must exercise its functions 
with a view to enabling health care 
services provided by the purposes of 
the NHS to be provided in an 
integrated way and the provision of 
health care services is integrated 
with the provision of health related 
services or social care services where 
it considers that this would— 
(a) improve the quality of the health 
services (including the outcomes that 
are achieved from the provision of 
those services), 
(b) reduce inequalities between 
persons with respect to their ability 
to access those services, or 
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(c) Reduce inequalities between 
persons with respect to the 
outcomes achieved for them by the 
provision of those services". (section 
62, paragraphs 4-5) 
 
 
The Board must exercise its functions 
with a view to securing that the 
health services are provided in an 
integrated way and the provision of 
health services is integrated with the 
provision of health related services or 
social care services where it 
considers that this would— 
(a) improve the quality of the health 
services (including the outcomes that 
are achieved from the provision of 
those services), 
(b) reduce inequalities between 
persons with respect to their ability 
to access those services, or 
(c) Reduce inequalities between 
persons with respect to the 
outcomes achieved for them by the 
provision of those services. (section 
13N, paragraphs 1-2) 
 
 
"(1) A Health and Wellbeing Board 
must, for the purpose of advancing 
the health and wellbeing of the 
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people in its area, encourage persons 
who arrange for the provision of any 
health or social care services in that 
area to work in an integrated 
manner." (Section 195) 
High quality 
care for all 2008 
 
The NHS is as much a social 
movement as a health service. That is 
why it is so vital to secure its 
founding principles and set out the 
rights and responsibilities of patients, 
public and staff. 
 
An NHS that gives patients and the 
public more information and choice, 
works in partnership and has quality 
of care at its heart. 
 
The NHS is there when we need it 
most. It provides round the clock, 
compassionate care and comfort. It 
plays a vital role in ensuring that as 
many of us as possible can enjoy 
good health for as long as possible – 
one of the things that matters most 
to us and to our family and friends. 
 
They were delivered by the 
dedication and hard work of NHS 
staff who were determined to 
improve services for patients and the 
public.  
 
Over the last 10 years we have 
improved the basic standards of the 
NHS. 
If the challenge 10 years ago was 
capacity, the challenge today is to 
drive improvements in the quality 
of care. We need a more 
personalised NHS, responsive to 
each of us as individuals, focused on 
prevention, better equipped to 
keep us healthy and capable of 
giving us real control and real 
choices over our care and our lives. 
 
My team’s conversations about 
quality take place in weekly 
multidisciplinary meetings rather 
than in corridors. Together, these 
changes have meant real 
improvements for patients. 
 
 
In developing the visions, the NHS 
has had to face up to signiﬁcant 




Developing new best practice tariffs 
focused on areas for improvement. 
These will pay for best practice 
rather than average cost, meaning 
NHS organisations will need to 
improve to keep up. 
 
 
High quality work is not simply a 
matter of a good deal for staff and 
for patients. It is also essential to 
meeting the productivity challenge: 
high quality workplaces make best 
use of the talents of their people, 
ensuring that their skills are up to 
date, and their efforts never 
wasted. The public rightly expect 
their taxes to be put to best use. For 
those working in the NHS there is a 
need to reduce unnecessary 
bureaucracy, freeing up their time 
to care for patients, within the 
resources available. Creating high 
quality workplaces requires great 
leadership and good management. 
 
 
Outcomes have improved as a 
result: 238,000 lives have been 
saved in the last 11 years as a result 
of signiﬁcant improvements in 
cancer and heart disease survival 




NHS South West, for example, has 
set a goal of matching the longest 
life expectancy in Europe. 
 
 
From no later than 2010, payments 
will reward outcomes under the 
scheme. 
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My career is dedicated to improving 
continuously the quality of care we 
provide for patients. This is what 
inspires me and my professional 
colleagues, and it has been the 
guiding principle for this Review. We 
need to continue the NHS journey of 
improvements and move from an 
NHS that has rightly focused on 
increasing the quantity of care to one 
that focuses on improving the quality 
of care. 
 
The NHS in the 21st century faces a 
particular set of challenges, which I 
would summarise as: rising 
expectations; demand driven by 
demographics; the continuing 
development of our ‘information 
society’; advances in treatments; the 
changing nature of disease; and 
changing expectations of the health 
workplace. These are challenges we 
cannot avoid. The NHS should 
anticipate and respond to the 
challenges of the future. 
 
People want a greater degree of 
control and inﬂuence over their 
health and healthcare. If anything, 
this is even more important for those 
who for a variety of reasons ﬁnd it 
Tackling this will be our ﬁrst 
priority. The NHS needs to be 
ﬂexible to respond to the needs of 
local communities, but people need 
to be conﬁdent that standards are 
high across the board. 
Delivering the visions will mean 
tackling head on those variations in 
the quality of care and giving 
patients more information and 
choice. The message they send is 
that the programme of reform that 
has been put in place has been 




 The vision this report sets out is of 
an NHS that gives patients and the 
public more information and choice, 
works in partnership and has quality 
of care at its heart – quality deﬁned 
as clinically effective, personal and 
safe. It will see the NHS deliver high 
quality care for all users of services 
in all aspects, not just some. 
 
 
We will raise standards. The visions 
set out for each NHS region and 
formed by patients’ expectations 




Providing greater choice of GP will 
mean developing fairer rewards for 
practices that provide responsive 
services and attract more patients. 
 
 
Funding will be freed up through 
reducing the tariff uplift from 2009 
to give commissioners dedicated 
space to pay for improved 
outcomes. Providers will be 
rewarded in the ﬁrst year for 
submitting data. 
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harder to seek out services or make 
themselves heard. 
Personalising services means making 
services ﬁ t for everyone’s needs, not 
just those of the people who make 
the loudest demands. When they 
need it, all patients want care that is 
personal to them. 
The NHS has a responsibility to 
promote good health as well as 
tackle illness. Achieving this goal 
requires the NHS to work in 
partnership with the many other 
agencies that also seek to promote 
health. Much progress on closer 
working has been made in recent 
years. In line with my terms of 
reference, this report focuses on 
what the NHS can do to improve the 
prevention of ill health. 
 
 
That includes those people 
traditionally less likely to seek help or 
who ﬁnd themselves discriminated 
against in some way. The visions 
published in each NHS region make 
clear that more support is needed for 
all people to help them stay healthy 
and particularly to improve the 
health of those most in need. 
 
Getting the basics right ﬁrst time, 
every time. We will continue to 
seek improvements in safety and 
reductions in healthcare associated 
infections. The Care Quality 
Commission will have new 
enforcement powers. There will be 
national campaigns to make care 
even safer.  
• Independent quality standards 
and clinical priority setting. NICE will 
be expanded to set and approve 
more independent quality 
standards. A new National Quality 
Board will offer transparent advice 
to Ministers on what the priorities 
should be for clinical standard 
setting by NICE.  
• For the ﬁrst time we will 
systematically measure and publish 
information about the quality of 
care from the frontline up. 
Measures will include patients’ own 
views on the success of their 
treatment and the quality of their 
experiences. There will also be 
measures of safety and clinical 
outcomes. All registered healthcare 
providers working for, or on behalf 
of, the NHS will be required by law 
to publish ‘Quality Accounts’ just as 
they publish ﬁnancial accounts. 
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Every primary care trust will 
commission comprehensive 
wellbeing and prevention services, in 
partnership with local authorities, 
with the services offered 
personalised to meet the speciﬁc 
needs of their local populations. Our 
efforts must be focused on six key 
goals: tackling obesity, reducing 
alcohol harm, treating drug 
addiction, reducing smoking rates, 
improving sexual health and 
improving mental health.  
• A Coalition for Better Health, with a 
set of new voluntary agreements 
between the Government, private 
and third sector organisations on 
actions to improve health outcomes. 
Focused initially on combatting 
obesity, the Coalition will be based 
on agreements to ensure healthier 
food, to get more people more 
physically active, and to encourage 
companies to invest more in the 
health of their workforce. 
 
We will give patients more rights and 
control over their own health and 
care. I have heard the need to give 
patients more information and 
choice to make the system more 
responsive to their personal needs. 
 
 
Making funding for hospitals that 
treat NHS patients reﬂect the 
quality of care that patients receive. 
For the ﬁrst time, patients’ own 
assessments of the success of their 
treatment and the quality of their 
experiences will have a direct 
impact on the way hospitals are 
funded. 
For senior doctors, the current 
Clinical Excellence Awards Scheme 
will be strengthened, to reinforce 
quality improvement. New awards, 
and the renewal of existing awards, 
will become more conditional on 
clinical activity and quality 
indicators; and the Scheme will 
encourage and support clinical 
leadership of service delivery and 
innovation. 
Easy access for NHS staff to 
information about high quality care. 
All NHS staff will have access to a 
new NHS Evidence service where 
they will be able to get, through a 
single web-based portal, 
authoritative clinical and non-
clinical evidence and best practice. 
Measures to ensure continuous 
improvement in the quality of 
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High quality care should be as safe 
and effective as possible, with 
patients treated with compassion, 
dignity and respect. As well as clinical 
quality and safety, quality means 
care that is personal to each 
individual.  
As independent research has shown, 
the NHS has made good progress 
over the past decade in improving 
the overall quality of care for 
patients. During this period, 
improvements in quality were 
focused primarily on waiting times, 
as basic acceptable standards of 
access to A&E and secondary care 
were established, and on stafﬁng 
levels and physical infrastructure. 
 
As this Review has shown, change is 
most likely to be effective if it is led 
by clinicians. We will do this by 
ensuring that:  
• Medical directors and quality 
boards feature at regional and 
national level. These will complement 
the arrangements at PCT level that 
are developing as part of the World 
Class Commissioning programme.  
• Strategic plans for delivering the 
visions will be published later this 
primary and community care. We 
have just completed our 
consultation on proposals to bring 
all GP practices and dental practices 
within the scope of the new health 
and adult social care regulator, the 
Care Quality Commission. 
 
 
We will foster a pioneering NHS. 
Throughout my career, in all the 
clinical teams I have worked in, my 
colleagues and I have challenged 
one another to improve the way we 
provide care for patients. 
Continuous advances in clinical 
practice mean the NHS constantly 
has the opportunity to improve. My 
review will enable this through:  
• Introducing new responsibilities, 
funds and prizes to support and 
reward innovation. Strategic health 
authorities will have a new legal 
duty to promote innovation. New 
funds and prizes will be available to 
the local NHS. 
 
 
We will value the work of NHS staff. 
NHS staff make the difference 
where it matters most and we have 
an obligation to patients and the 
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year by every primary care trust. 
Change will be based on the ﬁve 
principles I set out earlier this year in 
Leading Local Change. 
 
I have seen that, where change is led 
by clinicians and based on evidence 
of improved quality of care, staff who 
work in the NHS are energised by it 
and patients and the public more 
likely to support it.  
We will empower frontline staff to 
lead change that improves quality of 
care for patients. 
We will provide more integrated 
services for patients, by piloting new 
integrated care organisations, 
bringing together health and social 
care professionals from a range of 
organisations – community services, 
hospitals, local authorities and 
others, depending on local needs. 
 
Enhancing professionalism. There will 
be investment in new programmes of 
clinical and board leadership, with 
clinicians encouraged to be 
practitioners, partners and leaders in 
the NHS. We challenge all 
organisations that do business as part 
of, or with, the NHS to give clinicians 
more control over budgets and HR 
public to enable them to make best 
use of their talents. 
 
 
An NHS Constitution will help 
patients by setting out, for the ﬁrst 
time, the extensive set of legal 
rights they already have in relation 
to the NHS. It will ensure that 
decision-making is local where 
possible and more accountable than 
it is today, providing clarity and 
transparency about who takes what 
decisions on our behalf. 
 
 
The focus on prevention, improved 
quality and innovation will support 
the NHS in its drive to ensure the 
best possible value for money for 
taxpayers. It is also an excellent 
opportunity to pursue our duties to 
promote equality and reduce 
discrimination under the Equality 
and Human Rights Act. 
 
 
it must constantly respond to those 
it serves, changing to continue to 
live up to the ambition of high 
quality care. The NHS should be 
universal, but that does not mean 
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decisions. 
 
Over the past few months, each 
region of the NHS has published its 
vision for improving health and 
healthcare services.  
These visions are the product of the 
work more than 2,000 clinicians and 
other staff in health and social care, 
who have shown tremendous 
leadership in creating, shaping and 
forming the conclusions. In each 
region, they have met in eight or 
more groups reﬂecting different 
‘pathways of care’ – from maternity 
and newborn care through to end of 
life care. These groups have 
considered the best available clinical 
evidence, worked in partnership with 
thousands of patients, listened to the 
needs and aspirations of the public 
and set out comprehensive and 
coherent visions for the future. 
 
The proposals will allow NHS services 
everywhere to reﬂect the needs of 
their local communities. People and 
communities across England have 
different characteristics and different 
needs. Yet too often, the services 
they receive are not sufﬁciently 
shaped around those characteristics 
that it should be uniform. Clear 
minimum standards and 
entitlements will exist, but not a 
one size ﬁts all model. 
These visions are the start of 
responding to local needs. They 
describe an NHS that will work with 
partner organisations locally to 
reach out and help people stay 
healthy, and, when people do need 
care, provide convenient, high 
quality care. Services will be found 
in the community, with family 
doctors, pharmacies and local 
partnerships taking a leading role in 
helping people to stay healthy. In 
future, the NHS will not be conﬁned 
to hospitals, health centres or GP 
surgeries but will be available online 
and in people’s homes, whilst the 
most specialist care will be 




The visions have sent a powerful 
message that the most effective 
treatments should be available for 
all NHS patients. Their plans for 
transforming treatment for heart 
attack, stroke and major trauma 
vividly illustrate this. For stroke – 
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and needs. 
 
There is a clear consensus across the 
service that the NHS must help 
people to lead independent and 
fulﬁlling lives by supporting them to 
stay healthy. The local NHS wants to 
work with others to help people stop 
smoking, to address obesity in 
children and adults, and to tackle 
excessive alcohol consumption. In 
the East of England, for example, 
patients, the public and staff have set 
themselves the ambition of reducing 
the number of smokers in their 
region by 140,000, from its current 
level of a million. 
 
Each region will continue to improve 
the quality of access by reducing 
waiting times for treatment, whilst 
ensuring that services are available 
regardless of where a patient lives. 
 
All the visions emphasised the need 
to organise care around the 
individual, meeting their needs not 
just clinically, but also in terms of 
dignity and respect. 
 
This report addresses big national 
themes such as improving quality, 
the third largest cause of death and 
single largest cause of disability in 
the UK – the clinical evidence 
clearly demonstrates that the 
quality of care is greatly improved if 
stroke is treated in specialist 
centres. 
Each region is therefore pushing 
forward with the development of 
specialised centres for their 
populations with access to 24/7 
brain imaging and thrombolysis 
delivered by expert teams. 
 
 
From the vision documents, and 
from my own visits to every region 
of the country, the message that 
improving quality of care is what 
excites and energises NHS staff has 
been loud and clear. International 
evidence shows that we have made 
great improvements but that there 
is further to go. Nolte and McKee 
have found that the NHS made a 21 
per cent reduction in premature 
mortality rates from 1997–98 to 
2002–03, compared to a 4 per cent 
reduction by the US. 
However, there is much more to do, 
as our starting point was worse 
than our international comparators.  
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leadership and the workforce.25 It 
focuses on what must be done 
centrally to support local 
organisations. It illustrates that the 
role of the Department of Health is to 
enable the visions created by the 
local NHS to become a reality, whilst 
ensuring that universality, minimum 
standards and entitlements are 
retained and strengthened. It sets 
out how we will back local leaders to 
deliver for their communities. 
 
The drivers for change in healthcare 
and society are beyond the control of 
any single organisation. Nor can they 
be dealt with simply or reactively at 
national level. This reinforces the 
case for enabling and encouraging 
the NHS locally to anticipate and 
respond proactively to the challenges 
of the future. 
 
The children of the last three decades 
of the 20th century. These 
generations are inﬂuenced by new 
technologies that provide 
unprecedented levels of control, 
personalisation and connection. They 
expect not just services that are 
there when they need them, and 
treat them how they want them to, 
Every region of the NHS has 
articulated its aspiration for high 
quality care for their populations. 
Using clinical expertise, NHS East 
Midlands will publish standard 
quality measures allowing patients 




Health practitioners will see a 
generation with expectations of 
more tailored treatment received at 
a time and place convenient to 
them. As people continue to live 
longer, they will continue to access 
services for longer, and are likely to 
live more of their life with one or 
more long-term condition.  
They will make demands that are 
not just larger but different. They 
still expect the clinician to lead, but 
expect a bigger role for themselves 




It is easier to access information on 
how to stay healthy than ever 
before. People are able to quickly 
and conveniently ﬁnd information 
about treatment and diseases in a 
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but that they can inﬂuence and shape 
for themselves. Better still, they will 
want services that ‘instinctively’ 
respond to them using the 
sophisticated marketing techniques 
used by other sectors. 
 
The NHS and all of its many partners 
must respond to this shifting disease 
burden and provide personalised 
care for long-term conditions, a goal 
already set out in the Government’s 
Our health, our care, our say White 
Paper. We need to make this goal a 
reality. Providing personalised care 
should also help us to reduce health 
inequalities, as the households with 
the lowest incomes are most likely to 
contain a member with a long-term 
condition. 
 
Improved technology is enabling 
patients that would once have been 
hospitalised to live fulﬁlling lives in 
the community, supported by their 
family doctor and multi-professional 
community teams. Where patients 
were once conﬁned to hospital, 
Wireless and Bluetooth technologies 
allow their health to be monitored in 
their own homes. 
This information helps to prevent 
way that was previously impossible. 
They are able, and want, to engage 
with others online, sharing 
information and experiences. They 
want to do their own research, 
reﬂect on what their clinicians have 
told them and discuss issues from 
an informed position. The challenge 
is ensuring that people are able to 
access reliable information. 
Evidence shows that clinicians have 
sometimes been slower in 
exploiting the potential of new 
information sources, such as the 




Healthcare itself is on a journey 
where the emphasis of care is 
shifting to extending wellness and 
improving health. This is making 
healthcare more complex, with a 
broader range of interventions 
possible. In some areas of practice, 
such as for acute coronary 
syndrome, this has led to increased 
standardisation where the evidence 
shows that following protocols 
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unnecessary hospital admissions. This 
is better for patients and their carers, 
delivers improved outcomes, and is a 
very efﬁcient way of using NHS 
resources. An even bigger factor in 
the shift from hospital to home is the 
up-skilling of a wider range of staff, 
and the removal of barriers to more 
independent working in the patient’s 
interest. 
 
Healthcare professionals expect the 
depth of their expertise to be 
recognised and rewarded, and their 
skills to be developed and enhanced. 
They seek personal fulﬁlment as well 
as ﬁnancial reward. 
They understand the demands of 
accountability and welcome 
transparency as a route to achieving 
true meritocracy. Staff expect a 
better work/life balance and more 
respect and regard for pressures on 
their time beyond those of their 
profession. 
 
The extra capacity in the NHS today 
gives all of us the opportunity to 
focus on improving quality. To 
achieve that we need to:  
-Help people to stay healthy. 
-Empower patients. 
High quality care is safe, meaning 
no avoidable healthcare associated 
infections. This is obviously better 
for patients and also reduces the 
need for costly post-infection 
recovery in hospital. Finally, high 
quality care involves giving the 
patient more control over their 
care, including information to make 
healthy choices, which will reduce 
their chances of poor health and 
dependency on the NHS. The 
answer to the challenges the NHS 
faces is therefore to focus on 




This Review is about achieving the 
highest quality of care for patients 
and the public. I have heard from 
patients and staff, and I know from 
my own experience, that when in 
the care of the NHS, it is the quality 
of that care that really matters. 
People want to know they will 
receive effective treatment. They 
want care that is personal to them, 
and to be shown compassion, 
dignity and respect by those caring 
for them. People want to be 
reassured that they will be safe in 
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-Provide the most effective 
treatments. 
-Keep patients as safe as possible. 
 
Locally, the NHS and local authorities 
are working closely together to 
improve health and wellbeing, 
prompted by their legal duty to co-
operate in improving outcomes for 
their populations. 
It highlighted the rapidly rising risks 
to long-term health if people are not 
supported sufﬁciently early to 
address issues that stop them from 
working, with back problems and 
mental ill health among the most 
signiﬁcant. From next year, we will 
introduce integrated Fit for Work 
services in primary and community 
care, bringing together access to 
musculoskeletal services and 
psychological therapies for example. 
This will help people get the support 
they need to return to appropriate 
work faster. 
 
People referred for secondary or 
hospital-based care can now choose 
freely where they receive their 
treatment. And increasingly, there is 
better information available for 
patients about outcomes of care such 
the care of the NHS. And whilst 
most people recognise their health 
is their responsibility, they also look 
to the NHS for help. 
 
 
The strategy will describe a vision 
for primary and community care 
that builds on these strengths and 
raises our ambitions. It will focus on 
making services personal and 
responsive to all, promoting healthy 
lives and striving to improve the 
quality of care provided. 
 
 
Care planning creates packages of 
care that are personal to the 
patient. It involves working with 
professionals who really understand 
their needs, to agree goals, the 
services chosen, and how and 
where to access them. 
 
First, we will make payments to 
hospitals conditional on the quality 
of care given to patients as well as 
the volume. A range of quality 
measures covering safety (including 
cleanliness and infection rates), 
clinical outcomes, patient 
experience and patient’s views 
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as the information at GP-practice 
level from the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework.  
Patients empowered in this way are 
more likely to take greater 
responsibility for their own health, 
and to dedicate their own time, 
effort and energy to solving their 
health problems. This partnership is 
especially important for those with 
long-term conditions and their 
carers. We must therefore continue 
to empower patients with greater 
choice, better information, and more 
control and inﬂuence. 
 
Choice gives patients the power they 
need in the system, as NHS resources 
follows patients in the choices they 
make. Where patients ﬁnd it difﬁcult 
to express preferences, it is the role 
of staff to take steps to ensure that 
patients can beneﬁt from greater 
choice. 
We believe that choice should 
become a deﬁning feature of the 
service. A health service without 
freedom of choice is not 
personalised. So the right to choice 
will now be part of the NHS 
Constitution, ensuring that people 
become more clearly aware of it. 
about the success of their 
treatment (known as patient 
reported outcome measures or 
PROMs) will be used. 
 
 
Whilst all primary care trusts have a 
legal duty to fund drugs that have 
been positively appraised by NICE, 
we recognise that patients and the 
public are concerned that there 
remains unexplained variation in 
the way local decisions are made on 
the funding of new drugs before the 
appraisal takes place, or where no 
guidance is issued. 
We will take steps to end this so 
called ‘postcode lottery’ for new 
drugs and treatments. Through the 
NHS Constitution we will make 
explicit the right of NHS patients 
everywhere to positively NICE 
appraised drugs and treatments, 
where their doctor judges that 
these would be of beneﬁt. 
 
 
• Quality of care includes quality of 
caring. This means how personal 
care is – the compassion, dignity 
and respect with which patients are 
treated. It can only be improved by 
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We want patients to make the right 
choices for themselves and their 
families. So we will empower them to 
make informed choices. The ﬁrst step 
towards this vision was taken with 
the launch of the NHS Choices 
website, with a variety of limited 
quality information (such as 
Healthcare Commission ratings and 
MRSA rates at an organisation level). 
 
The next stage is to empower 
patients with clear information on 
the quality of each service offered by 
every NHS organisation – across all 
settings of care. 
The information will be on every 
aspect of high quality care – on safety 
such as cleanliness and infection 
rates, on experiences such as 
satisfaction, dignity and respect, and 
on measures of outcomes that 
include patients’ views on the 
success of treatments. 
 
During the Review, patients have told 
us that they need better information 
and more help to understand how to 
access the best care, especially 
urgent care, when they need it. 
 
People need to know the risks and 
analysing and understanding 
patient satisfaction with their own 
experiences. 
• Effectiveness of care. This means 
understanding success rates from 
different treatments for different 
conditions. Assessing this will 
include clinical measures such as 
mortality or survival rates, 
complication rates and measures of 
clinical improvement. Just as 
important is the effectiveness of 
care from the patient’s own 
perspective which will be measured 
through patient-reported outcomes 
measures (PROMs). 
• Bring clarity to quality. This means 
being clear about what high quality 
care looks like in all specialties and 
reﬂecting this in a coherent 
approach to the setting of 
standards.  
• Measure quality.  In order to work 
out how to improve we need to 
measure and understand exactly 
what we do. The NHS needs a 
quality measurement framework at 
every level. 
• Publish quality performance. 
Making data on how well we are 
doing widely available to staff, 
patients and the public will help us 
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have the opportunity to take control 
of their own healthcare. To help with 
this, the Department of Health will 
publish a new Patients’ Prospectus by 
the end of this year to provide 
patients with long-term conditions 
the information they need about the 
choices which should be available to 
them locally and to enable them to 
self-care in partnership with health 
and social care professionals. 
 
Enabling increasing numbers of 
patients to securely see and suggest 
corrections to a summary of their 
care records, to receive personalised 
information about staying healthy, 
and to upload the results of health 
checks for their clinician(s) to see. 
We will increase the inﬂuence that 
patients have over NHS resources. 
For hospitals, resources already 
follow the choices that patients make 
through the Payment by Results 
system. 
We will strengthen this by reﬂecting 
quality in the payment mechanism 
and increasing individual control. 
 
Give individual patients greater 
control over the services they receive 
and the providers from which they 
understand variation and best 
practice and focus on improvement.  
• Recognise and reward quality. The 
system should recognise and 
reward improvement in the quality 
of care and service. This means 
ensuring that the right incentives 
are in place to support quality 
improvement.  
• Raise standards. Quality is 
improved by empowered patients 
and empowered professionals. 
There must be a stronger role for 
clinical leadership and management 
throughout the NHS.  
• Safeguard quality. Patients and 
the public need to be reassured that 
the NHS everywhere is providing 
high quality care. Regulation – of 
professions and of services – has a 
key role to play in ensuring this is 
the case.  
• Stay ahead. New treatments are 
constantly redeﬁning what high 
quality care looks like. We must 




If everyone, from the hospital Chief 
Executive to the GP receptionist is 
primarily focussed on achieving high 
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receive services 
 
Partnership working between the 
NHS, local authorities and social care 
partners will help to improve 
people’s health and wellbeing, by 
organising services around patients, 
and not people around services. This 
will lead to a patient-centred and 
seamless approach. 
Continuously improving patient 
safety should be at the top of the 
healthcare agenda for the 21st 
century. The injunction to ‘do no 
harm’ is one of the deﬁning principles 
of the clinical professions, and as my 
Interim Report made clear, safety 
must be paramount for the NHS. 
Public trust in the NHS is conditional 
on our ability to keep patients safe 
when they are in our care. 
 
High quality care is care where 
patients are in control, have effective 
access to treatment, are safe and 
where illnesses are not just treated, 
but prevented. These are 
manifestations of high quality care – 
there is much more to be done to 
place quality right at the heart of the 
NHS. 
 
quality care for patients, we will 
have succeeded. Central initiatives, 
from fostering innovation to 
encouraging quality reporting can 
play their part. However, ultimately 
if high quality care is to become 
more than an ideal, we need to free 





We seek to change that not by 
central control, but by freeing NHS 
staff and organisations to make the 
right decisions. Therefore, we will 
extend and improve existing 
reforms such as NHS foundation 
trusts and practice-based 
commissioning. Through these 
changes, healthcare professionals 
will be not just practitioners, but 
partners and leaders. 
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If quality is to be at the heart of 
everything we do, it must be 
understood from the perspective of 
patients. Patients pay regard both to 
clinical outcomes and their 
experience of the service. They 
understand that not all treatments 
are perfect, but they do not accept 
that the organisation of their care 
should put them at risk. For these 
reasons, the Review has found that 
for the NHS, quality should include 
Patient safety. 
 
Providing high quality care leads to 
professional pride, and focusing on 
improving it energises and motivates 
all NHS staff, clinical and non-clinical 
alike. I believe we can use that 
energy and make the achievement of 
high quality of care an obsession 
within the NHS. 
 
Healthcare is delivered by a team. 
The team includes clinicians, 
managerial staff and those in 
supporting roles. All members of the 
team are valued. The sense of a 
shared endeavour – that all of us 
matter and stand together – was 
crucial in the inception of the NHS. 
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We will continue the journey of 
setting frontline staff, both providers 
and commissioners, free to use their 
expertise, creativity and skill to ﬁnd 
innovative ways to improve quality of 
care for patients. 
• Creating a new accountability. 
Setting NHS staff free from central 
control requires a new, stronger 
accountability that is rooted in the 
people that the NHS is there to serve. 
It means the service should look out 
to patients and the communities they 
serve not up the line.  
• Empowering staff. Professionals 
need to be empowered to make the 
daily decisions that improve quality 
of care and we will enable this to 
happen.  
• Fostering leadership for quality. All 
these steps together create the right 
environment for high quality care to 
happen, but we need to further 
develop clinical and managerial 
leadership. 
A first class 
service- quality 
in the new NHS 
1998 
"High quality care should be a right 
for every patient in the NHS. […] . 
Such a National Health Service should 
guarantee fair access and high quality 
to patients wherever they live". 
(paragraph 1.1) 
 
"There are unacceptable variations 
in performance and practice. The 
inequalities go beyond the provision 
of medicines and other treatments. 
There are inequalities in the way 
that some proven treatments get 
introduced to the NHS too slowly 
"As a result of participation in 
national comparative clinical audit, 
individual hospital doctors will be 
able to compare their own 
performance with national 
averages". (paragraph 3.14) 
"The Government will ensure there 
is accountability for both efficiency 
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"Improving the quality and 
consistency of NHS services is an 
important part of improving the 
overall health of the population and 
tackling inequalities in both health 
and access to care". (paragraph 2.2) 
 
 
"Quicker access to services will be 
brought by reducing hospital waiting 
lists" (paragraph 1.9) 
 
 
"We will introduce a clinical 
governance framework that: 
•modernises and strengthens 
professional self-regulation and 
builds on the principles of 
performance review 
• strengthens existing systems for 
quality control, based on clinical 
standards, evidence based practice 
and learning the lessons of poor 
performance". (paragraph 3.11) 
 
 
"Clinical governance will be the 
process by which each part of the 
NHS quality assures its clinical 
decisions. Backed by a new statutory 
duty of quality it will introduce a 
while other unproven treatments 
can be introduced too quickly. 
There are inequalities in waiting 
times for operations; in the time it 
takes for patients to receive test 
results; in the number of people 
given screening tests. There are 
inequalities in clinical practice – and 




"National Service Frameworks will 
set standards to achieve greater 
consistency in the availability and 
quality of services for a range of 
major care areas and disease 
groups. The clear aim will be to 
reduce unacceptable variations in 
care and standards of treatment, 
using the best evidence of clinical 
and cost-effectiveness" (p. 34) 
 
 
"The commission has an important 
role in working to reduce variations 
in services across the NHS through 
its systematic reviews of services, 
providing feedback into the 
National Service Frameworks, and 
its monitoring of uptake if NICE 
guidance". (p. 66) 
"Quicker access to services will be 
brought by reducing hospital 
waiting lists" (paragraph 1.9) 
 
 
"National Service Frameworks will 
include performance measures 
against which progress will be 
assessed" (paragraph 2.38) 
 
 
"Strengthening the way in which we 
assess the performance of the NHS, 
using measures that are relevant to 
the standards of care delivered and 
by making public information on 
clinical quality". (paragraph 4.2) 
 
 
"Performance Framework [...] 
focusing on six main areas: 
• health improvement 
• fair access to services 
• effective delivery of appropriate 
healthcare 
• efficiency 
• patient and carer experience and 




"The Performance Framework will 
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system of continuous improvement 
into the operation of the whole 
NHS". (paragraph 1.16) 
 
 
"We need consistent action locally to 
ensure that national standards and 
guidance are reflected in the delivery 
of services. That action will be guided 
by a single, robust framework – a 
new system of clinical governance – 
to monitor health care quality at a 
local level. This will be backed up by 
lifelong learning by staff, through 
rigorous professional self-regulation 
and through a new system of 
external monitoring". (paragraph 3.1) 
 
 
"Clinical governance needs to be 
underpinned by a culture that values 
lifelong learning and recognises the 
key part it plays in improving 
quality". (paragraph 3.28) 
 
 
"There is much excellent work on 
which to draw, but too often it is 
fragmented in its approach and 
dependent on the enthusiasm of 
individuals rather than the 
commitment of whole organisations 
 
 
"Each National Service Framework 
will set out where care is best 
provided and the standard of care 
that patients should be offered in 
each setting". (paragraph 2.35) 
 
 
"National Service Frameworks will 
bring together the best evidence of 
clinical and cost- effectiveness with 
the views of service users to 
determine the best ways of 




"The NHS has a duty to make the 
best use of resources and to deliver 
good value for money. But true 
value for money includes an 
assessment of quality and outcomes 




"There is a view that high quality 
care costs more money. But this 
fails to recognise that poor quality is 
itself costly. Operations that need 
to be re-done, patients who need to 
support the drive for higher quality 
standards by ensuring that 
performance assessment is focused 
on the delivery of effective, 
appropriate and timely health 




"Each patient is different and 
treatment must be tailor-made to 





"The National Survey of Patient and 
User Experience will ask those who 
use the services for their views 




"Introducing a new National Survey 
of Patient and User Experience to 
provide systematic and comparable 
information on patient and user 
experiences". (paragraph 4.2) 
 
 
"Service failure, from the patient’s 
viewpoint, could trigger a 
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or whole health systems. We want to 
keep and build on what works, on 
existing good practice, but most of all 
on the experience and commitment 
of NHS staff". (paragraph 5.4) 
 
 
"The point has been made repeatedly 
to us that achieving meaningful and 
sustainable quality improvements in 
the NHS requires a fundamental shift 
in culture, to focus effort where it is 
needed and to enable and empower 
those who work in the NHS to 
improve quality locally. One of the 
key challenges is to engage health 
organisations wholeheartedly, from 
top to bottom, in developing and 
delivering a common agenda for 




"We want to create a culture in the 
NHS which celebrates and 
encourages success and innovation. 
But this must also be a culture which 
recognises that if the NHS is to have 
the confidence to strive for quality 
there must be scope for 
acknowledging and learning from 
past mistakes". (paragraph 5.7) 
be re-admitted within weeks or 
months, infections picked up on 
wards, unnecessary or 
inappropriate treatments, 
complaints and litigation might all 
be reduced with higher quality 
care". (paragraph 5.10) 
 
 
"In a National Health Service there 
must be a guarantee of excellence 




regulation, for example, will play a 
fuller part in the early identification 




"Doctors with results that fall short 
of these norms will need to take 
urgent action to improve their 
results. Where the outcome has 
unacceptable mortality or 
complications, it might be necessary 
for the clinician to stop performing 
the procedure. Fellow professionals 
could provide extra training, 
supervision and support to correct 





"We will ask patients about the 
issues which really matter to them, 
such as the ease of access to 
services, how long they have to wait 
for treatment, and whether they 
are happy with the quality of 
information provided about their 
care. We want to explore patients’ 
views of the efficiency of the 
medical and technical aspects of 
their care. We also want to cover 
areas such as the privacy and 
dignity of their care, especially with 
regard to mixed sex 
accommodation in hospital, as well 
as the courtesy and helpfulness of 
staff”. (paragraph 4.60) 
 
 
"The NHS Executive Regional Offices 
will lead in overseeing the 
implementation of local clinical 
governance arrangements. The 
Commission will complement and 
strengthen these mechanisms, by 
providing a further external and 
independent check on local 
arrangements". (paragraph 4.1) 
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"There are some crucial elements 
which are needed to drive change 
forward: 
-Excellent leadership: A clear 
commitment and involvement from 
the top. Trust Boards and Chief 
Executives must sign up to the need 
for change and drive it forward 
through the whole organisation. 
Strong leadership is needed by, and 
from, both clinicians and managers     
-Involvement of staff: Total 
involvement of staff in shaping 
services and planning change, with 
open communication and 
collaboration, is one of the best ways 
in which the NHS can improve patient 
care     
-Involvement of patients: Patients 
provide a uniquely valuable 
perspective on services, and it is 
impossible to get the best from a 
change process without actively 
involving them". (paragraph 5.21) 
appropriate circumstances, the 
General Medical Council would be 
involved". (paragraph 3.15) 
 
 
"[Patients] need to be assured that 
their treatment is up to date and 
effective, and that it is provided by 
those whose skills have kept pace 
with new thinking and new 
techniques. Where individual health 
professionals fail to meet the 
standards set by their profession, 
when things go wrong, people 
expect matters to be openly 
investigated, explanations provided 
and, where appropriate, action 




"If the Commission discovers or 
suspects that there are problems 
with the performance of individual 
clinicians, it will refer these to the 
appropriate professional regulatory 
body (for example, the General 
Medical Council) for it to take 
action". (paragraph 4.31) 
 
 
"The objective is to ensure fair 
 
 
"Health professionals need to be 
able to assess the care they give 
against established clinical 
standards. This can be done 
through clinical audit, which allows 
them to look at what they are doing 
against agreed standards and, 
where necessary, make changes to 
practice". (paragraph 2.18) 
 
 
"Clinical audit involves 
systematically looking at the 
procedures used for diagnosis, care 
and treatment, examining how 
associated resources are used and 
investigating the effect care gas on 
the outcome and quality of life for 
the patient. Audit is a valuable tool 
to improve quality of professional 
care and, ultimately, patient choice" 
(p. 26) 
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access to effective, prompt high 
quality care wherever a patient is 
treated in the NHS. The 
Government’s intention is to ensure 
clear national standards for 
services. These will be supported by 
consistent, evidence-based 
guidance to raise quality standards 
in the NHS". (paragraph 1.10) 
 
 
"Involves setting clear national 
standards but with responsibility for 
delivery being taken locally and 





"NICE will produce clear guidance 
for clinicians about which 
treatments work best for which 
patients. It will assess new drugs, 
treatments and devices for their 




"NICE will reduce duplication of this 
activity and maximise the use of the 
academic and professional 
expertise needed to produce 
302 
Policy document Structure Process Output Outcome 




"The Commission for Health 
Improvement will provide an 
independent means of 
guaranteeing quality throughout 
the NHS. 
Through a rolling programme of 
reviews of Trusts and the ability to 
investigate when things are going 
wrong [...]. It will have the power to 
intervene at the Government’s 
request, in a hospital where clinical 




"The Performance Framework will 
judge how well each part of the 




"Establishing a new statutory body, 
the Commission for Health 
Improvement, to provide 
independent scrutiny of local efforts 
to improve quality and to help 
address any serious problems". 
(paragraph 4.2) 
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"Recent tragedies demonstrate all 
too clearly the necessity for 
supplementing a hospital’s internal 
processes with independent, 
external, review of clinical quality 




"The Commission’s reports will not 
just be about identifying areas for 
improvement, but will also provide 
a way of identifying and 
acknowledging success and good 
practice, and encouraging its 
dissemination". (paragraph 4.13) 
 
 
"These components will come 
together to help assure quality, 
improve equity of access and tackle 
unacceptable variations in services. 
They will support local services in 
working to improve the quality of 




"There may be cases where there is 
an unacceptable delay in putting 
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serious problems right, or a 
persistent failure to act. In such 
cases, the Secretary of State for 
Health will be able to ask the 
Commission to investigate the 
problem and make 
recommendations for rapid action. 
This will usually happen only where 
there are very serious concerns 
about the quality of clinical 
services". (paragraph 4.29) 




0 “The new Commission will offer an 
independent guarantee that local 
systems to monitor, assure and 
improve clinical quality are in place. 
It will support local development 
and 'spot-check' the new 
arrangements. It will also have the 
capacity to offer targeted support 
on request to local organisations 
facing specific clinical problems" 
(paragraph 7.13)  
 
 
When performance is not up to the 
standards, there will be an 
investigation and if necessary, an 
intervention:    
-the NHS executive regional office 
could be called by the health 
authority, when an NHS trusts is not 
delivering according to the health 
0 "A new national performance 
framework, measuring how local 
services are progressing against 
their targets, will help shape NHS 




"... for the first time in the history of 
the NHS there will be systematic 
evidence to enable the health 
service to measure itself against the 
aspirations and experience of its 
users, to compare performance 
across the country and to look at 
trends over time. The survey will 
give patients and their carers a 
voice in shaping the modern and 
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improvement programme. The 
regional office can investigate the 
issue. Also, CHI could be called to 
investigate on the problem. Primary 
care groups can change terms of 
service agreements when a NHS 
trusts is underperforming. The 
secretary of State could remove the 




The committee (on social services) 
and the government are at one in 
their firm commitment to [...] 
continuing to develop comprehensive 
care of a high standard, available and 
accessible to all. (paragraph 1.20) 
 
 
"The government will review its 
minimum standard for premises. 
FPCs and HBs will continue to be 
responsible for the inspection of 
premises, and will be required to 
apply sanctions […] in respect of 




"Effective team working requires 
willingness amongst all the team 
members to co-operate and 
communicate well, and to adopt a 
flexible approach which puts the 
"… There are wide variations in 
standards across the country (in 
FPS), particularly, in inner cities, 
where too many, often elderly, 
doctors are operating single-handed 
practices where group practices 
would be more effective" 
(paragraph 3.6). 
 
Several factors related to 
"considerable variations in the 
quality of general medical services": 
population served is different in 
terms of age structure, medical and 
social needs; standard of premises 
is often poor; use and development 
of practice teams is variable; 
medical services need to be 
adapted to ethnic minorities 
sometimes. 
 
"The government intends to raise 
standards nearer to those of the 
1.17…"the new financial incentives 
for doctors and the stronger 
management role for FPCs and HBs 
will encourage doctors to provide 
better service, thus creating a more 
competitive environment which will 
itself have the effect of raising 
standards further."   The 
Government approves the 
development of private practice, 
because it serves as an alternative 
and a comparator of NHS services. 
Moreover, this would offer more 
choice to consumers and drive 
improvement through competition. 
"The government sees advantage in 
practices submitting annual reports 
to FPCs and HBs about the range of 
services offered and the workload 
undertaken in the period of 
question. This should encourage 
doctors to focus more clearly on the 
provision of high-quality, patient-
oriented services and the need to 
plan and set objectives for their 
development and improvement" 
(paragraph 3.65) 
 
"Monitoring performance: output 
measures and performance 
indicators for the Family 
Practitioner Services will be 
developed to assist FPCs in their 
management of these services". The 
annual reports would help FPCs to 
monitor the level and quality of 
services provided (paragraph 10.10) 
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quality of health provision to the 
population served above professional 
status and function" (paragraph 7.9) 
best practices" (paragraph 3.6). 
 
"Family doctors remuneration 
system should be develop in order 
to recognise high standards quite 
explicitly, probably through the 
introduction of a 'good practice 
allowance'. this will be linked to: 
personal availability to patients; 
provision of wide range of services, 
including prevention; ensuring 
certain services had been provided 
for an agreed proportion of 
patients; attendance at recognised 




"Many of the improvements set out 
earlier (basic practice allowance, 
compulsory retirement, allowances 
linked to immunization and health 
promotion) will not only improve 
the quality of service to the public 




"…the government has provided 
resources directly for monitoring 
the quality and appropriateness of 
treatment provided  and to 
 
1.17…"the consumer will be much 
better informed about the services 
offered by local practices and will 
be able to choose the one that best 
suits his or her needs". 
 
 
2.6 "the Government is prepared to 
invest substantial extra resources in 
FPS to develop positive health 
promotion activities, raise 
standards and make the services 
more sensitive to the need so the 
consumer" 
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encourage continuing education 
through: - the dental reference 
services, which routinely examine a 
sample of patients to ensure that all 
necessary treatment has been 
provided and to the proper 
standard; - the dental estimates 
boards, which monitor the 
treatment dentists provide; - funds 




FPCs should use independent 
medical advisers to encourage good 
practice in the referral of patients 




"They (managers) are concerned with 
levels of service, quality of product, 
meeting budgets, cost improvement, 
productivity, motivating and 
rewarding staff, research and 
development, and the long term 
viability of the undertaking" (general 
observations, paragraph 1). 
 
 
"Rarely are precise management 
objectives set; there is little 
measurement of health output; 
clinical evaluation of particular 
"policy for performance appraisal 
and career development operates, 
from the Unit to the centre, to meet 
both the aspirations of staff and the 
management needs of the service" 
(paragraph 9.3) 
This approach should prompt some 
measurement of output in terms of 
patient care, and should ensure that 
the time at present spent by 
doctors in meetings, committees, 
etc., will be reduced and employed 
more purposefully. (paragraph 8.2) 
The role of the Health Services 
Supervisory Board would be to 
strengthen existing arrangements 
for the oversight of the NHS. It 
would be concerned with: 
a. determination of purpose, 
objectives and direction for the 
Health Service; 
b. approval of the overall budget 
and resource allocations; 
c. strategic decisions; 
d. receiving reports on performance 
and other evaluations from within 
the Health Service. 
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practices is by no means common 
and economic evaluation of those 




"Ascertain how well the service is 
being delivered at local level by 
obtaining the experience and 
perceptions of patients and the 
community" (paragraph 13.1). 
 
 
"The driving force behind our advice 
is the concern to secure the best deal 
for patients and the community 
health within available resources; the 
best value for the taxpayer; and the 
best motivation for staff". (general 
observations, paragraph 3) 
 
 
"Sufficient management impression 
must be created at all levels that the 
centre is passionately concerned with 
the quality of care and delivery of 
services at local level" 
(recommendations, paragraph 12). 
 
 
"The most important development to 
be achieved is one of morale and 
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attitudes: this will be done by the line 
management leadership and the 
perceived professional competence 
of the Personnel Director and an 
injection of enthusiasm and pride in 
the quality of personnel service 




"the rights of members of Councils to 
enter and inspect premises 
controlled by Area Health 
Authorities" (paragraph 9 subsection 
4) 
Commissioner may investigate- 
(a) an alleged failure in a service 
provided by a relevant body ; or 
(b) an alleged failure of a relevant 
body to provide a service which it 
was a function of the body to 
provide ; or 
(c) any other action taken by or on 
behalf of a relevant body, in a case 
where a complaint is duly made by 
or on behalf of any person that he 
has sustained injustice or hardship 
in consequence of the failure or in 
consequence of maladministration 
connected with the other action. 
(Paragraph 34 subsection 3). 
Paragraph 35 refers to patients' 




"recommendations for changes 
which the Working Party believes 
would lead to considerable 
improvement in the organisation and 
therefore in the overall quality of 
clinical work in hospitals" 
Clinical practice and opinion differ 
in a variety of situations are the 
treatment of varicose veins and 
after-care in meniscectomy; 
tonsillectomy; and fenestration. 
(paragraph 51) 
0 “Medical advisory committees 
could valuably undertake periodic 
discussion of a systematic review 
and statistical analysis of the clinical 
work of all departments in the 
hospital, thus helping to maintain a 
high standard" (Paragraph 24). 
310 
Policy document Structure Process Output Outcome 
 
 
"If the results of the work of all 
departments were regularly 
reviewed and where practicable 
subjected to statistical analysis and 
brought before the full committee 
at its periodical meetings, 
discussion of the results would, in 
the Minister's view, assist all the 
staff in achieving and maintaining a 




It proposes the unification, under 
one administrative body, of services 
under supervision of executive 
councils, personal health services, 
public health services and school 
health services. 
0 0 0 
Guillebaud 
committee 1956 
0 "If the test of “adequacy” were that 
the Service should be able to meet 
every demand which is justifiable 
on medical grounds, then the 
Service is clearly inadequate now, 
and very considerable additional 
expenditure (both capital and 
current) would be required to make 
it so" (paragraph 94) 
"The rise in the cost of the Service 
between 1948 and 1954, when 
expressed in real terms (i.e., at 
constant prices), was quite small; 
while many of the services provided 
were substantially expanded during 





"In most cases, waiting rooms are too 
small, cold, and generally 
inhospitable" 
 
0 0 0 
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Policy document Structure Process Output Outcome 
 




With better organisation, the same 
volume of work could be handled at a 
higher level and adequate safety and 
comfort to the patient  
 
 
"Causes unnecessary inconvenience; 
expense, and sometimes danger to 
patients who have to travel to the 
nearest hospital". 
NHS act 1946 
Comprehensive health service to 
secure improvement of physical and 
mental health, and the prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of illness" 
"to provide or secure effective 
provision of services" 
A tribunal, for the purpose of 
inquiring into cases presented by 
the executive council or any other 
person that continued inclusion of 
an independent contractor would 
be prejudicial to the efficiency of 
the services in question. (part IV, 




The government wanted to ensure 
provision of treatment and care for 
all matters related to health within 
the best facilities available, 
regardless ability to pay with the aim 
"to reduce ill-health and promoting 
good health in all its citizens" 
 
 
"Double purpose of bringing to 
notice defects of organisation or 
management and, what is equally 
important, of enabling individual 
hospitals to be kept in touch with 
the latest practice and ideas." 
0 0 
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Policy document Structure Process Output Outcome 
"that their getting these [best 
treatment] shall not depend on 
whether they can pay for them, or on 




"Reform in this field is not a matter 
of making good what is bad, but of 
making better what is good already" 
Beveridge 
report 1942 
A National Health Service will provide 
medical treatment for all citizens 
(Paragraph 19, section xi) 
0 0 0 
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Appendix Chapter 3  
 
Figure 3.1 Timeline of Prime ministers, Health secretaries, main proponents of reforms and key changes in the last 40 years of the NHS. 




Figure 3.2 Scheme of a CQC comprehensive inspection of acute NHS trusts 
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Appendix Chapter 4  
4.1 Search Strategies 
The Cochrane Library, Issue 7, July 2015 (CDSR, DARE, CENTRAL) 
1  MeSH descriptor: [Health Facilities] explode all trees 
2   (hospital or hospitals or (health near/2 care)):ti,ab 
3  1 or 2 
4  MeSH descriptor: [Peer Review, Health Care] this term only 
5  MeSH descriptor: [Benchmarking] this term only 
6  MeSH descriptor: [Accreditation] explode all trees 
7  MeSH descriptor: [Management Audit] explode all trees 
8  MeSH descriptor: [Clinical Audit] explode all trees 
9  7 or 8 
10 ("organisation* raid*" or "organization* raid*"):ti,ab 
11 ((external* near/5 accreditation) or (external* near/5 accredited) or (external* near/5 
peer review) or (external* near/5 inspection) or (external* near/5 inspected) or (external* 
near/5 regulation) or (external* near/5 regulated) or (external* near/5 certified) or (external* 
near/5 certification) or (external* near/5 benchmark*) or (external* near/5 measured) or 
(external* near/5 measurement) or (external* near/5 (audit or audits or auditing)) or 
(external* near/5 evaluation) or (external* near/5 evaluated) or (external* near/5 assessment) 
or (external* near/5 assessed) or (external* near/5 monitored) or (external* near/5 visitation) 
or (external* near/5 surveillance)):ti,ab 
12  4 or 5 or 6 or 9 or 10 or 11 
13  st.fs. 
14  (standards or standard or performance or criterion or criteria or indicator* or "clinical 
competence" or compliance or "clinical improvement" or "quality improvement" or 
"organisation* development" or "organization* development" or "health care 
regulation"):ti,ab 
15  13 or 14 
16  3 and 13 and 15 - Publication Year from 2011 to 2015 
 
Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations and Ovid MEDLINE(R) 1946 to 
Present 
1 exp Health Facilities/ 
2 (hospital or hospitals or (health adj2 care)).tw. 
3 or/1-2 
4 Peer Review, Health Care/ 
5 Benchmarking/ 
6 exp Accreditation/ 
7 exp Management Audit/ or exp Clinical Audit/ 
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8 (organi?ation$ adj raid$).tw. 
9 (external$ adj5 (accreditation or accredited or peer review or inspection or inspected or 
regulation or regulated or certified or certification or benchmark$ or measured or measurement 
or evaluation or evaluated or audit or audits or auditing or assessment or assessed or monitored 
or visitation or surveillance or (control adj program$))).tw. 
10 or/4-9 
11 st.fs. 
12 (standards or standard or performance or criterion or criteria or indicator$ or (clinical 
adj competence) or compliance or (clinical adj improvement) or (quality adj improvement) or 
(organi?ation$ adj development) or (health adj care adj regulation)).tw. 
13 or/11-12 





19 controlled before-after studies/ or interrupted time series analysis/ 
20 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 18 or 19 
21 Animals/ 
22 Humans/ 
23 21 not (21 and 22) 
24 20 not 23 
25 3 and 10 and 13 and 24 
26 "audit and feedback".mp. 
27 25 not 26 
28 limit 27 to yr="2011 -Current" 
 
Embase 1974 to 2015 August 13 
1 *health care facility/ 
2 (hospital or hospitals or (health adj2 care)).tw. 
3 or/1-2 
4 "peer review"/ 
5 Clinical audit/ 
6 (organi?ation$ adj raid$).tw. 
7 (external$ adj5 (accreditation or accredited or peer review or inspection or inspected or 
regulation or regulated or certified or certification or audit or audits or auditing or benchmark$ 
or measured or measurement or evaluation or evaluated or assessment or assessed or 
monitored or visitation or surveillance or (control adj program$))).tw. 
8 exp accreditation/ 
9 or/4-8 
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10 (standards or standard or performance or criterion or criteria or indicator$ or (clinical 
adj competence) or compliance or (clinical adj improvement) or (quality adj improvement) or 
(organi?ation$ adj development) or (health adj care adj regulation)).tw. 
11 3 and 9 and 10 
12 randomized controlled trial/ 
13 (randomised or randomized).tw. 
14 experiment$.tw. 
15 (time adj series).tw. 









25 23 not 24 
26 11 and 25 
27 limit 26 to yr="2011 -Current" 
 
Web of Knowledge (SCI, SSCI, Conference Proceedings) 
1 TS=(((external* SAME audit) or (external* SAME accreditation) or (external* SAME 
accredited) or (external* SAME peer review) or (external* SAME inspection) or (external* SAME 
inspected) or (external* SAME regulation) or (external* SAME regulated) or (external* SAME 
certified) or (external* SAME certification) or (external* SAME benchmark*) or (external* SAME 
measured) or (external* SAME measurement) or (external* SAME evaluation) or (external* 
SAME evaluated) or (external* SAME assessment) or (external* SAME assessed) or (external* 
SAME monitored) or (external* SAME visitation) or (external* SAME surveillance)))  
2 TS=(standards or standard or performance or criterion or criteria or indicator* or 
"clinical competence" or compliance or "clinical improvement" or “quality improvement" or 
"organisation* development" or "organization* development" or "health care regulation")  
3 TS=(randomi?ed or experiment* or impact* or intervention* or evaluat* or effect* or 
comparative or "time series")  
4 TS=(random* SAME allocat*) or TS=(random* SAME assign*) or TS=(controlled SAME 
trial*) or TS=(controlled SAME study)  
5 4 OR 3  
6 TS=(hospital or hospitals or (health NEAR care))  
7 6 AND 5 AND 2 AND 1 - Timespan=2011-2015 
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PsycINFO 2002 to February Week 4 2018 
1 (randomi?ed or experiment* or impact* or intervention* or evaluat* or effect* or 
comparative or pre test or pretest or posttest or post test).tw. 
2 ((time adj2 series) or (random* adj2 allocat*) or (random* adj2 assign*) or (controlled 
adj2 trial*) or (controlled adj2 study) or (clinical adj2 trial*) or (clinical adj2 study)).tw. 
3 1 or 2 
4 (hospital or hospitals or (health adj2 care)).tw. 
5 Peer Evaluation/ 
6 Hospital Accreditation/ 
7 Clinical audits/ 
8 (organi?ation* adj raid*).tw. 
9 (external$ adj5 (accreditation or accredited or peer review or inspection or inspected or 
regulation or regulated or certified or certification or benchmark$ or measured or measurement 
or evaluation or evaluated or assessment or assessed or audit or audits or auditing or monitored 
or visitation or surveillance or (control adj program$))).tw. 
10 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 
11 (standards or standard or performance or criterion or criteria or indicator$ or (clinical 
adj competence) or compliance or (clinical adj improvement) or (quality adj improvement) or 
(organi?ation* adj development) or (health adj care adj regulation)).tw. 
12 4 and 10 and 11 
13 3 and 12 
14 limit 13 to yr="2011 -Current" 
 
HMIC Health Management Information Consortium 1979 to January 2018  
1 exp Health Services/ 
2 exp Health Buildings/ 
3 (hospital or hospitals or (health adj2 care)).tw. 
4 1 or 2 or 3 
5 Peer Review/ 
6 Benchmarking/ 
7 exp Accreditation/ 
8 exp Clinical audit/ or exp Management audit/ 
9 (organi?ation* adj raid*).tw. 
10 (external$ adj5 (accreditation or accredited or peer review or inspection or inspected or 
regulation or regulated or certified or certification or benchmark$ or measured or measurement 
or evaluation or evaluated or assessment or assessed or audit or audits or auditing or monitored 
or visitation or surveillance or (control adj program$))).tw. 
11 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 
12 (standards or standard or performance or criterion or criteria or indicator$ or (clinical 
adj competence) or compliance or (clinical adj improvement) or (quality adj improvement) or 
(organi?ation* adj development) or (health adj care adj regulation)).tw. 
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13 4 and 11 and 12 
14 (randomi?ed or experiment* or impact* or intervention* or evaluat* or effect* or 
comparative or pre test or pretest or posttest or post test).tw. 
15 ((time adj2 series) or (random* adj2 allocat*) or (random* adj2 assign*) or (controlled 
adj2 trial*) or (controlled adj2 study) or (clinical adj2 trial*) or (clinical adj2 study)).tw. 
16 14 or 15 
17 13 and 16 
18 limit 17 to yr="2011 -Current" 
 
CINAHL Plus, EBSCO 
S21 (S13 AND S20) OR (S17 AND S20) 
S20 S18 OR S19 
S19 TI (control* or random* or experiment or time series or impact or intervention? or 
evaluat* or effect?) or AB (control* or random* or experiment or time series or impact or 
intervention? or evaluat* or effect?) 
S18 (MH “Clinical Trials+”) or (MH “Comparative Studies”) or (MH “Pretest-Posttest Design”) 
or (MH “Quasi-Experimental Studies+”) 
S17 S14 OR S15 OR S16 
S16 (MH “Quality Assurance+/ST”) or (MH “Clinical Indicators/ST”) or (MH “Clinical 
Competence+/ST”) 
S15 (MH “Peer Review+/ST”) or (MH “Benchmarking/ST”) or (MH “Accreditation+/ST”) 
S14 (MH “Outcome Assessment/ST”) or (MH “Process Assessment (Health Care)+/ST”) 
S13 S3 AND S11 AND S12 
S12 TI (standards or standard or performance or criterion or criteria or indicator* or “clinical 
competence” or compliance or “clinical improvement” or “quality improvement” or 
“organisation* development” or “organization* development” or “health care regulation”) or 
AB (standards or standard or performance or criterion or criteria or indicator* or “clinical 
competence” or compliance or “clinical improvement” or “quality improvement” or 
“organisation* development” or “organization* development” or “health care regulation”) 
S11 S4 OR S5 OR S6 OR S7 OR S8 OR S9 OR S10 
S10 TI ( "care quality commission" or "commission for health care improvement" or 
"Commission for health care audit and inspection" or "healthcare commission" ) OR AB ( "care 
quality commission" or "commission for health care improvement" or "Commission for health 
care audit and inspection" or "healthcare commission" ) 
S9 TI ((external* N5 accreditation) or (external* N5 accredited) or (external* N5 peer 
review) or (external* N5 inspection) or (external* N5 inspected) or (external* N5 regulation) or 
(external* N5 regulated) or (external* N5 certified) or (external* N5 certification) or (external* 
N5 benchmark*) or (external* N5 measured) or (external* N5 measurement) or (external* N5 
evaluation) or (external* N5 evaluated) or (external*N5 assessment) or (external* N5 assessed) 
or (external* N5 monitored or (external* N5 visitation) or (external* N5 surveillance) or 
(external* N5 audit) or (external* N5 audits) or (external* N5 auditing)) OR AB ((external* N5 
accreditation) or (external* N5 accredited) or (external* N5 peer review) or (external* N5 
inspection) or (external* N5 inspected) or (external* N5 regulation) or (external* N5 regulated) 
or (external* N5 certified) or (external* N5 certification) or (external* N5 benchmark*) or 
(external* N5 measured) or (external* N5 measurement) or (external* N5 evaluation) or 
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(external* N5 evaluated) or (external* N5 assessment) or (external* N5 assessed) or (external* 
N5 monitored) or (external* N5 visitation) or (external* N5 surveillance) or (external* N5 audit) 
or (external* N5 audits) or (external* N5 auditing)) 
S8 TI (organization* raid* or organisation* raid*) or AB (organization* raid* or 
organisation* raid*) 
S7 (MH "Nursing Audit") 
S6 (MH "Accreditation+") 
S5 (MH "Benchmarking") 
S4 (MH "Peer Review") 
S3 (S1 OR S2) 
S2 TI (hospital or hospitals or (health N2 care)) or AB (hospital or hospitals or (health N2 
care)) 
S1 (MH “Health Facilities+”) 
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Table 4.1 Primary studies according to pairwise comparisons of interventions 
 Accredited institutions After accreditation 




Sekimoto et al. (2008), 
Weeks et al. (2007), 
Casey et al. (2006), 
Salmon et al. (2003), 
Duckett (1983), 
Simons et al. (2002), 
Suñol et al. (2009), 
Barker et al. (2002), 
Landon et al. (2006), 
Chandra et al. (2009), 
Pasquale et al. (2001), 
Lutfiyya et al. (2009), 
Quality assurance 
project (2005), Chen 
et al. (2003), Longo et 






Piontek et al. (2003), 
Stradling et al. (2007), 













Table 4.2 Individual primary studies included and their relationships with eligible systematic reviews 


























x x x x x x x 




 x     x 
OPM report (2009) Interrupted 
time-series 
  x     




    x   




     x  




 x   x   
Weeks et al (2007) Time-series 
study 
    x   
Pollack et al (2008) Time-series 
study 
   x    
Barker et al (2002) Prospective 
Cohort 





    x   
Duckett (1983) Retrospective 
Cohort 
   x x   




   x    
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     x  
Ross et al (2008) Retrospective 
Cohort 
   x x   
Silver et al (2004) 
Before and after 
study with 
control 
     x  
Snyder et al (2005) 
Before and after 
study with 
control 
     x  
Tan et al (2004) Before and after 
study 
   x x   
Frasco et al (2005) Before and after 
study 
   x    
Juul et al (2005) Before and after 
study 
   x x   
Al Tehewy et al 
(2009) 
Before and after 
study 
   x x   
Hadley et al (1988) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
   x x x x 




      x 




    x   




   x x x x 
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Grachek (2002) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
    x   




   x  x x 
Sierpinska et al 
(2002a, b ,c) 
Cross-sectional 
analytical 
    x   




    x   
Chen et al (2003) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
   x  x x 




     x  




     x  
Brown et al (2004) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
   x    
Lau et al (2004) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
    x   




    x   
Casey et al (2005) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
    x   
Grasso et al (2005) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
     x  




    x   
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     x  









   x    
Longo et al (2007) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
    x   




    x   




    x   
Braun et al (2008) Cross-sectional 
analytical 
    x   




   x x   




   x x   




   x x   




    x   
Suñol et al (2009) Cross-sectional 
analytical 





 x      
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   x x x  




    x   
Gough et al (2000) Cross-sectional 
study 
    x   
Gross et al (2000)  Cross-sectional 
study 
     x  




   x  x x 









      x 
Heuer (2004) Cross-sectional 
study 
      x 
Miller et al (2005) Cross-sectional 
study 
   x  x x 




    x   
Oh et al (2006) Cross-sectional 
study 
   x    
Wells et al (2007) Cross-sectional 
study 
   x x   




    x   
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    x   




   x    
Dédale (2009)* Cross-sectional 
study 
    x   




     x  




     x  




     x  




   x x   
ANAES (2003)* Descriptive 
study 





    x   




     x  




      x 




    x  x 
Day et al (2004) Multi-methods 
study 
      x 
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    x   
Beaumont (2008)* Multi-methods 
study 
    x   
Berthelier (2002)* Qualitative 
study 
    x   




    x   
Devers et al (2004) Qualitative 
study 
      x 




    x   
Pham et al (2006) Qualitative 
study 
    x   
Doyle et al (2008) Qualitative 
study 
    x   




    x   
Pomey et al (2010) Qualitative 
study 
    x   
Scrivens (1995) Book     x   
*Studies in French 
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Table 4.3 List of excluded reviews and reasons for exclusion 
Excluded studies Reasons for exclusion 
Al-Awa et al, 2011 Lack of inclusion/exclusion criteria defined a priori. 
Cerqueira, 2006 The search strategy is not replicable. 
Hinchcliff et al, 2012 
Meta-synthesis of themes commonly mentioned in 
healthcare accreditation research. 
Kilsdonk et al, 2015 
Focus on organisational processes during 
accreditation or peer-review. 
Petit Dit Dariel and Regnaux, 2015 
Accreditation programme assesses working 
environment for nurses, instead of process of care 
more generally. 
Mumford et al, 2013 Search strategy is not replicable. 
Ng et al, 2013 
No relevant outcomes reported. SWOT (strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis of 
the literature on accreditation. 
Nicklin, 2015 Lack of inclusion/exclusion criteria defined a priori. 
Vist et al, 2014 
Duplicate of Brubakk et al (2015) systematic review. 




Table 4.4 Description of primary studies included in the seven reviews of the overview of reviews 
Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 






Acute hospitals in 
KwaZulu-Natal, 
South Africa 
To assess the effects of an 
accreditation program on public 
hospitals’ processes and 
outcomes in a developing 
country setting. 
COHSASA accreditation 
process, which starts with a 
self-assessment against 
standards, then the 
implementation of a 
continuous quality 
improvement programme and 
the last phase is the audit to 
determine accreditation status 
Hospitals in 
waiting list 








Level II trauma 
centre at a 
community 
hospital, USA 
To compare the impact of 
trauma patient outcomes before 
and after Level II American 
College of Surgeons (ACS) 
verification was received in a 
not-for-profit community 
hospital. 
Trauma patients admitted 
between March 1993 and 
November 2001. The centre 
was certified in July 1998 
Coronary artery 
bypass graft 
surgery at the 
same hospital and 
trauma patients 






168 acute trusts 
(2009) 
Acute trusts in 
the English NHS, 
United Kingdom 
To assess the effect of the 
external inspection of 
compliance with Code of 
practice on MRSA infection rates 
5 quarters before external 
inspection by the Healthcare 
Commission 














To examine changes in the last 
12 years on methadone doses 
provision and to identify factors 
associated with variation in 
programme performance. 






Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Salmon et al 
(2003) 
Overall compliance with accreditation 
standards (28 service elements) 
Compliance with critical criteria (19 generic 
service elements) 
8 quality indicators: 
Nurse perceptions of clinical quality, 
participation and teamwork 
Patient satisfaction 
Medication education 
Medical record accessibility and accuracy 
Medical record completeness 
Completeness of peri-operative notes 




Intervention group improved average overall compliance from 48 to 78%, control 
remained in 43%. 
The compliance with critical criteria in the intervention group improved from 38% to 
76%, whilst for the control group there was no change (37% baseline vs 38% follow-
up) 
Mean effect for each quality indicator: 
overall nurses' perception of care 6% (p<0.03) 
patients' satisfaction 2% (p=0.48) 
medication education 1.7% (p>0.05) 
Accessibility of medical records 3% (p>0.05) 
Discharge and admission record completeness 6% (p>0.05) 
Completeness peri-operative notes -1.9% (p>0.05) 
Medicine labelling 12% (p>0.05) 
Hospital sanitation -2.4% (p>0.05) 
Piontek et al 
(2003) 
Length of stay 
Mortality 
Total hospitalisation cost 
Intensive care unit cost 
Payment and key labour cost 
Ventilator use 
Prevalence of complication 
Readmission to the hospital within 31 days 
Patient level 
In the external control, length of stay (1.146 vs 1.340), cost (0.968 vs 1.167) and 
readmission (-0.015 vs 0.043) ratios (observed to expected) increased between pre-
certification and post-certification period. Mortality remained similar. 
In the internal control, there were no differences in length of stay and mortality, but 
cost increased (0.755 vs 0.937). 
In the exposed group, length of stay (1.122 vs 1.014), mortality (-0.007 vs -0.019), cost 
(1.147 vs 1.097) and readmission (-0.046 vs -0.052) ratios decreased. 
OPM report 
(2009) 
MRSA infection rates Trust level Non-significant decrease, mean (CI) cases at 3 months 100 (-221 to 21.5) 
D'Aunno et al 
(2002) 
Accreditation status and % of patients 
receiving 40, 60 and 80mg/day of 
methadone 
Patient level 
Patients treated in JCAHO accredited units in 1988 were less likely to receive doses 
<40mg/day, <60mg/day and <80mg/day. The coefficients (95% CI) were -4.84 (-9.6 to -
0.04; p=0.05), -4.8 (-9.7 to 0.09; p=0.05) and -4.5 (-8.6 to -0.3; p=0.04) for doses of 40, 
60 and 80 mg/day, respectively. 
In 2000, the direction of the result remained constant, but the magnitude increased 
for <60mg/day and <80 mg/day, although for <40mg/day was no longer significant. 
The coefficients (95% CI) were -4.5 (-9.25 to 0.3; p=0.07), -10.45 (-18.6 to -2.31; 
p=0.01) and -12.75 (-21.9 to -3.6; p=0.01) for doses of 40, 60 and 80 mg/day, 
respectively. 
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To examine JCAHO accredited 
hospitals' performance on 18 
standardised indicators of 
quality of care for acute 
myocardial infarction, 
pneumonia and heart failure. 
High level of performance on 
18 indicators at baseline (Third 
quarter 2002) 











To examine the effect of JCAHO 
stroke centre certification and 
related changes on delivery of 
stroke care at one institution 
1.5 years after JCAHO stroke 
centre certification 









18 standardised indicators of the quality of care: 
Acute myocardial infarction 
Aspirin within 24 hours after admission 
Aspirin prescribed at discharge 
ACE inhibitor prescribed at discharge for patients with left 
ventricular systolic dysfunction 
Smoking-cessation counselling or advice 
Beta-blocker within 24 hours after admission 
Beta-blocker prescribed at discharge 
Mean time from arrival to thrombolysis 
Mean time from arrival to PCI 
Inpatient death 
Heart failure 
Discharge instructions regarding medications, diet, weight, 
worsening of symptoms, follow-up, and activity 
Assessment of left ventricular function 
ACE inhibitor prescribed at discharge for patient with left 
ventricular systolic dysfunction 
Smoking-cessation counselling or advice 
Pneumonia 
Oxygenation assessment within 24 hours after admission 
Pneumococcal screening, vaccination, or both by discharge 
Blood cultures collected before initiation of antibiotic 
therapy 
Smoking-cessation counselling or advice 
Mean time from arrival to initial antibiotic administration 
Patient Level 
15 measures showed improvement over time. Absolute changes from 
2002 to 2004 were: 
Acute myocardial infarction 
Aspirin at admission: 3%, p=0.002 
Aspirin at discharge: 3%, p <0.001 
ACE inhibitor for LV systolic dysfunction: 5%, p <0.001 
Smoking cessation counselling: 19%, p <0.001 
Beta-blocker at admission: 7%, p<0.001 
Beta-blocker at discharge: 6%, p <0.001 
Mean time to thrombolysis: -8 min, p=0.53 
Mean time to PCI: -113 min, p <0.001 
Inpatient death: -1%, p=0.58 
Heart failure 
Discharge instructions: 26%, p<0.001 
Assessment of LV function: 7%, p <0.001 
ACE inhibitor for LV systolic dysfunction: 4%, p=0.005 
Smoking-cessation counselling: 32%, p<0.001 
Pneumonia 
Oxygenation assessment: 4%, p <0.001 
Pneumococcal vaccination: 22%, p <0.001 
Blood cultures: <1%, p= 0.31 
Smoking-cessation counselling: 33%, p <0.001 
Mean time to initiation of antibiotics: -39 min, p<0.001 
The rate of improvement was greater for hospitals with a low level of 
performance at baseline compared to hospitals with an average and high 





Deep vein thrombosis prophylaxis 
Lipid profile testing 
Patient Level 
The proportion of individuals receiving DVT prophylaxis (80% before vs 
98% after, p<0.0001) and lipid profile testing (71% before vs 86% after, 
p<0.0001) increased, whilst admission rate remained similar after 
certification for patients with ischemic stroke. 
Admission rates for all types of stroke increased by 36% after certification 
(from 64 to 87 cases per quarter, p<0.005). Mainly driven by an increase in 
admission of patients with intracerebral haemorrhage (from 14 to 32 cases 
per quarter, p <0.0001). 
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Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 







JCAHO and with 
information in 
AHA data set, 
USA 
To examine the relationship 
between JCAHO accreditation 
status, scores and process of 





Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Weeks et al 
(2007) 
Acute Myocardial Infarction 
ACE-I for left ventricular systolic dysfunction 
Aspirin at arrival 
Aspirin at discharge 
ß-blocker at arrival 
ß-blocker at discharge 
PTCA within 90 minutes of arrival 
Smoking cessation advice/counselling 
Heart Failure 
ACE-I for left ventricular systolic dysfunction 
Assessment of left ventricular function 
Discharge instructions 
Smoking cessation advice/counselling 
Pneumonia 
Blood culture before 1st antibiotic 
Initial antibiotic timing 
Oxygenation assessment 
Pneumococcal vaccination 
Smoking cessation advice/counselling 
Mortality in 1999, 2000 and 2001 for 
Abdominal aortic aneurysm repair 
Aortic valve replacement 






Lower extremity bypass 
Lung lobectomy 





Significant differences in level of performance (weighted mean) 
between JCAHO accredited and non-accredited hospitals for: aspirin 
at arrival (94.3 vs 93.5, p=0.02), aspirin at discharge (94.1 vs 92.9, 
p=0.01), assessment of left ventricular function (86.3 vs 82.3, 
p<0.001), initial antibiotic timing (69 vs 71.8, p<0.001) and 
oxygenation assessment (98.4 vs 97.7, p=0.003). 
Odds of death in 2001 comparing non-accredited vs accredited 
hospitals for  
Abdominal aortic aneurysm repair: 0.70 (0.60 – 0.83), p<0.001 
Aortic valve replacement: 0.71 (0.62 – 0.81), p<0.001 
Coronary artery bypass graft: 0.86 (0.81 – 0.91), p<0.001 
Carotid endarterectomy: 0.87 (0.81 – 0.94), p<0.001 
Colectomy: 0.87 (0.81 – 0.95), p<0.001 
Cystectomy: 0.49 (0.33 – 0.72), p<0.001 
Esophagectomy: 0.00 (0.00 – 0.23), p<0.001 
Gastrectomy: 0.73 (0.52 – 1.01), p<0.05 
Lower extremity bypass: 0.76 (0.69 – 0.84), p<0.001 
Lung lobectomy: 0.49 (0.40 – 0.59), p<0.001 
Mitral valve replacement: 0.46 (0.36 – 0.59), p<0.001 
Nephrectomy: 0.97 (0.80 – 1.19) 
Pancreatectomy: 0.33 (0.16 – 0.66), p<0.001 
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To examine the extent to which 
U.S. methadone maintenance 
facilities meet established 
standards for minimum dosages, 
1988–2005. 






Harm reduction/HIV prevention 
 






















and District of 
Columbia, USA 
To explore whether the quality 
of hospital care for Medicare 
beneficiaries improves more in 
hospitals that voluntarily 
participate with Medicare’s QIOs 
compared with nonparticipating 
hospitals. 
Actively participating: either 
used the information to track 
quality improvement efforts or 
implemented system changes. 
Four other definitions of "active 
participation": 
- Hospitals only using data to 
track performance 
- Hospitals only implementing 
system changes 
- Hospitals doing both 
- Hospitals not participating at all 
 













To identify the prevalence of 
medication errors (doses 
administered differently than 
ordered) 
JCAHO accredited hospitals 
Non-accredited 






Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Pollack et al 
(2008) 
Percentage of patients receiving <40, <60 and <80mg/day of 
methadone 
Facility level 
Patients treated in JCAHO accredited facilities were more likely 
to receive higher doses. The coefficients were -2.848, -4.079 
and -4.643 for doses <40, <60 and <80 mg/day, respectively 
Snyder et al 
(2005) 
15 quality indicators 
Atrial fibrillation 
Warfarin prescribed 
Acute myocardial infarction  
Administration of aspirin within 24 h of admission  
Aspirin prescribed at discharge  
Administration of beta-blocker within 24 h of admission 
Beta-Blocker prescribed at discharge 
ACE inhibitor prescribed at discharge for patients with LVEF <40% 
Smoking cessation counselling given during hospitalisation 
Heart failure 
Evaluation of ejection fraction and ACE inhibitor prescribed at 
discharge for patients with LVEF <40% 
Pneumonia  
Antibiotic within 8 h of arrival at hospital  
Antibiotic consistent with current recommendations  
Blood culture drawn (if done) before antibiotic given  
Patient screened for or given influenza vaccine  
Patient screened for or given pneumococcal vaccine  
Stroke 
Antithrombotic prescribed at discharge for patients with acute 
stroke or transient ischemic attack 
Avoidance of sub lingual Nifedipine for patients with acute stroke 
Patient level 
Non-participating hospitals had fewer beds and a higher 
proportion was for-profit. 
At baseline non-participating hospitals performed better in 
prescription of warfarin for AF (OR 0.75 [CI 95% 0.6 to 0.94]) 
and prescription of beta-blocker at discharge for AMI (0.56 
[0.33 to 0.98]). Participating hospital performed better in 
smoking counselling during hospitalisation for AMI (2.28 [1.37 
to 3.8]), screening for or given influenza vaccine (1.70 [1.23 to 
2.36]) and pneumococcal vaccine (1.93 [1.46 to 2.54]). 
At follow-up participating hospitals performed better in 
evaluation of ejection fraction and ACE-I prescription at 
discharge for patient with systolic dysfunction for heart failure 
(1.27 [1.06 to 1.53]), antibiotic administration within 8 hrs of 
arrival at hospital (1.3 [1.04 to 1.61]), screening for or given 
influenza vaccine (2.51 [1.9 to 3.33]) and pneumococcal 
vaccine (3.61 [2.92 to 4.45]).  
When change from baseline was compared between the two 
groups, only screening for or given pneumococcal vaccine was 
significant (1.58 [1.15 to 2.18]) 
Barker et al 
(2002) 
Medication errors during 50 medication administration per shift 
site: Unauthorised drug, extra drug, wrong dose, omission, wrong 
route, wrong form, wrong technique and wrong time 
Facility level 
Overall, 19% (605/3216) of doses were in error. JCAHO 
accredited hospital did not have a significantly different rate of 
errors compared to non-accredited hospitals or skilled nursing 
facilities. The most frequent errors were: 43% wrong time, 














To evaluate the impact of the 
Zambia accreditation programme 
on various indicators of the quality 
of healthcare and health 
outcomes in the participating 
hospitals. 
Hospitals participating in the 
accreditation programme 
Hospitals non-








Large, small, rural 
and urban hospitals 
in New South 
Wales, Australia 
To determine the impact of a 
hospital accreditation programme 
in New South Wales, Australia 
Hospitals surveyed by the 
accreditation programme between 
1978 and 1980. 
Hospitals to be surveyed 
and not applying to be 
surveyed in the same 
period of time 
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Overall compliance with accreditation standards 
8 indicators of quality of care: 
-Hospital death rate within two days of 
admission divided by rate of all hospital deaths 
-Cesarian section (C-section) infection rate 
-Availability of emergency drugs 
-Availability of essential drugs 
-Availability of lab tests 




Compliance with accreditation standards in exposed group change from 36% in 
1998-99 to 48% in 2000-01. In the unexposed group, the compliance in 2000-01 
was 18% (p=0.018)  
Compliance with 8 indicators. Unexposed vs exposed 
Deaths<2 days: 38% vs 48% 
C-section infection: 53% vs 67% 
Emergency drugs: 42% vs 52% 
Essential drugs: 75% vs 76% 
Lab tests availability: 93% vs 85% 
Sanitation: 60% vs 73% 
Nurse satisfaction: 54% vs 56% 
Patient satisfaction: 63% vs 62% 
High performing hospitals were larger (number of beds and admissions) and had a 
higher patient-to-nurse ratio. 
Duckett 
(1983) 
Six areas considered indicators of overall 
performance of hospitals: 
-Administration and management 
-Medical staff organisation 
-Review systems 
-Organisation of nursing services 
-Physical facility and safety 
-Hospital role definition and planning. 
Patient level 
Administration and management: more informal communication in the hospital 
not applying to accreditation. Surveyed and to be surveyed hospitals had more 
systematic processes to make decisions and prioritise actions. 
Medical staff organisation: surveyed hospitals had a better organisation of medical 
staff, which was reflected by meetings more often and more delegation to 
department chairs. 
Review systems: surveyed and to be surveyed hospitals had better or a greater 
number of review systems than hospitals not applying to accreditation. 
Organisation of nursing services: The accreditation was seen as an opportunity to 
update or create documentation and review procedures. The representation of 
nurses in committees was increased. This change was not observed in the hospital 
not applying to accreditation. 
Physical facility and safety: All types of hospitals made changes related to fire and 
physical hazards. To be surveyed hospitals had a higher incidence of preventive 
actions than surveyed hospitals. On the other hand, surveyed hospitals had more 
safety inspections than the other two types of hospitals. 
Hospital role definition and planning: role definition was more common for 
surveyed and to surveyed hospitals compared to not applying hospitals. However, 
accreditation had no effect on hospital planning according to the needs of the 
community. 
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To evaluate the impact of five 
trauma centre characteristics on 
survival outcome in nine serious 
injury categories. 
Level of accreditation (I or II) by 
American College of Surgeons 
Volume of trauma admissions 
In-house trauma surgeon 
Surgical residency programme 
On-site medical school 
 









To determine whether 
documentation of compliance 
with any or all of the six required 
discharge instructions is 
correlated with readmissions to 
hospital or mortality. 
Compliance with six written 
















measures for AMI 
during 2005, USA 
To determine whether hospitals 
accredited by the Society of 
Chest Pain Centers (SCPC) 
hospitals are associated with 
better performance regarding 
Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) core 
measures for acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) than non-
accredited hospitals. 
Accreditation by Society of Chest 
Pain Centres 
Non-accredited by 




Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Pasquale et al 
(2001) 
Survival in nine selected serious injuries 
defined as A Severity Characterization of 
Trauma (ASCOT) <0.5 
Injuries of Head, Neck, Chest, Brain, Lung, 
Liver, Spleen, Aorta and Vena Cava 
Patient level 
Level I and II of accreditation had higher than predicted survival in six (head, neck, 
chest, brain, lung and spleen) out of nine serious injuries.  
High volume of trauma admissions was associated with higher than predicted survival 
for seven (head, neck, chest, brain, lung, spleen and aorta) out of nine serious injuries, 
whilst for low volume, survival was higher for only three injuries.  
Centres with in-house trauma surgeon had higher than expected survival for four 
serious injuries (head, brain, lung and spleen), and centres without in-house trauma 
surgeon had higher survival for six injuries (head, neck, chest, brain, lung and spleen). 
The presence of surgical residency was associated with higher than predicted survival 
for six serious injuries (head, neck, chest, brain, lung and spleen) and five for centres 
without surgical residency (chest, brain, lung, spleen and aorta). 
Having an on-site medical school related to seven (head, neck, chest, brain, lung, 
spleen and aorta) higher than expected survival rates and six (head, neck, chest, brain, 
lung and spleen) in the case of not having a medical school on-site. Low-volume was a 
significant risk factor for death for head, chest, brain and lung injuries. 
Van Such et al 
(2006) 
Mortality and readmissions Patient level 
Only 68% of patients received all the discharge instructions. There was no association 
between survival and receiving all discharge instructions. 
At 9 month after discharge, 37% and 41% of patients were readmitted for heart failure 
or any cause, respectively. Patients receiving all instruction were less likely to be 
readmitted for heart failure (p=0.003) or any other cause (p=0.035) 
Ross et al 
(2008) 
Core measures AMI: 
Aspirin administration at hospital arrival 
Aspirin administration at discharge 
Beta-blocker administration at arrival 
Beta-blocker administration at discharge 
Percutaneous coronary intervention < 
120 minutes after arrival 
Fibrinolytic therapy < 30 minutes after 
arrival 
ACE-I or angiotensin receptor blocker 
administration for left Ventricular systolic 
dysfunction 
Smoking cessation counselling on 
discharge. 
Patient level 
The rate of percutaneous coronary intervention was higher in accredited hospitals 
(92.8% vs 80.8%), whilst it was lower for fibrinolysis (7.2% vs 19.2%) 
In the unadjusted analysis, for seven out of eight core measures the level of 
compliance was higher for accredited hospitals, except for fibrinolytic 
administration. These results were robust when adjusted by hospital characteristics 
(e.g. number of hospital beds, type of ownership, JCAHO accreditation, teaching 
hospital status, urban location, total patient days, and region of the country).  
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To identify changes in the quality 
indices of our cervicovaginal 
cytology service preceding and 
following laboratory 
accreditation by the College of 
American Pathologists in 2000. 
Data from 2001 after 
accreditation by College of 
American Pathologists. 
Data from 1997 
before accreditation 








care unit (PACU) 
of Mayo Clinic, 
USA 
To assess the effects of the 
JCAHO pain initiative in our 
institution. 
Mandatory use of 11-point scale 
to assess pain intensity after 
surgery in PACU 
Period before January 
2002 










To examine the availability and 
quality of clinical guidelines on 
perioperative diabetes care in 
hospital units before and after a 
randomised clinical trial (RCT) 
and international accreditation. 




Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Tan et al 
(2004) 
Positive predictive value (PPV) of low-grade squamous 
intraepithelial lesion (LSIL), high-grade squamous 
intraepithelial lesion (HSIL) and positive cytology to 
diagnose cervical intraepithelial neoplasia. 
Patient level 
The PPV of LSIL increased from 68% in 1997 to 78% in 2001. The 
PPV of HSIL decreased from 94% in 1997 to 85% in 2001. The 
overall PPV for positive cytology increased from 82% in 1997 to 
87% in 2001. None of these differences was statistically significant. 
Frasco et al 
(2005) 
Amount of opioids used in PACU 
Opioid-induced side effects (nausea and vomiting requiring 
treatment and naloxone used for respiratory depression) 
PACU discharge time 
Patient level 
Overall opiates use increased (p=0.001) due to increased use in 
PACU. Postoperative use of opioids increased for all diagnostic 
related groups except for back surgery. 
Nausea and vomiting treatment decreased between 2000 and 
2002 (31.2% vs 27.5%), but prophylactic treatment increased in the 
same period (53.2% vs 73.8%). Naloxone used for respiratory 
depression did not change between 2000 and 2002. 
Length of stay in PACU decreased between 2000 and 2002 (105.6 
vs 97.9 min, respectively) 
Juul et al 
(2005) 
Availability and quality of clinical guidelines for 
perioperative diabetic care 
Facility level 
At baseline, a higher proportion of units that were accredited 
during the period (63%, 17/27) had clinical guidelines compared to 
those non-accredited (29%, 7/24). At the completion of the follow-
up, the accredited units with clinical guidelines increased by 33%, 
whilst for non-accredited units the increase was 21%. 
Quality of clinical guidelines measured by the systematic 
development scale, improved more in the accredited units 
(median[range]: 2 [0-8] to 9 [0-9]) than the non-accredited ones (0 
[0-6] to 2 [0-7]) 
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Al Tehewy 









To determine the effect of 
accreditation of non-governmental 
organisations’ health units on 
patient satisfaction and provider 
satisfaction and the output of 
accreditation on compliance to some 
accreditation standards 
Accreditation  










To determine whether accreditation 
by JCAHO or certification by the 
Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) were related 
to seven hospital characteristics 
reflecting quality of care (1984 data) 
JCAHO accreditation 
HCFA accreditation 
Accredited by JCAHO and HCFA 





Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Al Tehewy 
et al (2009) 
Patient satisfaction 
Provider satisfaction 






Maintenance contract  
Complaints box  
Announced patient rights  
Analysed patient satisfaction questionnaire (at least once)  
Analysed provider satisfaction questionnaire (at least once)  
Presence of record room  
Presence of records  
Presence of guidelines  
Presence of emergency drug list  
≥50% of records with recorded two visits (for hypertension)  
≥50% of records with recorded two visits (for diabetes)  
≥50% of records with recorded two visits (for antenatal care)  
Waste segregation  
Proper sharp disposal  
Presence of three sterilised sets  
Employee health file 
Patient level 
For patient satisfaction, accredited health units had 
higher mean scores in all aspects assessed compared to 
non-accredited health units: Unit staff (90.6 vs 83.2), 
cleanliness (81.3 vs 71.9), waiting area (85.7 vs 73.8), 
waiting time (75.2 vs 67.8) and overall (90.4 vs 79.5). 
For provider satisfaction, accredited units only performed 
better in the mean overall score (81 vs 73) compared to 
non-accredited units. 
For all the selected standards, compliance was better in 
accredited units than non-accredited units, with the 
exception of more than 50% of antenatal care records 
with two visits recorded, and the presence of three 
sterilised sets, which had similar compliance. 
Hadley et al 
(1988) 
Average cost per patient 
Per diem bed cost 
Total staff hours per patient 
Clinical staff hours per patient 
% staff hours provided by medical staff 
Bed turnover 
% beds occupied 
Facility level 
Average cost per patient (R2=0.38), per diem bed cost 
(R2=0.39), percent of staff hours provided by medical staff 
(R2=0.46) and bed turnover (R2=0.49) were better 
explained by accreditation status. 
Additionally, higher costs were associated with percent of 















To determine the proportion of 
JCAHO /HCFA accredited hospitals 
that maintained their status and 
proportion of non-accredited 
hospitals that gained accreditation 
between 1984 and 1986 
JCAHO accreditation 
HCFA accreditation 
Full accreditation by JCAHO and HCFA 
Non-accredited by JCAHO or HCFA 
 
Verstraete 







in 1995 and 






To determine attitudes of 
laboratory personnel towards 
accreditation 
Beltest accreditation in Belgium or 















To determine the characteristics of 
plans that have submitted to 
accreditation review, the 
performance of accredited plans 
on quality indicators and the 
impact of accreditation on 
enrolment. 
National Committee on Quality 
Assurance (NCQA) accreditation 














Change of status 
Average cost per patient 
Per diem bed cost 
Total staff hours per patient 
Clinical staff hours per patient 
% staff hours provided by medical 
staff 
Bed turnover 
% beds occupied 
Facility level 
Only two out of 178 hospitals accredited by JCAHO or HCFA or both in 1984 lost their status by 
1986. Seven out of 55 hospitals that were accredited by one agency in 1984, gained full 
accreditation by 1986. Five out of 38 hospitals non-accredited by JCAHO or HCFA in 1984 gained 
full accreditation by 1986. 
Average cost per patient and per diem bed cost increased for all groups between 1984 and 1986; 
however, clinical staff hours per patient, percentage of staff hours provided by medical staff, bed 
turnover, and percentage of beds occupied remained stable between 1984 and 1986. The 




Change in quality after accreditation 
Working preference between 
accredited and non-accredited 
laboratory 
Workload in accredited laboratories 
Advantages of working in an 
accredited laboratory 
Disadvantages of working in an 
accredited laboratory 
Patient level 
88% of lab technologists considered that workload is higher or much higher in accredited 
laboratories. In relation to how quality changed after accreditation, 43% indicated that quality 
remained the same and 45% replied that it improved. 
24 laboratory technologists answered the survey in 1995 and 1996. In relation to advantages of 
working in an accredited laboratory, there was a significant increase in respondents saying that 
accreditation improved documentation of all manipulations, increased confidence about 
procedures, knowledge of analyses, and quality. In relation to disadvantages of accreditation, 
there was a significant decrease in respondents considering that job was less motivating and there 
was a discrepancy between reality and what accreditation assesses. Additionally, there was a 




Characteristics of health plans 
Mean performance on nine HEDIS 
(Health Plan and Employer Data 
Information Set) measures 
Seven patient-reported ratings 
(quality and satisfaction). 
Health plan enrolment 
Health plan 
Accredited plans were more likely to be older, larger in terms of enrolment, federally qualified, 
affiliated with a national managed care firm (NMCF), and of a mixed model type. Also, they were 
more likely to offer a point of service (POS) and Medicare managed care products. Fully-
accredited plans were more likely to be older and belong to a national managed care. 
Accredited plans performed modestly better in seven out of nine HEDIS measures: childhood 
immunization (68.3 vs 61.8), adolescent immunizations (57 vs 51.3), breast (72.4 vs 68.2) and 
cervical cancer screening (72.6 vs 69.4), prenatal care (86 vs 81.4), diabetic eye exam (41.1 vs 35) 
and follow-up after hospitalization for mental illness (74.4 vs 70.4). Fully accredited plans 
performed better in two out of nine HEDIS measures: beta-blocker treatment (67 vs 55.5) and 
Follow-up after hospitalisation for mental illness (77.2 vs 70.2). 
Accredited plans performed slightly better in one out of eight patient-reported ratings: overall 
satisfaction (18.3 vs 16.8). Non-accredited plans performed better in two patient-reported rating: 
quality of care (86.9 vs 88.5) and choice of specialist (74 vs 76). 
Health plan enrolment was positively associated with accreditation only for 1994-95 (beta=0.064) 
and 1995-96 (beta=0.072) 
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centres in British 
Columbia, Canada 
To examine outcomes within 
a single regional trauma 
system after the designation 
of trauma centres and to 
compare outcomes in the 
one accredited centre to the 
non-accredited centres. 













Acute care hospitals, 
USA 
To assess whether JCAHO 
hospital accreditation is 
associated with the use of 
guideline-recommended 
therapies and clinical 
outcomes. 




















To determine differences in 
performance rates between 
organisations with and 
without quality 
improvement activities. 
Organisations with or without 
"similarly targeted" activities.  
 
*"similarly targeted" when the 
aim of quality improvement 




Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Simons et al 
(2002) 
Actual mortality compared to predicted mortality by 
Trauma Injury Severity Score. 
Sub-group analysis by patients, transfer patients, 
penetrating trauma and hip fractures rates. 
Patient level 
Hospital A (accredited) had better survival than hospitals B and C (odds 
ratio: 2.06 A vs B and 1.47 A vs C) 
When outcomes were compared to the Major Trauma Outcome Study, 
hospital A performed above the norm, whilst hospitals B and C had lower 
performance. 
Chen et al 
(2003) 
Use of aspirin or beta-blockers within 48 hrs of admission 
Aspirin or beta-blockers anytime during hospitalisation 
Acute reperfusion therapy (thrombolytic agents or 
primary angioplasty) within six hours of admission 
risk-standardised 30-day mortality 
Patient level 
Non-surveyed hospitals were more likely to be rural, non-teaching, 
publicly-owned and smaller-volume centres. Surveyed hospitals with 
higher accreditation level were more likely to be urban and larger-volume 
centres. 
Performance measured as percent of ideal candidates receiving therapy 
was worse in not surveyed hospitals compared to surveyed hospitals: 
aspirin on admission (51.8 vs 54.5), aspirin during hospitalisation (81.4 vs 
85.5), beta-blockers on admission (43.1 vs 48.5), beta-blockers during 
hospitalisation (52.6 vs 60.5) and reperfusion (61.8 vs 67.5). Risk-
standardised 30-day mortality was higher (20.4%) in not surveyed than 
surveyed hospitals (18.4%). 
Variability of performance across JCAHO accreditation status categories 
indicates that accreditation is not a good reflection of quality of care for 
patients with AMI 
Borenstein et 
al (2004) 
Performance score in effectiveness-of-care categories:  
Comprehensive diabetes care 
Breast cancer screening 
Childhood immunizations 
Adolescent immunizations 
Cervical cancer screening 
Beta-blocker therapy after myocardial infarction 
Check-up after delivery 
Follow-up after hospitalisation for mental illness 
Prenatal care in the first trimester 
Advice on smoking cessation 
Asthma medication management 
Antidepressant medication management 
Facility level 
For only 8 out of 12 effectiveness-of-care measures there were 
organisations with "similarly targeted" activities. Performance scores for 
these measures were better for five categories: adolescent 
immunisations, breast cancer screening, comprehensive diabetes care, 
cervical cancer screening, check-ups after delivery, and follow-up after 
hospitalisation for mental illness. Results were significant for the latest 
three categories (mean difference [95% confidence interval]: 6.4 [3.5 to 
9.2], 6.6 [1.9 to 11.2] and 21.1 [14.5 to 27.7]) 
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To evaluate the reliability of 
carotid duplex ultrasound 
scanning performed by non-
accredited vascular laboratories 
and to assess the clinical effect 
on patient management. 
Accredited vs non-accredited 
laboratories by the Intersocietal 
Commission for Accreditation of 
Vascular Laboratories 
 










To estimate the scope of 
potentially inappropriate 
medication prescriptions (PIRx) 
among elderly residents in U.S. 
nursing homes (NHs), and to 
examine associated resident 
and facility characteristics. 
Resident characteristics (age, sex, 
race, marital status, number of 
living children, education, and 
poverty status) 
Facility characteristics 
(organisational structure, nurse 
staffing levels, JCAHO accreditation 
status, high-level technological 
services and geographical location) 
Resident and facility characteristics 
 
Brannigan 












To conduct the first systematic 
evaluation of the quality of 
highly regarded adolescent 
substance abuse treatment 
programs in the United States. 
Programme characteristics 
-Region 




-Accreditation (Joint Commission 
on the Accreditation of Healthcare 
organisations, Commission on the 
accreditation of rehabilitation 





Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Brown et al 
(2004) 
Agreement between accredited and non-
accredited laboratories about severity of stenosis 
Effect of ultrasound result on clinical 
management. 
Patient level 
There was agreement about the severity of stenosis in 49% (171/348) of 
the vessels examined. 
In 88 patients (104 vessels) the degree of stenosis was overestimated in 
the non-accredited laboratory. None of these patients underwent surgery. 
In 19 patients (19 vessels) the degree of stenosis was underestimated in 
the non-accredited laboratory. The accredited laboratory finding agreed 
with the angiography in 5 patients. All 19 patients underwent surgery. 
Lau et al 
(2004) 
Potentially inappropriate medication 
prescriptions 




50% of nursing home residents received at least one PIRx during 1996. 
40% of PIRx were inappropriate drug choice. 
Accreditation status was protective of PIRx when the model was adjusted 
for facility characteristics (OR[95% CI]: 0.78 [0.61-0.99]), and resident and 
facility characteristics (0.7 [0.54-0.92]) 
Brannigan et 
al (2004) 
9 key elements 
Assessment and matching 
Comprehensive, integrated approach 
Family involvement 
Development Appropriateness 
Engaging and retaining 
Qualified staff 




Top-quartile programmes were more likely to have been implemented 
more than 20 years ago (54.3% vs 29% in middle 50% vs 37.5% in bottom 
quartile; p<0.05). Additionally, they were more likely to use 
multidimensional family therapy (25.7% vs 8.7% vs 10%; p<0.05) compared 
to the middle 50% and bottom quartile. 19 programmes (13%) had more 
than 30 points (45 maximum possible) and 64 (44%) programmes had less 
than 22 points. Accredited institutions were not better than non-
accredited ones in any of the 9 key elements. 
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To assess the capacity of small 
rural hospitals to implement 
medication safety practices, with 
a particular focus on pharmacist 






Type of ownership 
Financial status 
Rural adjacency 
Registered nurse staffing 
Medication or patient safety 
committee with active 
participation of a pharmacist 
 








hospital in Maine, 
USA 
To compare the sensitivity of 
medication error detection 
resulting from independent 
audit with hospital’s usual self-
reporting process for errors and 
with the JCAHO, CMS, and Maine 
Department for Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) licensing 
surveys. 
Medication error rates according 
to  
-JCAHO licensing standards  
-CMS licensing standards 
-Maine DHHS licensing standards  





Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Casey et al 
(2005) 
Pharmacists full-time equivalents (FTEs) 
Use of computer for clinical purposes 
Implementation of four medication safety 
practices: list of "do not use", policy for 
using two patient identifiers for 
administering medication, a list of "high-
alert" drugs, and a policy for checking high-
alert medications dosage by two health 
professionals. 
Facility level 
46% of hospitals had 1.0 or less FTE pharmacists. Pharmacist staffing levels 
were significantly associated with the active participation of a pharmacist on 
medication and patient safety committees (p<0.001). Amount of pharmacist 
staffing was positively associated with inpatient days in hospital unit 
(p<0.0001), inpatient day in nursing home (p<0.001), Medicare case mix index 
(p<0.0001), JCAHO accreditation (p<0.0001), net other income (p<0.001) and 
net operating margin (p<0.001). Additionally, it was negatively associated with 
for-profit ownership (p<0.01). 
45% of hospitals had a pharmacy computed being used for clinical purposes. 
The use of pharmacy computer for clinical purposes was positively associated 
with inpatient days in hospital unit (p<0.0001), JCAHO accreditation (p<0.001), 
net other income (p<0.001) and net operating margin (p<0.05). 
Drug protocols were more commonly implemented for emergency 
medications, anticoagulants and insulin. Protocols for chemotherapy were 
implemented in 46% of hospitals, whilst protocols for pre-surgical antibiotics 
were implemented in 58%. 
49% of hospitals had implemented the four medication safety practices. Three 
variables were positively associated with their implementation: JCAHO 
accreditation (p<0.0001), active participation of a pharmacist in 
patient/medication safety committee (p<0.001), and net operating margin 
(p<0.05). 
Grasso et al 
(2005) 
Rates of medication errors Patient level 
JCAHO survey gave a score of 89 (one third of hospitals surveyed obtained this 
score) due to deficiencies in the initial assessment, pathology and clinical 
laboratory services, medication use, strategic planning, staff orientation, 
training and education, and assessing staff competency.  
CMS survey found deficiencies in the documentation of social services, 
psychiatric evaluation, and treatment plans.  
Maine DHHS survey found deficiencies in Medical/professional staff bylaws.  
AHMI study found that self-report was significantly lower than medication 
errors found through independent audit: 9 errors over two months compared 
to 2194 errors 
 
354 

















To examine whether and how 
various organisational and 
environmental forces 
influence staffing in 
outpatient substance abuse 
treatment programs. 
Percentage of revenues covered by 
managed care 
Managed care stringency 
Professional qualifications of staff 
JCAHO accreditation 
Hospital affiliation 
Mental health centre affiliation 
Ownership 
Methadone treatment unit 
Percentage of clients unemployed  
Percentage of clients with dual 
diagnoses  











To investigate the reliability of 
self-reported standardised 
performance indicators 
introduced by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations in 
July 2002 
Self-report of standardised 
performance indicators by hospital 
Re-abstraction of standardised 




Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Lemark et al 
(2005) 
Number of treatment staff hours per client 
Active client caseload 
Patient level 
The average staff hours per patient per week was 2.66 and an average 
number of active patients per treatment staff was 32. 
JCAHO accredited (beta=0.36, p<0.01) and mental health centre-
affiliated units (beta=0.55, p<0.05) provided more staff hours per 
patients. 
Percentage of revenues covered by managed care (beta=-0.002, p<0.05), 
private not-for-profit (beta=-0.12, p<0.01) and private for-profit units 
(beta=-0.22, p<0.001) were negatively associated with active caseload. 
Conversely, professional qualifications of staff (beta=0.003, p<0.01), 
mental health centre affiliation (beta=0.2, p<0.01) and methadone 
treatment units (beta=0.44, p<0.001) were positively associated with 
active caseload. Units with a higher percentage of unemployed (beta= -
0.002, p<0.05) patients had a lower active caseload. 
Williams et 
al (2006) 
61 individual elements grouped into 5 categories:  
-Global elements (9 indicators) 
-Acute myocardial infarction elements (22 indicators)  
-Heart failure elements (13 indicators)  
-Pneumonia elements (16 indicators)  
-Pregnancy elements (1 indicator) 
Patient level 
The weighted average agreement for data elements was 91.9%. In the 
case of binary data, the overall weighted agreement was 0.68.  
When indicators rates were calculated again using original and re-
abstracted data, the mean difference was 4.8%.  
For eight indicators, there was a statistically significant difference in the 
symmetry (i.e. differences in inclusion, exclusion, numerator and 
denominator): aspirin at arrival, aspirin prescribed at discharge, beta-
blocker at arrival, discharge instructions, left ventricular (LF) function 
assessment, smoking cessation advice for heart failure, oxygenation 






Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 










To determine the quality of care 
in US hospitals for three 
common conditions (AMI, heart 
failure and pneumonia) and 
hospitals characteristics 






Metropolitan Statistical Area size 
Number of beds 
Medicare discharges per 
admission 
Medicaid discharges per 
admission 
Technology index 
Registered nurse per adjusted 
inpatient day 
Licensed practical nurse per 






Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Landon et al 
(2006) 
Acute Myocardial Infarction 
-Aspirin at arrival 
-Aspirin prescribed at discharge 
-ACE inhibitor for LVSD 
-Adult smoking cessation advice/counselling 
-Beta-Blocker prescribed at discharge 
-Beta-Blocker at arrival 
-Thrombolysis within 30 min of arrival 
-PTCA within 90 min of arrival 
Congestive Heart Failure 
-Discharge instructions 
-LVF assessment 
-ACE inhibitor for LVSD 
-Adult smoking cessation advice/counselling 
Pneumonia 
-Oxygenation assessment  
-Pneumococcal vaccination 
-Blood culture before the first antibiotic 
-Adult smoking cessation advice/counselling 
-Paediatric smoking cessation advice/counselling 
-Initial antibiotic timing 
Two composite measures: 
-"Opportunity" score for each disease 
-Measures that crosscut multiple conditions identified 
through factor analysis. 
Patient level 
75.9% of these recommended practices were delivered to hospitalised 
patients. The lowest performance was for the administration of 
thrombolytic therapy within 30 min of arrival (mean [interquartile 
range]: 0.36 [0-0.67]), whilst the highest was for assessment of blood 
oxygenation for patients with pneumonia (0.98 [0.98-1]). 
The mean (interquartile range) overall performance for each disease 
was: AMI 0.85 (0.81-0.95), CHF 0.64 (0.52-0.74), and pneumonia 0.88 
(0.75-0.92). 
Factor analysis revealed two common factors for the three diseases: 
Factor 1 was treatment and diagnosis including aspirin at arrival and at 
discharge for AMI, Beta-blocker at arrival and discharge for AMI, ACE 
inhibitor for LVSD, and assessment of LVF for CHF; Factor 2 was 
counselling and prevention including smoking cessation advice for the 
three diseases, pneumococcal vaccination for pneumonia, and discharge 
instructions for CHF. 
For-profit and public/municipal hospitals consistently performed worse 
in both composite measures than not-for profit hospitals. In contrast, 
federal/military hospitals performed better than not-for-profit hospitals. 
JCAHO accredited hospitals also performed consistently better than non-
accredited hospitals. A higher number of registered nurses hours (above 
4.77) was associated with better performance in both composite scores. 
Similarly, a higher technology index was associated with better 





Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 
Partha-










To study the effect of 
American Academy of Sleep 
Medicine (AASM) 
accreditation of sleep 
centres and sleep-medicine 
certification of physicians on 
the management of patients 
with obstructive sleep 
apnoea (OSA). 
Accreditation of centre and 
certification of physician. 
Accreditation of centre or 
certification of physician. 
Neither centre was accredited 
nor physician was certified 
 






Acute hospitals in 
Utah and 
Missouri, USA 
To examine characteristics of 
hospitals with extensive 
patient safety systems and 
those that have made more 
in implementing these 
systems over time 








Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Partha-
Sarathy et al 
(2006) 
Adherence to positive airway pressure (PAP) 
therapy 
Timeliness of the initiation of PAP therapy 
Patients' perceptions about education 
received 
Overall satisfaction with care received from 
physicians and centres 
Patient level 
78% of 632 respondents had been prescribed the use of a PAP device. 444 
patients were aware of the certification/accreditation status of their centre and 
physician. 5% of patients (16 out of 307) being cared for a certified physician 
and an accredited centre had discontinued the use of the PAP device. Whilst 7% 
of patients (7 out of 99) being treated in either an accredited centre or by a 
certified physician had discontinued the use of the PAP device. In the case of 
patients treated in non-accredited centres by a noncertified physician, the drop-
out proportion was 21% (8 out of 38). 
Lack of centre accreditation or physician certification (OR [95% CI]: 1.86 [1.08-
3.20]) and severity of nasal congestion (1.57 [1.03-2.41]) increased the odds of 
discontinuing use of the PAP device. Conversely, patient's risk perception and 
education (0.47 [0.23-0.93]), medication for nasal congestion (0.28 [0.1-0.81]), 
and having health insurance (0.19 [0.05-0.77]) decreased the odds of 
discontinuing use of the PAP device. When accreditation/certification status was 
entered into the model with patients' education, accreditation/ certification was 
no longer significant; therefore, the effect of accreditation might be mediated 
by the approach to educate patients. 
Longo et al 
(2007) 
Seven latent variables: 
-Computerised physician order entry (CPOE) 
systems 
-Specific patient safety policies 
-Use of data in patient safety programmes 
-Drug storage, administration and safety 
procedures 





The summary score for the seven latent variables was significantly higher in 
both surveys for larger hospitals (p=0.007 survey 1 and p=0.04 survey 2); rural 
hospitals (p=0.02 survey 1 and p=0.03 survey 2); and JCAHO accredited 
(p<0.0001 survey 1 and p=0.0007 survey 2). Significant differences between first 
and second survey were found for larger hospitals (p=0.03); nongovernment 
not-for-profit hospitals (p<0.0001); and urban hospitals (p=0.03). Additionally, a 
significant difference in change of summary score was found between 
state/local government and non-governmental not-for-profit hospitals 
(p=0.047); and JCAHO accredited and non-accredited (p=0.01). The effect of 




Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 













To determine which hospital 
characteristics are 
associated with 
preparedness for terrorism 
and natural disaster in the 
areas of emergency 
response planning and 
availability of equipment and 
specialised care units. 
Residency programme 
Medical school affiliation 
Hospital size 
Ownership 
Location in urban or rural area 
Accreditation by JCAHO. 
 













To determine which hospital 
characteristics are 
associated with providing 
terrorism preparedness 
training to clinical staff. 
Teaching hospital status 
Residency programme 
Medical school affiliation 
Hospital size 
Ownership 







Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Niska et al 
(2007a) 
Revision of emergency plan after September 11, 2001 
Types of incidents addressed in the plan: biological, chemical, 
nuclear-radiological, explosive-incendiary, and natural disaster 
incidents 
10 components of emergency plan: 
-Integration into community-wide planning 
-Cooperative planning with other health care facilities 
-Memoranda of understanding with outlying hospitals to accept 
in-patients during a disaster 
-Alternate care sites 
-Cancellation of elective procedures and admissions 
-Conversion of post-anaesthesia unit to augment intensive care 
-Activation of decommissioned wards 
-Utilization of nonclinical space for medical purposes 
-Antibiotic and supply stockpiles 
-Coordinated supply-chain management of pharmaceuticals 
and other supplies. 
Facility level 
92% of hospitals revised their emergency plans after 
September 11, 2001. JCAHO accreditation was not 
significantly associated with revising the emergency plan, 
but accredited hospitals were more likely to have plans for 
natural disasters and four types of terrorism incidents. 
JCAHO accredited hospitals included more components in 
their emergency plan (mean [95% CI]: 6.3 [6 to 6.5] vs 3.8 [3 
to 4.5]). JCAHO accredited hospitals were significantly more 
likely to include all the components of the emergency plan, 
except for utilisation of nonclinical space for medical 
purposes (mean [95% CI]: 62.6 [57.1 to 67.8] vs 47.9 [33.3 to 
62.8]). JCAHO accredited hospitals had a significantly higher 
mean number of mechanical ventilators, personal protective 
suits, negative pressure isolation rooms, critical care beds, 
and decontamination showers for mass casualties episodes. 
Niska et al 
(2007b) 
Staff received special training since September 11, 2001, in 
terrorism response 
Staff have received training in the identification, diagnosis and 
treatment of smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularaemia, 
viral haemorrhagic fever, viral encephalitis, chemical exposures, 
and nuclear-radiological exposures. 
Key personnel had been trained in the implementation of a 
formal hospital incident command system. 
Facility level 
88.4% of registered nurses, 75.1% of attending physicians 
and 39% of residents had received training in terrorism 
response. JCAHO accredited hospitals were more likely to 
have trained their staff than non-accredited hospitals in 
terrorism response. Additionally, they were more likely to 
have trained staff in the identification, diagnosis and 
management of smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, 
tularaemia, haemorrhagic fever, viral encephalitis, chemical 
and radiological exposure. There was no significant 
difference between JCAHO accredited and non-accredited 
hospital in the percentage of key personnel receiving 




Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 







Health centres with 
support from the 
Bureau of Primary 
Health Care 
(BPHC), USA 
To examine quality-related 
activities in Health Resources 
Services Administration 
(HRSA)/BPHC-supported 
Health centres (HCs) 
Location 
Size: small (1-35 full time 
equivalents[FTEs]), medium 














(ASC) in Florida, 
USA 
To compare quality 
outcomes of accredited ASCs 
operating in Florida with 
those of non-accredited 
facilities. 
ASC accredited by JCAHO 
ASC accredited by 
Accreditation association for 







Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Braun et al 
(2008) 
Four topic areas 
(1) resources and activities related to 
infection control, 
risk management, QI, and environment 
of care;  
(2) follow-up and tracking of diagnostic 
studies;  
(3) staff training and education; 
(4) provider credentialing, privileging, and 
performance evaluations. 
Facility level 
The reported mean FTEs dedicated to infection control by accredited hospitals was 
higher than non-accredited ones (0.8 vs 0.5, p<0.05). Larger HCs as well as accredited 
HCs reported higher mean FTEs dedicated to risk management (small 0.7, medium 
0.7, large 1.2, p<0.05. Accredited 1.1 vs non-accredited 0.7, p<0.05); quality 
improvement (small 0.9, medium 1.1, large 1.8, p<0.01. Accredited 1.5 vs non-
accredited 1.1, p<0.05); environmental safety (small 0.6, medium 1.0, large 1.3, 
p<0.05. Accredited 1.4 vs non-accredited 0.7, p<0.01). 
A greater proportion of accredited compared to non-accredited hospitals reported 
having a consistent follow-up method for mammographies with a referral (88.9% vs 
78.3%, p<0.05) and report immediately to a provider critical values of laboratory 
exams (87.3% vs 77.2%, p<0.05). 
A greater proportion of accredited compared to non-accredited hospitals reported to 
have trained more than 75% of clinical staff on emergency preparedness (58.7% vs 
41.3%), quality improvement (55.6% vs 37.5%), risk management/patient safety(57% 
vs 35.8%), and pain management (49.1% vs 18.2%). Additionally, a greater proportion 
of accredited compared to non-accredited hospitals reported to have trained more 
than 75% of staff conducting laboratory tests on methods for identifying the correct 
patient (91.5% vs 52.7%), response to managing patient who have passed out (67% 
vs 44%), and response to needle stick/sharp injury (94.1% vs 75.1%). 
A greater proportion of accredited compared to non-accredited hospitals used 14 out 
of 22 measures related to credentialing, privileging and job performance. 
Using multiple regression and controlling for size and location, accreditation was 
significant for the frequency of auditing of clinical records, the frequency of use of 
credentialing methods, the frequency of providers review and the percentage of staff 
receiving training. 
Menachemi 
et al (2008) 
Risk-adjusted 7-day and 30-day unexpected 
hospitalisations controlled for facility volume 
of procedure and patient demographic 
characteristics including gender, race, age, 
insurance type and severity of illness. 
These outcomes were calculated for the five 
most common procedures i.e. colonoscopy, 
cataract removal, upper gastroendoscopy, 
arthroscopy and prostate biopsy.  
Patient level 
For raw 7-day and 30-day unexpected hospitalisation rates, there were no 
differences for the most common procedures, except for colonoscopy, where the 30-
day raw rate was lower for JCAHO accredited compared to AAAHC accredited and 
non-accredited ASCs (1.83 vs 1.96 vs 2.00, p-value=0.01). 
When controlling for procedure volume and patients demographic, this result was 
still significant. JCAHO accredited ASCs had lower 7-day and 30-day unexpected 
hospitalisations for colonoscopy (OR: 0.89, p-value<0.05 and 0.9, P-value<0.01; 
respectively) compared to non-accredited facilities. 
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To characterise the situation 
of hospital infection control 
(IC) programs and activities 
and assess the impact of 
accreditation and other 
factors on hospital infection 
control performance. 
Japan Council for Quality 
Health Care (JCQHC) 
accredited in 2004 and 2005 
JCQHC newly accredited 
(2005) 















To evaluate the association 
between Society of Chest Pain 
Centres (SCPC) accreditation 
and adherence to the 
American College of 
Cardiology/ American Heart 
Association (ACC/AHA) 




SCPC accreditation  
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Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Sekimoto et 
al (2008) 
Infrastructure for infection control activities: 
-Organization of IC provision and IC team (ICT) 
-Presence of IC doctors (ICDs) and IC nurses (ICNs) 
-Time allocated for IC activities by IC practitioners. 
Activities and practices of infection control 
-Surveillance  
-Standard precautions  
-Isolation precautions (including patient isolation 
practices) 
-Needle-stick prevention programs  
-Hospital food hygiene  
-Medical waste management  
-Catheter-related IC  
-Sterilization  
-Antimicrobial therapy use and regulation  
-IC in operating theatres and intensive care units 
(ICUs) 
Facility level 
There was no significant difference in infrastructure for infection control 
activities according to accreditation status. In the case of newly accredited 
and accredited hospitals, the hours of ICNs increased significantly 
between 2004 and 2005. 
There was no difference in overall score for IC activities according to 
accreditation status. For newly and accredited hospitals there was a 
significant increase between 2004 and 2005 in surveillance (mean 
[standard deviation (Poulsen et al.)]: 1.3[2.7] and 0.5[2.3], p<0.05) and 
anti-microbial therapy (mean [SD]: 0.9 [2.4] and 0.8 [2.5]). For non-
accredited and accredited hospitals there was a significant increase 
between 2004 and 2005 in isolation precautions (mean [SD]: 0.7 [1.5] and 
0.4 [1.2], p<0.05), IC for operating theatre/ICU (mean [SD]: 1.4 [2.1] and 
0.7 [1.8]), and IC without evidence (mean [SD]: 0.3 [1.5] and 0.6 [1.5]). 
Medical waste management, catheter-related IC and sterilisation had a 
significant increased between 2004 and 2005 for accredited hospitals 
(mean [SD]: 0.5 [3.3], 0.5 [1.9] and 0.5 [1.8], p<0.05) 
Using multiple linear regression, accreditation was associated with 2.8 
higher overall score in 2004 and 3.2 in 2005. When the change in overall 
score was used as dependent variable, accreditation in 2005 was 
associated with 2.0 greater increase, whilst accreditation in 2004 was 
associated with -2.0 change in score. When newly accredited and no 
change in accreditation status hospitals are compared, newly accredited 
hospitals had a 2.6 points greater increase in overall score. 
Chandra et 
al (2009) 
-ECG within 10 min of ED presentation  
-Aspirin  
-Beta-blocker  
-Unfractionated or low-weight heparin  
-Glycoprotein IIb/IIIa inhibitors within 24 hrs  
-In-hospital mortality  
-Postadmission infarction 
Patient level 
In an adjusted model, patients treated in SCPC accredited hospitals were 
more likely to receive acute aspirin and beta blocker compared to patients 
treated in non-accredited hospitals (OR [95% Confidence Interval]: 1.73 
[1.06 to 2.83] and 1.68 [1.04 to 2.7]). There were no differences in the use 
of unfractionated or low-weight heparin, glycoprotein IIb/IIIa inhibitors 
within 24 hrs and ECG within 10 min of ED presentation.  
In an adjusted analysis of clinical outcomes, there were no differences in 
mortality, reinfarction, cardiogenic shock, ischemic stroke, haemorrhagic 
stroke, congestive heart failure, or overall major bleeding episodes. 
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730 hospitals  




To determine whether quality 
measures used in the US 
Centres for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services Hospital 
Compare database differed for 
critical access hospitals based 
on Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) 
accreditation status. 
JCAHO accreditation  














To explore the association 
between the implementation of 
quality improvement strategies 
in hospitals and hospitals’ 
success in meeting defined 
quality requirements that are 
considered intermediate 
outputs of the care process for 
AMI, appendicitis and 
deliveries. 





Audit and internal assessment of 
clinical standards 
Patient safety systems 
Clinical practice guidelines 
Performance indicators 









Acute Myocardial infarction (AMI) 
- Aspirin at arrival 
- Aspirin at discharge 
- Beta-Blocker at arrival 
- Beta-Blocker at discharge 
Heart failure 
- ACE inhibitor for LVSD. 
- Left ventricular function assessment 
- Comprehensive discharge instructions 
- Smoking cessation 
Pneumonia 
- Pneumococcal vaccination status 
- Initial antibiotic received within 4 h of hospital arrival 
- Oxygenation assessment 
- Smoking cessation 
- Appropriate initial antibiotic selection 
- Blood culture performed before first antibiotic received 
Surgical infection prevention 
- Prophylactic antibiotic 1 h prior to surgical incision 
- Prophylactic antibiotics discontinued 24 h after surgery 
Patient level 
Accredited hospital had a significantly higher performance for four out of 16 quality 
indicators: percent of patients given aspirin at arrival for AMI (90% vs 87.1%), 
percent of patients with heart failure receiving ACE inhibitors for LVSD (81.8% vs 
77%) and smoking cessation advice (71% vs 60%), and percent of patients with 
pneumonia that received smoking cessation advice (68.2% vs 62.1%). 
The likelihood for accredited hospitals to have an above average performance was 
significantly better for six quality indicators: percent of patients receiving aspirin at 
arrival (OR [95% CI]: 1.39 [1.10–1.75]), percent of patients given ACE inhibitor for 
LVSD (1.29 [1.02–1.62]), percent of patients with left ventricular function 
assessment (1.50 [1.19–1.89]), percent of patients given comprehensive discharge 
instructions (1.65 [1.31–2.08]), percent of patients aged 65 and older who were 
screened for pneumococcal vaccine status and administered the vaccine prior to 
discharge, if indicated (1.96 [1.56–2.46]) and percent of patients given appropriate 
initial antibiotic selection (1.56 [1.24–1.97]). Accredited hospitals were more likely 










There was a significant correlation between the different internal quality 
improvement strategies at hospital level, explaining between 6 to 32% of the 
variance. Given the association between the different strategies, they were 
combined into one latent strategy index, which was used as a proxy. 
There was a significant correlation between the different intermediate outputs at 
hospital level, explaining between 6 to 33% of the variance. These outputs were 
also combined into a single latent output index, being used as a proxy. 
The strategies more frequently associated with outputs at a ward level were patient 
safety, performance indicators and clinical guidelines. The correlation between the 
latent strategy and latent output indexes at a ward level was 0.76 (p<0.01). 
Voluntary and government accreditation were significantly correlated to clinical 
outputs at medical wards and safety outputs. 
Global output was significantly higher in hospitals with a higher maturity index (a 














To examine the relationship 
between patient safety 
practices, as measured by 
accreditation standards, and 
patient safety outcomes as 
measured by hospital rates of 
infections, decubitus ulcers, 
postoperative respiratory failure, 




Location (rural or urban) 
Nurse staffing levels 
Utilisation of safety practices 
(comprising four subscores: 
surveillance capacity, assessing 
patients’ needs, care procedures 
and measuring processes) 
 
Mazmanian 








To describe cognitive 
rehabilitation services, 
education and training in 
Commission on Accreditation of 
Rehabilitation Facilities (CARF) 
and non-CARF facilities 
CARF Accreditation  
Fairbrother 













To describe the views from 
hospital personnel about the 
EQuIP survey, survey week and 
overall views of the process 
EQuIP accreditation survey  
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Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Thornlow 
et al (2009) 




-Postoperative respiratory failure 
-Failure to rescue. 
Patient level 
JCAHO accreditation scores were not associated with patient safety indicators. Risk adjusted rates 
were: healthcare-associated infections (1.8 cases per 1000 discharges), postoperative respiratory 
failure (9.8 cases per 1000 elective surgical discharges) decubitus ulcers (21.5 incidences per 1000 
discharges), failure to rescue or death (133.9 cases per 1000 discharges with potentially preventable 
complications). Larger hospitals had higher rates of healthcare-associated infections (Beta: 0.30, 
p<0.05) and postoperative respiratory failure than smaller hospitals (Beta: 0.36, p<0.05) in 
univariate and multivariate analyses. Higher rates of decubitus ulcers were associated with poorer 
performance in care procedures practices subscore (Beta: 0.27, p<0.01) and higher rates of 
healthcare-associated infections with poorer performance in assessing patients' needs practices 
subscore (Beta: 0.25, p<0.05) 
Mazmanian 
et al (1993) 
Education and training options 
Direct costs for staff training  
Learning needs of clinical staff 
Cognitive rehabilitation therapy 
practice 
Facility level  
Fairbrother 
et al (2000) 
Preparing for EQuIP survey week 
EQuIP survey week 
Overall views on EQuIP 
accreditation 
Individual level 
In relation to personnel views about the preparation work before EQuIP, 47% thought the 
workbook format was easy to use, 45% considered the self-assessment process satisfactory, 48% 
found the compliance rating helpful, 67% found the individual standards comprehensible, 63% 
considered standards to be relevant for their departments and 69% expressed that workload 
associated with future surveys will be less. However, 60% observed that activities were foregone in 
order to complete EQuIP preparation. Some of these activities comprised planned quality 
improvement activities, patient care time lost, departmental planning activities and continuing 
education activities. 
On average, staff estimated 6.7 hours per week of work during the six months preceding the survey. 
51% was satisfied with the face-to-face meeting process during the survey week. Those not satisfied 
stated as reasons that process was too superficial and did not account for actual evidence 
presented by the team. 58% thought the overall rating reflected their department's performance. 
The staff that did not agree since they perceived that the overall rating lost granularity of 
performance across the hospital. 
86% were satisfied with the hospital's facilitation of EQuIP accreditation, but only 45% thought the 
accreditation process was worthwhile. Among the reasons against accreditation staff mentioned: 
lack of evidence on the impact of the process on patient care, magnitude in terms of time and 




Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 









To ascertain whether the users 
of CPA (Clinical Pathology 
Accreditation) find the whole 
procedure helpful 
and think that it should 
continue 
CPA process  









To examine the relationship of 
outcomes measures generated 
from Medicare data to Joint 
Commission accreditation 
measures for hospitals. 











To examine the extent to which 
JCAHO’s pre-2004 hospital 
accreditation process identified 
deficiencies in Medicare 
Conditions of Participation 
(COPs) that were identified by 
state survey agencies 
State agency and JCAHO 
found no deficiencies 
State agency and JCAHO 
found same deficiencies 
JCAHO found more 
deficiencies than state 
agency 
State agency found more 





Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Gough et al 
(2000) 




Inspection and report 
Policies and procedures 
Value for money 
Suggestions to CPA 
Facility level 
The response rate was 64%. 71% of respondents agreed that CPA improved lab service 
delivery, 78% said that lab focus had shifted towards quality, but only 51% thought it had led 
to structured training and 86% thought training budget had not increased. 62% expressed 
that CPA was informative, 71% that has changed policies or procedures and 54% that had 
improved safety and health. 
60% considered the accreditation process as a proof of compliance with national standards, 
whilst a 49% ascertained the excessive paperwork and bureaucracy as a disadvantage. 40% 
suggested as a way to improve CPA's work to generate consistent standards and have 
permanent, trained inspectorates. 
Griffith et al 
(2002) 
Solucient scores:  




-Cost per case 
-Length of stay 
-Outpatient activity 
Performance areas according 
to JCAHO accreditation system 
Facility level 
Overall evaluation scores (OES) ranged from 74 to 100 (possible scores from 0 to 100) and 
only 15% of cases scored under 87.5. The OES was associated with the mean performance 
area score (r=-0.9). 
Out of the 45 performance areas, 10 areas were identified as the most influential on OES: 
managing staff requests (beta=–0.732); design of new services (beta=–0.724); relevant 
policies (beta=–0.717); use of comparative information (beta=–0.653); patient and family 
education (beta=–0.641); measurement of processes and outcomes (beta=–0.639); initial 
assessment procedures (beta=–0.606); governance (beta=–0.606); and strategic planning 
(beta=–0.577). The four least influential performance areas were: pathology and clinical 
laboratory services (beta=–0.269); needs assessment for specific patient populations (beta=–
0.180); operative procedures (beta=–0.124); and rehabilitation care (beta=–0.099). 
There was no association between the individual Solucient scores and the OES, except for 




Rate of hospitals with serious 
deficiencies according to COPs 
Number of serious deficiencies 
according to COPs 
Facility level 
In the validation surveys run by state agencies designated by CMS (Centres for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services) during 2000 to 2002, serious deficiencies in compliance with COPs were 
found in 31%(157 hospitals), of which JCAHO failed to identify them in 78% (123 hospitals) of 
cases. When single serious deficiencies were analysed, JCAHO failed to identify 69% of them. 
In only 34 hospitals (6.8%), state agencies and JCAHO detected serious deficiencies. 
The most common deficiencies not identified by JCAHO fell into the categories of physical 
environment (36%), nursing services (4%), infection control (3.7%), patient's rights (3.7%) and 
pharmaceutical services (3.7%) 
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profit hospitals in 
New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania, 
USA 
To determine the 
association between 
patient satisfaction and 
overall accreditation score 
Overall JCAHO accreditation 
score 








-Design of environment 
-Continuity of care 
 









1997 and 1999, 
USA 
To examine the association 





scores and the Agency for 
Healthcare Research 
Quality’s (AHRQ) Inpatient 
Quality Indicators (IQIs) 
and Patient Safety 
Indicators (PSIs). 
Performance in 15 Inpatient 
Quality Indicators 





Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Heuer 
(2004) 
Overall patient satisfaction rating 





-Explanation of tests/treatments 
-Admission 




No association was found between overall JCAHO accreditation scores and overall 
patient satisfaction scores. The results were consistent for percentile ranking of patient 
satisfaction. No significant association was found between JCAHO scores for selected 
categories and patient satisfaction scores for the equivalent categories. 
Using multivariable regression analysis, no relationship was found between scores on 
different patient satisfaction categories and the overall accreditation score. Likewise, 
there was no relationship between overall patient satisfaction score and scores for 
different accreditation assessment categories. 
Miller et al 
(2005) 
JCAHO final overall evaluation score 
Accreditation decision 
Facility level 
Most hospitals obtained a score between 90 and 100 for the final overall evaluation 
score (FOES). Regression analysis showed that none of the IQIs was associated with the 
FOES.  
Factor analysis revealed three factors explaining most of IQIs variability: Factor 1 
included post procedural mortality rates; Factor 2 included caesarian section and 
vaginal delivery after C-section rates, and Factor 3 included mortality rates after hip 
replacement and rates of laparoscopic cholecystectomy. There was no relationship 
between these component factors and FOES. 
Worse rates in postoperative respiratory failure (p=0.003) and technical difficulty with 
care (p=0.004) were associated with lower FOES. Conversely, higher rates of iatrogenic 
pneumothorax (p=0.03) and obstetrical trauma (p=0.04) were related to higher FOES. 
Factor analysis of PSIs resulted in three factors explaining most of the variability: 
Factor 1 involved postoperative adverse events, Factor 2 involved obstetric trauma, 
and Factor 3 involved procedural technical complications. Only factor 1 was associated 
with FOES (p=0.02). 
Analyses of association between individual JCAHO elements performance score and 




Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 







with more than 
300 beds, Korea. 
To assess the infrastructure 
and essential activities of 
ISCPs in the Republic of 
Korea. 
  











To examine to what extent 
common forms of 
outpatient substance abuse 
treatment organisation 
licensure and accreditation 
are associated with 
desirable treatment 
practices 
Features of the centre: 
Ownership status, affiliation to a 
hospital or mental health centre, 
methadone treatment provision 
and number of patients. 
Features of clients: Employment 
status, HIV positive, dual 











To gain a baseline 
understanding of existing 
health centre linkages to 
community emergency 
preparedness and response 
systems and to identify 
factors that were 
associated with strong 
linkages. 
Urban location 
High user volume 
Large number of service delivery 
sites 
Joint Commission accreditation 
Experience responding to an 
actual disaster High perceived 




Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Oh et al 
(2006) 
Characteristics of Infection Control 
Doctors (ICD) and Nurses (ICN) 
Essential activities of Infection 
Surveillance and Control 
Programmes (ISCP) 
Facility level 
There was a significant difference between inpatients wards and intensive care 
units in the use of paper towels (p=0.001), antiseptics (p=0.004), and waterless 
antiseptics (p<0.001). 
86% of hospitals had an ICD and 98% had an ICN. All hospitals had an infection 
control committee. 
There was an increase of newly employed ICNs between 1994 and 1996 and then 
decrease until 1998. In 2000, it steadily increased again until 2003. 
There was a significant increase of Intensity of surveillance over time, which is 
explained by an increase in very active and moderately active approaches since 
1997. 
Authors claim that introduction of medical accreditation in 1995 and change of 
regulation in 2002 were drivers for the change in infection control systems. 




Physical examinations, Routine 
medical care, Mental health care, 
Individual therapy course, Group 
therapy course, Employment 
counselling. 
-Treatment sufficiency: Treatment 
duration, After-treatment plans 
Patient level 
Coefficients for JCAHO accreditation for: 
Staff-to-client ratio:  -0.19, p>0.05 
Physical examinations: 0.57, p<0.01 
Routine medical care: 0.27, p>0.05 
Mental health care: 0.51, p<0.05 
Individual therapy course: -0.14, p>0.05 
Group therapy course: 0.27, p>0.05 
Employment counselling: -0.29, p>0.05 
Treatment duration: -0.28, p<0.05 
After-treatment plans: 0.52, p<0.05 
Wineman et 
al (2007) 
Health centre completion of a 
collaborative hazard 
Vulnerability analysis with 
community responders 
Documentation of the health 
centre’s role in the community 
Emergency response plan 
Health centre participation in 
community-wide exercises. 
Facility level 
The response rate was 34% (307/890). Respondents were more likely to be 
JCAHO accredited (42% vs 31%), be located in a rural area (38% vs 31%) and be 
high user volume (44% vs 32%). Accreditation was associated with having a radio 
to communicate with the community during a response, to have received extra 
funds for emergency preparation, to have staff involved in the preparation of the 
community for emergencies and that have received training in appropriate 
laboratory techniques. Additionally, accreditation was associated with having a 
designated contact person that the community emergency manager could reach 
at any time and having staff aware of the emergency operation plan.  
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To assess the perceived 
impact of accreditation 
on quality of care through 




Commitment and support 
Strategic quality planning 
Quality management 
Human resource utilisation 













To examine the 
effectiveness of 
accreditation by a 
national health insurance 
programme to ensure or 
promote the quality of 





Physician characteristics (age, 





Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
El-Jardali et 
al (2008) 
Quality results Individual Level 
The response rate was 75.5%. There was an association between quality results and benefits 
of accreditation, indicating that nurses perceived there was a positive impact on quality. 
Additionally, there was a significant difference in the perception of nurses on the association 
between strategic quality planning, education and training, rewards and recognition, quality 
management, and use of data with accreditation, when small vs large and medium vs large 
hospitals were compared, with large hospitals having the lowest scores. 
Predictors of a better perception of benefits of accreditation were leadership, commitment 
and support (beta: 0.18, p<0.001); use of data (beta: 0.39, 0<0.001); quality management 
(beta for medium hospitals: 0.4, p=0.004); staff involvement (beta for small hospitals: 0.26, 




Quality of care in five specific 
clinical domains for diarrhoea, 




-Making a diagnosis 
-Treatment plan 
Individual level 
61% of physician surveyed worked in public institutions. 66% were accredited and 64% of 
them had received payment by PhilHealth. The average score of the vignettes was 54 points 
(possible scores from 0 to 100). 
In all models, younger doctors provided a better quality of care measured by their score in the 
vignettes. 
In the case of doctors working privately, accreditation and receiving payment were associated 
with better quality of care. On average, receiving payment would add 8 points to their score, 
whilst accreditation added 6 points. 
In the case of doctors working in public institutions, when they do not receive payments, 
accreditation has a significant effect on vignette score, but when they are not accredited, 













































of the indicators 
5. Responses to 
a particular set 
of indicators 







1. The development of each indicator set involved a literature 
search, drafting, field testing, confirmation and dissemination. 
Professional colleges were the main responsible for this 
process. After submission of data, the organisation would 
receive a report with their performance compared to similar 
organisations. 
2. Since 1997, when a revised programme of accreditation 
(EQuIP) was implemented, the reporting of performance on the 
indicators every 6-month was made mandatory. The uptake of 
indicators increased since they were included in the 
accreditation programme. The main reason was the on-site 
visits to verify clinical performance. 
3. Initially, when a healthcare organisation did not meet data 
requirements, this information was excluded from the 
aggregated figures. But, when more institutions were reporting, 
inconsistencies had less influence on the overall figures. 
4. Organisations reported to the accreditation programme on 
their performance for each indicator and actions taken after 
the monitoring. The reporting of actions has steadily increased 
over time.  
5. Organisations have reported that the introduction of 
indicators has helped to improve care. 
6. For example, one hospital had above average hospital 
acquired bacteraemia rates. This led to a revision of procedures 
related to cleaning the insertion site. The rate was reduced 
(0.72% vs 0.3%) after one year. 
7. The 250 indicators will be reduced in number to a core set of 
measures that are more valuable and responsive. 
Success of the programme is attributed to two factors: 
involvement of clinicians in the development of indicators and 
"soft" policy of the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards 























































1. Indicators were developed by medical colleges 
using three criteria: availability of data from 
healthcare organisations, clinical relevance, and the 
measure was achievable. 
2. The first set comprised 10 hospital-wide medical 
indicators. By 2000, there were 200 different 
indicators organised in 18 sets. 
3. Content validity was ensured by involving 
providers in their development. The number of 
providers reporting information retrospectively has 
decreased and the increase in the number of 
institutions reporting data makes less relevant the 
impact of any inaccuracy of information. 
4. There was a significant difference between 1997 
and 1998 for those organisations taking actions to 
reduce unplanned readmissions, whilst those 
organisation who did not have a stable rate of 
unplanned readmissions. 
5. Every two years indicators are reviewed by 
medical colleges using qualitative and quantitative 
information provided by healthcare organisations. 
This leads to refinement of the indicator or 
exclusion from a given set. 
6. The indicators are being used by France and New 
Zealand. The involvement of provider in their 
development has made them unique and appealing. 
7. Future directions are the development of 
multidisciplinary indicators, the inclusion of 
intermediate and long term outcomes, and the 































1. Recognising need to 
improve quality and 
choosing accreditation to 
address need 
2. Choosing the 
appropriate accreditation 
configuration and adapting 
it to the country 
3. Setting up the formal 
structure to advise, 
operate, and manage the 
accreditation program 
4. Developing and testing 
standards, and agreeing on 
the survey process 
5. Recruiting, hiring, and 
training surveyors  
6. Conducting educational 
campaigns and surveys 
7. Refining rules, policies, 
and procedures for 
accreditation 
8. Developing the 
accreditation database 
format  
9. Conducting accreditation 
decision surveys  
10. Interpreting survey data 




1. A health reform aiming to increase access to quality healthcare 
together with help from USAID impulse the establishment of an 
accreditation programme as a quality improvement strategy. 
2. The chosen configuration was an integrated approach, where an 
accreditation council (comprising the general public, professional 
organisations and the government) was going to be in charge of the 
accreditation programme. 
3. The central board of health chose members for the accreditation 
programme. It had an executive committee and three subcommittees, 
who were in charge of: standards development, training of surveyors 
and accreditation outcome decision-making. 
4. The first set of standards was developed with healthcare 
professionals and community representatives taking into 
consideration the problematic areas at that time and key functions of 
healthcare facilities. The ZHAC visited the US to learn from the 
process implemented by JCAHO. 
5. Representatives who visited the US conducted the training. 
Organisation represented in ZHAC nominated surveyors depending on 
their experience. 
6. The standards were piloted during educational surveys, where the 
hospital would be surveyed without receiving an accreditation 
outcome. 
7. The results from the educational surveys were used to determine 
decision-making rules for accreditation. 4 out of 10 points were need 
for each functional area and 6 out of 10 for four critical areas, in order 
to obtain 'basic' accreditation 
8. A decision algorithm and a scoring form were developed to achieve 
consistency. 
9. 12 hospitals received full accreditation surveys during the period. 
All of them gained accreditation status. 
10. The greatest difficulty was drawing up the reports since hospitals 
were expecting more than just the accreditation decision. Hospitals 















To analyse the practical feasibility and 
efficacy of the quality indicators 
elaborated by the National Health 
Service study group in a radiotherapy 
unit. 
Baseline measurements 
for quality improvement 


























To provide a summary and 
recommendations based on our 
assessment of the external review of 
hospitals that participate in Medicare. 
The role of Joint 
commission and state 
agencies in overseeing 
hospitals and of HCFA 
reviewing the work 









The level of achievement in 8 indicators: 
1. Number of staff members/patients treated per year 
2. Waiting list 
3. Case-history accuracy 
4. Multidisciplinary approach in the study of clinical 
cases/total number of cases 
5. Number of CT treatment plans/overall treatments 
6. Number of fields performed per fraction/overall 
treatment fraction 
7. Number of treatments verified by portal 
imaging/overall treatments 
8. Patient satisfaction verified by questionnaires filled 
Facility level 
The reference number of staff/patient ratio was 19 professionals over 1293 
patients. The mean (SD) overall waiting time was 54.6 (25.2) days. In relation to 
the case-history accuracy, the centre had an 80% of conformance with the 
standard. Treatment was multidisciplinary for 100% of head and neck cancers 
and 70% for gastrointestinal cancer, however, for breast cancer only reached 
50%. The mean (SD) number of CT treatment plans was 1.6 (0.9) per patient. 
The mean (SD) number of fields performed per day and per patient was 3.5 
(1.7). On average (SD), each patient received 16.7 (10) portal images during the 





Strengths and deficiencies of the Joint Commission 
accreditation system, the certification by state agencies 
and overseeing capacity of HCFA. 
Programme 
level 
Nine main findings:  
1. Accreditation surveys serve as a driver to improve care and patient-safety 
2. State agency investigations serve as an opportunity for responding to 
complaints and adverse events. 
3. Malpractice and substandard care are unlikely to be detected by JCAHO 
surveys. 
4. Non-accredited hospitals are not routinely inspected by state agencies 
5. Hospital review systems are moving toward a more collegial way of 
oversight. JCAHO is leading this movement. 
6. A more regulatory approach is being used by state agencies 
7. Using a more collegial approach could jeopardise patient protection systems 
currently in place. 
8. HCFA, which is supposed to oversee the work of JCAHO and states agencies, 
does not obtain information on their performance, or provide thorough 
feedback to them. 
9. Limited use of public disclosure as a mechanism to hold accountable JCAHO 
and states agencies. 
Recommendations 
-HCFA should hold fully accountable for the external review of hospitals 
performance to JCAHO and state agencies 




Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 





30 NHS trusts 
Acute trusts in 
the English NHS, 
United Kingdom 
To measure specific changes and 
improvements in patient care 
resulting from Commission for 
Health Improvement regulatory 
attention. 
Clinical governance review 
by CHI in the last 12 







Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Benson et al 
(2004) 
For each clinical governance review report, information 
was collected about:  
Key area of action, scale and content of change proposed, 
measurability of changes proposed, key area for action 
was acknowledged and addressed on action plan, 
timescale for change, scale and content of proposed 
actions, routinely collected data available to monitor 
progress of action plan, categorise progress of change and 
potential barriers. 
Additionally, data about validity of recommendation 
according to the trusts was sought, in terms of how 
recently the concern was raised, extent that change has 
happened and if change was driven by CHI's 
recommendation 
Four case studies exploring general impressions about CHI 
review; action plan implementation and development; the 
contribution of CHI review to change; and learning that 
was drawn from the experience. 
Trust level 
Clinical governance report varied in content, depth of content, 
presentation and design. It is not clear to what extent this 
variation reflects of the context in each NHS trust.  
Interviewees found recommendations appropriate for the local 
issues. 90% of NHS trusts agreed with key areas of action (KAA) 
recommendations, whilst 25% of PCTs and 40% of SHAs do not 
know if KAA were adequate. Additionally, interviewees 
commented that the process of collecting information was very 
labour intensive, the focus of the review should be on patient 
experience and the expertise of the reviewers was patchy. 
Actions plans from NHS trusts also varied greatly in content, 
depth, structure and design, reflecting the level of engagement 
of each institution with CHI's review. The inexplicit way KAA were 
presented led to some of them (5%) not being addressed by NHS 
trusts. 
When the progress of KAA was assessed against available data, 
for 31% of KAA it was not possible to determine the level of 
progress. For the rest of KAA, 15% had been fully implemented, 
30% mainly implemented and 12% showed no implementation. 
KAAs in the area of strategic capacity were more likely to be 
implemented (60% mainly or fully implemented) compared to 
clinical effectiveness (27% mainly or fully implemented). 
The format of CHI/strategic health authority reviews of progress 
also varied in format and content. 
The level of implementation of a KAA was associated with being 
addressed in detail in the action plan, change being measurable, 
reasonable timescale for implementation, documentation of 
progress and NHS trust performance rating (stars). 
NHS trusts reported that a 77% of changes identified in KAA were 
raised once or more times before. Additionally, 50% of trusts 




Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 





25 NHS trusts 
Acute trusts in 
the English NHS, 
United Kingdom 
To identify and analyse the 
challenges faced by CHI and the 
way it responded, and to draw 
out some implications for the 
future. 







Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Day et al 
(2004) 
CHI's methodology was assessed in practice 
through three main streams:  
- How adequate is the conceptual framework 
provided by the seven pillars of clinical 
governance to the reviews. 
- How consistent were the reviews to assess 
performance (i.e. assessment of same aspects 
of performance, weighting and interpretation 
of evidence is similar, and presentation of 
finding allows comparison). 
- How reviews relate to the score awarded and 
how to interpret them. 
Trust level 
The main role of CHI was to report on the systems of clinical governance of NHS 
trusts. To achieve this role, CHI divided clinical governance into seven pillars: risk 
assessment, clinical audit, staffing and management, education and training, 
clinical effectiveness, use of information, and patient involvement. The rationale 
for these pillars was a mix of common sense and theory. Only the last one (i.e. 
patient involvement) does not fit in the model since it considers that patient 
should be involved in the planning of services and in decision-making about their 
own treatment, which are desirable components of quality of care, but they do 
not equate clinical governance. Culture and leadership are essential features of 
good clinical governance, however, they were not included in the pillars, instead, 
CHI added an additional area of "strategic capacity to develop and implement CG" 
to assess these features. 
The review reports are consistent regarding the aspects that are assessed since 
CHI sends in advance a questionnaire to each NHS trust with the information 
required. The strategy to weigh the evidence and decide to report on an issue is 
standardised; however, the characteristics of the NHS trusts cannot fully explain 
the differences observed in the review reports. For example, for control of 
infections and bed sores, some reports comment on both, whilst other do not 
refer to them. Some reports compare performance to the national average or 
similar trusts, whilst others describe trends over time. The composition of review 
teams seems to influence the issues that are raised, which raised the question 
whether the absence of comments on an issue is due to absence of problems or 
absence of adequate expertise.  
CHI had a scoring system on a one-to-four-point scale for each of the seven pillars 
guided by an assessment matrix. The level of compliance and the extent the 
activity was present across the organisation were considered in the scoring. CHI's 
overall score is used to assign the "star rating" in the annual review report. Four 
points in one of the pillars was rarely seen and the best performing trusts received 
around 18-20 points. This could imply that clinical governance has not been fully 
implemented; hospitals deliver high quality of care, but their clinical governance 
systems could be improved or methodology cannot fully capture the variations in 
performance of clinical governance systems. Moreover, the score does not relate 
to the narrative in the reports. 
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with leaders and 
226 with 
employers 




To describe hospital 
systems’ and freestanding 
hospitals’ patient-safety 
initiatives; their progress 
toward implementing 
them; and the relative 
roles that professionalism, 
regulation, and markets 
play in stimulating 
progress. 
Role of regulation, 











To explore how surveying 
benefits accreditation 
surveyors and the 
organisations in which 
they are regularly 
employed. 
Surveyors for the Australian 





Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Devers et al 
(2004) 
Hospitals' patient-safety initiatives Facility level 
Interviews showed that major patient-safety initiatives were driven by JCAHO 
requirements. In 188 occasions these initiatives could be mapped to JCAHO policies 
or requirements, which can be grouped into three main categories: sentinel events, 
patient-safety standards and patient-safety goals. The level of implementation for 13 
of 15 initiatives was either partially implemented or fully implemented in some 
hospital areas. Only a bar-code system for patients, medications and staff; and 
computerised physician order entry were under discussion. When health plans 
companies were asked about these initiatives, they were not aware of the 
requirement or level of implementation of them. 
Besides JCAHO, 14 other organisations were mentioned by hospital respondents: 
private purchasers, professional associations, federal agencies, public-private 
partnerships and institutions working on quality improvement. 
Among the facilitators to implementing patient-safety initiatives, respondents 
mentioned: Medicare participation requires JCAHO accreditation, publication of "To 
Err is Human", the Leapfrog Group, and ongoing research and peer education. 
Among the barriers, respondents mentioned: absence of incentives in local markets 
to improve patient safety, costs of implementation, Information Technology (IT) 
infrastructure, the commitment of physicians to implement patient safety initiatives, 
loss of professional autonomy and income of physicians, and malpractice liability 
concerns. 
In terms of the impact of patient-safety initiatives on hospitals, respondents thought 
that the publication from the IOM had increased attention, efforts and accountability 
for patient-safety improvement. The impact on patients was unclear. Data on medical 
errors were not usually reported or were non-existent, therefore current efforts to 
improve reporting had led to an increase in rates of reported medical errors. 
Lancaster et 
al (2010) 
Perceptions about organisational 
understanding of quality 
Value of the experience and skills 
gained from surveying 
Perception about the reward of being a 
surveyor 
Perception of the utility of the 
experience and skills gained as a 
surveyor in their professional roles. 
Individual level 
Main benefits could be categorised into 4 groups: 
Exposure to new methods and innovation in healthcare 
Engagement in ongoing learning 
Gaining expertise to improve quality of care in their own institutions 
Translating experience as surveyors into improvement of processes of care and 




Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure Comparison 
















To examine the interaction 
between different quality 
reporting programmes and 
their impact on operations at 
hospitals  
Quality reporting 
programmes (i.e. Public 
reporting, private 
benchmarking or incentives) 














Author Outcomes Level of analysis Results 
Pham et al 
(2006) 
-Institutional support and 
attitudes 
-Specific clinical conditions 
-Response to incentives 





modification of quality 
improvement activities 
Facility Level 
The 36 hospitals participating reported data to the CMS and JCAHO. Additionally, other 36 quality 
reporting programmes were mentioned. On average, hospitals reported data to 3.3 programmes 
(range 1 to 7). 
Quality improvement had turned into a priority for hospital leadership due to its link with 
payments, JCAHO accreditation and public benchmarking. This had been translated into practice 
in several ways: QI activities explicitly included in strategic planning; regular commitment from 
senior managers to review performance data; introduction of quality performance-based 
incentives; management more open to releasing resources for quality improvement; and more 
leadership from senior managers with front-line staff. 
Quality officers argued that reporting programmes were limiting the aspects of quality of care 
that the hospital focuses on, shifting resources and attention away from other clinical areas. 
Reporting to CMS and JCAHO were seen as incentives for participation due to their mandatory 
nature, impacting on the use of resources which had been redirected to improve the care of 
JCAHO and CMS core conditions. Initiatives coming from institutions working on healthcare 
improvement or professional associations were also seen as incentives to focus on specific 
conditions. For instance, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) had published a 
"ventilator bundle" to prevent ventilator-associated pneumonia, which included a set of concrete 
evidence-based actions that could be implemented for improvement. 
There was a general consensus that performance measurement and improvement increased 
costs. In some hospitals, staff had been relocated to collect performance data, whilst in others, 
the responsibilities had been added to existing staff. 
Performance reporting had impacted the frequency of data review. A third of hospitals were 
reviewing information monthly in order to give rapid feedback to staff or perform root-cause 
analysis. Dissemination of performance data has also changed. These reports were frequently 
reviewed by board members along with clinical staff in order to drive improvement. Staff had 
been restructured into multidisciplinary teams to track and improve overall performance and for 
those condition included in CMS and JCAHO data reporting. 
There were mixed responses about the extent to which quality performance reporting had 
impacted quality improvement initiatives in their hospitals. Those reporting no impact stated that 
hospitals had been active before the implementation of performance reporting programmes. The 
proponents of a moderate impact pointed out the uptake of bundles of quality improvement for 
Chronic Heart Failure (CHF). Hospitals' leaders believed that performance reporting had changed 







Sample size Setting Aim 
Intervention/ 
exposure 
















enhance the quality 
and safety of care. 
Five case studies 




Time participating in 
accreditation 
Conceptual framework 













Pomey et al 
(2010) 
Case 1: New regional health authority created from the merger of several organisations without experience in accreditation. There was strong 
leadership at all level of management. The most substantial changes occurred during the self-assessment phase. Accreditation was used to integrate 
different function into a single entity, as an opportunity for individuals to meet and start working together, and to involve community member in 
decision-making. The fact that the institution was expected to implement changes served as catalyser to improve problematic areas. At the 
management level, accreditation drove the creation of an information management strategy, a performance appraisal process, and a director of 
education and human resources. 
Case 2: New healthcare organisation was created from the merger of three institutions, all of them with experience in accreditation. Management 
open to listening to proposals from any member of staff and employees felt responsible for creating quality initiatives. The inclusion of physician 
with knowledge in administration and leadership helped to be recognised as a leader in certain areas such patient safety and quality. During the self-
assessment phase, members of staff from the different institutions had to learn to work together toward a common goal. Accreditation itself served 
as a means to merge not just the institutions, but the culture. Most changes occurred after receiving the accreditation report, which was focused on 
group practices, centralising rehabilitation services and communicating better with the community. 
Case 3: Hospital accredited for many years. It had been put under guardianship in two consecutive years. This supervision led to the implementation 
of a new governance policy and as a consequence, a performance improvement committee. The quality director was recognised by his leadership 
abilities and knowledge. Self-assessment and visit did not lead to any changes. After receiving the report, this was not seen as a driver for 
improvement, rather an invitation to analyse potential changes to meet mandatory requirements. Among the initiatives implemented were 
strategies to encourage leadership, emphasis on staff retention and adoption of an accountability framework. 
Case 4: Hospital accredited for many years. Strong leadership from the chief executive. Quality improvement activities were a regular part of the 
institution, having someone in charge of matters related to risks, preventable events, complaints and quality. Organisational culture was open to 
change, with very active members in the board of directors and strong communication with their community. Accreditation was seen as an 
opportunity to prioritise those initiatives that were aligned with recommendations by the accrediting body. A consultancy firm helped them to 
organise the process. Using the previous report, they mapped changes required against changes implemented. The organisation passed the 
accreditation. CEO appreciated the recommendations since they were an instrument to emphasise the need for improvement initiatives. 
Case 5: New regional health authority. Pre-merger institutions had experience in accreditation. The merger was driven by financial pressures. The 
institution had been recognised as a top employer due to its management of human resources. It provided continuing education opportunities to its 
staff and encouraged physicians to participate in decision-making. Director of quality improvement and the risk manager were recognised as very 
visible within the organisation and leaders in their fields. The research department was in charge of the accreditation process, which was seen as an 
opportunity to share experiences from the different healthcare organisations, now merged into one. Accreditation was a driver to implement 
changes that had been long overdue. The report was seen as a morale booster since it allowed staff to compare their performance against others in 
the country. The institution created an ethics committee, improved patients' health records, and implemented a coordinated corporate quality 
improvement initiative after receiving the accreditation report. 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive information of missing studies and articles in French 
Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure 
Sierpinska et al 






21 hospitals (4 accredited 
and 17 non-accredited), 
Poland 
To determine professionals' knowledge of the 
requirements to obtain a Quality Certificate, 
perceptions about management of therapeutic 
teams, and the relationship between 
perception of competence and scope of duties, 
authorization and responsibility among 
members of therapeutic teams 
Quality certificate in Poland 
versus non-accredited 
hospitals 







Acute care, France 
To determine the perceptions of healthcare 
professional about the impact of accreditation 
Accreditation by ANAES 









To describe the working conditions of 
healthcare professionals in accredited and non-








To determine the perceptions of directors, 
doctors and care personnel about effect of 
accreditation 







Acute hospitals, regional 
health offices, regional 
managers of health and 
social care offices and risk 
management support 
structures, France 
To determine characteristics of risk 
management programmes in hospitals in France 






Annual report of 
activity 
Acute care hospitals, 
France 
To describe progress made between 2002 and 
2003 by the accreditation agency in France 
Accreditation 
Abdelmounène 




Acute care hospitals, 
France 
To describe the level of implementation of 
recommendations received by hospitals during 
the first wave of accreditation, when they 
received a second visit 
Accreditation by ANAES 
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Author Study Design Sample size Setting Aim Intervention/ exposure 






interview and a 
questionnaire 
Acute hospitals, France 
To describe perceptions of healthcare 
professional about accreditation and its impact 
on quality of care and on the organisation 







Acute hospital, Saudi 
Arabia 
To determine capacity building in a hospital and 










Nephrology units, France 
To describe the perceptions of healthcare 
professionals working in nephrology units about 
the accreditation process 
Accreditation of nephrology 
units 









and peak bodies 
Accredited residential care 
in Western Australia 
To explored issues relating to the basic 
philosophy and principles underlying the 
accreditation, the implementation process, the 
accreditation standards, and the overall impact 
on providers. 
Accreditation programme 
of residential aged care 
facilities 




One case study 
University Hospital, 
France 
To assess the impact of the self-assessment 
phase of accreditation on organisational change 
One case study using semi-
structured interviews, 












Consequences and perceptions about 
accreditation process, critical success factors, 
professional groups involvement and costs 
associated 
Three case studies using in-
depth interviews, focus 
groups, surveys and walk of 
facilities: 
-One teaching hospital 
-One rural non-teaching 
hospital 
-One private not-for-profit 
hospital 
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Table 4.6 Summary of numeric results for all studies included in the overview of reviews 
Accredited vs non-accredited                   
Disease-specific organisational performance Unit of 
analysis 





SD 95 % CI p-value 
AMI exposed control 
Time-series        
  
Weeks et al. (2007) -compliance after intervention          
ACE-I for left ventricular systolic dysfunction Patients 43930 5511 78.4 14.8 78.7 15.9  0.7 
Aspirin at arrival Patients 167064 23782 94.3 5.6 93.5 7.4  0.02 
Aspirin at discharge Patients 183801 23413 94.1 7.9 92.9 9.8  0.01 
ß-blocker at arrival Patients 147181 20819 88.8 10.1 87.9 12.6  0.1 
ß-blocker at discharge Patients 184527 23411 91.4 8.8 90.7 10.7  0.1 
PTCA within 90 minutes of arrival Patients 3015 427 38.1 22.6 41.2 24.4  0.5 
Smoking cessation advice/counselling Patients 24330 3144 83.3 18.7 84 18.4  0.6 
Thrombolytic agent within 30 minutes of arrival Patients 1032 210 38.7 28.8 44.8 33.2  0.2 
          
Retrospective cohort  
       
 
Ross et al. (2008) - odds ratio  
       
 
Aspirin at hospital arrival Patients 37758 317514 1.16    (1.09–1.23) 0.0001 
Aspirin at discharge Patients 30570 263277 1.13    (1.07–1.18) 0.0001 
Beta-blocker at arrival Patients 6850 39014 1.37    (1.29–1.46) 0.0001 
Beta-blocker at discharge Patients 528 9277 1.3    (1.07–1.59) 0.0001 
PCI < 120 minutes after arrival Patients 54625 329150 1.17    (1.11–1.23) 0.0001 
Fibrinolytic therapy < 30 minutes after arrival Patients 55418 339832 1.13    (1.08–1.19) 0.0001 
    ACE-I or angiotensin receptor blocker administration 
for Left Ventricular systolic dysfunction Patients 
12920 85213 1.11    (1.05–1.17) 
0.0001 
Smoking cessation counselling on discharge. Patients 20651 106875 1.54    (1.44–1.65) 0.0001 
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Accredited vs non-accredited                   
Disease-specific organisational performance Unit of 
analysis 





SD 95 % CI p-value 
AMI exposed control 
Cross-sectional analytical          
Chen et al. (2003)          
Use of aspirin within 48 hrs of admission, n Patients 124182 10328 36074  2868    
Beta-blockers within 48 hrs of admission, n Patients 124182 10328 37905  3035    
Acute reperfusion therapy (thrombolytic agents or 
primary angioplasty) within six hours of admission, n Patients 
124182 10328 8550  606   
 
  
       
 
Chandra et al. (2009) - Odds ratio  
       
 
ECG within 10 min of ED presentation Facilities 3059 30179 1.28    (0.98-1.67)  
Aspirin Facilities 3059 30179 1.73    (1.06-2.83)  
Beta-blocker Facilities 3059 30179 1.68    (1.04-2.70)  
Unfractionated or low-weight heparin Facilities 3059 30179 1.12    (0.74-1.70)  
Glycoprotein IIb/IIIa inhibitors within 24 hrs  Facilities 3059 30179 1.3    (0.93-1.80)  
  
       
 
Landon et al. (2006)  
       
 
Opportunity score, odds ratio Facilities 3893 166 1.32    (1.26-1.37)  
  
       
 
Lutfiyya et al. (2009)  
       
 
Aspirin at arrival, n Patients 1306 2909 1138  2618    
Aspirin at discharge, n Patients 638 1480 549  1258    
Beta-Blocker at arrival, n Patients 1176 2670 960  2107    
Beta-Blocker at discharge, n Patients 648 1552 559  1315    
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Disease-specific organisational performance Unit of 
analysis 





SD 95 % CI p-value 
Pneumonia exposed control 
Time-series          
Weeks et al. (2007) - Compliance after intervention          
Blood culture before 1st antibiotic Patients 109209 14450 82.5 9.9 82.9 10  0.5 
Initial antibiotic timing Patients 410328 63884 69 11.8 71.8 12.4  <0.001 
Oxygenation assessment Patients 422229 65288 98.4 4 97.7 5.5  0.003 
Pneumococcal vaccination Patients 226663 35532 43.4 25.7 42.7 26  0.5 
Smoking cessation advice/counselling Patients 27743 3788 63.9 27.6 63.1 27  0.6 
  
       
 
Cross-sectional analytical  
       
 
Landon et al. (2006)  
       
 
Opportunity score Facilities 3893 166 1.18    (1.16-1.20)  
  
       
 
Lutfiyya et al. (2009)  
       
 
Pneumococcal vaccination status, n Patients 8578 16131 5490  10469    
Initial antibiotic received within 4 h of hospital 
arrival, n Patients 
10675 18703 8892  15916   
 
Oxygenation assessment, n Patients 13299 23947 13179  23755    
Smoking cessation, n Patients 2611 4453 1781  2765    
Appropriate initial antibiotic selection, n Patients 10255 18007 8091  13901    
Blood culture performed before first antibiotic 
received, n Patients 
9117 14998 7604  12403   
 




Disease-specific organisational performance Unit of 
analysis 





SD 95 % CI p-value 
Heart failure exposed control 
Time-series          
Weeks et al. (2007) - Compliance after intervention  
       
 
ACE-I for left ventricular systolic dysfunction Patients 130020 17618 75.5 13.5 74.6 14.5  0.2 
Assessment of left ventricular function Patients 385801 57601 86.3 11.4 82.3 17.1  <0.001 
Discharge instructions Patients 120953 16699 48.4 28.5 46.4 27.4  0.2 
Smoking cessation advice/counselling Patients 24087 3414 68.2 27.2 66.6 26.4  0.3 
  
       
 
Cross-sectional analytical  
       
 
Landon et al. (2006)  
       
 
Opportunity score, odds ratio Facilities 3893 166 1.43    (1.39-1.47)  
  
       
 
Lutfiyya et al. (2009)  
       
 
ACE inhibitor for LVSD, n Patients 1786 2733 1461  2104    
Left ventricular function assessment, n Patients 7386 12499 5274  8487    
Comprehensive discharge instructions, n Patients 5240 8295 2720  4197    
Smoking cessation, n Patients 997 1547 708  928    
  
       
 
Surgical infection prevention  
       
 
Cross-sectional analytical  
       
 
Lutfiyya et al. (2009)  
       
 
Prophylactic antibiotic 1 h prior to surgical incision, n Patients 2358 5080 1724  3693    
Prophylactic antibiotics discontinued 24 h after 
surgery, n Patients 
2153 4763 1514  3520   
 
  




Hospital-level organisational performance 
Unit of 
analysis 





SD 95 % CI p-value 
exposed control 
RCT          
Salmon et al          
Overall compliance with accreditation standards, % Facilities 10 10 30  0  (23 - 37) 0.001 
Overall nurses' perception of care, mean difference Facilities 10 10 1.5 5.1 -4.2 6.7 (0.6 - 10.9) 0.031 
Patients' satisfaction, mean difference Facilities 10 10 4.6 5 3.1 4.6 (-2.8 - 15.8) 0.484 
Medical education, mean difference Facilities 10 10 0.2 4.7 -1.5 3.9 (-2.5 - 5.9) 0.395 
Accessibility of medical records, mean difference Facilities 10 10 -7.9 9.4 -11 9.6 (-6.1 - 12.2) 0.492 
Discharge and admission record completeness, mean 
difference Facilities 
10 10 2 7.7 -3.7 7.4 (-1.4 - 12.9) 
0.114 
Completeness peri-operative notes, mean difference Facilities 10 10 2.5 5.5 4.4 6.5 (-8.4 - 4.3) 0.489 
Medicine labelling, mean difference Facilities 10 10 15.8 19.3 4 22 (-3.1 - 26.7) 0.112 
Hospital sanitation, mean difference Facilities 10 10 3.1 12.4 5.5 9.3 (-5.7 - 12) 0.641 
          
Interrupted time series  
       
 
Piontek et al. (2003) - 1 -Expected value  
       
 
Length of stay (internal control) Patients 1952 342 -0.11 0.75 -0.02 0.27   
Length of stay (external control) Patients 1952 2144 -0.11 0.75 0.19 1.19   
Cost (internal control) Patients 1952 342 -0.05 0.31 0.18 0.35   
Cost (external control) Patients 1952 2144 -0.05 0.31 0.20 1.23   
  
       
 
Prospective cohort  
       
 
Barker et al. (2002)  
       
 
Medication errors, n Doses 1481 284 1247  228    
  
       
 
Quality assurance project (2005)  
       
 
C-section infection, % Facilities 4 4 33  36    
Emergency drugs, % Facilities 4 4 58  45    
Essential drugs, % Facilities 4 4 77  77    
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Hospital-level organisational performance 
Unit of 
analysis 





SD 95 % CI p-value 
exposed control 
Lab tests availability, % Facilities 4 4 9  97    
Sanitation, % Facilities 4 4 79  62    
Nurse satisfaction, % Facilities 4 4 54  53    
Patient satisfaction, % Facilities 4 4 59  55    
  
      
  
Cross-sectional analytical  
      
  
Sekimoto et al. (2008)  
      
  
Organization of IC provision and IC team (ICT), n Facilities 211 93 188  71    
Presence of IC doctors (ICDs) and IC nurses (ICNs), 
compliance Facilities 
211 93 41.9 38.5 32 36.5 
  
Time allocated for IC activities by IC practitioners, 
compliance Facilities 
211 93 14.4 17.7 16.5 21.1 
  
Surveillance, compliance Facilities 211 93 0.5 2.3 0.5 2.5   
Standard precautions, compliance Facilities 211 93 0.2 3.5 0.2 4   
Isolation precautions (including patient isolation 
practices), compliance Facilities 
211 93 0.4 1.2 0.7 1.5 
  
Needle-stick prevention programs, compliance Facilities 211 93 0.1 1.3 0.2 1.8   
Hospital food hygiene, compliance Facilities 211 93 0.1 1.9 0.4 2.1   
Medical waste management, compliance Facilities 211 93 0.5 3.3 0.6 3.2   
Catheter-related IC, compliance Facilities 211 93 0.5 1.9 0.3 2.1   
Sterilization, compliance Facilities 211 93 0.5 1.8 0.2 1.9   
Antimicrobial therapy use and regulation, compliance Facilities 211 93 0.8 2.5 0.9 2.4   
IC in operating theatres and intensive care units 
(ICUs), compliance 
Facilities 211 93 0.7 1.8 0.4 2.1 
  
          
 
401 
Patients’ outcomes Unit of 
analysis 





SD 95 % CI p-value 
exposed control 
Time-series          
Weeks et al. (2007) – odds ratio          
Mortality for Abdominal aortic aneurysm repair Patients ? ? 0.7    (0.60 – 0.83)  <0.001 
Mortality for Aortic valve replacement Patients ? ? 0.71    (0.62 – 0.81)  <0.002 
Mortality for Coronary artery bypass graft Patients ? ? 0.86    (0.81 – 0.91)  <0.003 
Mortality for Carotid endarterectomy Patients ? ? 0.87    (0.81 – 0.94)  <0.004 
Mortality for Colectomy Patients ? ? 0.87    (0.81 – 0.95)  <0.005 
Mortality for Cystectomy Patients ? ? 0.49    (0.33 – 0.72)  <0.006 
Mortality for Esophagectomy Patients ? ? 0.01    (0.00 – 0.23)  <0.007 
Mortality for Gastrectomy Patients ? ? 0.73    (0.52 – 1.01)  <0.008 
Mortality for Lower extremity bypass Patients ? ? 0.76    (0.69 – 0.84)  <0.009 
Mortality for Lung lobectomy Patients ? ? 0.49    (0.40 – 0.59)  <0.010 
Mortality for Mitral valve replacement Patients ? ? 0.46    (0.36 – 0.59)  <0.011 
Mortality for Nephrectomy Patients ? ? 0.97    (0.80 – 1.19)  
Mortality for Pancreatectomy Patients ? ? 0.33    (0.16 – 0.66)  <0.001 
Mortality for Pneumonectomy Patients ? ? 0.66    (0.34 – 1.26)  
          
Interrupted time series          
Piontek et al. (2003) - 1 -expected value          
Mortality (internal control) Patients 1952 342 -0.012 0.12 -0.002 0.02   
Mortality (external control) Patients 1952 2144 -0.012 0.12 -0.004 0.07   
Readmission within 30 days (external control) Patients 1952 2144 -0.006 0.31 0.058 0.41   
          
Prospective cohort          
Quality assurance project (2005)          
Mortality within two days of admission, % Facilities 4 4 49  62    
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Patients’ outcomes Unit of 
analysis 





SD 95 % CI p-value 
exposed control 
Retrospective cohort          
Pasquale et al. (2001)    %obs %exp %obs %exp   
Survival for injuries of Head Facilities 171 418 68 58 68 57   
Survival for injuries of Neck Facilities 113 481 76 65 87 79   
Survival for injuries of Chest Facilities 223 456 80 72 80 70   
Survival for injuries of Brain Facilities 748 1553 80 73 84 71   
Survival for injuries of Lung Facilities 2048 3304 83 75 79 68   
Survival for injuries of Liver Facilities 214 652 61 62 70 69   
Survival for injuries of Spleen Facilities 403 817 79 74 85 76   
Survival for injuries of Aorta Facilities 118 272 36 34 39 33   
Survival for injuries of Vena Cava Facilities 46 205 28 39 48 62   
          
Cross-sectional analytical          
Simons et al. (2002)          
Observed vs predicted mortality Facilities 16473 5542 2.06     <0.001 
          
Chen et al. (2003)          
Risk-standardised 30-day AMI mortality Patients 124182 10328 22849  2107    
          
Chandra et al. (2009)          
In-hospital AMI mortality Facilities 3059 30179 1.07    (0.80-1.42)  




High vs low performing                 
Disease-specific organisational performance                 




AMI n before after n before after 
Williams et al. (2005)         
Aspirin within 24 hours after admission, n Facilities 351 351 337 351 274 326  
Aspirin prescribed at discharge, n Facilities 351 351 323 351 232 302  
ACE inhibitor at discharge for left ventricular systolic 
dysfunction, n Facilities 351 351 291 351 126 260  
Smoking-cessation counselling or advice, n Facilities 351 344 298 351 25 239  
Beta-blocker within 24 hours after admission, n Facilities 351 351 326 351 214 302  
Beta-blocker prescribed at discharge, n Facilities 351 351 326 351 207 298  
Mean time from arrival to thrombolysis, min Facilities 315 24 49 315 138 63 0.03 
Mean time from arrival to PCI, min Facilities 172 92 196 172 881 340 0.33 
         
Pneumonia         
Oxygenation assessment within 24 hours after admission, n Facilities 426 426 421 426 349 413  
Pneumococcal screening, vaccination, or both by discharge, n Facilities 426 285 281 426 0 149  
Blood cultures collected before initiation of antibiotic therapy, n Facilities 426 417 357 426 268 328  
Smoking-cessation counselling or advice, n Facilities 426 340 315 426 4 243  
Mean time from arrival to initial antibiotic administration, min Facilities 426 159 190 426 380 254 0.001 
         
Heart failure         
Discharge instructions , n Facilities 466 340 340 466 5 196  
Assessment of left ventricular function, n Facilities 466 452 433 466 233 336  
ACE inhibitor at discharge for left ventricular systolic 
dysfunction, n Facilities 466 457 391 466 196 326  
Smoking-cessation counselling or advice, n Facilities 466 405 377 466 9 294  
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Before and after accreditation                 














(SD or CI) Piontek et al. (2003) 
ICU costs, US dollars Patients 3973 1,664 91 3835 1370 62  
Labour costs, US dollars Patients 3973 4,520 25 3835 2005 17.4  
Ventilator use >96 hrs, n Patients 3973 290  3835 364  0.0001 
         
OPM report (2009)         
MRSA infection rates, mean difference (95% CI) Trusts  168 24.27 -10.4 to 58.9    0.147 
         
Time-series         
Stradling et al. (2007)         
Stroke admission, % Patients 1161 87%  ? 64%  0.005 
Deep vein thrombosis prophylaxis,% Patients 1161 86%  ? 71%  0.0001 
Lipid profile testing,% Patients 1161 98%  ? 80%  0.0001 
         
Patients’ outcomes                 
Interrupted time series         
Piontek et al. (2003)         
Complications, n Patients 3973 56  3835 42  0.317 
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from six studies 





in seven reviews 
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Before and after 
accreditation 
0/3 outcomes 
from one study 
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reviews 
3/6 outcomes 
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reviews 
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Initial medical assessment done within 24 h 
of admission 
No effect No effect No effect 
Initial nursing assessment within 24 h of 
admission 
No effect No effect No effect 
Percentage of pain assessments completed 
per month 
No effect No effect No effect 
Percentage of completed pain 
reassessments per month 
Improvement Decline No effect 
Monitor the timeliness of complete blood 
count as routine lab results 
Improvement Decline No effect 
The turnaround time of troponin lab results No effect Improvement No effect 
Completion of the surgical invasive 
procedure consent 
Improvement Decline Decline 
Percentage of operating room (OR) 
cancellation of elective surgery 
No effect No effect No effect 
Unplanned return to OR within 48 h  No effect No effect No effect 
Reported medication errors No effect No effect Improvement 
Percentage of completed anaesthesia, 
moderate and deep sedation consents 
Improvement Decline Decline 
Percentage of completed modified Aldrete 
scores (pre, post, discharge) 
Improvement Decline Decline 
Percentage of completed pre-anaesthesia 
assessments 
No effect No effect No effect 
Percentage of completed anaesthesia care 
plans 
Improvement Decline Decline 
Percentage of completed assessments of 
patients receiving anaesthesia 
No effect No effect No effect 
Effective communication of risks, benefits 
and alternatives of anaesthesia to patients 
Improvement Decline Decline 
Percentage of typed post-operative report 
completed within 48 h  
Improvement Decline No effect 
Hospital acquired methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus rate 
Improvement Decline Decline 
Healthcare associated infection hospital-
wide 
No effect No effect No effect 
Surgical site infection rate No effect No effect No effect 
Mortality rate No effect No effect No effect 
Compliance with surgical site marking Improvement No effect Decline 
Compliance with the time-out procedure  Improvement Decline Decline 
Screening for patient fall risk Improvement No effect Decline 
Overall hospital hand hygiene compliance 
rate 
No effect No effect No effect 
Patient fall rate No effect Decline Decline 
Fall risk assessment and reassessment Improvement Decline No effect 
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Table 4.9 Detailed characteristics of included studies in update of systematic review 
Devkaran and O'Farrell (2015) and Devkaran and O'Farrell (2014) 
Methods Study design: ITS study 
Data: A selection of measures of clinical quality routinely used by the accreditation 
agency was selected to determine the impact of the intervention. Data were 
collected monthly for a 4-year period, including one year pre-accreditation (2009) 
and three post intervention (2010, 2011 and 2012). A random sample of 12,000 
patients’ records served as the data source. This represented a 24% of the monthly 
census. A total of 324,000 observations/data points were used for the model. 
Participants Recipients: Al-Noor hospital in Abu Dhabi. 
Characteristics of included hospital: Private, 150-bed, multispecialty, acute care 
hospital. Annual inpatient census is 15,000. 
Country: United Arabic Emirates 
Targeted behaviours: see outcomes 
Interventions Description of intervention:  
 
Joint Commission International (JCI) accreditation process comprises several 
consecutive steps:  
The first phase is characterised by the implementation of new standards. JCI 
recommends developing an internal structure, composed of teams and leaders, to 
facilitate coordination of all the activities needed to prepare for accreditation. A 
steering committee of team leaders coordinates the preparation. As JCI requires a 
number of mandatory policies and procedures, a document review is initiated.  
JCI recommends as a next step, to perform a Baseline Assessment/Gap analysis in 
order to compare current processes and compliance with the expectations of the 
standards. Additionally, the collection and analysis of baseline quality data are 
compared with the requirements of the quality monitoring standards. The process 
includes:  
(1) analysing compliance with the JCI standards; 
 
(2) developing an action plan to address deficiencies; 
 
(3) implementation of new processes and data collection targeting compliance to 
standards;  
(4) conducting an organisation-wide training programme and 
 
(5) Allocation of required resources. 
 
3–6 months prior to the accreditation survey, a mock survey is performed. The 
findings lead to a review of existing gaps and the staff work on closing these within 
the short time frame.  
JCI Accreditation requires submission of a 4-month record of compliance measures 
prior to the accreditation survey.  
The process ends with the final accreditation survey, granting accreditation status. 
 
Type of external standard: Joint Commission International's standards. Indicators 
from 10 out of 14 chapters were selected. These measures reflect important 
dimensions of quality, including patient assessment, surgical procedures, anaesthesia 
and sedation use, medication errors, infection control and patient safety.  
Who developed the standards: The quality measures were selected by a panel of 
experts consisting of clinical auditors, doctors, quality and patient safety leaders 
based on:  
(1) interpretability, enabling clear conclusions to be drawn on the level of compliance 
with JCI standards and thus accreditation impact;  
(2) consistency in terms of high values indicating better quality; 
 
(3) direct correlation with a specific JCI standard and relation to an important 
dimension of quality and  
(4) applicability, as all measures should apply to all patients in the hospital 
irrespective of disease condition or specialty.  
Voluntary or Mandatory review: Voluntary 
 
Universally or targeted review: Universal 
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Interventions Who performed the review: Joint Commission International (non-governmental and 
non-for-profit organisation).  
Purpose and focus of the review: The goal of the survey is to evaluate care, 
organisational processes and to provide education with the objective of promoting 
continual improvement for the organisation under survey.  
Timing:  
Frequency and number of inspections: One survey every three years. Three months 
before the final accreditation survey, a mock survey was performed  
Duration of inspection: Not specified. 
Outcomes Some outcome measures were transformed so an increase on its value represent an 




Change in level  
(95% CI) 
Change in slope  
(95% CI) 
 
Patient assessment and laboratory safety measures 
 
Initial medical assessment done 
within 24 h of admission: 
−4.54 (−16.33, 7.25) −0.99 (−3.63, 1.65)  
p=0.44 p= 0.45 
 
Initial nursing assessment within 
24 h of admission 
1.24 (−1.63, 4.11) -0.18 (-0.60, 0.24)  
p= 0.38 p= 0.39 
 
Percentage of pain assessments 
completed per month 
−4.00 (−12.10, 4.10) -0.02 (-1.82, 1.77)  
p=0.33 p= 0.98 
 
Percentage of completed pain 
reassessments per month 
−13.91 (−32.37, 4.56) -7.28 (-10.00, -4.56)  
p= 0.14 p< 0.001 
 
Hours for complete blood count 
as routine lab result 
0.34 (0.13, 0.54) 0.34 (0.04, 0.64)  
p= 0.52 p< 0.001 
 
Turnaround time of troponin lab 
results (in minutes) 
−0.43 (−2.99, 2.13) −0.60 (−1.02, −0.18)  
p= 0.74 p= 0.01 
 
Surgical Procedures, medication error use and near-misses 
 
Completion of the surgical 
invasive procedure consent 
-2.70 (-4.76, -0.63) -1.18 (-1.72, -0.64)  
p= 0.01 p= 0.01 
 
Percentage of operating room 
(OR) cancellation of elective 
surgery (transformed) 
-0.36 (-4.66, 3.95) 0.32 (-0.31, 0.95)  
p= 0.87 p= 0.31 
 
Unplanned return to OR within 48 
h (transformed) 
-0.05 (-0.30, 0.20) 0.01 (−0.03, 0.04) 
 
p= 0.69 p= 0.63 
 
Reported medication errors 
(transformed) 
-0.04 (-0.06, -0.01) -0.001 (-0.01, 0.00) 
 
p< 0.001 p= 0.18 
 
Anaesthesia and sedation use 
 
Percentage of completed 
anaesthesia, moderate and deep 
sedation consents 
−15.42 (−23.38, −7.45) -4.95 (-6.12, -3.78)  
p< 0.001 p< 0.001 
 
Percentage of completed 
modified Aldrete scores (pre, 
post, discharge) 
−7.17 (−12.11, −2.23) −7.30 (−8.49, −6.11)  
p= 0.01 p< 0.001 
 
Percentage of completed pre-
anaesthesia assessments 
0.97 (−4.86, 6.80) −0.84 (−1.98, 0.30)  
p= 0.74 p= 0.14 
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Percentage of completed 
anaesthesia care plans 
-11.68 (-20.04, -3.31) −2.48 (−4.07, −0.88) 
 
p= 0.01 p< 0.001 
 
Percentage of completed 
assessments of patients receiving 
anaesthesia 
−6.17 (−14.37, 2.03) −0.02 (−1.90, 1.87)  
p= 0.14 p= 0.98 
 
Effective communication of risks, 
benefits and alternatives of 
anaesthesia to patients 
−12.83 (−21.63, −4.03) −3.64 (−4.94, −2.35)  
p= 0.01 p< 0.001 
 
Infection control, content and use of patient records. 
 
Hospital acquired methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
rate 
1.41 (0.09, 2.72) 0.70 (0.31, 1.10)  
p= 0.04 p= 0.001 
 
Healthcare associated infections 
at hospital level 
0.25 (-0.81, 1.32) 0.08 (-0.08, 0.23)  
p= 0.63 p= 0.33 
 
Surgical site infection rate 
-0.05 (-0.29, 0.18) 0.001 (-0.03, 0.04)  
p= 0.64 p= 0.81 
 
Percentage of typed post-
operative report completed within 
48 h 
4.33 (-4.98, 13.64) -1.85 (-3.22, -0.48)  
p= 0.35 p= 0.01 
 
Mortality rate (transformed) 
-0.01 (-0.16, 0.14) -0.02 (-0.04, 0.01)  
p= 0.90 p= 0.15 
 
International patient safety goals 
 
Compliance with surgical site 
marking 
0.79 (−4.37, 5.94) −5.26 (-6.19, −4.34)  
p= 0.76 p< 0.001  
Compliance with the time-out 
procedure 
−14.89 (−21.30, −8.49) −7.36 (−8.64, −6.08)  
p< 0.001 p< 0.001 
 
Screening for patient fall risk 
0.21 (−2.46, 2.89) −0.67 (−1.07, −0.28)  
p= 0.87 p< 0.001  
Overall hospital hand hygiene 
compliance rate 
0.14 (−0.43, 0.71) −0.02 (−0.11, 0.06)  
p= 0.62 p= 0.62 
 
Patient fall rate 
1.71 (1.04, 2.38) 0.11 (0.00, 0.230)  
p< 0.001 p= 0.06  
Fall risk assessment and 
reassessment 
−1.67 (−6.29, 2.96) −4.26 (−5.30, −3.22)  
p= 0.47 p< 0.001 
 
Mean Composite score (It 
includes only 23 measures) 
-3.95 (-6.39, -1.51) −2.16 (−2.52, −1.80) 
 
p< 0.001 p< 0.001 
Towers and Clark (2014) 
Methods Study design: ITS design 
Data: 10 years (1999-2008) of hospital discharge information was retrieved for 58 
hospitals in New Jersey from the healthcare cost and utilization project state 
inpatient database. 
From the public-facing Joint Commission website, documentation for each site visit of 
the Joint Commission was obtained. 
For each year, risk-adjusted mortality data for 7 months was retrieved: 3 months 
before and after the accreditation visit and for the month of the visit. Additionally, 
system affiliation, technological status and if the visit was announced or not, were 
used to perform subgroup analyses. 
Annual admission rates and membership to the Council of Teaching Hospitals and 
Health Systems were used as proxies of hospital characteristics. 
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Participants Recipients: 58 hospitals in New Jersey, United States of America. 
Characteristics of included hospitals: Non-specialist and non-paediatric acute 
hospitals. 
Country: United States of America 
Targeted behaviour: Risk-adjusted mortality 
Interventions Description of intervention: Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) scheme. 
Type of external standard: JCAHO’s standards. 
Who developed the standards: JCAHO. 
Voluntary or Mandatory review: Mandatory 
Universally or targeted review: Universal 
Who performed the review: JCAHO (non-governmental organisation). 
Purpose and focus of the review: The Joint Commission explicitly pursues a mission 
devoted to the overall quality and safety of patient care. Whilst many of the 
standards inform a host of practices that may not be obviously tied to mortality, 
their collective adoption is clearly aimed at reducing the risk of harm and 
unnecessary death by improving the integrity and effectiveness of care delivery 
practices. 
Timing: 
Frequency and number of inspections: Every three years. 
Duration of inspection: Not specified 
Outcomes Results: 
There was a statistically significant decrease in risk-adjusted mortality in the month 
after the site visit (β= -0.0454, p<0.05). 
System affiliation and technological status were significantly associated with risk 
adjusted mortality rates during the study period (β=0.048, p<0.05 and β=-0.039, 
p<0.05; respectively). An analysis including interaction terms for these two variables 
revealed that the cyclical decrease in risk-adjusted mortality was driven by hospitals 
with low technological status (β= -0.096, p<0.01). High-technological status hospitals 
had a lower risk-adjusted mortality rate over time (β= -0.045, p<0.05). 
The cyclical effect observed in the month after the site visit remained significant 
after the introduction of the variable “unannounced” (β=-0.0454, p<0.05). 
Bogh et al. (2015) 
Methods 
Study design: Controlled before and after study 
Data: Data regularly reported to disease-specific national registries 
Participants 
Recipients: 6 accredited and 27 non-accredited hospitals in Denmark 
Characteristics of included hospitals: Public, non-specialist, acute hospitals. 
Country: Denmark 
Targeted behaviours: 21 measures of processes of care for stroke, heart failure, 
perforated and bleeding ulcers. 
An opportunity-based composite score was calculated based on the individual 
processes of care for each disease area. The opportunity-based composite score 
reflects the number of times the patients received a process according to guidelines, 
divided by the number of patients who were eligible for this process. Second, an all-
or-none score was calculated, which reflects the proportion of patients who received 
100% of the recommended processes of care. 
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Interventions Description of intervention:  
  Hospitals were divided into two groups based on their accreditation status through 
the study period. In 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011 five hospitals were accredited by the 
Joint Commission International (JCI), whilst four hospitals in 2004 were accredited by 
the Health Quality Service (HQS). 
  Type of external standard: The performance measures were identified by national 
expert panels taking into account the strength of evidence, the multidisciplinary 
efforts involved in patient care and the feasibility of collecting the data in routine 
clinical settings. If relevant, a time limit was defined for the individual performance 
measures to capture the timeliness of the interventions. Each registry developed 
standard descriptions on how hospitals should report data and set a deadline for 
when data should be registered. Data from each registry was used for an annual 
report, which was used to evaluate disease-specific quality of care within and 
between hospitals. 
  Who developed the standards: Danish Healthcare Quality Programme 
  Voluntary or Mandatory review: Voluntary 
  Universally or targeted review: Universal 
  Who performed the review: Governmental institution and The Joint Commission 
International. 
  
Purpose and focus of the review: The accreditation programme targeted quality 
improvements within the entire hospitals organization, including improvement of 
process of care. Accredited hospitals were specifically assessed on their work with 
data collection and data analysis in order to evaluate their compliance with clinical 
guidelines 
  Timing: 
  Frequency and number of inspections: One visit every three years 
  Duration of inspection:Visit is announced 6 months in advance. Duration of visit is 
not stated. 
Outcomes Results: 




(95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) 
  Opportunity-based composite score 
  Stroke 13.8 (9.7 to 17.8) 9.8 (4.6 to 15.1) 3.9 (−1.4 to 9.2) 
  Heart failure 16.8 (11.5 to 22.5) 8.7 (−5.9 to 23.3) 8.3 (−3.3 to 19.9) 
  Perforated 
Ulcer 
7.1 (−1.3 to 15.6) 10.2 (−20.4 to 40.8) −3.0 (−23.5 to 17.4) 
  Bleeding Ulcer −0.3 (−2.3 to 1.7) −0.1 (−4.8 to 4.7) −0.2 (−3.7 to 3.3) 
  Overall 13.7 (10.6 to 16.8) 9.9 (5.4: 14.4) 3.8 (0.8 to 8.3) 
  All-or-none 
  Stroke 9.9 (3.9 to 16.0) 6.4 (−4.8 to 17.7) 3.6 (−3.8 to 10.9) 
  Heart failure 9.7 (5.4 to 14.1) 4.3 (−1.8 to 10.4) 5.4 (−0.1 to 14.4) 
  Perforated 
Ulcer 
12.3 (0.4 to 24.2) 12.4 (−19.3 to 44.1) −0.1 (−22.6 to 22.4) 
  Bleeding Ulcer −3.6 (−7.9 to −0.3) −5.2 (−11.7 to 1.3) 1.6 (−1.8 to 8.2) 
  Overall 9.4 (5.0 to 13.9) 6.3 (−0.6 to 13.2) 3.2 (−3.6: 9.9) 
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Bogh et al. (2016) 
Methods 
Study design: ITS study 
Data: Data regularly reported to disease-specific national registries From November 
1st, 2008 to December 31st, 2013. 
Participants 
Recipients: 25 hospitals in Denmark 
Characteristics of included hospitals: Public, non-specialist, acute hospitals. 
Country: Denmark 
Targeted behaviours: 43 different process performance measures were included 
covering six conditions: stroke, heart failure, ulcer, diabetes, breast cancer and lung 
cancer. 
Interventions Description of intervention:  
  All public hospitals in Denmark were obliged to implement The Danish Healthcare 
Quality Programme (in Danish: Den Danske Kvalitetsmodel (DDKM)). The first version 
was launched in August 2009; the first hospital was accredited in May 2010 and the 
last in June 2012. 
The agency responsible for DDKM recommended that every hospital perform an 
internal survey 6 months before the external survey, in order to identify areas for 
improvements and to prepare for the announced on-site survey. A team comprising 
peer reviewers performed the on-site survey, with the main task to evaluate to what 
extent the hospital met the predefined standards. The surveyors used 
methodologies including interviews with staff and patients and reviews of local 
guidelines. The evaluation was documented in a report used by an independent 
Accreditation Award Committee to award the hospitals a level of accreditation. 
Because the report identify strengths and areas for improvement, it was used by the 
hospital to continue the cycle of quality improvement. 
  Type of external standard: The first version of the programme consisted of 104 
standards grouped in three categories: organizational, general patient pathway and 
disease-specific standards. The standards incorporated the four steps in the plan-do-
check-act cycle, a management method used for control and continuous 
improvement of processes. Each standard incorporated a number of indicators used 
to guide the hospitals to meet the standard. Documentation was required when 
performance against the disease-specific standards failed to reach the expected 
quality level. If a hospital reached a satisfactory level of quality, this level had to be 
maintained as a minimum, and no further action was required. Diseases included in 
the disease-specific standards were selected according to their 
incidence/prevalence, severity and the complexity of patient care services. 
Ultimately the aim was to ensure high quality of care. In addition to the disease-
specific standards, DDKM also include general standards that require policies related 
to clinical guidelines, documentation and monitoring and quality improvement at an 
organizational level. 
  Who developed the standards: Danish Healthcare Quality Programme (DDKM) 
  Voluntary or Mandatory review: Mandatory 
  Universally or targeted review: Universal 
  Who performed the review: DDKM (governmental institution). 
  Purpose and focus of the review: DDKM’s aim was to create a framework for 
continuous quality improvement, to document and make the quality of healthcare 
transparent and to prevent errors that cause death and lower quality of life. 
  Timing: 
  Frequency and number of inspections: One visit every three years 









(95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) 
  All hospitals (probability of meeting standards) 
  
Level 3.5 (2.8 to 4.4) (78%) – – 
  
Trend 1.007 (1.005 to 1.008) – – 




(0.997 to 1.006) 
0.99  
(0.988 to 0.999) 
  Subgroup analysis of hospitals not meeting standards pre-accreditation 
  
Level 2.2 (1.9 to 2.54) (68%) – – 
  
Trend 1.005 (1.003 to 1.006) – – 




(1.002 to 1.013) 
0.992  
(0.984 to 0.995) 
Bogh et al. (2017) 
Methods 
Study design: ITS study 
Data: Data regularly reported to disease-specific national registries From November 
1st, 2008 to December 31st, 2013. 
Participants 
Recipients: 25 hospitals in Denmark 
Characteristics of included hospitals: Public, non-specialist, acute hospitals. 
Country: Denmark 
Targeted behaviours: 43 different process performance measures were included for 
six different conditions: stroke, heart failure, ulcer, diabetes, breast cancer and lung 
cancer. 
Interventions Description of intervention:  
  A team of surveyors conducted on-site surveys to judge the compliance of each 
hospital according to a set of standards. Their judgements were documented in 
reports that the independent Accreditation Award Committee then used to award 
levels of accreditation to hospitals. The reports identified hospitals’ strengths and 
areas for improvement and were used by hospitals in the cycle of quality 
improvement. In preparation for accreditation, it was recommended that hospitals 
conduct an internal survey 6 months before the on-site survey. 
  Type of external standard: The accreditation standard incorporates the four steps of 
the plan-do-check-act cycle to encourage systematic quality development. The 
DDKM comprises 104 standards that can be grouped into three categories: (i) 
organizational; (ii) general patient pathway and (iii) disease-specific standards. 
In addition to the requirement that staff work in accordance with clinical guidelines 
that reflect the recommendations of national clinical guidelines, the disease-specific 
standards require hospitals to report data on pre-defined processes of care for each 
of the six conditions. If a hospital fails to reach a pre-defined target value, the 
accreditation standards require the hospital to complete specific action plans to 
improve performance. If a satisfactory level of quality is obtained, the (minimum) 
level must be maintained and no further action is required. 
  Who developed the standards: Danish Healthcare Quality Programme (DDKM) 
  Voluntary or Mandatory review: Mandatory 
  Universally or targeted review: Universal 
  Who performed the review: DDKM (governmental institution). 
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 Interventions Purpose and focus of the review: DDKM’s aim was to create a framework for 
continuous quality improvement, to document and make the quality of healthcare 
transparent and to prevent errors that cause death and lower quality of life. 
  Timing: 
  Frequency and number of inspections: One visit every three years 
  Duration of inspection: Visit is announced 6 months in advance. Duration of visit is 
not stated. 
Outcomes Results: 






  Level Trend Change in trend Change in trend 
   (95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) 









































































































































Table 4.10 List of excluded primary studies and reasons for exclusion 
Excluded studies Reason for exclusion 
Abilleira et al, 2012 
The intervention was the implementation of a Clinical 
Practice Guideline and periodic audits- no inspection. In this 
article, they compared results from two audits. 
Adam et al, 2012 Review of literature. 
Ahn and Ahn, 2014 Accreditation in education. 
Al Awa et al, 2011 
Insufficient data points - Four data points were analysed (1 
pre, two during and 1 post-accreditation) using ANOVA. 
Al Awa et al, 2011 
Cross sectional study - perception of quality of care of 
nursing staff. 
Al-Awa et al, 2012 Cross sectional study. 
Al-Sughayir, 2016 Comparison before and after. 
Al-Sughayir, 2017 Comparison before and after. 
Alberts et al, 2013 Observational study - Three data points were compared. 
Arani et al, 2014 Cross sectional study. 
Babich, 2015 Qualitative study. 
Barnett et al, 2017 
The model was specified to detect a step change between 
non-survey and survey week. It does not report secular 
trends to be considered an interrupted time-series. 
Boivin et al, 2011 
No assessment of the impact on clinical outcomes. Outcome 
was the agreement of priorities between patients and 
clinicians. 
Bonacci and Balado, 2015 No assessment of impact. 
Caldana et al, 2015 
Validation of the Quality Improvement Implementation 
Survey in Brazil. No assessment of impact. 
Carpenter et al, 2011 No assessment of impact. 
DeLellis and Ozcan, 2013 Cross sectional study. 
Petit Dit Dariel and Regnaux, 
2015 
Review of literature. 
Edwards, 2013 
Cross sectional study - intervention does not qualify 
(compliance with quality improvement programme). 
Ergasti and Consolante, 
2011 
The intervention was performance monitoring. 
Falstie-Jensen et al, 2015 
Cross sectional study. It pools and compares length of stay 
and mortality between accredited and non-accredited 
hospitals during three years. 
Falstie-Jensen et al, 2017 
Cross sectional study. It compares outcomes of hospitals by 
compliance in consetive accreditation cycles. 
Falstie-Jensen et al, 2017 
Cross sectional study. It compares mesasures of hospital care 
acording to accreditation status. 
Ferreira et al, 2013 No intervention. 
Flodgren et al, 2011 Review of literature. 
Ghaemmaghami, 2012 Cross sectional study. 
Greenfield et al, 2012 
Cross sectional study - it compares two methods of surveying 
hospitals. 
Greenfield et al, 2012 Review of literature. 
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Excluded studies Reason for exclusion 
Greenfield et al, 2014 Cross sectional study. 
Greenfield et al, 2016 
Insufficient information. Abstract from a conference 
proceeding. 
Grigoroudis et al, 2012 No intervention. 
Halasa et al, 2015 
Insufficient data points – Retrospective difference-in-
difference analysis of four hospitals in Jordan. Only one point 
before the intervention. The assumption of parallel paths 
was not met. 
Hysong et al, 2011 
Intervention includes only performance monitoring- no 
inspection. 
Hysong et al, 2012 Qualitative study. 
Jaafaripooyan, 2014 Qualitative study. 
Jaafaripooyan, 2011 Qualitative study. 
Jaber, 2014 
Cross sectional study - perception about accreditation was 
asked of nurses. 
Kalodimos, 2017 No assessment of impact. 
Lam et al, 2016 
Cross sectional study. It analyses the changes in 
organisational culture before and after accreditation. 
Mosadeghrad et al, 2017 No assessment of impact. 
Mumford et al, 2013 Review of literature. 
Mumford et al, 2015 
Cross sectional study. It looks at the association between 
bacteraemia and accreditation score. 
Ng et al, 2013 Review of literature. 
Nomura et al, 2016 Before and after study. 
Ramjee et al, 2016 
Insufficient information. Abstract from a conference 
proceeding. 
Renzi et al, 2012 Intervention was public reporting of hospital performance. 
Schmaltz et al, 2011 
Cross sectional study - relationships between accreditation 
status and hospital performance. 
Shahian et al, 2012 
Intervention includes performance monitoring- no 
inspection. It compares level of compliance with standards 
and mortality for three diagnoses. 
Stausberg and Berghof, 
2014 
No intervention. 
Tabrizi and Gharibi, 2011 Review of literature. 
Telem et al, 2015 
Cross sectional study. It compares unaccredited and 
accredited hospitals. 
Yildiz and Kaya, 2014 
Cross sectional study - perception about accreditation was 
asked of nurses. 
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Appendix Chapter 5  





Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 
(Frimley Park Hospital NHS FT) 
Francis Report 






Never events incidents 
"The Trust had 9 Never Events 
between November 2013 and 
January 2015. 8 of the 9 Never 
Events were for wrong site 
surgery" 
    
Emergency readmissions 
with an overnight stay 
within 30 days of discharge 
following an elective spell at 
the Trust 
      
      
      
      
Emergency readmissions 
with an overnight stay 
within 30 days of discharge 
following an emergency 
spell at the Trust 
      
      
      
From the time you first 
arrived at the A&E 
department, how long did 
you wait before being 
examined by a doctor or 
nurse? 
      
      
      







Death in low risk groups (Dr 
Foster) 
Peer reviews report raised 
serious concerns about the 
Trust’s ability to deliver a safe 
service, and raised questions 
about management capability 
    






Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 
(Frimley Park Hospital NHS FT) 
Francis Report 
3 





Potential under-reporting of 
patient safety incidents 
resulting in death or severe 
harm 
  
Incident reporting was embraced 
by staff throughout the 
organisation. Where some staff 
groups had low levels of incident 
reporting, such as doctors, work 
had been carried to increase their 
reporting with good results, 
which demonstrated the 
continuous improvement culture 
and accountability amongst all 
staff groups 
Any example of a serious 
incident or avoidable harm 
should trigger an examination 
by the Care Quality Commission 
of how that was addressed by 
the provider and a requirement 
for the Trust concerned to 
demonstrate that the learning 
to be derived has been 
successfully implemented. 
Consistency of reporting to 
the National Reporting and 




safety goals and 
performance 
against them 
          









Proportion of reported 
patient safety incidents that 
are harmful 
The Trust had 42 new Serious 
Incidents (SI's) reported from 
April 2014 to January 2015. 
  
Candour – any patient harmed 
by the provision of a healthcare 
service is informed of the fact 
and an appropriate remedy 
offered, regardless of whether a 
complaint has been made or a 
question asked about it 
Potential under-reporting of 
patient safety incidents 
We reviewed a number of Serious 
Incidents and there was limited 
assurance that the duty of 
candour had been upheld. One 
incident we reviewed occurred in 
December 2013 the report was 
completed in November 2014 
  
A statutory obligation should be 
imposed to observe a duty of 
candour: On healthcare 
providers who believe or 
suspect that treatment or care 
provided by it to a patient has 






Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 
(Frimley Park Hospital NHS FT) 
Francis Report 
and the intention to liaise with 
the family had not taken place in 
March 2015.   
to a patient to inform that 
patient or other duly authorised 
person as soon as is practicable 
of that fact and thereafter to 
provide such information and 
explanation as the patient 




and users are 
involved in them 
Duty of 
candour 
The proportion of staff who 
stated that the incident 
reporting procedure was fair 
and effective 
Some staff told us that they did 
not have the time to report 
incidents and were not 
encouraged to report incidents 
and were not aware of any 
improvements as a result of 
learning from incidents. 
A safety culture was a priority for 
staff at all levels and embedded 
throughout the Trust. Staff were 
empowered to be part of 
improvements. 
"However evidence of learning 
was limited, actions were not 
always timely and evident and 
staff spoken with were not 
always aware of incidents within 
their service, within their Clinical 
Academic Group (CAG) or within 
the hospital. Learning across the 
organisation was not apparent" 
The Trust had carried out some 
‘look back’ exercises as a team 
approach to review notes and 
look for areas of improvement to 
patient care, with any concerns 
identified shared with patients in 
an open and transparent manner. 
  
3 






Learning and improvements from 
incidents was seen throughout 
the majority of the organisation 
with many levels of staff able to 
describe an improvement to 
patient care. 
  
Feedback to staff on reported 
incidents to allow learning so that 
services could improve did not 
routinely occur, lessons learnt 




How actions are 
shared to other 
teams or services. 
Good 
governance 






Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 
(Frimley Park Hospital NHS FT) 
Francis Report 
Safe-Key Line of Enquiry S3: Reliable safety systems, processes and practices. 
1 





Dealing timeously with (CAS) 
safety alerts indicators 
    
There was a gap in safety 
monitoring that required a 







The proportion of staff 
receiving health and safety 
training in last 12 months 
Ward staff had not received any 
training in care of the dying 
patient for at least three years. 
We were told by the palliative 
care team they intended to roll 
out end of life training once the 
care planning documentation to 
replace the Liverpool Care 
Pathway had been implemented. 
Statutory and mandatory training 
levels were good and where they 
fell below the Trust expectation 











Proportion of admitted 
patients risk assessed for 
VTE 











    
Staff were trained in safeguarding 
and there were appropriate 
processes for safeguarding 








Patient-Led Assessment of 
the Care Environment 
  
The standard of cleanliness, 
infection control and hygiene was 







Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 
(Frimley Park Hospital NHS FT) 
Francis Report 
"Thinking about your stay in 
hospital, how clean were the 
toilets and bathrooms you 
used?" 
  
seen adhering to infection control 









Incidence of Clostridium 
Difficile 
The Trust was exceeding its 
maximum trajectory for 2014/15 
clostridium difficile and reported 
79 cases (post 72 hours) in 
February 2015 against a full year 
trajectory of less than 71 cases.  
There was a system for robust 
monitoring of cleanliness and 
infection control to ensure 
standards were being met 
  
Incidence of MRSA 
The Trust also reported 10 
patients with MRSA bacteraemia 
(48 hours post admission) from 
April 2014 to January 2015, 
against a last year outturn of 11 
cases of MRSA bacteraemia, 
there is zero tolerance as this is 









We identified non-compliance 
with theatre ventilation on the 
Whipps Cross site as it was not 
adequately monitored or 
maintained. 






Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 








  The Trust could not assure us that 
the work which was taking place 
[It services] was having the 
required impact and when the 
issue would be resolved. Staff at 
the Trust did not know when they 
would be able to recommence 
monitoring in line with the 
national requirements. The Trust 
had not reported since August 
2014. 
There was sufficient equipment 
to ensure staff were able to carry 
out their duties and there was a 
















  There were concerns related to 
both storage and administration 
of medicines. There was no 
consistency in the use of opioids, 
no policy and no guidance with 
some wards using morphine and 
others diamorphine. 
Medicines management was 
good throughout the organisation 
and learning was embedded in 




of care records 




Data Quality of Trust 
Returns to the HSCIC 
Record keeping was a significant 
issue across all three sites and an 
area of concern that we had 
previously identified in 2013 
when we last inspected. 
Records were well maintained 
and documentation was 
completed comprehensively 







Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 
(Frimley Park Hospital NHS FT) 
Francis Report 




Improvements were needed to 
ensure accurate records were 
maintained and that there were 
suitable prompts for staff to 
follow to ensure all patient needs 
had been met and recorded. 
to date, including completion of 
risk assessments 
  
Safe-Key Line of Enquiry S4: Assessment of risks for users 
1 
Planning of staff 
levels and skill 




Composite risk rating of ESR 
items relating to staff 
support/ supervision 
Staffing levels in some areas were 
significantly below the 
recommended standards and did 
not provide consistently safe care 
Nursing staffing levels and skill 
mix in Paediatrics (services for 
children) require improvement. 
An unacceptable delay in 
addressing the issue of shortage 
of skilled nursing staff. 
Composite risk rating of ESR 
items relating to ratio: Staff 







    The majority of staff told us 
staffing was a significant problem 
and recognised the impact of 
inadequate staffing levels on 
maintaining patient safety 
Nurse staffing levels were mostly 
sufficient and where there were 
vacancies, the Trust monitored 
the risk through a tool used on 
each ward consistently 
Savings in staff costs were being 
made in an organisation which 
was already identified as having 
serious problems in delivering a 
service of adequate quality, and 




use bank, agency 
and locum staff 
avoid harm. 
Safety 
  There was a high use of 
temporary staff however the data 
being presented to the Trust 
board did not clearly illustrate 
this 
Where bank or agency nurses 
were used there was a robust 
induction checklist, which 
included introduction to the use 




The processes that should be in 
place to ensure temporary staff 
are supported were not sufficient 
across the Trust despite the high 






Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 










The Trust recognised that three 
patients died following a fall 
while in hospital in December 
2013, April 2014 and in January 
2015 the board papers state that 
the falls documentation is still 
under review to standardise the 
paper work and the risk 
assessment tool used across all 
sites. 
There was a system in place to 
assess deteriorating patients, 
known as the Medical Emergency 
Team (MET) score, which was a 
tool developed by the Trust. 
Evidence demonstrated good 
compliance with completion and 







in risk assessment 
Safety 
    
Ensure paediatric staff have the 
necessary skills to identify and 







          









"Proportion of ambulance 
journeys where the 
ambulance vehicle remained 
at hospital for more than 60 
minutes" 













Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 




the impact of 
changes to the 
service on safety 
Safety         
    
  CQC’s National Customer 
Service Centre (NCSC) 
safeguarding concerns 
      
Effective-Key Line of Enquiry E1: Assessment and treatment of patients according to evidence-based guidance 
1 







Maternity outlier alert: 
Emergency Caesarean 
sections 
The use of national clinical 
guidelines was not evident in the 
majority of services, two 
examples were the delivery of 
end of life care and care provided 
to children. National guidance for 
the care and treatment of 
critically ill patients was not 
always followed. 
Evidence-based care was 
fundamental to the policies and 
procedures used throughout the 
organisation, with a commitment 
to continuously improve 
outcomes for patients. Guidelines 
and polices included evidence-
based guidance and national 
recommendations 
  
Puerperal sepsis and other 
puerperal infections within 
42 days of delivery 
  
Maternal non-elective 




readmissions within 28 days 
of delivery 
The application of early warning 
systems to assist staff in the early 
recognition of a deteriorating 
patient was varied and its use 
inconsistent across the Trust  
    
Emergency readmissions 
with an overnight stay 
within 30 days of discharge 
following an elective spell at 
the Trust 
    
Emergency readmissions 
with an overnight stay 
within 30 days of discharge 
following an emergency 
spell at the Trust 
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planning of care 
and assessment 




Maternity outlier alert: 
Elective Caesarean sections 
      
9 Best Practice standards hip 
fracture 
      
Patients receiving all 
secondary prevention 
medications they were 
eligible for 

















The management of patients 
nutritional and hydration needs 
varied 
Nutrition and hydration of 
patients was managed effectively 
and staff were clear in ensuring 
this aspect of care was delivered 






  "Do you think the hospital 
staff did everything they 
could to help control your 
pain?" 
  
Management of pain was good 
and patient feedback was 
consistent with this evidence 
  
6 
Use of technology 
and equipment to 
enhance delivery 
of care 
          
7 
Rights protected 
of people subject 
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PROMs Groin hernia repair 
    
Why did the regulatory bodies 
not act sooner to investigate a 
Trust whose mortality rates had 
been significantly higher than 
the average since 2003 and 
whose record in dealing with 
serious complaints was so poor? 





    





those in similar 
services and their 
change over time 
  
Summary Hospital Mortality 
Indicator (SHMI) 
Patient outcomes were at or 
better than the national average 
across most medical and surgical 
specialties at The Royal London 
Hospital and were similar to or 
below the performance of other 
hospitals on the other sites 
inspected. 
Clinical outcomes were 
consistently in line with or better 
than the national average. Where 
the Trust had recognised 
themselves as needing to 
improve outcome data, such as 
orthopaedics, there was 
innovative multidisciplinary team 
working to assess the concerns 
identified and take necessary 
steps to improve outcomes to a 
position to being better than the 
national average 
Composite of Hospital 
Standardised Mortality Ratio 
indicators 
In-hospital mortality - 
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disorders and perinatal 
mortality 
Respiratory conditions 








9 Best Practice standards hip 
fracture 
Audits carried out to check 
compliance with the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) 
surgical safety check list were 
remarkably low - less than 1% of 
patients notes who had 
undergone surgery were audited 
  
  
Overall team-centred level 
for key stroke unit indicators 
  
5 





Patients receiving all 
secondary prevention 
medications they were 
eligible for 
No proactive monitoring of 
quality and metrics to ensure that 
quality was being maintained as 
well as improvements being 
aspired to. 
    
6 






      There needs to be a relentless 
focus on the patient’s interests 
and the obligation to keep 
patients safe and protected 
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Effective-Key Line of Enquiry E3: Skills, knowledge and experience of staff 
1 






Composite risk rating of ESR 
items relating to staff 
registration 
  
Staff competence and continuous 
development was evident in the 
Trust 
Not only to inadequate staffing 
levels, but poor leadership, 
recruitment and training. 
  
Healthcare employers recruiting 
nursing staff, whether qualified 
or unqualified, should assess 
candidates’ values, attitudes 
and behaviours towards the 
well-being of patients and their 
basic care needs, and care 
providers should be required to 







The proportion of staff 
reported receiving support 
from immediate managers 
      
3 
Appropriate 
training for staff 
Staffing Staff turnover rate       
4 
Opportunities for 
staff to develop 
Staffing 
Composite risk rating of ESR 
items relating to staff 
stability 






Composite risk rating of ESR 
items relating to staff 
support/ supervision 
      
6 
Identification of 
poor or variable 
staff performance 
Staffing 
The proportion of staff who 
were appraised in last 12 
months 
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Effective-Key Line of Enquiry E4: Coordinated work of staff, teams and services 
1 






    Staff throughout the organisation 
were committed to 
multidisciplinary working and 
recognised the value of each 
other’s role in delivering high 
quality care. Multidisciplinary 
meetings were consistently 
carried out with a clear 
commitment to working 
collaboratively to improve care 
through innovations, 
improvements in pathways, 
improvements in teamwork and 




different teams to 
deliver care 
Safety   
The CAG structure facilitated 
multidisciplinary working across 
sites but it relied on effective 







together to assess 
and plan ongoing 
care 
Safety         
4 
Discharge at an 
appropriate time 
of the day, 
relevant teams 
informed and 
care plan in place 
  
        
Effective-Key Line of Enquiry E5: Information that staff needs is available 
1 
Information 
needed to deliver 
care is available in 
a timely manner 
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system to staff to 
deliver care 
          
Effective-Key Line of Enquiry E6: Consent to care sought according to legislation 
1 










Most staff lacked an 
understanding of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 and 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 
(DoLs) and how it applied to their 
roles 







        
3 
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6 






        
7 
Monitoring of use 






        








Overall... (I had a very 
poor/good experience) 
Patients were not always offered 
cultural and religious support 
they wished to receive. 
Where patients had specific 
needs staff demonstrated a 
commitment to deliver care that 
met the individual requirements. 
  
2 
Staff take time to 





      
While the theme of the 
recommendations will be a 
need for a greater cohesion and 
unity of culture throughout the 
healthcare system,[...] by 
engagement of every single 
person serving patients in 
contributing to a safer, 
committed and compassionate 
and caring service 
3 







"Did you find someone on 
the hospital staff to talk to 
about your worries and 
fears?” 
  Patients were empowered to be 
part of their ongoing care and 
feedback from patients during the 
inspection was consistently 
excellent. 
"Did hospital staff tell you 
who to contact if you were 
worried about your 
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you left the A&E 
Department?" 
"Were you (and/or your 
partner) left alone by 
midwives or doctors at a 
time when it worried you?" 
  
There was a clear motivation 
from staff to offer kind and 
compassionate care, where 
patients’ views were considered 
and acted upon 
Patients must be the first priority 
in all of what the NHS does by 
ensuring that, within available 
resources, they receive effective 
care from caring, compassionate 
and committed staff, working 
within a common culture, and 
protected from avoidable harm 
and any deprivation of their 
basic rights. 
"If you were feeling 
distressed while you were in 
the A&E Department, did a 


















Patient-Led Assessment of 
the Care Environment 
 We observed staff holding 
discussions about patients’ 
conditions and care plans in 
communal areas on wards and in 
some outpatient areas. 
Treating patients with dignity and 
respect, as well as valuing them 
as individuals was evident 
throughout the organisation and 
fundamentally part of the culture 
The knowledge and skills 
framework should be reviewed 
with a view to giving explicit 
recognition to nurses’ 
commitment to patient care 
and the priority that should be 
accorded to dignity and respect 
in the acquisition of leadership 
skills. 
"Overall, did you feel you 
were treated with respect 
and dignity while you were 
in the hospital?" 
"Overall, did you feel you 
were treated with respect 
and dignity while you were 
in the A&E Department?" 
"Thinking about your care 
during labour and birth, 
were you treated with 
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6 




patients in pain 
  
"Do you think the hospital 
staff did everything they 
could to help control your 
pain?" 
At the listening events, most 
people told us they were 
dissatisfied with the care 
provided by the Trust. However, 
during our inspection most 
patients and relatives were 
satisfied with the care and 
support they received and felt 
that staff listened to them and 
were compassionate  
    
"During your labour, were 
you able to move around 
and choose the position that 
made you most 
comfortable?" 






        




with patients in a 





Patients told us they understood 
the care and treatment they were 
offered or had received. However 
results of the National Cancer 
Patient Experience Survey 2013 
suggested that patients did not 
always feel fully involved in 
decisions about their care and 
treatment, or were given full 
information regarding potential 
side effects, test results or choice 
of treatment. The Trust 
performed in the bottom 20% of 
50 out of 64 questions 









"Did you get enough help 
from staff to eat your meals? 
    
3 
Staff make sure 
patients can find 




"Thinking about the care you 
received in hospital after the 
birth of your baby, were you 
given the information or 
explanations you needed?" 
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"Were you involved as much 
as you wanted to be in 
decisions about your care 
and treatment?" 
    
Caring- Key Line of Enquiry C3: Support to patients to cope emotionally 
1 
Staff understand 





“Do you feel you got enough 
emotional support from 
hospital staff during your 
stay?” 




timely support to 
cope emotionally 
  
At the very start of your 
labour, did you feel that you 
were given appropriate 
advice and support when 
you contacted a midwife or 
the hospital" 
 Psychological support was not 
routinely available to patients. 






next of kin 









    There was a culture of innovative 
approach to meeting patients’ 
individual needs and staff were 
reported to ‘go out of their way’ 
to meet patients’ needs. For 
example, patients reaching the 
end of life were involved in 
planning their wishes and staff 
were committed to meeting 
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5 
People is enabled 
to keep contact 




        
      Inpatient Friends and Family 
Test 
      
      "If you needed attention, 
were you able to get a 
member of medical or 
nursing staff to help you?" 
      
      "Did you have confidence 
and Trust in the doctors 
treating you?" 
      
      "Did you have confidence 
and Trust in the nurses 
treating you?" 
      
      Did the staff treating and 
examining you introduce 
themselves? 
      










There was limited evidence to 
demonstrate that information 
about the local population’s 
needs was used to inform the 
planning and delivery of services. 
Meeting people’s individual 
needs were a significant focus 
when services were developed 
and patient’s views were actively 
sought through groups in the 
There are a wide range of 
routes through which patients 
and the public can feed 
comments into health services 
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Senior staff were unaware of 
their local population make up. 
There were over 200 different 
languages spoken in the local 
population and the 'top 5' were 
not consistently known and 
services were not planned for 
community, constituency 
meetings and other forums to 
ensure developments captured 
the wishes and needs of their 
population 
However, in the case of 
Stafford, these routes have 
been largely ineffective and 









    
Commissioners of services, as 
the paying party for services 
they contract from providers, 
must ensure that those services 
are well provided and are 
provided safely. 
    
The commissioner is entitled to 
and should, wherever it is 
possible to do so, apply a 
fundamental safety and quality 
standard in respect of each item 
of service it is commissioning. 
3 
Services reflect 




continuity of care 
    
The services provided did not 
reflect the needs of the 
population served and did not 
ensure flexibility, choice and 
continuity of care 
As pathways were reviewed and 
redesigned, there was a 
commitment to ensure that 
patients were able to receive care 






services do not 




      Patients surveys contained 
disturbing indicators that all was 
not well from long before the 
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"Were you given enough 
privacy when being 
examined or treated?" 
      




account of the 




    The Trust demonstrated a culture 
that strived to meet the needs of 
patients through service 
development and using 






account of the 





Information was only provided in 
English, and not in the language 
of the predominant population 
served by the hospitals. 









  The Trust had provided dementia 
training for 3,130 of its 15,000 
staff (21 %) between April 2014 - 
March 2015. This meant the Trust 
had not achieved the 
recommendations of the National 
Dementia Strategy published in 
2009. 
The Trust proactively took steps 
to meet the individual needs of 
different and vulnerable groups 




enable access and 
use to people 
with disabilities 
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Patients nearing the end of their 
life were not always identified, 
and their needs therefore were 
not always assessed and met. 
    
Responsive- Key Line of Enquiry R3: Timely access to care and treatment 
1 






Overall team-centred level 
for key stroke unit indicators 
    
In 2004, the Commission for 
Health Improvement (CHI) re-
rated the Trust, and it went 
from a three star Trust to zero 
stars. [...] factors likely to have 
been behind this: failure to 
meet targets for elective 
surgery, outpatient waiting 
times, cancer waiting times and 
financial performance. 
A&E waiting times more 
than 4 hours 
The emergency departments 
were not meeting the national 4 
hour waiting time target 
The Trust has consistently met 
the referral to treatment targets 
for the previous two years; it has 
consistently achieved the A&E 
four-hour target and has met the 
cancer waiting times target. 
There were examples of pathway 
redesign and innovation to 
achieve this, such as the extended 
theatre sessions to increase 
theatre productivity 
Composite monthly Referral 
to Treatment (RTT) waiting 
times 
Some patients were experiencing 
delays of more than 18 weeks 
from referral to treatment (RTT). 
The Trust had suspended 
reporting activity to the 
department of health and had 
started a recovery plan 
Patients waiting over 6 
weeks for a diagnostic test 
    
Proportion of patients 
receiving their first definitive 
treatment for cancer within 
two months (62 days) of GP 
or dentist urgent referral for 
suspected cancer 
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Proportion of patients 
receiving their first definitive 
treatment for cancer within 
two months (62 days) of 
urgent referral from the 
national screening service 
    
Proportion of patients 
receiving their first definitive 
treatment within one month 
(31 days) of a decision to 
treat (as a proxy for 
diagnosis) for cancer 
    
2 
Access to care at 
a convenient time 
  
The ratio of the total 
number of days delayed to 
the total number of 
occupied beds over the 
quarter (3 months), where 
the delay is attributable to 
the NHS 
Capacity issues within the 
hospital led to a high proportion 
of medical “outliers” (patients on 
wards that were not the correct 
specialty for their needs). The 
result of this was that patients 
were being moved from ward to 
ward on more than one occasion, 
this impacted on their treatment, 
delayed their stay in hospital and 
were on occasion transferred late 
at night. 







A&E waiting times more 
than 4 hours 
Bed occupancy was very high, the 
average between April and 
December 2014 was 95%. This 
meant patients were not always 
cared for in the appropriate 
environment and the high 
occupancy impacted on the flow 
of patients through the hospitals. 
    
Composite monthly Referral 
to Treatment (RTT) waiting 
times 
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Safety   
Patients well enough to leave 
hospital experienced significant 
delays in being discharged for a 
variety of reasons and some 
because of documentation 
needing to be completed 
    
5 
Appointments 
system is easy to 
use 
    
Many patients experienced 
delays in their treatment as a 
result of the poor 
implementation of the new IT 
system. 









  Proportion of patients not 
treated within 28 days of 
last minute cancellation due 
to non-clinical reason 
Some patients had their surgery 
cancelled on multiple occasions 
due to a lack of beds, We 
observed patients with cancer 
having their surgery cancelled 
while on inspection in November 
2014 
    
Proportion of patients 
whose operation was 
cancelled 
    
7 
Services run on 
time. Disruptions 
are informed. 
          
Responsive- Key Line of Enquiry R4: Response to concerns and complaints 
1 
Awareness about 










Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 




complaints is easy 
to use. People 




      Openness – enabling concerns 
and complaints to be raised 
freely without fear and 
questions asked to be 
answered. 
    The lack of complaints from the 
public may well have been due 
to the lack of profile each 
organisation has. Both the 
public and professionals may 
also be deterred from referring 
cases by the apparent 
complexity of the process and 







If you raised a concern 
during labour and birth, did 
you feel that it was taken 
seriously? 
Complaints were not always 
managed in a timely or 
appropriate manner. 
Complaints were effectively 
managed with clear processes in 
place, which included the CEO 
and Director of Nursing 
(occasionally referred to as Chief 
Nurse) reading all complaints that 
involved patient care 
There was no central team for 
managing complaints - 
complaints were managed locally 
within the CAG structure. Time 
frames were not being met and 
CAG leads had been spoken with. 
There were inadequate 
processes for dealing with 
complaints and serious 
untoward incidents (SUIs). Staff 
and patient surveys continually 
gave signs of dissatisfaction 
with the way the Trust was run, 
and yet no effective action was 
taken and the Board lacked an 
awareness of the reality of the 
care being provided to patients 
The Trust received 231 formal 
complaints in January 2015 of 
which 157 (68%) were 
acknowledged within three 
working days. Also only 38% of 
complaints were responded to 
within the negotiated time frame 
in January 
Complaints, their source, their 
handling and their outcome 
provide an insight into the 
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4 
Outcome of the 
complaint is 
explained to the 
individual. 
Openness about 
process to deal 
with complaints 
Complaints 
      organisation’s ability to uphold 
both the fundamental standards 
and the culture of caring. 
    Patients raising concerns about 
their care are entitled to: have 
the matter dealt with as a 
complaint unless they do not 
wish it; identification of their 
expectations; prompt and 
thorough processing; sensitive, 
responsive and accurate 
communication; effective and 
implemented learning; and 
proper and effective 
communication of the 
complaint to those responsible 







    
There was a commitment and 
accountability from staff 
throughout the organisation to 
learn from complaints and make 
improvements where necessary 
  Complaints were not given a 
high enough priority in 
identifying issues and learning 
lessons. Patients, clinicians and 
the public need to be at the 
heart of the health service and 
the decisions being made. 
      
Share your experience 
negative comments 
    
It is service users, including 
visitors and families, who are 
likely to be the first to witness 






Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 
(Frimley Park Hospital NHS FT) 
Francis Report 
      
Patient opinion – negative 
comments 
    
signs that standards are 
slipping. It is here that a more 
specific focus by local inspectors 
on complaints, allowing perhaps 
for contact with complainants, 
would be of great assistance. 
NHS Choices negative 
comments 
    
The Care Quality Commission 
should ensure as a matter of 
urgency that it has reliable 
access to all useful complaints 
information relevant to 
assessment of compliance with 
fundamental standards, and 
should actively seek this 
information out, probably via its 
local relationship managers. 
CQC complaints     
Provider complaints     
Well-led- Key Line of Enquiry W1: Clear vision and strategy to deliver quality of care 
1 
Quality and safety 
top priorities in 




Proportion of Health Care 
Workers (HCW) with direct 
patient care that have been 
vaccinated against seasonal 
influenza 
We were not provided with the 
strategy that detailed the merger 
objectives and the short, medium 
and long term plan for the future 
of the organisation. 
The drive for high quality patient-
centred care was evident through 
the combination of the leadership 
at all levels, with the governance 
process and the open and 
transparent culture being used to 
drive improvements 
The Trust lacked a sufficient 
sense of collective responsibility 
or engagement for ensuring 
that quality care was delivered 
at every level. 
Q2 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Is the board sufficiently 
aware of potential risks to 
the quality, sustainability 
and delivery of current and 
future services? 
The board members interviewed 
did not share an agreed strategy 
or vision for the organisation as a 
whole other than an aim to be 
financial viable which was proving 
a challenge at the time of 
inspection. Individual board 
members had different visions. 
There must be no tolerance of 
substandard care; frontline staff 
must be empowered with 
responsibility and freedom to 
act in this way under strong and 
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Lack of strategy for the following 
aspect of care: nursing, estates, 
IT, children services or quality. 
The positive approach to 
leadership and shared vision and 
strategy among staff engendered 
a culture of patient-centred care 
with a clear shared purpose, 
which motivated staff to drive 
improvements 
Foster a common culture shared 
by all in the service of putting 
the patient first 
  
In November 2013 we judged the 
Trust to not be meeting 15 CQC 
standards. In the last 12 months 
the Trust board papers did not 
demonstrate that the Trust had 
achieved or had plans to achieve 
compliance with the regulatory 
standards to protect patients 
from harm. 
The negative aspects of culture 
in the system were identified as 
including: A lack of openness to 
criticism; A lack of consideration 
for patients; Defensiveness; 
Looking inwards not outwards; 
Secrecy; Misplaced assumptions 
about the judgements and 
actions of others; An 
acceptance of poor standards; 
and A failure to put the patient 







Q1 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Does the board have a 
credible strategy to provide 
high quality, sustainable 
services to patients and is 
there a robust plan to 
deliver? 
They told us they had discussed 
the strategy but there was nothing 
written to confirm what the short, 
medium and long term strategy 
was. They went on to confirm that 
they could not monitor it as they 
had no process to do so. They told 
us there were limited metrics to 
assess the effectiveness of the 
CAGs and believed the 
information being received at the 
Quality Assurance Committee and 
at the Trust board provided 
adequate assurance. 
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process for vision, 
values and 
strategy 
    The medical director took a paper 
detailing the strategic plan for end 
of life care to the Trust board in 
January 2015. This paper referred 
to the removal of the LCP which 
took place nationally in July 2013. 
It was confirmed at the board 
meeting that the strategic plan 
had not been through a structured 
engagement process and had not 
included engagement with 
patients, this supported findings 
on inspection that end of life care 
was inadequate. 
    
4 
Staff awareness 
of vision and 
values 
      
Staff were aligned with the 
Trust’s vision and values 
“committed to excellence; 
working together; facing the 
future” and they were evidently 






of strategy and 
their role 
        
6 
Monitoring of 
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Q6 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Are there clear roles and 
accountabilities in relation 
to board governance 
(including quality 
governance)? 
At this inspection we found the 
CAG structure was still not 
embedded and site-specific 
management had not been 
developed. A clear process for 
board to ward governance and 
engagement was not evident. 
  The Royal College of Surgeons 
reached critical conclusions 
about the operation and 
management of the Trust’s 
surgical department, which it 
described as “dysfunctional”. 
  All the required elements of 
governance should be brought 
together into one 
comprehensive standard. This 
should require not only 
evidence of a working system 
but also a demonstration that it 
is being used to good effect. 
2 
Staff understand 
their roles and 
accountability 






          
4 












Q7 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Are there clearly defined, 
well-understood processes 
for escalating and resolving 
issues and managing 
performance? 
An example of poor governance 
with no ownership was a patient 
who had their surgery cancelled 
on five occasions and neither the 
Surgical and Cancer CAG leads 
nor the Hospital Director and 
Hospital Matron were aware. 
Children's services sat across 
  
The focus of the system resulted 
in a number of organisations 
failing to place quality of care 
and patients at the heart of 
their work. Finances and targets 
were often given priority 
without considering the impact 
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three CAG's and we heard of a 
range of developments within 
children's services however this 
was compromised with no one 
known as the lead. 
  
The Trust prioritised its finances 
and its FT application over its 
quality of care, and failed to put 
patients at the centre of its 
work 
  
A culture focused on doing the 
system’s business – not that of 
the patients 
    
An institutional culture which 
ascribed more weight to 
positive information about the 
service than to information 










Q9 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Is appropriate information 
on organisational and 
operational performance 
being analysed and 
challenged? 
Senior staff did not always have 
the information they needed to 
have oversight of the services 
they led. 
There was evidence that 
governance structures were 
embedded throughout the Trust 
and that the processes were 
reliable, such as incident 
reporting where staff 
demonstrated knowledge of 
improvements being made as a 
consequence 
Too great a degree of tolerance 












Data Quality of Trust 
Returns to the HSCIC 
    
Deficiencies in the Trust’s risk 
management and assurance 
systems and made serious 
criticisms which called into 
question the accuracy and 
reliability of the Trust’s 
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Q10 Monitor/TDA 
framework: Is the board 
assured of the robustness of 
information? 
    
Transparency – allowing 
information about the truth 
about performance and 
outcomes to be shared with 















Safety   
The systems and processes of 
assurance was variable with some 
services lacking any formal, 
effective oversight. Risk registers 
were poorly applied in some 
clinical areas which led to some 
risks not being identified, 
recorded and managed or 
escalated. 
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Q3 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Does the board have the 
skills and capability to lead 
the organisation? 
The Director of Human Resources 
advised us that the Medical 
Director and the Director of 
Corporate Affairs were 
responsible for the 
implementation of the Duty of 
Candour legislation and the Fit 
and Proper Person Requirements 
which came into effect on 27 
November 2014. At the January 
2015 board meeting the new 
legislations were discussed, 
however the appropriate steps to 
ensure compliance and on-going 
monitoring were not yet in place. 
The executive team were 
cohesive yet challenging to 
ensure patients were at the 
centre of their work. 
It is clear that a staff nurse’s 
report in 2007 made a serious 
and substantial allegation about 
the leadership of A&E. This was 







    
A leadership staff college or 
training system, whether 
centralised or regional, should 
be created to: provide common 
professional training in 
management and leadership to 
potential senior staff; promote 
healthcare leadership and 
management as a profession; 
administer an accreditation 
scheme to enhance eligibility for 
consideration for such roles; 
promote and research best 










The Trust board were not aware 
of significant issues on specific 
sites, due to the lack of site-
specific management and 
information. At the time of 
inspection the board was 
receiving Trust wide data which 
did not detail the level of issues 
and concerns we identified on 
specific sites and when we spoke 
with both executives and non-
executive directors the detail was 
not evident when looking at Trust 
wide data. 
  
  The fact that it might be typical 
of what happened elsewhere is 
cause for increased concern not 
reassurance. It is an argument 
which evidences a culture of 
habituation and passivity in the 
face of issues which may 






Trust put into special measures 
(Barts Health NHS trust) 
Trust rated as outstanding 
(Frimley Park Hospital NHS FT) 
Francis Report 
When we explored this local 
triumvirate they did not to have 
accountability and responsibility 
and had to refer to the CAGs. The 
relationships and responsibilities 
between site specific leaders and 
CAG leadership team were 
confused. 
  As a result of poor leadership 
and staffing policies, a 
completely inadequate standard 
of nursing was offered on some 
wards in Stafford. 
  It failed to tackle an insidious 
negative culture involving a 
tolerance of poor standards and 
a disengagement from 






The proportion of staff 
reporting good 
communication between 
senior management and 
staff 
The majority of staff did not know 
the executives leading the Trust 
nor were they familiar with the 
leaders of the CAGs despite this 
structure being in place since 
October 2012. 
There was a recognised visibility 
of leadership and excellent 
engagement with governors and 
the public through constituency 
meetings held monthly. 
Ward managers should work 
alongside staff as a role model 
and mentor, developing clinical 
competencies and leadership 
skills within the team and 
ensuring that the caring culture 
expected of professional staff is 
being consistently maintained 
and upheld. 
Staff told us that the executive 
team were not visible however 
several staff told us they received 






among staff are 
encouraged 
  
The proportion of staff who 
would recommend the Trust 
as a place to work or receive 
treatment 
On the last inspection, November 
2013 we identified a culture of 
bullying and harassment, in 
response to this the Trust 
commissioned an independent 
review by Duncan Lewis that 
found: 
• Unreasonable management: 
There was a strong sense of 
support and alignment between 
clinicians and managers with a 
clear sense of accountability 
among staff at all levels. 
The previous reports are clear 
that the following existed: a 
culture of fear in which staff did 
not feel able to report concerns; 
a culture of secrecy in which the 
Trust board shut itself off from 
what was happening in its 
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Composite indicator: NHS 
staff survey questions 
relating to abuse from other 
staff 
mainly associated with negative 
behaviour from line managers 
and other managers. 
• Incivility and disrespect: mainly 
associated with behaviours from 
work colleagues and from line 
managers, but can also include 
patients and the relatives of 
patients. 
• Approximately 75-80% of the 
respondents indicated that most 
of the 26 ill-treatment behaviours 
were still occurring within the last 
three months. 
patients; and a culture of 
bullying, which prevented 






    
Indeed staff gave examples of not 
being valued or recognised. We 
spoke with a number of 
temporary staff and also staff 







vision and values 
Fit and 
proper staff 
      
8 
Culture centred 
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The proportion of staff who 
would recommend the Trust 
as a place to work or receive 
treatment 
Risks were apparent across the 
Trust and staff commitment to 
reporting and escalating concerns 
varied considerably. Some staff 
told us they had actively been 
told not to report incidents other 
staff told us they did not report 
because there was no action 
taken. 
The culture throughout the Trust 
was open and transparent with a 
clear sense of pride among all staff 
groups 
Ensure openness, transparency 
and candour throughout the 
system about matters of 
concern 
An open and transparent 
approach with patients was 
evident, with ‘look back’ exercises 
carried out and subsequent 
sharing of information with 
patients or relatives. 
Every healthcare organisation 
and everyone working for them 
must be honest, open and 
truthful in all their dealings with 
patients and the public, and 
organisational and personal 
interests must never be allowed 
to outweigh the duty to be 
honest, open and truthful. 
Composite risk rating of ESR 
items relating to staff 
sickness rates 
We were provided with some 
examples that the non-executive 
directors on their walk rounds 
had identified concerns that they 
had previously not been aware 
of. The reasons for the Trust 
having a back-log of 100 open SIs 
and complaints for months and in 
some cases complaints never 
answered were unknown. 
  
The NHS Constitution should be 
revised to reflect the changes 
recommended with regard to a 
duty of openness, transparency 
and candour, and all 
organisations should review 
their contracts of employment, 
policies and guidance to ensure 
that, where relevant, they 
expressly include and are 
consistent with above principles 
and these recommendations. 
Q4 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Does the board shape an 
open, transparent and 
quality-focused culture? 
Morale was low. Some staff were 
reluctant to speak with the 
inspection team, when staff did 
some did not want the inspection 
team to record the discussions 
for fear of repercussions. 
  
A failure to tackle challenges to 
the building up of a positive 
culture, in nursing in particular 
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The 2013 NHS Staff Survey for the 
Trust as a whole had work related 
stress at 44%, the joint highest 
rate in the country for an acute 
Trust. Only 32% recommend it as 
a place to work, which is third 
lowest in the country.  
  
The Trust was an organisation 
that lacked insight and 
awareness of the reality of the 
care being provided to patients. 
It was generally defensive in its 
reaction to criticism and lacked 
openness with patients, the 
public and external agencies. 




and wellbeing of 
staff 
  
Composite risk rating of ESR 
items relating to staff 
stability 
Staffing was a key challenge 
across all services and the 
environment was not conducive 
to recruitment and retention and 
the sustainability of services. 
There were a number of vacant 
managerial posts and interim 
staff in post making it difficult for 
staff to be well-led. 
  
Healthcare providers should be 
encouraged by incentives to 
develop and deploy reliable and 
transparent measures of the 
cultural health of front-line 
nursing workplaces and teams, 
which build on the experience 
and feedback of nursing staff 
using a robust methodology, 
such as the “cultural 
barometer”. 







quality of care 
          








"Overall..." (I had a very 
poor/good experience) 
  
There was a sense of mutual 
support and passion to deliver 
patient-centred care amongst all 
staff groups at all levels 
It is a significant part of the 
Stafford story that patients and 
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NHS England Inpatients 
response rate from Friends 
and Family Test 
  
effective participation in the 
patients’ care. 
3 
Staff's views are 
reflected in the 
planning and 
delivery of care 
      
There was a genuine sense of a 
flattened hierarchy and culture 
that ensured all staff views were 
captured amongst all groups and 







users and staff 
  
GMC National Training 
Survey – Trainee's overall 
satisfaction 
Staff described their passion and 
commitment to the community 
they served and to their 
immediate colleagues. Staff did 
not however speak of vision, 
strategy and leadership and 
feeling valued by senior 
colleagues 
  
Q8 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Does the board actively 
engage patients, staff, 
governors and other key 
stakeholders on quality, 
operational and financial 
performance? 
  
GMC Enhanced monitoring 
In the 2014 NHS Staff survey, the 
engagement score for the Trust 
was 3.61 which is in the worst 
20% when compared with other 
acute Trusts of a similar type. 
  
The General Medical Council 
should in the course of its 
review of its standards and 
regulatory process ensure that 
the system of medical training 
and education maintains as its 
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5 
Leaders and staff 
understand value 
of staff raising 
concerns. 
Appropriate 
actions are taken 
Good 
governance 
CQC National Customer 
Service Centre qualified 
Whistleblowing alerts 
  
There was a commitment and 
accountability from staff 
throughout the organisation to 
learn from complaints and make 
improvements where necessary 
Reporting of incidents of 
concern relevant to patient 
safety, compliance with 
fundamental standards or some 
higher requirement of the 
employer needs to be not only 
encouraged but insisted upon 
Well-led- Key Line of Enquiry W5: Continuous improvement and sustainability 
1 
Assessment of 
impact of changes 




Monitor - Continuity of 
service rating 
  
The strategy and vision for the 
Trust, which included the 
potential acquisition of another 
provider, demonstrated robust 
analysis and proactive approach 
to ensure sustainability and 
pathways of care (including 
hyperacute services), whilst 
remaining realistic regarding the 












Senior staff were trialling the 
Multidisciplinary Action Training 
in Crises and Human Factors 
initiative (MATCH).This was a 
framework within which Never 
Events and Serious Incidents 
could be discussed in an 
environment characterised by 
  
I have no doubt that the 
economies imposed by the 
Trust Board, year after year, had 
a profound effect on the 
organisation’s ability to deliver a 
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mutual respect and in which 
lessons learnt could be quickly 
introduced without damaging 
personal relationships. It was 
reported that initial results had 
been very promising. However, 
staff reported that whilst there 
had previously been plans to 
introduce this across the Trust, 
the financial pressures the Trust 
faced may put this on hold. 
  
No effective consideration was 
given to the potential effects of 
cost savings and staff cuts on 









The proportion of staff 
reported receiving support 
from immediate managers 
We found the financial position of 
the Trust impacted on the volume 
of innovation, improvement and 
sustainability initiatives for the 
services. 
Innovation and continuous 
improvement was fundamental to 
the culture at the Trust and there 
was evidence that innovation 
among all staff groups and at all 
levels was encouraged 
  
Q5 Monitor/TDA framework: 
Does the board help support 
continuous learning and 






quality of care 
Good 
governance 
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    There was evidence of a proactive 
and systematic approach to 
improve outcomes, improve 
The Trust’s culture was one of 
self-promotion rather than 
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  patient experience, drive 
efficiency and productivity; 
including work with other 
stakeholders where appropriate 
to continuously improve patient 
care. 
The absence of such a system 
[clinical governance] meant that 
the leadership of the Trust was 
bound to be blind to many 
concerns which it took the HCC 
to uncover by its investigation. 
      Monitor risk rating for 
governance 
      
      NHS Trust Development 
Authority risk rating for 
governance 
      
Key to the table 
 
Performance indicators relevant for 
more than one KLOE 
 Monitor’s assessment of governance  
Breach of compliance leads to 




Appendix Chapter 6  
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive information for each acute NHS trust in England (n=155) 


















Aintree University Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
REM Yes Medium acute Trust North South Sefton 2 3 3 
2 Airedale NHS Foundation Trust RCF Yes Small acute trust North 
Airedale Wharfedale and 
Craven 
1 2 3 
3 
Alder Hey Children's NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RBS Yes Acute specialist trust North NHS England North 2 2 6 
4 
Ashford and St Peter's Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RTK Yes Medium acute Trust South North West 2 2 4 
5 
Barking, Havering and Redbridge 
University Hospitals NHS Trust 
RF4 No Large acute trust London Havering 3 3 4 
6 
Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RFF Yes Small acute trust North Barnsley 1 1 3 
7 Barts Health NHS Trust R1H No Large acute trust London Tower Hamlets 8 14 7 
8 
Basildon and Thurrock University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
RDD Yes Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Basildon and Brentwood 2 2 5 
9 Bedford Hospital NHS Trust RC1 No Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Bedfordshire 1 1 6 
10 
Birmingham Children's Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RQ3 Yes Acute specialist trust 
Midlands 
and East 
NHS England Midlands 
and East 
1 2 4 
11 
Birmingham Women's NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RLU Yes Acute specialist trust 
Midlands 
and East 
NHS England Midlands 
and East 
1 1 3 
12 
Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RXL Yes Large acute trust North Blackpool 5 12 2 
13 Bolton NHS Foundation Trust RMC Yes Medium acute Trust North Bolton 4 7 4 
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Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RAE Yes Large acute trust North Bradford Districts 2 6 6 
15 
Brighton and Sussex University 
Hospitals NHS Trust 
RXH No Acute teaching trust South Brighton and Hove 6 8 7 
16 
Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS 
Trust 
RXQ No Medium acute Trust South Aylesbury Vale 3 9 5 
17 
Burton Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RJF Yes Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
East Staffordshire 3 3 5 
18 
Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RWY Yes Large acute trust North Calderdale 2 5 5 
19 
Cambridge University Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust 





6 13 2 
20 
Central Manchester University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
RW3 Yes Acute teaching trust North Central Manchester 6 23 6 
21 
Chelsea and Westminster 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
RQM Yes Acute teaching trust London West London 2 2 4 
22 
Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RFS Yes Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
North Derbyshire 1 2 4 
23 
City Hospitals Sunderland NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RLN Yes Large acute trust North Sunderland 8 9 3 
24 
Colchester Hospital University 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RDE Yes Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
North East Essex 2 2 1 
25 
Countess Of Chester Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RJR Yes Medium acute Trust North Western Cheshire 2 2 1 
26 
County Durham and Darlington 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RXP Yes Large acute trust North 
Durham Dales, 
Sedgefield & Easington 
5 11 6 
27 
Croydon Health Services NHS 
Trust 
RJ6 No Medium acute Trust London Croydon 2 3 3 
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Dartford and Gravesham NHS 
Trust 
RN7 No Small acute trust South 
Dartford Gravesham and 
Swanley 
2 5 2 
29 
Derby Teaching Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RTG Yes Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Southern Derbyshire 2 2 4 
30 
Doncaster and Bassetlaw 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
RP5 Yes Large acute trust North Doncaster 4 4 2 
31 
Dorset County Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RBD Yes Small acute trust South Dorset 7 7 1 
32 
East and North Hertfordshire NHS 
Trust 
RWH No Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
East and North 
Hertfordshire 
4 6 2 
33 East Cheshire NHS Trust RJN No Small acute trust North Eastern Cheshire 3 4 2 
34 
East Kent Hospitals University 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RVV Yes Large acute trust South East Kent 5 5 4 
35 
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS 
Trust 
RXR No Large acute trust North East Lancashire 7 7 4 
36 East Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust RXC No Large acute trust South 
Eastbourne, Hailsham 
and Seaford 
7 20 4 
37 
Epsom and St Helier University 
Hospitals NHS Trust 
RVR No Large acute trust London Sutton 6 6 3 
38 
Frimley Health NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RDU Yes Medium acute Trust South 
North East Hampshire 
And Farnham 
3 6 3 
39 
Gateshead Health NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RR7 Yes Medium acute Trust North Gateshead 2 5 2 
40 George Eliot Hospital NHS Trust RLT No Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
North Warwickshire 1 1 3 
41 
Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RTE Yes Large acute trust South Gloucestershire 8 8 4 
42 
Great Ormond Street Hospital for 
Children NHS Foundation Trust 
RP4 Yes Acute specialist trust London NHS England London 1 1 2 
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Great Western Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RN3 Yes Medium acute Trust South Swindon 5 5 4 
44 
Guy's and St Thomas' NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RJ1 Yes Acute teaching trust London Lambeth 6 10 4 
45 
Hampshire Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RN5 Yes Medium acute Trust South West Hampshire 3 3 3 
46 
Harrogate and District NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RCD Yes Small acute trust North 
Harrogate and Rural 
District 
3 3 1 
47 
Heart Of England NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RR1 Yes Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Birmingham Crosscity 7 8 6 
48 
Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS 
Trust 





1 2 3 
49 
Homerton University Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RQX Yes Small acute trust London City and Hackney 1 2 4 
50 
Hull and East Yorkshire Hospitals 
NHS Trust 
RWA No Large acute trust North Hull 2 5 6 
51 
Imperial College Healthcare NHS 
Trust 
RYJ No Acute teaching trust London Hammersmith & Fulham 5 12 5 
52 Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust RGQ No Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Ipswich and East Suffolk 1 6 3 
53 Isle of Wight NHS Trust R1F No Small acute trust South Isle of Wight 5 10 2 
54 
James Paget University Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RGP Yes Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Great Yarmouth and 
Waveney 
2 3 4 
55 
Kettering General Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RNQ Yes Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Nene 1 1 5 
56 
King's College Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RJZ Yes Acute teaching trust London Bromley 4 12 2 
57 
Kingston Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RAX Yes Medium acute Trust London Kingston 1 1 3 
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Lancashire Teaching Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RXN Yes Large acute trust North Greater Preston 4 6 4 
59 
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS 
Trust 
RR8 No Acute teaching trust North 
NHS England 
North/Leeds West 
6 6 6 
60 
Lewisham and Greenwich NHS 
Trust 
RJ2 No Medium acute Trust London Bexley 6 11 3 
61 
Liverpool Heart and Chest NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RBQ Yes Acute specialist trust North NHS England North 1 1 4 
62 
Liverpool Women's NHS 
Foundation Trust 
REP Yes Acute specialist trust North Liverpool 2 2 5 
63 
London North West Healthcare 
NHS Trust 
R1K No Large acute trust London Ealing and Brent 6 7 10 
64 
Luton and Dunstable University 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
RC9 Yes Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Luton 3 4 2 
65 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 
NHS Trust 
RWF No Large acute trust South West Kent 2 2 6 
66 Medway NHS Foundation Trust RPA Yes Medium acute Trust South Medway 1 1 7 
67 
Mid Cheshire Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RBT Yes Small acute trust North South Cheshire 1 3 4 
68 
Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS 
Trust 
RQ8 No Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Mid Essex 3 5 7 
69 
The Mid Yorkshire Hospitals NHS 
Trust 
RXF No Large acute trust North Wakefield 3 7 6 
70 
Milton Keynes University Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RD8 Yes Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Milton Keynes 1 1 3 
71 
Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RP6 Yes Acute specialist trust London NHS England London 6 10 2 
72 
Norfolk and Norwich University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
RM1 Yes Acute teaching trust 
Midlands 
and East 
North Norfolk 2 3 5 
464 

















73 North Bristol NHS Trust RVJ No Large acute trust South South Gloucestershire 3 5 7 
74 
North Cumbria University 
Hospitals NHS Trust 
RNL No Medium acute Trust North Cumbria 3 3 6 
75 
North Middlesex University 
Hospital NHS Trust 
RAP No Medium acute Trust London Enfield 2 2 5 
76 
North Tees and Hartlepool NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RVW Yes Medium acute Trust North 
Hartlepool and Stockton-
on-Tees 
3 3 2 
77 
Northampton General Hospital 
NHS Trust 
RNS No Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Nene 4 4 2 
78 
Northern Devon Healthcare NHS 
Trust 
RBZ No Small acute trust South 
Northern Eastern and 
Western Devon 
22 25 7 
79 
Northern Lincolnshire and Goole 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RJL Yes Large acute trust North North Lincolnshire 3 5 3 
80 
Northumbria Healthcare NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RTF Yes Large acute trust North 
North Tyneside and 
Northumberland 
11 13 2 
81 
Nottingham University Hospitals 
NHS Trust 
RX1 No Acute teaching trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Nottingham City 3 4 3 
82 
Oxford University Hospitals NHS 
Trust 
RTH No Acute teaching trust South 
NHS England Midlands 
and East/Oxfordshire 
7 7 2 
83 
Papworth Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RGM Yes Acute specialist trust 
Midlands 
and East 
NHS England Midlands 
and East 
1 1 2 
84 
The Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS 
Trust 
RW6 No Large acute trust North 
Heywood, Middleton & 
Rochdale 
6 7 8 
85 
Peterborough and Stamford 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 





2 2 4 
86 Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust RK9 No Large acute trust South 
Northern Eastern and 
Western Devon 
8 12 4 
87 
Poole Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RD3 Yes Medium acute Trust South Dorset 1 1 4 
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88 Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust RHU No Large acute trust South Portsmouth 4 4 4 
89 
Queen Victoria Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RPC Yes Acute specialist trust South NHS England South 1 1 3 
90 
The Robert Jones and Agnes Hunt 
Orthopaedic Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RL1 No Acute specialist trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Shropshire County 2 2 3 
91 
Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RHW Yes Large acute trust South 
Berkshire West 
Federation 
4 5 1 
92 
Royal Brompton and Harefield 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RT3 Yes Acute specialist trust London NHS England London 2 2 3 
93 
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS 
Trust 
REF No Large acute trust South Kernow 4 5 6 
94 
Royal Devon and Exeter NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RH8 Yes Acute teaching trust South North East West Devon 9 12 4 
95 
Royal Free London NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RAL Yes Acute teaching trust London Barnet 8 11 4 
96 
Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen 
University Hospitals NHS Trust 
RQ6 No Acute teaching trust North Liverpool 2 3 4 
97 
Royal National Orthopaedic 
Hospital NHS Trust 
RAN No Acute specialist trust London 
NHS England Midlands 
and East 
2 2 3 
98 
Royal Surrey County NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RA2 Yes Medium acute Trust South Guildford and Waverley 1 1 2 
99 
Royal United Hospitals Bath NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RD1 Yes Medium acute Trust South Wiltshire 7 7 4 
100 
Salford Royal NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RM3 Yes Acute teaching trust North Salford 1 1 3 
101 Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust RNZ Yes Small acute trust South Wiltshire 1 1 3 
102 
Sandwell and West Birmingham 
Hospitals NHS Trust 
RXK No Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Sandwell and West 
Birmingham 
4 6 3 
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Sheffield Children's NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RCU Yes Acute specialist trust North Sheffield 1 1 2 
104 
Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RHQ Yes Acute teaching trust North 
NHS England 
North/Sheffield 
5 16 4 
105 
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RK5 Yes Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Mid Nottinghamshire 2 4 5 
106 
Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital 
NHS Trust 
RXW No Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Shropshire 5 6 3 
107 
South Devon Healthcare NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RA9 Yes Medium acute Trust South South Devon and Torbay 11 17 3 
108 
South Tees Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RTR Yes Large acute trust North South Tees 8 10 7 
109 
South Tyneside NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RE9 Yes Small acute trust North South Tyneside 4 16 3 
110 
South Warwickshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RJC Yes Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
South Warwickshire 4 6 2 
111 
Southend University Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RAJ Yes Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Southend 1 1 5 
112 
Southport and Ormskirk Hospital 
NHS Trust 
RVY No Medium acute Trust North Southport & Formby 2 3 3 
113 
St George's University Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RJ7 Yes Acute teaching trust London Wandsworth 4 6 3 
114 
St Helens and Knowsley Hospitals 
NHS Trust 
RBN No Medium acute Trust North St Helens 2 2 5 
115 Stockport NHS Foundation Trust RWJ Yes Medium acute Trust North Stockport 1 1 3 
116 
Surrey and Sussex Healthcare 
NHS Trust 
RTP No Medium acute Trust South Crawley 2 2 2 
117 
Tameside Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RMP Yes Small acute trust North Tameside and Glossop 1 1 5 
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Taunton and Somerset NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RBA Yes Medium acute Trust South Somerset 5 5 3 
119 
The Christie NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RBV Yes Acute specialist trust North NHS England North 1 1 3 
120 
The Clatterbridge Cancer Centre 
NHS Foundation Trust 
REN Yes Acute specialist trust North NHS England North 1 1 2 
121 
The Dudley Group NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RNA Yes Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Dudley 2 2 3 
122 
The Hillingdon Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RAS Yes Medium acute Trust London Hillingdon 2 7 4 
123 
The Newcastle Upon Tyne 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
RTD Yes Acute teaching trust North Newcastle West 4 6 1 
124 
The Princess Alexandra Hospital 
NHS Trust 
RQW No Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
East and North 
Hertfordshire 
4 4 2 
125 
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital, 
King's Lynn. NHS Foundation Trust 
RCX Yes Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
West Norfolk 1 1 5 
126 
The Rotherham NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RFR Yes Medium acute Trust North Rotherham 1 1 2 
127 
The Royal Bournemouth and 
Christchurch Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RDZ Yes Medium acute Trust South Dorset 2 2 4 
128 
The Royal Marsden NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RPY Yes Acute specialist trust London NHS England London 2 5 2 
129 
The Royal Orthopaedic Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RRJ Yes Acute specialist trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Birmingham CrossCity 1 1 6 
130 
The Royal Wolverhampton NHS 
Trust 
RL4 No Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Wolverhampton 2 5 3 
131 
The Walton Centre NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RET Yes Acute specialist trust North NHS England North 1 1 3 
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The Whittington Hospital NHS 
Trust 
RKE No Medium acute Trust London Islington 1 1 5 
133 
United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS 
Trust 
RWD No Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Lincolnshire East 6 7 6 
134 
University College London 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
RRV Yes Acute teaching trust London Camden 7 8 5 
135 
University Hospital Birmingham 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RRK Yes Acute teaching trust 
Midlands 
and East 
NHS England Midlands 
and East 
1 1 4 
136 
University Hospital Of South 
Manchester NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RM2 Yes Acute teaching trust North South Manchester 3 7 2 
137 
University Hospital Southampton 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RHM Yes Acute teaching trust South 
NHS England South/West 
Hampshire 
4 5 4 
138 
University Hospitals Bristol NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RA7 Yes Acute teaching trust South 
NHS England 
South/Bristol 
9 9 5 
139 
University Hospitals Coventry and 
Warwickshire NHS Trust 
RKB No Acute teaching trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Coventry and Rugby 2 2 4 
140 
University Hospitals Of Leicester 
NHS Trust 
RWE No Acute teaching trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Leicester City 7 20 5 
141 
University Hospitals Of 
Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RTX Yes Large acute trust North Lancashire North 3 3 8 
142 
The University Hospitals of North 
Midlands 
RJE No Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
NHS England Midlands 
and East/Stoke-on-trent 
2 2 1 
143 Walsall Healthcare NHS Trust RBK No Medium acute Trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Walsall 3 3 3 
144 
Warrington and Halton Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RWW Yes Medium acute Trust North Warrington 2 3 6 
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West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS 
Trust 
RWG No Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Herts Valleys 3 3 4 
146 
West Middlesex University 
Hospital NHS Trust 
RFW No Small acute trust London Hounslow 1 1 2 
147 
West Suffolk NHS Foundation 
Trust 
RGR Yes Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
West Suffolk 2 2 3 
148 
Western Sussex Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RYR Yes Large acute trust South Coastal West Sussex 4 5 5 
149 Weston Area Health NHS Trust RA3 No Small acute trust South North Somerset 1 1 6 
150 
Wirral University Teaching 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
RBL Yes Large acute trust North Wirral 2 2 5 
151 
Worcestershire Acute Hospitals 
NHS Trust 
RWP No Large acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
South Worcestershire 4 5 4 
152 
Wrightington, Wigan and Leigh 
NHS Foundation Trust 
RRF Yes Large acute trust North Wigan Borough 4 6 5 
153 Wye Valley NHS Trust RLQ No Small acute trust 
Midlands 
and East 
Herefordshire 4 16 4 
154 
Yeovil District Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RA4 Yes Small acute trust South Somerset 2 2 2 
155 
York Teaching Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
RCB Yes Medium acute Trust North Vale of York 3 12 5 
FT: Foundation Trust; NHS: National Health Service  
470 















































































































































REM                                                    
RCF                                                    
RBS                                                        
RTK  1 1                                                
RF4     1    1  1                                       
RFF                                                     
R1H    2  2  1 3                   1  2                 
RDD    1  1        1                                    
RC1                                                        
RQ3                                                      
RLU                                                     
RXL                  1                                  
RMC    2    1    1                                   
RAE     1    1     1    1   1                          
RXH    2    1 2 1  1                         1            
















































































































































RJF  1  1    1                                           
RWY      1  1                                            
RGT     1                                             
RW3  1  1   1         1  1                              
RQM              1  1       1     1         
* 
         
RFS                                                       
RLN    1             1        2                     
RDE                                                   
RJR       1                                          
RXP   1 1   1       1 1                                 
RJ6            1                                       
RN7   1                                               
RTG   1        1       1                               
RP5                                                    
RBD                1                                 
RWH              1                                   
















































































































































RVV        1  1                                         
RXR             1     1 1                                
RXC      1    1                                       
RVR  1 1                1 1                             
RDU                           1                        
RR7                                                    
RLT                                                      
RTE       2    2                                        
RP4                                                    
RN3     2      1    1                                  
RJ1              1    1                                 
RN5      1          1                                 
RCD                                                   
RR1      1 1 1 1                                          
RQQ                                                    
RQX                                                      
















































































































































RYJ    1 1      1                                       
RGQ                                                     
R1F                                                    
RGP       1         1         1                      
RNQ                                                     
RJZ                *  1                                
RAX                                                     
RXN   2             2  1    2                         
RR8   1  1    1     1                                   
RJ2       1     1   *                                   
RBQ                                                     
REP                                                      
R1K    1  1  1  1 1  1   1 1         *                      
RC9                1                                  
RWF  1     1        1  1                               
RPA                                                          
















































































































































RQ8       1   1 1                          1              
RXF        1          1                                  
RD8                                                     
RP6       1                                           
RM1   1    1         1               R                 
RVJ  1   1     1     1                   1    1        
RNL      1  1  1     1                                    
RAP     1       1 1    1                              
RVW       1                                           
RNS                                                   
RBZ       1  1       1 1  1                 1          
RJL       1           1                                
RTF   1                                               
RX1                                                     
RTH       1                                           
RGM                                                    
















































































































































RGN       1  1                                         
RK9  1      1                                          
RD3     1    1        1                               
RHU        1  1                         1              
RPC                                                    
RL1  1              1                                 
RHW                                                   
RT3      1      1       1                             
REF    2     2      1                          1        
RH8    1        1        2                             
RAL   1            1   1      R                      
RQ6        1                                            
RAN      1          1                                 
RA2                                                    
RD1   1   1   1                      *                 
RM3     1                                              
















































































































































RXK  2        2                                       
RCU                                                    
RHQ     1 1       3                                   
RK5   1         1      1                                 
RXW         1      1                                  
RA9  1    1                                 *          
RTR       1 1        1 1 1 3                              
RE9                                                     
RJC       1                                           
RAJ                             R                         
RVY   1                                                
RJ7      1      1                                      
RBN   1          1    1 1                             
RWJ   1         1                                      
RTP                                                    
RMP                                                        
















































































































































RBV                                                     
REN                                                   
RNA       1     1                                       
RAS     1          1                                   
RTD                                                   
RQW            1                                       
RCX                                                       
RFR                                                    
RDZ                                                      
RPY                                                    
RRJ                                                        
RL4                                                    
RET                                                     
RKE                                                       
RWD   1  1  1     2        2                              
RRV    1    1  2                                        
















































































































































RM2                                                    
RHM   1  1   1                                         
RA7  1  1    1       1                                
RKB      1       1   1                               
RWE    2 1 1          1                                  
RTX      1  1 1  1    2  1                                
RJE                                                   
RBK     1               1                             
RWW      1  1     1   1     1                          
RWG      1           1           1                    
RFW                                                    
RGR           1         1                             
RYR    1   2         1      1                          
RA3                                                        
RBL  1   1          1         1                      
RWP        2            2            
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RLQ    1           1                                   
RA4  1                                                
RCB   1  2     2      1                                
 
Key to the table   Old style inspection  Old style inspection and enforcement   Pilot phase inspection with ratings 
   New regime inspection   Keogh Review   Pilot phase inspection without ratings 
  Special measures  Follow-up inspection * New hospital acquired 




Table 6.3 Unadjusted model coefficients for rates of falls with harm, pressure ulcers, Summary Hospital Mortality Index, A&E waiting times, RTT waiting times, .patients’ perception of 
being treated with dignity and respect, and staff leaving the NHS trust 
 
Unadjusted model 
rates of falls with 
harm 
Unadjusted model 






rates of over 4 h A&E 
wait 
Unadjusted model 
rates of over 18 
weeks RTT wait 
Unadjusted model 
treatment with 
dignity and respect 
Unadjusted 
















Intercept 0.01 (0.005, 0.01) 0.04 (0.039, 0.046) 1.002 (0.99, 1.018) 0.05 (0.04, 0.05) 0.11 (0.1, 0.12) 88.5 (88.1, 88.9) 0.02 (0.019, 0.02) 
Trend pre-inspections 0.98 (0.97, 0.98) 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 
-0.00007  
(-0.0005, 0.0003) 





Change in level after 
announcement 
0.98 (0.86, 1.13) 1.002 (0.94, 1.07) 
-0.0015  
(-0.014, 0.011) 
0.92 (0.86, 0.99) 0.81 (0.75, 0.87) 0.58 (-0.28, 1.44) 0.96 (0.91, 1.01) 
Change in slope after 
announcement 
0.99 (0.94, 1.04) 0.99 (0.97, 1.02) 0.0019 (-0.01, 0.01) 1.002 (0.99, 1.01) 0.98 (0.95, 1.02) -0.07 (-0.44, 0.3) 1.02 (0.99, 1.04) 
Change in level after 
inspection 
1.04 (0.94, 1.15) 0.99 (0.95, 1.04) 
-0.004  
(-0.008, 0.0007) 
0.99 (0.92, 1.06) 1.05 (0.99, 1.11) -0.1 (-0.97, 0.76) 1.02 (0.98, 1.07) 
Change in slope after 
inspection 
1.02 (0.98, 1.08) 1.02 (0.99, 1.04) -0.001 (-0.01, 0.01) 0.99 (0.99, 1.007) 0.98 (0.95, 1.02) 0.14 (-0.23, 0.51) 0.98 (0.96, 0.99) 




Sine - - - 1.26 (1.23, 1.28) 1.05 (1.05, 1.06) - 0.93 (0.93, 0.94) 
Cosine - 1.03 (1.017, 1.04) - 0.97 (0.95, 0.99) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) - 1.02 (1.008, 1.03) 
Sine*2 - - - - 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) - 0.93 (0.92, 0.94) 
Cosine*2 - - - - 0.97 (0.96, 0.97) - 0.86 (0.86, 0.87) 
Medical rotations - - - - - - 2.9 (2.83, 2.99) 
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6.1 Subgroup analysis by performance rating 
Table 6.4 Descriptive information of all acute Trust in England by performance rating 
 
Excellent Good Fair Weak 
p-value 
 
n=37 n=73 n=37 n=6 
Foundation Trust 28 (76%) 52 (71%) 16 (43%) 1 (17%) <0.001 
Type of trust 
Large acute trust 8 (22%) 15 (21%) 12 (32%) 5 (83%) 0.02 
Medium acute Trust 8 (22%) 27 (37%) 9 (24%) 1 (17%)  
Small acute trust 3 (8%) 15 (21%) 7 (19%) 0 (0%)  
Acute teaching trust 10 (27%) 10 (14%) 5 (14%) 0 (0%)  
Acute specialist trust 8 (22%) 6 (8%) 4 (11%) 0 (0%)  
NHS England region 
North 14 (38%) 27 (37%) 9 (24%) 0 (0%) 0.06 
Midlands and East 8 (22%) 19 (26%) 17 (46%) 1 (17%)  
South 6 (16%) 19 (26%) 6 (16%) 3 (50%)  
London 9 (24%) 8 (11%) 5 (14%) 2 (33%)  






















Number of Trust 
Hospitals, median (IQR) 
2 (1, 4) 3 (2, 5) 2 (1, 4) 3 (2, 4) 0.4 
Number of locations, 
median (IQR) 
3 (2, 6) 5 (2, 8) 3 (2, 6) 4 (2, 5) 0.2 
Special measures 0 (0%) 10 (14%) 7 (19%) 2 (33%) 0.03 
Type of inspection      
New regime 15 (56%) 29 (55%) 18 (67%) 4 (67%) 0.7 
No inspected 10 (27%) 20 (27%) 10 (27%) 0 (0%) 0.5 
Overall rating 
Outstanding 3 (11%) 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 
Good 10 (36%) 15 (25%) 9 (27%) 0 (0%)  
Requires improvement 15 (54%) 39 (65%) 19 (58%) 5 (83%)  
Inadequate 0 (0%) 5 (8%) 5 (15%) 1 (17%)  



























Excellent Good Fair Weak 
p-value 
 
n=37 n=73 n=37 n=6 
Monitor Sustainability rating 
Significant risk 0 (0%) 4 (8%) 4 (27%) 0 (0%) 0.005 
Material risk 4 (14%) 3 (6%) 2 (13%) 0 (0%)  
Emerging or minor 
concerns 
14 (48%) 35 (69%) 2 (13%) 1 (100%)  
No evident concerns 8 (28%) 9 (18%) 7 (47%) 0 (0%)  
Lowest risk 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)  
Monitor Governance rating 
Subject to 
enforcement action 
2 (7%) 10 (21%) 7 (47%) 0 (0%) 0.2 
Under review 4 (13%) 4 (8%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%)  
No evident concerns 23 (79%) 34 (71%) 7 (47%) 1 (100%)  
TDA escalating score 
Enforcement action 0 (0%) 2 (10%) 3 (15%) 1 (20%) 0.9 
Significant delivery 
issues 
3 (38%) 8 (38%) 7 (35%) 3 (60%)  
Some delivery issues 2 (25%) 7 (33%) 6 (30%) 1 (20%)  
Limited/no issues 3 (38%) 3 (14%) 4 (20%) 0 (0%)  
Sound FT application 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)  
Number of inspections, 
median (IQR) 
3 (2, 4) 4 (3, 5) 4 (3, 5) 6 (4, 7) 0.07 
Months since previous 










Reporting culture 2016 
Poor 2 (5%) 11 (15%) 9 (24%) 2 (33%) 0.2 
Significant Concerns 13 (35%) 22 (30%) 16 (43%) 3 (50%)  
Good 19 (51%) 34 (47%) 11 (30%) 1 (17%)  
Outstanding 3 (8%) 6 (8%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%)  
Performance rating - Financial 2009 
Excellent 25 (68%) 37 (51%) 9 (24%) 1 (17%) <0.001 
Good 10 (27%) 28 (38%) 19 (51%) 1 (17%)  
Fair 1 (3%) 7 (10%) 8 (22%) 3 (50%)  
Weak 1 (3%) 1 (1%) 1 (3%) 1 (17%)  
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6.1.1 Adverse events 





Figure 6.1 Rates of falls with harm for all NHS Trusts over time by performance rating 
 
Table 6.5 Unadjusted model coefficients for rates of falls with harm by performance ratings 
 Unadjusted rate of falls with harm (95% CI) 










Intercept 0.005 (0.004, 0.006) 1.01 (0.71, 1.45) 1.21 (0.86, 1.71) 0.87 (0.43, 1.77) 
Pre-inspection slope 0.97 (0.96, 0.99) 1 (0.98, 1.03) 1.01 (0.99, 1.03) 0.99 (0.95, 1.03) 
Announcement change 0.95 (0.78, 1.16) 1.74 (1.21, 2.5) 0.78 (0.56, 1.1) 0.81 (0.42, 1.58) 
Announcement slope 1.01 (0.94, 1.09) 0.84 (0.74, 0.96) 1.01 (0.89, 1.15) 1.06 (0.83, 1.34) 
Post-inspection change 0.98 (0.85, 1.12) 1.28 (0.99, 1.64) 1.06 (0.82, 1.36) 1.1 (0.68, 1.77) 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.2 Rates of pressure ulcers for all NHS Trusts over time by performance rating 
 
Table 6.6 Unadjusted model coefficients for rates of pressure ulcers by performance ratings 
 Unadjusted rate pf pressure ulcers (95% CI) 










Intercept 1.17 (0.95, 1.44) 0.04 (0.036, 0.045) 1.1 (0.9, 1.34) 0.8 (0.53, 1.22) 
Pre-inspection slope 1.02 (1.001, 1.03) 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 0.98 (0.95, 1.003) 
Announcement change 1.01 (0.86, 1.18) 1.003 (0.92, 1.1) 1.02 (0.87, 1.19) 0.88 (0.64, 1.21) 
Announcement slope 0.99 (0.93, 1.05) 1 (0.97, 1.04) 0.98 (0.92, 1.04) 1.02 (0.9, 1.15) 
Post-inspection change 0.96 (0.86, 1.7) 0.98 (0.92, 1.04) 1.08 (0.97, 1.21) 1.09 (0.88, 1.36) 
Post-inspection slope 0.99 (0.94, 1.05) 1.01 (0.98, 1.05) 1.02 (0.96, 1.08) 1.002 (0.89, 1.13) 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.3 Summary Hospital Mortality Index for all acute NHS Trusts for all NHS Trusts over time by performance 
rating 
 
Table 6.7 Unadjusted model coefficients for summary hospital mortality index by performance ratings 
 Unadjusted summary hospital mortality index (95% CI) 




















Announcement change -0.008 (-0.04, 0.025) 0.002 (-0.016, 0.02) -0.006 (-0.03, 0.02) -0.005 (-0.07, 0.06) 
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6.1.3 Waiting times 





Figure 6.4 Rates of attendances waiting over 4h in A&E for all NHS Trusts over time by performance rating 
 
Table 6.8 Unadjusted model coefficients for rates of attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E by performance ratings 
 Unadjusted rate of attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E (95% CI) 










Intercept 0.88 (0.69, 1.13) 0.05 (0.04, 0.05) 0.94 (0.75, 1.2) 1.65 (1.02, 2.69) 
Pre-inspection slope 0.99 (0.99, 1.001) 1.004 (1.003, 1.005) 0.998 (0.996, 0.999) 1.002 (0.99, 1.01) 
Announcement change 1.9 (0.75, 1.09) 0.95 (0.86, 1.05) 0.94 (0.79, 1.12) 1.12 (0.78, 1.59) 
Announcement slope 1.01 (0.99, 1.03) 0.99 (0.99, 1.01) 1.02 (0.99, 1.03) 0.99 (0.96, 1.03) 
Post-inspection change 0.88 (0.73, 1.05) 1.01 (0.91, 1.11) 1.04 (0.88, 1.23) 1.01 (0.71, 1.42) 
Post-inspection slope 0.99 (0.97, 1.01) 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 0.99 (0.97, 1.01) 1.003 (0.97, 1.04) 
Sine 1.26 (1.23, 1.28) 1.26 (1.23, 1.28) 1.26 (1.23, 1.28) 1.26 (1.23, 1.28) 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.5 Rates of referrals to treatment waiting over 18 weeks for all acute NHS Trusts over time by 
performance rating 
 
Table 6.9 Unadjusted model coefficients for rates of referrals waiting over 18 weeks by performance ratings 
 Unadjusted rate of referrals to treatment waiting over 18 weeks (95% CI) 
 Excellent Good Fair Weak 







Intercept 1.12 (0.89, 1.43) 0.11 (0.09, 0.12) 1.14 (0.9, 1.44) 1.08 (0.66, 1.77) 
Pre-inspection slope 1.003 (0.99, 1.01) 1.04 (1.04, 1.05) 1.003 (0.99, 1.01) 0.99 (0.99, 1.01) 
Announcement change 1.04 (0.85, 1.27) 0.8 (0.71, 0.89) 0.99 (0.81, 1.2) 1.14 (0.75, 1.71) 
Announcement slope 0.96 (0.88, 1.04) 0.99 (0.94, 1.04) 1.003 (0.92, 1.09) 1.02 (0.85, 1.22) 
Post-inspection change 0.96 (0.83, 1.1) 1.05 (0.97, 1.14) 1.01 (0.88, 1.17) 1.02 (0.75, 1.38) 
Post-inspection slope 1.04 (0.95, 1.13) 0.98 (0.93, 1.03) 0.99 (0.91, 1.08) 0.97 (0.81, 1.16) 







Sine 1.06 (1.05, 1.06) 1.06 (1.05, 1.06) 1.06 (1.05, 1.06) 1.06 (1.05, 1.06) 
Cosine 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 
Sine*2 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.6 Patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect over time by performance rating 
 
Table 6.10 Unadjusted model coefficients for patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect by 
performance ratings 
 Unadjusted patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect (95% CI) 










Intercept 1.5 (0.6, 2.4) 88.5 (87.9, 88.9) -0.9 (-1.8, -0.02) -2 (-3.9, -0.15) 
Pre-inspection slope 0.0004 (-0.008, 0.009) 0.005 (0.0001, 0.01) -0.006 (-0.01, 0.002) -0.003 (-0.02, 0.015) 
Announcement change -1.4 (-3.7, 0.9) 1.6 (0.4, 2.9) -2.3 (-4.4, -0.2) -3.2 (-8.3, 1.9) 
Announcement slope 0.76 (-0.19, 1.7) -0.55 (-1.07, -0.016) 0.8 (-0.1, 1.7) 1.9 (-1.5, 5.5) 
Post-inspection change -2.1 (-4.2, -0.07) 0.8 (-0.38, 2.05) -0.6 (-2.9, 1.6) -5.5 (-15.2, 4.1) 
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Figure 6.7 Rates of staff leaving for all NHS Trusts over time by performance rating 
 
Table 6.11 Unadjusted model coefficients for rates of staff leaving NHS Trusts by performance ratings 
 Unadjusted rate of staff leaving NHS Trusts (95% CI) 










Intercept 1.08 (0.99, 1.17) 0.019 (0.018, 0.02) 1.04 (0.96, 1.12) 0.99 (0.84, 1.19) 
Pre-inspection slope 1.003 (0.99, 1.01) 1.002 (0.99, 1.005) 0.99 (0.99, 1.004) 0.99 (0.98, 1.005) 
Announcement change 0.84 (0.74, 0.96) 0.99 (0.92, 1.07) 1.01 (0.88, 1.15) 0.98 (0.74, 1.29) 
Announcement slope 1.05 (1, 1.1) 1.005 (0.98, 1.03) 1.002 (0.96, 1.05) 1.04 (0.94, 1.14) 
Post-inspection change 0.92 (0.84, 1.003) 1.06 (1.003, 1.11) 1.003 (0.92, 1.1) 0.97 (0.8, 1.17) 
Post-inspection slope 0.95 (0.91, 0.99) 0.99 (0.97, 1.02) 0.99 (0.95, 1.04) 0.97 (0.88, 1.06) 
Medical rotation 2.67 (2.59, 2.75) 2.67 (2.59, 2.75) 2.67 (2.59, 2.75) 2.67 (2.59, 2.75) 
Sine 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 
Cosine 0.94 (0.93, 0.94) 0.94 (0.93, 0.94) 0.94 (0.93, 0.94) 0.94 (0.93, 0.94) 
Sine*2 0.86 (0.86, 0.87) 0.86 (0.86, 0.87) 0.86 (0.86, 0.87) 0.86 (0.86, 0.87) 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Chapter 7  
7.1 Adverse events 
Falls with harm Pressure ulcers 
  
Old regime  
  
New regime  
  
No inspection  







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.1 Unadjusted and adjusted model coefficients for adverse events by type of inspection 
 Unadjusted rate of 
falls (95% CI) 
Adjusted rate of 
falls (95% CI) 
Unadjusted rate of 
pressure ulcers 
(95% CI) 
Adjusted rate of 











Intercept     
Old Regime 0.004 (0.003, 0.006) 0.004 (0.003, 0.005) 0.04 (0.03, 0.05) 0.05 (0.04, 0.05) 
New regime 1.15 (0.84, 1.57) 1.25 (0.94, 1.67) 1.02 (0.84, 1.24) 0.97 (0.8, 1.16) 
No inspection 1.43 (0.99, 2.05) 1.48 (1.06, 2.07) 0.88 (0.7, 1.11) 0.87 (0.7, 1.08) 
Pre-inspection slope     
Old regime 0.96 (0.94, 0.97) 0.96 (0.94, 0.97) 0.98 (0.98, 0.99) 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 
New regime 1.02 (1.005, 1.04) 1.02 (1.01, 1.04) 1.003 (0.99, 1.01) 1.003 (0.99, 1.01) 
No inspection 1.02 (1.001, 1.05) 1.02 (1, 1.04) 0.99 (0.98, 1.01) 0.99 (0.99, 1.01) 
Announcement change     
Old regime 1.27 (0.98, 1.64) 1.27 (0.98, 1.64) 0.92 (0.83, 1.03) 0.92 (0.83, 1.02) 
New regime 0.69 (0.5, 0.97) 0.69 (0.5, 0.97) 1.09 (0.95, 1.26) 1.1 (0.95, 1.26) 
No inspection 0.71 (0.49, 1.03) 0.71 (0.49, 1.03) 1.2 (1.04, 1.43) 1.22 (1.04, 1.43) 
Announcement slope     
Old regime 0.96 (0.88, 1.05) 0.96 (0.88, 1.05) 0.99 (0.95, 1.03) 0.99 (0.95, 1.03) 
New regime 1.05 (0.94, 1.18) 1.05 (0.94, 1.18) 0.99 (0.94, 1.05) 0.99 (0.94, 1.05) 
No inspection 1.06 (0.93, 1.21) 1.06 (0.93, 1.21) 0.99 (0.94, 1.05) 0.99 (0.94, 1.05) 
Post-inspection change     
Old regime 1.09 (0.91, 1.31) 1.09 (0.91, 1.31) 1.05 (0.97, 1.14) 1.05 (0.96, 1.14) 
New regime 0.92 (0.72, 1.16) 0.91 (0.72, 1.16) 0.96 (0.87, 1.08) 0.97 (0.87, 1.07) 
No inspection 0.82 (0.63, 1.07) 0.82 (0.63, 1.07) 0.96 (0.86, 1.09) 0.97 (0.85, 1.09) 
Post-inspection slope     
Old regime 1.08 (0.98, 1.18) 1.08 (0.98, 1.18) 1.02 (0.98, 1.06) 1.02 (0.98, 1.06) 
New regime 0.93 (0.83, 1.04) 0.93 (0.83, 1.04) 1.002 (0.95, 1.05) 1.002 (0.95, 1.05) 
No inspection 0.92 (0.81, 1.05) 0.92 (0.81, 1.05) 1.005 (0.95, 1.06) 1.005 (0.95, 1.06) 
Large acute NHS Trust - Reference - - 
Medium acute NHS 
Trust - 0.99 (0.82, 1.19) - - 
Small acute NHS Trust - 1.26 (1.02, 1.56) - - 
Teaching acute NHS 
Trust - 0.73 (0.59, 0.91) - - 
Specialist acute NHS 
Trust - 1.99 (1.47, 2.69) - 0.53 (0.45, 0.63) 
Cosine - - 1.02 (1.01, 1.04) 1.02 (1.01, 1.04) 
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7.2 Summary Hospital Mortality Index 
  
Old regime New regime 
 
 
No inspection  
Figure 7.2 Summary Hospital Mortality Index for all NHS Trusts over time by type of inspection 
 
Table 7.2 Unadjusted and adjusted model coefficients for summary hospital mortality index by type of inspection 
 Unadjusted summary hospital 
mortality index (95% CI) 
Adjusted summary hospital 






Intercept   
Old Regime 1.01 (0.99, 1.04) 1.05 (1.02, 1.08) 
New regime -0.02 (-0.06, 0.01) -0.01 (-0.04, 0.02) 
No inspection -0.01 (-0.05, 0.03) -0.02 (-0.05, 0.01) 
Pre-inspection slope   
Old regime 0.0005 (-0.0002, 0.001) 0.0005 (-0.0002, 0.001) 
New regime -0.001 (-0.002, -0.0002) -0.001 (-0.002, -0.0002) 
No inspection -0.0002 (-0.001, 0.0009) -0.0002 (-0.001, 0.0009) 
Announcement change   
Old regime -0.01 (-0.03, 0.002) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.002) 
New regime 0.02 (-0.002, 0.05) 0.02 (-0.0004, 0.05) 
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 Unadjusted summary hospital 
mortality index (95% CI) 
Adjusted summary hospital 
mortality index (95% CI) 
Announcement slope   
Old regime 0.007 (-0.009, 0.02) 0.008 (-0.009, 0.02) 
New regime -0.009 (-0.03, 0.01) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) 
No inspection -0.004 (-0.02, 0.02) -0.004 (-0.02, 0.02) 
Post-inspection change   
Old regime -0.008 (-0.01, 0.0005) -0.008 (-0.01, 0.0006) 
New regime 0.004 (-0.006, 0.01) 0.004 (-0.006, 0.01) 
No inspection 0.02 (0.006, 0.03) 0.02 (0.006, 0.03) 
Post-inspection slope   
Old regime -0.008 (-0.03, 0.009) -0.008 (-0.02, 0.009) 
New regime 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03) 0.01 (-0.009, 0.04) 
No inspection 0.004 (-0.02, 0.03) 0.004 (-0.02, 0.03) 
North -  
Midlands and East - -0.007 (-0.03, 0.02) 
South - -0.04 (-0.07, -0.02) 
London - -0.17 (-0.21, -0.14) 
 
7.3 Waiting times 
Over 4 h A&E wait Over 18 weeks RRT wait 
  
Old regime  
  


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No inspection  
Figure 7.3 Rates of attendances waiting over 4 h in A&E and referrals waiting over 18 weeks for all NHS Trusts 
over time by type of inspection 
 
 
Table 7.3 Unadjusted and adjusted model coefficients for waiting times by type of inspection 
 
Unadjusted rate of 
over 4h A&E wait 
(95% CI) 
Adjusted rate of 
over 4h A&E wait 
(95% CI) 
Unadjusted rate of 
over 18w RTT wait 
(95% CI) 
Adjusted rate of over 










Intercept     
Old Regime 0.04 (0.037, 0.05) 0.06 (0.05, 0.07) 0.11 (0.1, 0.13) 0.1 (0.09, 0.12) 
New regime 1.12 (0.89, 1.39) 1.03 (0.83, 1.3) 1.11 (0.93, 1.31) 1.07 (0.91, 1.26) 
No inspection 1.04 (0.81, 1.34) 1.07 (0.83, 1.38) 0.7 (0.57, 0.85) 0.7 (0.57, 0.85) 
Pre-inspection slope     
Old regime 1.003 (1.002, 1.004) 1.003 (1.002, 1.005) 1.04 (1.04, 1.05) 1.05 (1.04, 1.05) 
New regime 1 (0.99, 1.002) 0.99 (0.99, 1.002) 1.002 (0.99, 1.01) 1.001 (0.99, 1.005) 
No inspection 1 (0.99, 1.002) 1 (0.99, 1.002) 0.995 (0.99, 0.998) 0.99 (0.99, 0.99) 
Announcement change 
Old regime 0.93 (0.82, 1.05) 0.93 (0.82, 1.05) 0.87 (0.82, 0.93) 0.8 (0.75, 0.85) 
New regime 1.01 (0.86, 1.19) 1.01 (0.86, 1.19) 0.96 (0.84, 1.09) 0.97 (0.85, 1.11) 
No inspection 1.1 (0.92, 1.3) 1.1 (0.92, 1.31) 1.33 (1.24, 1.43) 1.33 (1.25, 1.43) 
Announcement slope     
Old regime 0.99 (0.98, 1.01) 0.99 (0.99, 1.01) 0.93 (0.89, 0.96) 0.92 (0.89, 0.96) 
New regime 1.01 (0.99, 1.03) 1.01 (0.99, 1.03) 1.06 (1.002, 1.13) 1.07 (1.005, 1.13) 
No inspection 0.98 (0.97, 1.001) 0.98 (0.97, 1) 1.05 (1.006, 1.1) 1.06 (1.01, 1.11) 
Post-inspection change 
Old regime 0.89 (0.78, 1.01) 0.89 (0.79, 1.01) 1.11 (1.008, 1.22) 1.12 (1.02, 1.23) 
New regime 1.25 (1.07, 1.47) 1.25 (1.07, 1.47) 0.98 (0.86, 1.12) 0.97 (0.85, 1.11) 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Unadjusted rate of 
over 4h A&E wait 
(95% CI) 
Adjusted rate of 
over 4h A&E wait 
(95% CI) 
Unadjusted rate of 
over 18w RTT wait 
(95% CI) 
Adjusted rate of over 
18w RTT wait (95% CI) 
Post-inspection slope     
Old regime 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 1.04 (1.004, 1.08) 1.04 (1.01, 1.09) 
New regime 0.98 (0.97, 1.002) 0.98 (0.97, 1.001) 0.94 (0.88, 0.997) 0.94 (0.88, 0.99) 
No inspection 1.02 (1.001, 1.03) 1.02 (1.001, 1.04) 0.95 (0.91, 1.001) 0.95 (0.91, 0.99) 
NHS reform - - - 0.84 (0.82, 0.87) 
Beds - - - 1.0003 (1.0001, 1.0004) 
Reporting culture -  - - 
Poor - Reference - - 
Significant concerns - 0.8 (0.65, 0.97) - - 
Good - 0.69 (0.57, 0.84) - - 
Outstanding - 0.54 (0.38, 0.77) - - 





Sine 1.26 (1.24, 1.29) 1.26 (1.24, 1.29) 1.06 (1.05, 1.07) 1.07 (1.06, 1.08) 
Cosine 0.97 (0.96, 0.99) 0.97 (0.96, 0.99) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 
Sine*2 - - 0.96 (0.96, 0.97) 0.96 (0.96, 0.97) 
 
7.4 Treatment with dignity and respect 
  
Old regime New regime 
 
 
No inspection  
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Table 7.4 Unadjusted and adjusted model coefficients for patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and 
respect by type of inspection 
 Unadjusted patients’ perception of being 
treated with dignity and respect (95% CI) 
Adjusted patients’ perception of being 






Intercept   
Old Regime 89.04 (88.37, 89.71) 87.6 (86.95, 88.22) 
New regime -1.36 (-2.24, -0.48) -0.69 (-1.38, 0.006) 
No inspection 0.24 (-0.77, 1.26) 0.22 (-0.58, 1.02) 
Pre-inspection slope   
Old regime 0.007 (0.0007, 0.01) 0.007 (0.001, 0.013) 
New regime -0.005 (-0.01, 0.002) -0.006 (-0.013, 0.0016) 
No inspection -0.004 (-0.01, 0.005) -0.004 (-0.01, 0.005) 
Announcement change   
Old regime -0.72 (-2.06, 0.63) -0.52 (-1.82, 0.78) 
New regime 2.09 (-0.03, 4.22) 1.92 (-0.17, 4.01) 
No inspection 0.47 (-0.52, 1.45) 0.34 (-0.62, 1.31) 
Announcement slope   
Old regime 0.66 (-0.004, 1.32) 0.58 (-0.07, 1.23) 
New regime -1.03 (-1.97, -0.1) -0.95 (-1.87, -0.02) 
No inspection 0.02 (-0.05, 0.08) 0.02 (-0.05, 0.08) 
Post-inspection change   
Old regime -2.08 (-3.76, -0.39) -1.99 (-3.66, -0.32) 
New regime 2.11 (-0.07, 4.29) 1.97 (-0.19, 4.13) 
No inspection -0.57 (-2.04, 0.9) -0.41 (-1.86, 1.04) 
Post-inspection slope   
Old regime -0.58 (-1.25, 0.08) -0.5 (-1.15, 0.15) 
New regime 1.09 (0.16, 2.03) 1.01 (0.09, 1.94) 
No inspection 0 (0, 0) 0 (0, 0) 
Specialist Trust - 4.71 (3.82, 5.6) 




7.5 Staff leaving acute NHS Trusts 
  
Old regime New regime 
 
 
No inspection  
Figure 7.5 Rates of staff leaving a Trust for all NHS Trusts over time by type of inspection 
 
Table 7.5 Unadjusted and adjusted model coefficients for staff leaving NHS Trusts by type of inspection 
 Unadjusted rate of staff leaving 
NHS Trusts (95% CI) 
Adjusted rate of staff leaving NHS 






Intercept   
Old Regime 0.019 (0.018, 0.02) 0.017 (0.016, 0.018) 
New regime 1.05 (0.97, 1.12) 1.03 (0.97, 1.1) 
No inspection 1.002 (0.91, 1.1) 1.01 (0.94, 1.1) 
Pre-inspection slope   
Old regime 1.001 (0.99, 1.004) 1.001 (0.99, 1.004) 
New regime 1.002 (0.99, 1.006) 1.002 (0.99, 1.006) 
No inspection 1.001 (0.99, 1.006) 1 (0.99, 1.006) 
Announcement change   
Old regime 0.99 (0.91, 1.1) 0.99 (0.91, 1.1) 
New regime 0.94 (0.83, 1.06) 0.94 (0.83, 1.06) 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Unadjusted rate of staff leaving 
NHS Trusts (95% CI) 
Adjusted rate of staff leaving NHS 
Trusts (95% CI) 
Announcement slope   
Old regime 0.99 (0.97, 1.03) 0.99 (0.97, 1.03) 
New regime 1.03 (0.99, 1.08) 1.03 (0.99, 1.08) 
No inspection 0.98 (0.93, 1.03) 0.98 (0.93, 1.03) 
Post-inspection change   
Old regime 1.12 (1.05, 1.19) 1.12 (1.05, 1.2) 
New regime 0.89 (0.82, 0.98) 0.9 (0.82, 0.98) 
No inspection 1.06 (0.96, 1.16) 1.06 (0.96, 1.16) 
Post-inspection slope   
Old regime 0.99 (0.97, 1.03) 1 (0.97, 1.03) 
New regime 0.97 (0.93, 1.01) 0.97 (0.93, 1.01) 
No inspection 1.02 (0.97, 1.07) 1.02 (0.97, 1.07) 
Medical rotation 2.65 (2.57, 2.73) 2.65 (2.57, 2.73) 
Cosine 0.93 (0.93, 0.94) 0.93 (0.93, 0.94) 
Sine 1.04 (1.03, 1.05) 1.04 (1.03, 1.05) 
Cosine*2 0.92 (0.91, 0.93) 0.92 (0.91, 0.93) 
Sine*2 0.86 (0.86, 0.87) 0.86 (0.86, 0.87) 
Large acute NHS Trust - reference 
Medium acute NHS 
Trust - 1.06 (1.01, 1.1) 
Small acute NHS Trust - 1.03 (0.98, 1.08) 
Teaching acute NHS 
Trust - 1.09 (1.03, 1.14) 
Specialist acute NHS 
Trust - 1.13 (1.07, 1.2) 
North region - reference 
Midlands and East 
region - 1.08 (1.04, 1.12) 
South region - 1.06 (1.02, 1.11) 





Appendix Chapter 8  
8.1 Adverse events 
8.1.1 Falls with harm 
Table 8.1 Characteristics of Trusts classified as improving and not improving for rates of fall with harm 
 Not improving Improving 
p-value  n=39 n=109 
Foundation Trust 26 (66.7%) 68 (62.4%) 0.63 
Type of trust    
Large acute trust 10 (25.6%) 30 (27.5%) 0.005 
Medium acute Trust 14 (35.9%) 31 (28.4%)  
Small acute trust 3 (7.7%) 23 (21.1%)  
Acute teaching trust 4 (10.3%) 21 (19.3%)  
Acute specialist trust 8 (20.5%) 4 (3.7%)  
NHS England region    
North 12 (30.8%) 36 (33.0%) 0.82 
Midlands and East 12 (30.8%) 31 (28.4%)  
South 8 (20.5%) 28 (25.7%)  
London 7 (17.9%) 14 (12.8%)  
Beds, median (IQR) 650 (485, 855) 736 (524, 1063) 0.13 
Population in thousands, median (IQR) 447.5 (350, 600) 460 (331, 600) 0.91 
Special measures 3 (7.7%) 16 (14.7%) 0.26 
Type of inspection    
New regime  14 (58%) 50 (58%) 0.99 
No inspected 15 (38.5%) 23 (21.1%) 0.033 
Overall rating    
Outstanding 3 (8.1%) 5 (4.6%) 0.35 
Good 12 (32.4%) 26 (24.1%)  
Requires improvement 21 (56.8%) 66 (61.1%)  
Inadequate 1 (2.7%) 11 (10.2%)  
Merged Trusts 3 (7.7%) 9 (8.3%) 0.91 
Monitor Sustainability rating    
Significant risk 2 (8%) 6 (9%) 0.34 
Material risk 2 (8%) 8 (12%)  
Emerging or minor concerns 12 (46%) 40 (61%)  
No evident concerns 9 (35%) 10 (15%)  
Lowest risk 1 (4%) 2 (3%)  
Monitor Governance rating    
Subject to enforcement action 5 (19%) 14 (21%) 0.91 
Under review 4 (15%) 8 (12%)  
No evident concerns 17 (65%) 44 (67%)  
TDA escalating score    
Enforcement action 1 (8%) 5 (12%) 0.46 
Significant delivery issues 4 (31%) 18 (42%)  
Some delivery issues 6 (46%) 9 (21%)  
Limited/no issues 2 (15%) 9 (21%)  
Sound FT application 0 (0%) 2 (5%)  
502 
 Not improving Improving 
p-value  n=39 n=109 
Number of inspections, median (IQR) 3 (3, 4) 4 (3, 5) 0.16 
Months since previous inspection, median 
(IQR) 
11 (7, 18) 10 (7, 13) 0.16 
Reporting culture 2016    
Poor 3 (7.7%) 22 (20.2%) 0.16 
Significant Concerns 17 (43.6%) 36 (33.0%)  
Good 15 (38.5%) 46 (42.2%)  
Outstanding 4 (10.3%) 5 (4.6%)  







8.1.2 Pressure ulcers 
Table 8.2 Characteristics of Trusts classified as improving and not improving for rates of pressure ulcers 
 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=43 n=105 
Foundation Trust 30 (69.8%) 64 (61.0%) 0.31 
Type of trust    
Large acute trust 8 (18.6%) 32 (30.5%) 0.49 
Medium acute Trust 17 (39.5%) 28 (26.7%)  
Small acute trust 8 (18.6%) 18 (17.1%)  
Acute teaching trust 7 (16.3%) 18 (17.1%)  
Acute specialist trust 3 (7.0%) 9 (8.6%)  
NHS England region    
North 12 (27.9%) 36 (34.3%) 0.73 
Midlands and East 12 (27.9%) 31 (29.5%)  
South 11 (25.6%) 25 (23.8%)  
London 8 (18.6%) 13 (12.4%)  
Beds, median (IQR) 674.5 (508, 953) 741.5 (500, 1047) 0.54 
Population in thousands, median (IQR) 402.5 (350, 640) 462.5 (340, 600) 0.86 
Special measures 6 (14.0%) 13 (12.4%) 0.80 
Type of inspection    
New regime 19 (63%) 46 (57%) 0.58 
No inspected 13 (30.2%) 25 (23.8%) 0.42 
Overall rating    
Outstanding 4 (9.5%) 4 (3.9%) 0.34 
Good 13 (31.0%) 25 (24.3%)  
Requires improvement 23 (54.8%) 64 (62.1%)  
Inadequate 2 (4.8%) 10 (9.7%)  
Merged Trusts 4 (9.3%) 8 (7.6%) 0.73 
Monitor Sustainability rating    
Significant risk 3 (10%) 5 (8%) 0.98 
Material risk 3 (10%) 7 (11%)  
Emerging or minor concerns 17 (59%) 35 (56%)  
No evident concerns 5 (17%) 14 (22%)  
Lowest risk 1 (3%) 2 (3%)  
Monitor Governance rating    
Subject to enforcement action 6 (21%) 13 (21%) 0.32 
Under review 6 (21%) 6 (10%)  
No evident concerns 17 (59%) 44 (70%)  
503 
 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=43 n=105 
TDA escalating score    
Enforcement action 2 (14%) 4 (10%) 0.11 
Significant delivery issues 3 (21%) 19 (45%)  
Some delivery issues 7 (50%) 8 (19%)  
Limited/no issues 1 (7%) 10 (24%)  
Sound FT application 1 (7%) 1 (2%)  
Number of inspections, median (IQR) 3 (3, 4) 4 (3, 5) 0.32 
Months since previous inspection, median (IQR) 9 (6, 15) 10 (8, 15) 0.24 
Reporting culture 2016    
Poor 7 (16.3%) 18 (17.1%) 0.66 
Significant Concerns 16 (37.2%) 37 (35.2%)  
Good 19 (44.2%) 42 (40.0%)  
Outstanding 1 (2.3%) 8 (7.6%)  
Rate of pressure ulcers, median (IQR) 0.04 (0.026, 0.059) 0.060 (0.046, 0.073) <0.001 
 
Table 8.3 Unadjusted model coefficients for adverse events accounting by previous performance 
 Unadjusted rates of falls 
with harm (95% CI) 
Unadjusted rates of 






Intercept   
Not improving old regime 0.01 (0, 0.01) 0.06 (0.04, 0.08) 
Improving old regime 0.5 (0.3, 0.86) 0.65 (0.48, 0.9) 
Not improving new regime 1.44 (0.79, 2.64) 1.13 (0.8, 1.59) 
Improving new regime 0.54 (0.32, 0.89) 0.61 (0.45, 0.82) 
Not improving no inspection 1.01 (0.54, 1.86) 0.8 (0.55, 1.17) 
Improving no inspection 0.71 (0.41, 1.25) 0.57 (0.41, 0.79) 
   
Pre-inspection slope   
Not improving old regime 1.03 (1, 1.06) 1.02 (1.01, 1.04) 
Improving old regime 0.92 (0.89, 0.94) 0.95 (0.94, 0.97) 
Not improving new regime 1 (0.97, 1.03) 0.99 (0.98, 1.01) 
Improving new regime 0.94 (0.91, 0.97) 0.96 (0.94, 0.97) 
Not improving no inspection 0.93 (0.9, 0.96) 0.98 (0.97, 1) 
Improving no inspection 0.98 (0.95, 1.02) 0.95 (0.94, 0.97) 
   
Announcement change   
Not improving old regime 1.04 (0.7, 1.54) 0.92 (0.78, 1.09) 
Improving old regime 1.27 (0.88, 1.83) 1.01 (0.85, 1.2) 
Not improving new regime 0.76 (0.42, 1.38) 1.07 (0.84, 1.36) 
Improving new regime 0.87 (0.55, 1.38) 1.11 (0.9, 1.36) 
Not improving no inspection 1.09 (0.6, 1.98) 1.36 (1.03, 1.78) 
Improving no inspection 0.75 (0.44, 1.27) 1.21 (0.96, 1.53) 
   
Announcement slope   
Not improving old regime 0.9 (0.82, 0.99) 0.96 (0.92, 1) 
Improving old regime 1.09 (1.06, 1.13) 1.05 (1.03, 1.07) 
Not improving new regime 1.11 (0.93, 1.33) 0.99 (0.92, 1.07) 
504 
 Unadjusted rates of falls 
with harm (95% CI) 
Unadjusted rates of 






Improving new regime 1.13 (1, 1.28) 1.05 (0.99, 1.12) 
Not improving no inspection 1.07 (0.89, 1.29) 0.99 (0.91, 1.08) 
Improving no inspection 1.18 (1.01, 1.37) 1.03 (0.96, 1.11) 
   
Post-inspection change   
Not improving old regime 1.32 (0.95, 1.83) 0.91 (0.79, 1.05) 
Improving old regime 0.78 (0.56, 1.11) 1.19 (1.02, 1.39) 
Not improving new regime 0.52 (0.33, 0.82) 1.09 (0.9, 1.31) 
Improving new regime 0.84 (0.58, 1.21) 1.1 (0.93, 1.3) 
Not improving no inspection 0.57 (0.36, 0.91) 1.13 (0.92, 1.39) 
Improving no inspection 0.74 (0.49, 1.11) 1.11 (0.92, 1.33) 
   
Post-inspection slope   
Not improving old regime 1.07 (0.98, 1.17) 1.02 (0.98, 1.06) 
Improving old regime 1 (0.99, 1.01) 0.99 (0.98, 1.02) 
Not improving new regime 0.9 (0.76, 1.08) 1 (0.93, 1.08) 
Improving new regime 0.94 (0.83, 1.06) 0.99 (0.94, 1.05) 
Not improving no inspection 0.97 (0.89, 1.06) 1.01 (0.96, 1.05) 




8.2 Summary Hospital Mortality Index 
Table 8.4 Characteristics of Trusts classified as improving and not improving for summary hospital mortality index 
 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=76 n=60 
Foundation Trust 51 (67%) 32 (53%) 0.10 
Type of trust    
Large acute trust 22 (29%) 18 (30%) 1.00 
Medium acute Trust 25 (33%) 20 (33%)  
Small acute trust 15 (20%) 11 (18%)  
Acute teaching trust 14 (18%) 11 (18%)  
NHS England region    
North 30 (39%) 13 (22%) 0.17 
Midlands and East 19 (25%) 21 (35%)  
South 18 (24%) 17 (28%)  
London 9 (12%) 9 (15%)  
Beds, median (IQR) 718.5 (515.5, 1044) 754.5 (569, 1035.5) 0.73 
Population in thousands, median (IQR) 443 (330.5, 585) 482 (345, 600) 0.43 
Special measures 5 (7%) 14 (23%) 0.005 
Type of inspection    
New regime 28 (52%) 34 (71%) 0.050 
No inspected 22 (29%) 12 (20%) 0.23 
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 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=76 n=60 
Overall rating    
Outstanding 2 (3%) 3 (5%) 0.70 
Good 22 (29%) 13 (22%)  
Requires improvement 46 (61%) 38 (63%)  
Inadequate 6 (8%) 6 (10%)  
Merged Trusts 6 (8%) 6 (10%) 0.67 
Monitor Sustainability rating    
Significant risk 3 (6%) 5 (16%) 0.59 
Material risk 7 (14%) 3 (9%)  
Emerging or minor concerns 30 (61%) 19 (59%)  
No evident concerns 8 (16%) 5 (16%)  
Lowest risk 1 (2%) 0 (0%)  
Monitor Governance rating    
Subject to enforcement action 8 (16%) 11 (34%) 0.17 
Under review 7 (14%) 4 (13%)  
No evident concerns 34 (69%) 17 (53%)  
TDA escalating score    
Enforcement action 1 (4%) 5 (18%) 0.24 
Significant delivery issues 13 (48%) 9 (32%)  
Some delivery issues 8 (30%) 7 (25%)  
Limited/no issues 5 (19%) 5 (18%)  
Sound FT application 0 (0%) 2 (7%)  
Number of inspections, median (IQR) 4 (3, 5) 4 (3, 5) 0.35 
Months since previous inspection, median (IQR) 11 (8, 18) 10 (7, 15) 0.34 
Reporting culture 2016    
Poor 11 (14%) 14 (23%) 0.54 
Significant Concerns 29 (38%) 22 (37%)  
Good 33 (43%) 21 (35%)  
Outstanding 3 (4%) 3 (5%)  
Summary Hospital Mortality Index, median (IQR) 0.99 (0.92, 1.03) 1.08 (0.97, 1.12) <0.001 
 
 
Table 8.5 Unadjusted model coefficients for summary hospital mortality index accounting by previous 
performance 
 Unadjusted summary hospital 





Not improving old regime 1.03 (0.99, 1.07) 
Improving old regime -0.05 (-0.11, 0.006) 
Not improving new regime -0.02 (-0.07, 0.03) 
Improving new regime -0.05 (-0.1, -0.008) 
Not improving no inspection 0.006 (-0.04, 0.06) 
Improving no inspection -0.08 (-0.15, -0.02) 
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 Unadjusted summary hospital 




Pre-inspection slope  
Not improving old regime 0.002 (0.001, 0.002) 
Improving old regime -0.004 (-0.005, -0.003) 
Not improving new regime -0.0005 (-0.001, 0.0002) 
Improving new regime -0.004 (-0.005, -0.003) 
Not improving no inspection -0.0002 (-0.001, 0.0006) 
Improving no inspection -0.004 (-0.005, -0.003) 
  
Announcement change  
Not improving old regime -0.007 (-0.02, 0.01) 
Improving old regime -0.01 (-0.04, 0.02) 
Not improving new regime 0.009 (-0.01, 0.03) 
Improving new regime 0.02 (-0.008, 0.04) 
Not improving no inspection 0.005 (-0.02, 0.03) 
Improving no inspection 0.03 (0.004, 0.06) 
  
Announcement slope  
Not improving old regime -0.003 (-0.03, 0.004) 
Improving old regime 0.01 (-0.001, 0.03) 
Not improving new regime 0.0004 (-0.01, 0.01) 
Improving new regime 0.005 (-0.006, 0.01) 
Not improving no inspection 0.001 (-0.0007, 0.004) 
Improving no inspection 0.004 (0.002, 0.007) 
  
Post-inspection change  
Not improving old regime 0.003 (-0.01, 0.02) 
Improving old regime -0.03 (-0.05, -0.005) 
Not improving new regime -0.009 (-0.03, 0.01) 
Improving new regime -0.0003 (-0.02, 0.02) 
Not improving no inspection -0.01 (-0.03, 0.001) 
Improving no inspection 0.02 (0.00003, 0.04) 
  
Post-inspection slope  
Not improving old regime 0.0007 (-0.007, 0.008) 
Improving old regime -0.005 (-0.02, 0.009) 
Not improving new regime -0.0002 (-0.01, 0.01) 
Improving new regime 0.001 (-0.009, 0.01) 
Not improving no inspection 0 (-0.001, 0.1) 






Table 8.6 Unadjusted model coefficients for crude mortality rates accounting by previous performance 






Not improving old regime 0.034 (0.031, 0.037) 
Improving old regime -0.00035 (-0.005, 0.004) 
Not improving new regime 0.00015 (-0.004, 0.004) 
Improving new regime -0.0017 (-0.005, 0.002) 
Not improving no inspection 0.0004 (-0.004, 0.004) 
Improving no inspection -0.002 (-0.007, 0.003) 
  
Pre-inspection slope  
Not improving old regime 0.00006 (0.00002, 0.00009) 
Improving old regime -0.00009 (-0.00016, -0.00003) 
Not improving new regime 0.00001 (-0.00004, 0.00006) 
Improving new regime -0.00007 (-0.0001, -0.00002) 
Not improving no inspection 0.00005 (-0.000006, 0.0001) 
Improving no inspection -0.00005 (-0.0001, 0.00001) 
  
Announcement change  
Not improving old regime 0.0002 (-0.0007, 0.001) 
Improving old regime 0.0002 (-0.0015, 0.002) 
Not improving new regime -0.0005 (-0.002, 0.0007) 
Improving new regime -0.00003 (-0.001, 0.001) 
Not improving no inspection 0.0008 (-0.0003, 0.002) 
Improving no inspection 0.001 (-0.0003, 0.002) 
  
Announcement slope  
Not improving old regime -0.0002 (-0.0005, 0.0002) 
Improving old regime 0.00057 (-0.0001, 0.001) 
Not improving new regime -0.00004 (-0.0006, 0.0005) 
Improving new regime 0.00003 (-0.0005, 0.0005) 
Not improving no inspection -0.00004 (-0.0002, 0.00007) 
Improving no inspection 0.00005 (-0.00009, 0.0002) 
  
Post-inspection change  
Not improving old regime -0.0017 (-0.002, -0.001) 
Improving old regime -0.002 (-0.003, -0.0009) 
Not improving new regime 0.0004 (-0.0006, 0.001) 
Improving new regime 0.0005 (-0.0005, 0.001) 
Not improving no inspection -0.0007 (-0.001, 0.0001) 
Improving no inspection 0.0006 (-0.0004, 0.0016) 
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Post-inspection slope  
Not improving old regime 0.0002 (-0.0002, 0.0006) 
Improving old regime -0.0004 (-0.001, 0.0003) 
Not improving new regime 0.00007 (-0.0005, 0.0006) 
Improving new regime 0.0001 (-0.0004, 0.0007) 
Not improving no inspection 0 (-0.001, 0.1) 




8.3 Waiting times 
8.3.1 A&E waiting times 
Table 8.7 Characteristics of Trusts classified as improving and not improving for rates of attendance over 4h A&E 
wait 
 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=110 n=32 
Foundation Trust 70 (63.6%) 19 (59.4%) 0.66 
Type of trust    
Large acute trust 34 (30.9%) 6 (18.8%) 0.006 
Medium acute Trust 34 (30.9%) 11 (34.4%)  
Small acute trust 21 (19.1%) 5 (15.6%)  
Acute teaching trust 20 (18.2%) 5 (15.6%)  
Acute specialist trust 1 (0.9%) 5 (15.6%)  
NHS England region    
North 37 (33.6%) 9 (28.1%) 0.36 
Midlands and East 31 (28.2%) 10 (31.3%)  
South 25 (22.7%) 11 (34.4%)  
London 17 (15.5%) 2 (6.3%)  
Beds, median (IQR) 750 (544, 1024) 640 (458, 1047) 0.13 
Population in thousands, median (IQR) 450 (350, 600) 463.5 (320, 612) 0.94 
Special measures 17 (15.5%) 2 (6.3%) 0.18 
Type of inspection    
New regime 51 (61%) 13 (57%) 0.67 
No inspected 27 (24.5%) 9 (28.1%) 0.68 
Overall rating    
Outstanding 4 (4%) 1 (4%) 0.041 
Good 19 (20%) 13 (46%)  
Requires improvement 62 (65%) 13 (46%)  
Inadequate 10 (11%) 1 (4%)  
Merged Trusts 12 (10.9%) 0 (0.0%) 0.051 
Monitor Sustainability rating    
Significant risk 6 (9%) 2 (11%) 0.048 
Material risk 7 (10%) 3 (16%)  
Emerging or minor concerns 42 (62%) 7 (37%)  
No evident concerns 13 (19%) 5 (26%)  
Lowest risk 0 (0%) 2 (11%)  
Monitor Governance rating    
Subject to enforcement action 15 (23%) 4 (21%) 0.81 
Under review 8 (13%) 1 (5%)  
No evident concerns 42 (65%) 14 (74%)  
TDA escalating score    
Enforcement action 5 (13%) 1 (8%) 0.43 
Significant delivery issues 18 (45%) 3 (23%)  
Some delivery issues 9 (23%) 6 (46%)  
Limited/no issues 7 (18%) 3 (23%)  
Sound FT application 1 (3%) 0 (0%)  
Number of inspections, median (IQR) 4 (3, 5) 4 (2, 5.5) 0.57 
Weeks since previous inspection, median (IQR) 43 (30, 63) 48 (32, 60) 0.71 
Reporting culture 2016    
Poor 21 (19.1%) 5 (15.6%) 0.94 
Significant Concerns 40 (36.4%) 11 (34.4%)  
Good 44 (40.0%) 14 (43.8%)  
Outstanding 5 (4.5%) 2 (6.3%)  
Rate of attendances over 4h wait, median (IQR) 0.028 (0.018, 0.047) 0.029 (0.015, 0.055) 0.73 
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8.3.2 RTT waiting times 
Table 8.8 Characteristics of Trusts classified as improving and not improving for rates of referrals waiting over 18 
weeks 
 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=95 n=59 
Foundation Trust 63 (66%) 35 (59%) 0.38 
Type of trust    
Large acute trust 26 (27%) 14 (24%) 0.64 
Medium acute Trust 24 (25%) 21 (36%)  
Small acute trust 17 (18%) 9 (15%)  
Acute teaching trust 15 (16%) 10 (17%)  
Acute specialist trust 13 (14%) 5 (8%)  
NHS England region    
North 35 (37%) 15 (25%) 0.27 
Midlands and East 29 (31%) 16 (27%)  
South 18 (19%) 18 (31%)  
London 13 (14%) 10 (17%)  
Beds, median (IQR) 682 (463, 977) 706 (491, 1072) 0.49 
Population in thousands, median (IQR) 450 (330, 600) 490 (350, 647.5) 0.42 
Special measures 12 (13%) 7 (12%) 0.89 
Type of inspection    
New regime 40 (56%) 26 (60%) 0.67 
No inspected 24 (25%) 16 (27%) 0.80 
Overall rating    
Outstanding 6 (6%) 4 (7%) 0.99 
Good 26 (27%) 16 (28%)  
Requires improvement 56 (59%) 33 (57%)  
Inadequate 7 (7%) 5 (9%)  
Merged Trusts 7 (7%) 5 (8%) 0.80 
Monitor Sustainability rating    
Significant risk 5 (8%) 3 (9%) 0.84 
Material risk 5 (8%) 5 (15%)  
Emerging or minor concerns 36 (56%) 16 (48%)  
No evident concerns 16 (25%) 8 (24%)  
Lowest risk 2 (3%) 1 (3%)  
Monitor Governance rating    
Subject to enforcement action 13 (21%) 6 (19%) 0.91 
Under review 7 (12%) 3 (10%)  
No evident concerns 43 (68%) 22 (71%)  
TDA escalating score    
Enforcement action 2 (7%) 4 (15%) 0.33 
Significant delivery issues 14 (50%) 7 (27%)  
Some delivery issues 6 (21%) 9 (35%)  
Limited/no issues 6 (21%) 5 (19%)  
Sound FT application 0 (0%) 1 (4%)  
Number of inspections, median (IQR) 4 (3, 5) 4 (3, 5) 0.60 
Months since previous inspection, median (IQR) 10 (6, 15) 10 (8, 15) 0.46 
Reporting culture 2016    
Poor 15 (16%) 11 (19%) 0.66 
Significant Concerns 30 (32%) 23 (39%)  
Good 43 (45%) 22 (37%)  
Outstanding 7 (7%) 3 (5%)  
Rate of referrals waiting over 18 w, median 
(IQR) 
0.42 (0.33, 0.51) 0.49 (0.35, 0.58) 0.037 
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Table 8.9 Unadjusted model coefficients for waiting times accounting by previous performance 
 Unadjusted rates of attendances 
over 4 h A&E wait (95% CI) 
Unadjusted rates of referrals 






Intercept   
Not improving old regime 0.05 (0.046, 0.06) 0.09 (0.08, 0.1) 
Improving old regime 0.41 (0.29, 0.57) 0.6 (0.47, 0.76) 
Not improving new regime 1.02 (0.83, 1.25) 0.99 (0.81, 1.2) 
Improving new regime 0.52 (0.38, 0.7) 0.77 (0.62, 0.95) 
Not improving no inspection 1.04 (0.82, 1.33) 0.95 (0.77, 1.19) 
Improving no inspection 0.45 (0.31, 0.63) 0.58 (0.45, 0.74) 
   
Pre-inspection slope   
Not improving old regime 1.005 (1.003, 1.006) 1.01 (1.008, 1.014) 
Improving old regime 0.99 (0.99, 0.99) 0.98 (0.98, 0.99) 
Not improving new regime 1 (0.99, 1.001) 0.99 (0.99, 1.002) 
Improving new regime 0.99 (0.99, 0.99) 0.98 (0.98, 0.98) 
Not improving no inspection 1 (0.99, 1.002) 0.99 (0.99, 1.002) 
Improving no inspection 0.99 (0.99, 0.99) 0.98 (0.97, 0.98) 
   
Announcement change   
Not improving old regime 0.9 (0.78, 1.04) 0.96 (0.82, 1.12) 
Improving old regime 1.15 (0.85, 1.55) 1.19 (0.92, 1.54) 
Not improving new regime 1.05 (0.87, 1.26) 1.06 (0.87, 1.31) 
Improving new regime 1.04 (0.8, 1.37) 1.28 (1.02, 1.61) 
Not improving no inspection 1.14 (0.94, 1.39) 0.99 (0.84, 1.19) 
Improving no inspection 1.1 (0.8, 1.5) 1.22 (1.01, 1.46) 
   
Announcement slope   
Not improving old regime 0.99 (0.98, 1.01) 1.01 (0.94, 1.07) 
Improving old regime 1.01 (0.98, 1.04) 0.99 (0.9, 1.1) 
Not improving new regime 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 1.002 (0.92, 1.09) 
Improving new regime 1.04 (1.01, 1.07) 1.05 (0.96, 1.15) 
Not improving no inspection 0.98 (0.97, 0.99) 1.003 (0.93, 1.08) 
Improving no inspection 1.01 (0.98, 1.03) 1.03 (0.95, 1.11) 
   
Post-inspection change   
Not improving old regime 0.85 (0.74, 0.98) 0.9 (0.81, 1.01) 
Improving old regime 1.24 (0.92, 1.67) 1.001 (0.83, 1.21) 
Not improving new regime 1.31 (1.09, 1.57) 1.12 (0.96, 1.3) 
Improving new regime 1.32 (1.01, 1.72) 1.07 (0.9, 1.26) 
Not improving no inspection 1.2 (0.97, 1.47) 0.95 (0.79, 1.13) 
Improving no inspection 1.02 (0.76, 1.38) 0.85 (0.69, 1.05) 
   
Post-inspection slope   
Not improving old regime 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 1.01 (0.95, 1.08) 
Improving old regime 0.99 (0.97, 1.03) 1.03 (0.93, 1.15) 
Not improving new regime 0.99 (0.97, 1.01) 0.99 (0.92, 1.09) 
Improving new regime 0.96 (0.94, 0.99) 0.98 (0.89, 1.07) 
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 Unadjusted rates of attendances 
over 4 h A&E wait (95% CI) 
Unadjusted rates of referrals 






Not improving no inspection 1.02 (1, 1.04) 0.99 (0.93, 1.08) 
Improving no inspection 1.01 (0.98, 1.03) 1.003 (0.93, 1.09) 
Sine 1.26 (1.24, 1.29) 1.05 (1.04, 1.05) 
Cosine 0.97 (0.96, 0.99) 0.98 (0.97, 0.99) 
Sine*2 - 0.96 (0.95, 0.97) 
 
8.4 Treatment with dignity and respect 
Table 8.10 Characteristics of Trusts classified as improving and not improving for patients’ perception of being 
treated with dignity and respect 
 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=57 n=93 
Foundation Trust 29 (51%) 66 (71%) 0.013 
Type of Trust    
Large acute Trust 19 (33%) 22 (24%) 0.053 
Medium acute Trust 13 (23%) 32 (34%)  
Small acute Trust 15 (26%) 11 (12%)  
Acute teaching Trust 7 (12%) 18 (19%)  
Acute specialist Trust 3 (5%) 10 (11%)  
NHS England region    
North 23 (40%) 25 (27%) 0.10 
Midlands and East 18 (32%) 26 (28%)  
South 12 (21%) 24 (26%)  
London 4 (7%) 18 (19%)  
Beds, median (IQR) 706 (481, 1016) 700 (511, 1020) 0.85 
Population in thousands, median (IQR) 445.5 (330, 575) 480 (350, 600) 0.42 
Special measures 12 (21%) 7 (8%) 0.016 
Type of inspection    
New regime 29 (66%) 36 (53%) 0.17 
No inspected 13 (23%) 25 (27%) 0.58 
Overall rating    
Outstanding 2 (4%) 7 (8%) 0.16 
Good 10 (18%) 29 (31%)  
Requires improvement 40 (70%) 50 (54%)  
Inadequate 5 (9%) 7 (8%)  
Merged Trusts 5 (9%) 8 (9%) 0.97 
Monitor Sustainability rating    
Significant risk 6 (21%) 2 (3%) 0.046 
Material risk 2 (7%) 8 (13%)  
Emerging or minor concerns 14 (48%) 38 (59%)  
No evident concerns 7 (24%) 13 (20%)  
Lowest risk 0 (0%) 3 (5%)  
Monitor Governance rating    
Subject to enforcement action 11 (38%) 8 (13%) 0.016 
Under review 2 (7%) 10 (16%)  
No evident concerns 16 (55%) 46 (72%)  
TDA escalating score    
Enforcement action 5 (18%) 1 (3%) 0.33 
Significant delivery issues 12 (43%) 10 (34%)  
Some delivery issues 6 (21%) 10 (34%)  
Limited/no issues 4 (14%) 7 (24%)  
Sound FT application 1 (4%) 1 (3%)  
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 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=57 n=93 
Number of inspections, median (IQR) 4 (3, 5) 4 (3, 5) 0.27 
Months since previous inspection, median (IQR) 11 (8, 16) 10 (8, 18) 0.90 
Reporting culture 2016    
Poor 9 (16%) 16 (17%) 0.76 
Significant Concerns 22 (39%) 32 (34%)  
Good 24 (42%) 38 (41%)  
Outstanding 2 (4%) 7 (8%)  
Patients’ perception of being treated with 
dignity and respect, mean (SD) 
89.20 (1.98) 87.88 (3.04) 0.005 
 
Table 8.11 Unadjusted model coefficients for patients’ perception of being treated with dignity and respect 
accounting by previous performance 
 Unadjusted patients’ perception of being 





Not improving old regime 88.38 (87.24, 89.52) 
Improving old regime 1.22 (-0.16, 2.59) 
Not improving new regime -1.41 (-2.81, -0.006) 
Improving new regime 0.03 (-1.33, 1.38) 
Not improving no inspection -1.13 (-2.79, 0.54) 
Improving no inspection 2.15 (0.71, 3.59) 
  
Pre-inspection slope  
Not improving old regime -0.01 (-0.02, -0.004) 
Improving old regime 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 
Not improving new regime -0.005 (-0.01, 0.004) 
Improving new regime 0.03 (0.03, 0.04) 
Not improving no inspection -0.001 (-0.01, 0.01) 
Improving no inspection 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 
  
Post-inspection change  
Not improving old regime 0.49 (-0.77, 1.75) 
Improving old regime -0.93 (-2.47, 0.61) 
Not improving new regime 0.13 (-1.37, 1.63) 
Improving new regime -1.16 (-2.61, 0.29) 
Not improving no inspection -1.59 (-3.53, 0.34) 
Improving no inspection -0.47 (-2.11, 1.18) 
  
Post-inspection slope  
Not improving old regime 0.08 (0.003, 0.16) 
Improving old regime -0.02 (-0.12, 0.07) 
Not improving new regime 0.07 (-0.03, 0.16) 
Improving new regime -0.04 (-0.11, 0.04) 
Not improving no inspection 0.11 (-0.004, 0.23) 
Improving no inspection -0.16 (-0.27, -0.05) 
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8.5 Staff leaving acute NHS Trusts 
Table 8.12 Characteristics of Trusts classified as improving and not improving for rates of staff leaving NHS Trusts 
 Not improving Improving p-value 
 n=99 n=52 
Foundation Trust 58 (59%) 38 (73%) 0.079 
Type of trust    
Large acute trust 26 (26%) 14 (27%) 0.20 
Medium acute trust 23 (23%) 21 (40%)  
Small acute trust 19 (19%) 6 (12%)  
Acute teaching trust 18 (18%) 7 (13%)  
Acute specialist trust 13 (13%) 4 (8%)  
NHS England region    
North 38 (38%) 12 (23%) 0.029 
Midlands and East 29 (29%) 15 (29%)  
South 16 (16%) 19 (37%)  
London 16 (16%) 6 (12%)  
Beds, median (IQR) 683 (417, 980) 719.5 (537, 1035.5) 0.38 
Population in thousands, median (IQR) 453.3 (320, 600) 455 (380, 612) 0.36 
Special measures 10 (10%) 9 (17%) 0.20 
Type of inspection    
New regime 40 (54%) 25 (66%) 0.23 
No inspected 25 (25%) 14 (27%) 0.82 
Overall rating    
Outstanding 6 (6%) 3 (6%) 0.80 
Good 24 (25%) 16 (31%)  
Requires improvement 59 (61%) 28 (54%)  
Inadequate 7 (7%) 5 (10%)  
Merged Trusts 6 (6%) 6 (12%) 0.24 
Monitor Sustainability rating    
Significant risk 4 (7%) 4 (11%) 0.34 
Material risk 5 (9%) 5 (13%)  
Emerging or minor concerns 30 (53%) 22 (58%)  
No evident concerns 17 (30%) 5 (13%)  
Lowest risk 1 (2%) 2 (5%)  
Monitor Governance rating    
Subject to enforcement action 10 (19%) 9 (24%) 0.38 
Under review 7 (13%) 3 (8%)  
No evident concerns 37 (69%) 26 (68%)  
TDA escalating score    
Enforcement action 5 (13%) 1 (8%) 0.46 
Significant delivery issues 16 (40%) 5 (38%)  
Some delivery issues 9 (23%) 6 (46%)  
Limited/no issues 9 (23%) 1 (8%)  
Sound FT application 1 (3%) 0 (0%)  
Number of inspections, median (IQR) 4 (3, 5) 4 (3, 5) 0.78 
Months since previous inspection, median (IQR) 10 (7, 18) 12 (8, 16) 0.75 
Reporting culture 2016    
Poor 15 (15%) 10 (19%) 0.344 
Significant Concerns 35 (35%) 17 (33%)  
Good 40 (41%) 24 (46%)  
Outstanding 9 (9%) 1 (2%)  
Rate of staff leaving NHS Trusts, median (IQR) 0.02 (0.01, 0.02) 0.02 (0.02, 0.02) 0.068 
 
515 
Table 8.13 Unadjusted model coefficients for rates of staff leaving NHS Trusts accounting by previous 
performance 
 Unadjusted rate of staff leaving 





Not improving old regime 0.021 (0.019, 0.022) 
Improving old regime 0.81 (0.71, 0.92) 
Not improving new regime 1.01 (0.92, 1.1) 
Improving new regime 0.89 (0.8, 0.99) 
Not improving no inspection 0.97 (0.87, 1.08) 
Improving no inspection 0.86 (0.76, 0.98) 
  
Pre-inspection slope  
Not improving old regime 1.005 (1.001, 1.009) 
Improving old regime 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 
Not improving new regime 0.99 (0.99, 1.004) 
Improving new regime 0.99 (0.99, 0.99) 
Not improving no inspection 1.002 (0.99, 1.01) 
Improving no inspection 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 
  
Announcement change  
Not improving old regime 0.93 (0.84, 1.03) 
Improving old regime 1.25 (1.03, 1.51) 
Not improving new regime 1.05 (0.92, 1.2) 
Improving new regime 0.98 (0.84, 1.14) 
Not improving no inspection 1.03 (0.88, 1.2) 
Improving no inspection 1.26 (1.05, 1.52) 
  
Announcement slope  
Not improving old regime 1.01 (0.98, 1.04) 
Improving old regime 0.96 (0.9, 1.03) 
Not improving new regime 0.99 (0.95, 1.04) 
Improving new regime 1.05 (0.99, 1.11) 
Not improving no inspection 0.97 (0.92, 1.02) 
Improving no inspection 0.96 (0.9, 1.02) 
  
Post-inspection change  
Not improving old regime 1.08 (1.004, 1.15) 
Improving old regime 1.06 (0.93, 1.21) 
Not improving new regime 0.94 (0.86, 1.03) 
Improving new regime 0.93 (0.83, 1.03) 
Not improving no inspection 1.06 (0.95, 1.18) 
Improving no inspection 1.12 (0.98, 1.27) 
  
Post-inspection slope  
Not improving old regime 0.98 (0.95, 1.02) 
Improving old regime 1.05 (0.99, 1.12) 
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 Unadjusted rate of staff leaving 




Not improving new regime 1.01 (0.96, 1.06) 
Improving new regime 0.96 (0.91, 1.01) 
Not improving no inspection 1.03 (0.98, 1.08) 
Improving no inspection 1.05 (0.99, 1.12) 
Medical rotation 2.73 (2.63, 2.83) 
Sine 1.03 (1.02, 1.04) 
Cosine 0.93 (0.93, 0.94) 
Sine*2 0.86 (0.85, 0.87) 
Cosine*2 0.92 (0.91, 0.93) 
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Figure 9.1 Information sheet for finance or quality governance directors 
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Table 9.1 Detailed costing of work carried out by the medium size acute trusts before, during and after the CQC inspection 







Average payment band 
Agenda for 
Change 2014/15 
Unit costs for 






Workshops with board members 1 1.5 15+1 15 directors+8D £1,415.09 £1,417.07 
Review of clinical standards and self-assessment by 
clinical teams to identify areas of improvement 
2 7.5 120 8A £40,032.00 £41,760.00 
Engagement and communication briefings with all 
staff. 
4 1 100 5 £5,000.00 £5,228.31 
Drawing up briefing material for staff 1 15 2 8D+8B £951.20 £1,001.48 
Attending pre-inspection briefings given by each 
division 
12 1 10 8B £3,130.20 £3,336.37 
External consultancy fees     £6,000.00 £6,000.00 
Update of all policies organisational wide 8 37.5 1 7 £5,453.00 £5,897.23 
Environment (e.g. deep cleaning, painting)     £14,500.00 £14,500.00 
Quality of care (i.e. directorates were asked to 
review serious incidents reports and check 
recommendations were implemented. Knowing the 
profile of reported incidents) 
1 37.5 1 7 £681.63 £740.87 
Quality of care (i.e. Organisational risk registers: 
consistency) 




Reply to inspection report due to factual inaccuracy 1 4 9 Executive directors £3,669.23 £3,669.23 
Collecting data in response to CQC's first data 
request to provider 
12 4 1 8B £1,252.08 £1,315.59 
Drawing up a report in response to CQC's first data 
request to provider 
3 37.5 2 8D+8B £7,134.00 £7,511.08 
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Average payment band 
Agenda for 
Change 2014/15 
Unit costs for 





Collecting and drawing up a report in response to 
CQC's second data request to provider 
1 37.5 2 8D+8B £2,378.00 £2,503.69 
Review and reply to pre-inspection data pack for 
factual inaccuracies 
1 37.5 1 8B £978.19 £1,027.81 
During 
inspection 
Organising meetings between inspection teams and 
management, staff and/or board 
1 2.5 3 
Clinical director+ matron + 
divisional manager 
£234.01 £247.80 
Introduction to the organisation (day 0) 2 7.5 3 
Chief executive+ medical 
director+ director of 
nursing 
£4,288.46 £4,288.46 
Focus groups and interviews 1 29 79 8C £3,471.17 £3,471.17 
Command room 4 13 3 8D+8B+7 £3,802.11 £5,022.10 
Extra data requests on-site 4 4 1 8B £4,242.68 £4,456.40 
ID badges for inspectors     £417.36 £438.53 
After 
inspection 
Quality summit 1 4 10 Executive directors+ chair £75.00 £75.00 
Action plan to improve deficient aspects of care 
after inspection 
2 37.5 2 8D+8B £4,756.00 £5,007.38 
Engaging meetings 3 1.5 5 
2 directors+ deputy 
director of operations + 
Trust secretary + assistant 
director of governance 
£1,198.90 £1,219.93 
Implementation of changes after verbal feedback 
given by CQC 
    
£40,200.00 £40,200.00 
CQC fee CQC’s annual subscription fee     
£198,000.00 £198,000.00 
Total       £357,556.80 £362,879.93 
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Table 9.2 Detailed costing of work carried out by the small size acute trusts before, during and after the CQC inspection 







average payment band 
Agenda for Change 
2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 
social care 2016 





Workshops with trust 
board members 
4 2 3 8 10 7 - £3,935.10 £5,149.44 £3,940.85 £5,158.07 
Workshops with non-
executive directors 
2 2 3 8 10 7 - £1,324.20 £2,793.99 £1,327.07 £2,798.30 
Workshops with senior 
management (divisional 
managers) 
3 2 3 8 15 8A 8D £1,067.52 £5,038.88 £1,134.65 £5,476.78 
Self-assessment by clinical 
teams to identify areas of 
improvement 
16 1 1.5 4 5 8A 8D £1,423.36 £4,479.00 £1,512.86 £4,868.25 
Meetings of director of 
nursing (or equivalent) 
with working groups 
50 2 - 4 10 3*band 6 + band 8C 9*band 8A + band 8C £7,760.33 £23,145.33 £8,187.44 £24,110.21 
Review of clinical 
standards: meetings of 
the lead of working group 
with the team 
50 1 2 5 10 
band 2 + 3*band 4 + 
band 8B 
band 2 + 2*band 5 + 
2*band 6+ 2*band7 + 
2*band 8A + band 8B 
£3,321.31 £17,196.73 £3,450.33 £18,051.69 
Engagement briefings 
with all staff. 
29 0.5 1 10 20 1 7 £1,889.65 £11,547.82 £1,913.87 £12,220.57 
Teaching afternoon with 
medical staff 
1 1 - 20 50 
10 junior Drs + 10 
consultants 
25 junior Drs + 25 
consultants 
£679.63 £1,504.84 £1,519.49 £3,604.49 
Drawing up booklets for 
general staff 
1 4 8 1 - 8A - £88.96 £177.92 £92.73 £185.45 
 
Attending pre-inspection 
briefings given by each 
division 
2 1 1.5 40 50 5 
10*band 6 + 15*band 7 
+ 15*band 8A + 
10*band 8B 
£1,009.90 £3,079.70 £1,051.16 £3,239.31 
 External consultancy fees 
(i.e. Capstick and KPMG) 
       £29,504.00 £29,504.00 £29,504.00 £29,504.00 
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average payment band 
Agenda for Change 
2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 
social care 2016 





Update of all policies 
organisational wide 
       £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
Environment (e.g. deep 
cleaning, painting) 
       £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
Quality of care (e.g. 
review of serious 
incidents reports) 




Reply to inspection report 
due to factual inaccuracy 
1 33 37.5 7  
COO+ band 6 + 5 
divisional managers 
(8A) 
COO+ band 6 + 5 
divisional managers 
(8D) 
£5,913.63 £9,548.47 £6,178.43 £10,195.37 
Collecting and drawing up 
a report in response to 
CQC's first data request to 
provider 
1 7.5 15 7  8 Executive team £3,294.93 £6,589.85 £3,300.32 £6,600.64 
Approval session for first 
data request 
2 to 3 1  4  COO + band 6+ secretary + director comm (8B) £225.38 £338.07 £231.52 £354.83 
 
Collecting and drawing up 
a report in response to 
CQC's second data 
request to provider 
1 10 12.5 12  
COO+ 5 divisional 
managers (8A)+ trust 
secretary+ clin qual 
(6)+ assoc dir (8A)+ 
HR+Info team (2*6) 
COO+ 5 divisional 
managers (8D)+ trust 
secretary+ clin qual (6)+ 
assoc dir (8A)+ HR+ Info 
team (2*6) 
£3,134.79 £4,861.30 £3,252.28 £5,123.49 
Approval session for 
second data request 
4 to 5 1  4  
Director operations + secretary + director 
comm (8B) + clin qual (6) 
£450.75 £563.44 £463.04 £578.80 
Review and reply to pre-
inspection data pack for 
factual inaccuracies 
1 3 3.5 7  CEO+5 exec directors+ trust secretary £1,317.97 £1,537.63 £1,320.13 £1,540.15 
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average payment band 
Agenda for Change 
2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 
social care 2016 




between inspection teams 
and management, staff 
and/or board 
2 4 7.5 1  4  £84.66 £158.74 £83.69 £156.92 
Introduction to the 
organisation (day 0) 
1 2 2.5 6  CEO + executives £841.96 £1,052.45 £841.96 £1,052.45 
Preparation of 
presentation for day 0 
1 4 7.5 1  CEO £517.95 £971.15 £517.95 £971.15 
Focus groups and 
interviews 
9 1 1.5 5 12 5 7 £2,358.74 £3,144.99 £2,358.74 £3,144.99 
Command room 3 7 7.5 2  8A 8C £1,860.47 £4,891.58 £1,946.45 £5,204.05 
Extra data requests on-
site 
3 7 7.5 1  6  £1,124.20 £1,204.50 £1,168.64 £1,252.12 
Daily briefings with chief 
of inspection 
2 0.3 0.5 15 20 
Executive team + 
9*band 6 
Board members + 
5*band6 
£324.17 £347.33 £345.84 £370.55 
ID badges for inspectors        £335.95 £527.32 £340.64 £530.49 
Hiring of venues for 
listening events, meetings 
with staff and/or quality 
summit 
 36    120 per 4 hours  £108.05 £108.05 £108.05 £108.05 
After 
inspection Quality summit 1 3 4 14  
CEO+ all board members+ Dorset council+ 
CCG+ hospice 
£1,080.00 £1,080.00 £1,080.00 £1,080.00 
 
Action plan to improve 
deficient aspects of care 
after inspection (initial 
set-up) 
4 1.5 2 30 40 
COO+ director of 
nursing+ 10*band 6 + 
10*band 7 + 8*band 
8A 
COO+ director of 
nursing+ 5*band 6 + 
10*band 7 + 10*band 
8A + 8*band 8B + 
5*band 8C 
£3,633.72 £7,521.04 £3,832.71 £7,891.63 
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average payment band 
Agenda for Change 
2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 
social care 2016 
low high low high low high lowest highest lowest highest 
After 
inspection 
Action plan to improve 
deficient aspects of care 
after inspection (long 
term follow-up) 
3 1.5 2 6 10 
Director of nursing+ 
2*band 6+ band 7+ 
band 8A 
Director of nursing+ 
2*band 6+ band 7+ 
band 8A+ 2*band 8B+ 
band 8C 
£726.06 £1,659.72 £750.79 £1,722.63 
 
Responding to data 
requests after the 
inspection 
22 30 37.5 1  6  £10,188.20 £12,735.25 £10,869.35 £13,586.69 
 
Implementation of quality 
improvement initiatives in 
response to action plan 
agreed during quality 
summit. 
6 1 1.5 5 10 
COO or CEO + band 
4+ 3*band 7 
COO or CEO + band 4 + 
3*band 7+ 2*band 8A+ 
3*band 8B 
£1,957.31 £6,144.45 £2,033.28 £7,487.85 
 
Implementation of 
changes after verbal 
feedback given by CQC 
       £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
CQC fee 
CQC’s annual subscription 
fee 
       £78,208.00 £78,208.00 £78,208.00 £78,208.00 




Table 9.3 Detailed costing of work carried out by the large teaching acute trusts before, during and after the CQC inspection 







Average payment band 
Agenda for Change 
2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 
social care 2016 





Workshops with trust board 
members 
4 1 1.25 15 18 
Executives+4*NED
+ 5*8D (clinical 




£3,786.84 £5,532.89 £3,851.72 £5,380.59 
Review of clinical standards and 
self-assessment by clinical 
teams to identify areas of 
improvement 
64 1 1.25 10 13 
7*band 5 + 3*band 
8D 
9*band 5 + 4*band 
8D 
£12,821.84 £21,033.10 £13,146.58 £21,592.08 
Meetings of director of nursing 
(or equivalent) with working 
groups 
10 1 1.25 9 12 
2*band 8C + 
7*band 8D 
3*band 8C + 9*band 
8D 
£3,238.62 £5,372.56 £3,507.37 £5,815.65 
Meetings of each working group 
to coordinate implementation 
of remedial changes pre-
inspection 
15 1 1.25 3 5 
1*band 2 + 2*band 
7 
2*band 2 +3*band 7 £675.35 £1,344.41 £715.78 £1,422.41 
Engagement and 
communication briefings with 
all staff. 
6 4 4 20 30 
2*band 1 to 7 
+1*band 8A to 8C 
+3*band 9 
3*band 1 to 7 + 
2*band 8A -8B + 1* 
band 8C + 4*band 9 
£9,104.38 £13,325.01 £9,529.37 £13,943.35 
Reviewing and approving 
documentation to be sent 
before the inspection. 
64 2 3 6 8 
3*band 7 + 3*band 
8D 
4*band 7 + 4*band 
8D 
£21,377.07 £42,754.13 £23,216.25 £46,432.49 
Attending pre-inspection 
briefings given by each division 
10 1 1.25 20 30 
2*band 1 - 2 
+3*band 3 to 6 
+2*band 7 -8A 
3*band 1 - 2 + 4* 
band 3 - 4 + 5*band 
5 +4*band 6 -7 + 
3*band 8A 
£2,570.80 £4,908.06 £2,679.73 £5,121.57 
 
External consultancy fees (i.e. 
project management support) 
1 247  1  £101.54  £25,080.00 £25,080.00 £25,080.00 £25,080.00 
Environment (e.g. deep 
cleaning, painting) 
       £125,000.00 £125,000.00 £125,000.00 £125,000.00 
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Average payment band 
Agenda for Change 
2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 
social care 2016 




Reply to inspection report due 
to factual inaccuracy 
10 1 1.25 5 8 
2*band 7 + 3*band 
8D 
3*band 7 + 5*band 
8D 
£1,486.64 £3,020.73 £1,614.87 £3,281.43 
Collecting and drawing up a 
report in response to CQC's first 
data request to provider 
8 1 1.25 15 17 
10*band 8A + 
5*band 8D 
12*band 8A + 
5*band 8D 
£3,272.20 £4,535.05 £3,513.83 £4,865.05 
Collecting and drawing up a 
report in response to CQC's 
second data request to provider 
3 1 1.25 15 17 
10*band 7 + 
5*band 8D 
12*band 7 + 5*band 
8D 
£1,110.21 £1,525.34 £1,205.24 £1,655.73 
Review and reply to pre-
inspection data pack for factual 
inaccuracies 
8 1 1.25 11 11 
6*band 7 + 5*band 
8D 
6*band 7 + 5*band 
8D 
£2,373.53 £2,966.92 £2,577.48 £3,221.85 
During 
inspection 
Organising meetings between 
inspection teams and 
management, staff and/or 
board 
36 1 1 2 2 band 8A + 8D band 8A + 8D £2,144.34 £2,144.34 £2,216.55 £2,216.55 
Drawing up welcome packs for 
inspectors 
2 6 10 2 2 band 4 + 8D band 4 + 8D £574.89 £958.16 £586.20 £977.01 
Focus groups and interviews 19 1 1.25 209 388 band 3 band 8B £3,832.84 £8,178.45 £7,257.90 £17,170.07 
ID badges for inspectors        £100.00 £100.00 £100.00 £100.00 
 
Hiring of venues for listening 
events, meetings with staff 
and/or quality summit 
       £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
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Average payment band 
Agenda for Change 
2015/16 
Unit costs for health and 
social care 2016 
low high low high low high lowest highest lowest highest 
After 
inspection 
Action plan to improve deficient 
aspects of care after inspection 
8 1 1.25 4 5 
3* band 8A + 
1*band 9 
1* band 8A + 
4*band 9 
£1,116.40 £1,615.36 £960.65 £2,203.03 
Implementation of quality 
improvement initiatives in 
response to action plan agreed 
during quality summit. 
4 1 1.25 2 2 8A+8D 8A+8D £238.26 £297.83 £256.83 £321.04 
Implementation of changes 
after verbal feedback given by 
CQC 
       £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
Organising quality summit 1 7 14 2 2 band 4 + 8D band 4 + 8D £335.36 £670.71 £341.95 £683.90 
Quality summit 1 3 4 11 11 Executives +5*NED Executives +5*NED £2,376.41 £3,168.55 £2,376.41 £3,168.55 
CQC fee CQC’s annual subscription fee        £128,484.00 £128,484.00 £128,484.00 £128,484.00 




Appendix Chapter 10  
 
Table 10.1 Summary of evidence of interventions effective to improve the seven measures selected and factors associated with success of interventions 
 Interventions with evidence of improving 
measure 
Quality of evidence Time to effect Factors associated with success 
Falls with 
harm 
Multifactorial assessment and intervention 
(NICE, 2013) 
Clinical trials in sub-acute 
settings (Haines et al., 
2004, Healey et al., 2004, 
Stenvall et al., 2007) 
After 45 days in hospital 
(Haines et al., 2004) 
Staffing levels (Griffiths et al., 2014, 
Griffiths et al., 2016, Aiken et al., 2016) 
Reduction of safety incidents (Aiken et al., 
2002, Griffiths et al., 2014, Robb et al., 
2010, Shekelle et al., 2013) 
Pressure 
ulcers 
Multicomponent intervention: risk factors 
and skin assessment, evaluation of 
nutritional and hydration needs, high-
specification mattresses, and repositioning 
(NICE, 2014) 
Large number of low 
quality studies with 
inconsistent results 
(Gillespie et al., 2014, 
McInnes et al., 2015, NICE, 
2014) 
Not clear. RCTs assessed 
individual components. 
Quality improvement 
studies suggest between 
three months (Courtney et 
al., 2006) and one-year 
after implementation 
(McInerney, 2008, 
Morehead and Blain, 2014, 
Cano et al., 2015, Sullivan 
and Schoelles, 2013). 
Staffing levels (Griffiths et al., 2014, 
Griffiths et al., 2016, Aiken et al., 2016, 
Cano et al., 2015) 
Reduction of safety incidents (Aiken et al., 
2002, Griffiths et al., 2014, Robb et al., 
2010, Shekelle et al., 2013) 
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 Interventions with evidence of improving 
measure 





-nurse-led early discharge planning 
programmes,  
-rapid response teams to reduce 
cardiopulmonary arrest, 
-use of antibiotic guidelines for 
pneumonia,  
-implementation of sepsis bundles,  
-interdisciplinary teamwork interventions,  
-increasing the proportion of support staff 
(Zegers et al., 2016) 
 
Multifactorial hospital-wide approaches: 
-Identification of high-mortality diagnoses. 
-Selection of interventions based on 
deficient aspects of care. 
-Involvement of frontline staff and 
consultants. 
-Training staff to improve care. 
-Establishing accessible monitoring 
systems. (Wright et al., 2006, Robb et al., 
2010) 
Consistent positive effect 
in meta-analyses of RCTs 
























One year (Robb et al., 
2010) to three years post-
intervention (Wright et al., 
2016) 
Staffing levels (Griffiths et al., 2014, 
Griffiths et al., 2016, Aiken et al., 2016) 
Reduction of safety incidents (Aiken et al., 
2002, Griffiths et al., 2014, Robb et al., 
2010, Shekelle et al., 2013) 
Early warning systems (Zegers et al., 2016, 
Robb et al., 2010. Shekelle et al., 2013) 
Communication between and within teams 
(Zegers et al., 2016) 
Distributed and designated leadership 
(NHS England, 2015) 
Prevention of hospital-acquired infections 
(Zegers et al., 2016, Wright et al., 2006, 
Robb et al., 2010, Shekelle et al., 2013) 
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 Interventions with evidence of improving 
measure 




Fast-track approaches (e.g. see and treat) 
(CRD, 2015) 
 
Team triage approaches 
 
 
Strategies used to meet the 4-hour target: 
-Increasing hours of staff (i.e. senior 
doctors, non-clinical staff, junior doctors 
and nurses),  
-Having a person in charge of monitoring 
the 4-hour target,  
-Improving access to emergency beds, and  
-Triage by senior staff (Munro et al., 2006) 
Moderately strong 
evidence (Oredsson et al., 
2011) 
Limited evidence 
(Oredsson et al., 2011) 
 
Cross-sectional survey 
(Munro et al., 2006) 
One month of 
implementation of ‘see 
and treat’ (Rogers et al., 
2004) or a combination of 
strategies (Munro et al., 
2006) 
Staff skills mix (NHS England, 2015) 
Prevention of hospital use (NHS England, 
2015, Oredsson et al., 2011, CRD, 2015) 
Management of flow and demand, 
coordination with social and primary care 




-Improving the use of existing capacity 
(e.g. performing more day surgeries, 
addressing bottlenecks in care pathways, 
pooling waiting lists) 
 
-Strategies for restructuring intake/referral 
processes (e.g. direct booking systems and 
generic waiting lists) 
Low quality evidence 




Low quality evidence 
(Ballini et al., 2015) due to 
high heterogeneity of 
interventions used, 
outcomes measured, and 
study designs 
Observed effects from six 
to 10 months (Lukman et 
al., 2004, McKessock et al., 
2001) 
Consideration of the functioning of the 
whole care system, engaging doctors, 
analysing available data, investment in 
long-term increases in capacity, and 
involving the entire organisation in 
reducing waiting times (Appleby et al., 
2005) 
Management of flow and demand 
(Appleby et al., 2005, NHS Improvement, 
2017) 
Coordination with social and primary care 
(NHS Improvement, 2017) 
530 
 Interventions with evidence of improving 
measure 
Quality of evidence Time to effect Factors associated with success 
Rate of 
leavers 
-Strategies to achieve better teamwork 
(DiMeglio et al., 2005),  
-Improvement of leadership practices 
(Gagnon et al., 2006, Cowden et al., 2011),  
-Mentorship or preceptorship programmes 
(Chen and Lou, 2014),  
-Multicomponent orientation programmes 
(Salt et al., 2008).  
Large number of low 
quality studies, focused on 
nurses, with inconsistent 
results (Lartey et al., 2014, 
Drennan et al., 2015, 
Halter et al., 2017) 
Effect between three 
(DiMeglio et al., 2005, 
Chen and Lou, 2014) and 
six months (Salt et al., 
2008) 
Staff skills mix (Aiken et al., 2008) 
Communication between and within teams 
(Shader et al., 2001, Estryn-Behar et al., 
2010, DiMeglio et al., 2005) 
Supervision and support (Hellman, 1997, 
Coomber and Barriball, 2007, Cowden et 
al., 2011, Gagnon et al., 2006, Chen and 
Lou, 2014) 
Working environment (Shader et al., 2006) 
Workload (Coomber and Barriball, 2007, 
Yin and Yang, 2002, Aiken et al., 2002) 
Distributed and designated leadership 




-Building new facilities,  
-Training of physicians on communication 
skills,  
-Standardisation of pain management 
protocols 
-Dog therapy (Davidson et al., 2017) 




and outcomes measured. 
  
Systemic changes of the working 
environment (NHS Confederation, 2011, 
The Point of Care Foundation, NICE, 2012). 
 - Learning what the patients’ needs are,  
 -Adapting care to each patient,  
 -Recognising other care needs (e.g. 
emotional support),  
 -Ensuring continuity of care,  
 -Engaging patients in decision-making 
Qualitative synthesis 
No information about time 
to effect. Given the scale of 
the suggested changes, 
improvements would be 
evident after three months 
Staff skill mix (Aiken et al., 2016) 
Working environment (NHS Confederation, 






NHS: National Health Service 
CQC: Care Quality Commission 
CHI: Commission for Healthcare Improvement 
CHAI: Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection 
A&E: Accident and Emergency department 
IOM: Institute of Medicine 
WHO: World Health Organisation 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
JCAHO: Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations 
SHMI: Summary Hospital Mortality Index 
HSMR: Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio 
CQUIN: Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
PROMs: Patient Reported Outcome Measures 
PRISMA: Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses 
COHSASA: Council for Health Service Accreditation of Southern Africa 
GRADE system: Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation 
JCI: Joint Commission International 
AMI: Acute Myocardial Infarction 
HF: Heart Failure 
MRSA: Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus 
ITS: Interrupted Time-Series 
RCT: Randomised Controlled Trial 
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CBA: Controlled Before and After 
NRLS: National Reporting and Learning System 
A&E: Accident and Emergency 
RTT: Referral to treatment 
IMD: Index of Multiple Deprivation 
ST: Safety Thermometer 
COO: Chief Operating Officer 
CEO: Chief Executive Officer 
HSCIC: Health and Social Care Information Centre 
PLACE: Patient-Led Assessments of the Care Environment 
SUS: Secondary Uses Service 
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